Cooperation and Coordination in Egalitarian Political Economies

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Abstract Incentive structures that support desired outcomes are crucial for building an egalitarian system. However, existing theories explicitly accounting for the social interactions that shape these structures are scarce. Thus, this study examines three types of political economies in which individual decisions depend on the actions of others and their consequences. Using simulations and mean-field solutions, it analyzes labor supply, occupational choice, and production decisions within these systems to explore the role of price signals, redistributive schemes and social interactions in achieving desirable equilibrium outcomes. JEL Classification: B51; C63; C72; D91; P21.
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Cooperation and Coordination in Egalitarian Political Economies | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Cooperation and Coordination in Egalitarian Political Economies Doğuhan Sündal This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8281788/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 26 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Incentive structures that support desired outcomes are crucial for building an egalitarian system. However, existing theories explicitly accounting for the social interactions that shape these structures are scarce. Thus, this study examines three types of political economies in which individual decisions depend on the actions of others and their consequences. Using simulations and mean-field solutions, it analyzes labor supply, occupational choice, and production decisions within these systems to explore the role of price signals, redistributive schemes and social interactions in achieving desirable equilibrium outcomes. JEL Classification: B51; C63; C72; D91; P21. market-socialism worker-owned enterprise statistical equilibrium Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 26 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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