Satisficing Agents in Peer-to-Peer ElectricityMarkets: A Compute–Welfare Frontier for Resource-Rational AI

Satisficing Agents in Peer-to-Peer ElectricityMarkets: A Compute–Welfare Frontier for Resource-Rational AI | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Satisficing Agents in Peer-to-Peer ElectricityMarkets: A Compute–Welfare Frontier for Resource-Rational AI Om Tailor This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7622936/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets clear every five minutes, leaving little time for complex optimization at the grid edge. We ask a focused question: can lightweight, satisficing agents deliver near-optimizer welfare in continuous double auctions (CDAs) with a fraction of the compute? We build a reproducible agent-based simulator of a residential P2P CDA, instrument per-agent compute, and benchmark an optimizer against two satisficers: an aspiration band (±τ%, whereτ is a price band) and a limited-search rule that inspects at most K offers (agreedy variant accumulates over the first K feasible resting orders; “K-greedy”). On thick markets (N ∈ {200,500}), K-greedy with K ∈ {3,5} attains 100–103% of optimizer normalized welfare while using 40–55×less per-agent compute; results are consistent under a periodic call auction, with a feeder-capacity constraint, and with ticker-only information. Compute scales with offers inspected, and satisficer parameters trace a clear compute–welfare frontier. We measure normalized welfare against a per-interval planner bound and profile compute via per-agent wall-clock time, offers inspected, and peak memory, with instrumentation overhead below 3%. To our knowledge, this is the first quantification of the compute–welfare trade-off for P2P CDAs with explicit per-agent instrumentation and a planner bound for welfare. bounded rationality satisficing compute–welfare tradeoff AI sustainability peer-to-peer electricity continuous double auction Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7622936","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":517766460,"identity":"778a1d5f-e993-45a3-b7f4-aacbadab785a","order_by":0,"name":"Om Tailor","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Maryland, College Park","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Om","middleName":"","lastName":"Tailor","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-09-15 16:53:24","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":false,"vertebrateSubjects":false,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":false,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false,"humanSubjectConsent":false,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7622936/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7622936/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":91809653,"identity":"2fff09a7-9f9b-4999-82fb-901ffd2d3cc5","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-22 04:07:55","extension":"json","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":3453,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"c3ab2e029639459b9a20858d339546cd.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7622936/v1/0350f1438a4914a0f926eac4.json"},{"id":91995417,"identity":"8cc3ff1d-ddb3-420a-990d-0d006394e977","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-23 13:32:08","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":814639,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"submissionmanuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7622936/v1_covered_12e4c53d-cec2-4d49-bfb3-c82e55f062c6.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eSatisficing Agents in Peer-to-Peer ElectricityMarkets: A Compute–Welfare Frontier for Resource-Rational AI\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"bounded rationality, satisficing, compute–welfare tradeoff, AI sustainability, peer-to-peer electricity, continuous double auction","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7622936/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7622936/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"Peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets clear every five minutes, leaving little time for complex optimization at the grid edge. 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