“Thirty grand for a MAC-10”: Revealing the factors that influence illicit firearms price

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Despite restrictive legislation across many jurisdictions that aim to limit access to firearms, criminal actors continue to access firearms through a range of channels, particularly via criminal networks and informal social connections. However, little is currently known about the factors that influence the prices of firearms in these illicit contexts. Building on the existing literature and drawing on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states—South Australia and New South Wales - this paper examines the factors that influence the prices of illicit firearms. In doing so, this paper contributes new empirical insights into how illicit firearms prices are structured and negotiated, as well as the social and market forces that influence illicit firearm pricing. Overall, our findings suggest that illicit firearm prices are affected by a combination of restrictive policy environments, supply and demand dynamics, perceived risks of buying and selling illicit firearms, the unique characteristics of specific firearms, and social dynamics including closed social networks and interpersonal trust. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings on policy and practice. illicit firearms illicit firearm markets trafficking price interviews Introduction Illicit firearm markets operate as embedded social and economic systems in which transactions are shaped by risk, scarcity, and legal constraints (Cook et al., 2007 ; Squires, 2021 ). These markets constitute a significant component of global illicit economies and assume a central role in facilitating violent and organised criminal activities (see Bright & Halsey, 2025 ). The trafficking of illicit firearms carries significant social and economic costs and places considerable strain on criminal justice systems. Despite restrictive legislation across many jurisdictions that aim to limit access to firearms, criminal actors continue to access firearms through a range of channels, particularly through trusted criminal networks and informal social connections (see Bright et al., 202023; Roberto et al., 2018 ). Legal restrictions on firearms access often move demand further underground, where limited supply and persistent demand can drive large price differentials between illicit and legal firearms. Similar price differentials for legal and illegal products are also observed in other illicit markets, such as illicit drug markets (Becker, 1968 ; Cook et al., 1995 ; Cook et al., 2015 ; Kalesan et al., 2016 ; Reuter & Kleiman, 1986 ; UNODC, 2020 ). Notwithstanding this broad observation about the relationship between tighter restrictions on firearms and prices in illicit markets, little is currently known about the factors that influence the prices of firearms in these illicit contexts. Other factors that might affect illicit firearms prices include the characteristics of individual firearms, such as the condition and functionality of weapons (Hales et al., 2006 ), the nature of social relationships within illicit trading networks (Granovetter, 1985 ), and bartering or exchange involving other illicit commodities such as drugs, which underscore the interconnected nature of illicit markets (Cook et al., 2015 ). The current paper seeks to address this gap in knowledge by analysing interviews with illicit firearm market participants to extract the key factors that are related to the prices of firearms in illicit contexts. We first provide an overview of the illicit firearms market in Australia to set the scene and then turn to potential drivers of illicit firearm prices, with a specific focus on economic, social and policy factors that might influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets. We then outline our methodological approach before presenting and discussing findings from a thematic analysis of interviews conducted with 75 incarcerated offenders in Australia. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings on policy and practice. Obtaining firearms in illicit markets The acquisition of illicit firearms, particularly among gang members and those affiliated with organised criminal groups, is frequently facilitated through social networks and personal connections (e.g., Cook et al., 2007 ; Bright et al., 2022). For instance, interviews with gang members in Chicago found that many individuals joined or remained in gangs primarily to gain access to firearms (Cook et al., 2007 ). In some cases, firearms are distributed by senior members to subordinates, often with explicit instructions to undertake specific criminal activities, such as transporting illicit drugs (e.g., Cook et al., 2007 ; Bright et al., 2022). Unlike other illicit commodities such as drugs, firearms are durable goods, and when properly maintained, they can circulate within illicit markets for decades, often being bought and sold multiple times over their lifespan (Savona & Mancuso, 2017 ; Goldsmith et al., 2022 ). One driver for this observation is that illicit firearms are often used only once or a few times by an offender before being sold or transferred to another user (see Bright et al., 2022). Illicit firearms market in Australia Australia’s illicit firearms market is rapidly evolving and despite the country’s robust regulatory framework, illicit firearms remain a persistent and serious problem. Illicit firearms contribute to firearm-related violence and broader social harms, while posing ongoing challenges for law enforcement agencies and policymakers seeking to keep pace with illicit market changes and to generate effective policy and policing responses (ACIC, 2020; Bright, 2024 ; Bright et al., 2023 ; Broadhurst et al., 2021 ). The demand and supply of illicit firearms in Australia are driven primarily by members and associates of organised crime groups, who deploy firearms to protect their interests and commit violent acts (ACIC, 2016; Bright et al., 2022). Although the illicit market is not monopolised by any single group, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), organised criminals such as drug traffickers and terrorist groups have consistently been identified as key actors in the trafficking and distribution of illicit firearms (ACIC, 2016; AFP, 2025; Bricknell, 2012 ; Morgan et al., 2020 ). Illicit firearms are acquired through diversion from legal markets, theft from licensed firearms owners, purchases from corrupt licensed dealers, and transactions conducted via darknet markets. Increasingly, privately manufactured firearms – particularly 3D-printed weapons – are also emerging as a prominent source of illicit supply (ACIC, 2020; Bricknell, 2012 ; Bright et al., 2022; Broadhurst et al., 2021 ). A wide range of firearms are available within Australia’s illicit market, including rifles, shotguns, handguns, and, to a lesser extent, heavy machine firearms (Bricknell, 2012 ). Estimating the size of this market, however, remains difficult due to its covert nature. In 2016, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) conservatively estimated that approximately 260,000 firearms—around 250,000 long arms and 10,000 handguns—were circulating in the domestic illicit market (ACIC, 2016). However, deploying calculations recommended by the United Nations (see GITOC, 2025), which suggests that the global illicit firearms market account for roughly 10 to 20% of the number of firearms in licit market, suggest that the Australia’s illicit firearm market could range somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000. One area that has received very little attention in the academic literature is the dynamics of prices in illicit firearms markets. Following the 1996 Port Arthur massacre, Australia implemented a national gun buyback program aimed at substantially reducing civilian firearm ownership. While the program was effective in many respects, a significant number of firearms remained in private hands, some of which subsequently entered the illicit market (see Bricknell, 2010 ; 2020 ; ACIC 2016; 2020). Ongoing seizures of illegal weapons linked to serious organised crime underscore that the supply and accessibility of illicit firearms remain key priorities for law enforcement across Australian jurisdictions. Despite this, little is known about the supply-side dynamics of Australia’s illicit firearm market, including the types of transactions through which weapons are bought, sold, or exchanged (but see Bright et al., 2023 ), including the drivers of price for firearms in illicit markets. In order to develop effective policy levers designed to prevent and restrict the illicit firearm market, policy makers need information about the factors that influence the prices paid for illicit firearms. Enhanced knowledge of these dynamics may help to design policies that further increase illicit firearm prices, in order to further inhibit access to illicit firearms. Given the paucity of available research on illicit firearms price, we now provide a critical analysis of potential drivers of prices of firearms in illicit markets. Potential drivers of illicit firearms price Social dynamics The acquisition of firearms is embedded in social relations governed by trust and reputation. This focus on the social organisation of illicit firearm circulation can be examined through Granovetter’s ( 1985 ) argument that economic behaviour is embedded in social networks. Drawing on Granovetter’s ( 1985 ) theory of embeddedness, studies emphasise that criminal markets function through interpersonal ties rather than impersonal exchanges. Trust between participants reduces perceived risks and can result in flexible pricing, informal credit arrangements, or reciprocal exchanges. These dynamics are well documented in research on illicit markets, where actors use established social ties and shared histories to manage uncertainty and reduce transaction risks (Dwyer & Moore, 2010 ; Van de Bunt et al., 2014 ). Conversely, transactions between unfamiliar parties carry higher risks of betrayal, robbery, or law-enforcement infiltration, which can increase prices, limit willingness to transact, and reinforce a preference for closed, network-based exchanges within organised crime settings, including illicit firearms market. These patterns align with broader research on the social embeddedness of criminal markets, which shows that interpersonal ties, reciprocity, and network-based trust play a central role in shaping how firearms circulate and how prices are negotiated (Dwyer & Moore, 2010 ; Van de Bunt et al., 2014 ). Actors within illicit markets with weaker ties to organised crime groups or established criminal suppliers often face higher prices due to greater uncertainty, higher vulnerability to exploitation, and reliance on unfamiliar intermediaries (Van de Bunt et al., 2014 ). Characteristics of firearms The physical attributes of firearms also influence pricing. The durability of firearms as a commodity means that they can circulate in an illicit market for extended periods, accumulating histories and reputational meanings within criminal cultures (Arsovska, 2015 ). Certain models or calibres may hold symbolic significance, serve particular operational functions, or confer status within organised groups, affecting their desirability and thus their price. Furthermore, Cook et al. ( 2007 ) note that ammunition availability can shape pricing behaviours in illicit firearm markets. Scarce ammunition types or calibres may significantly increase total acquisition costs, and offenders often place a premium on weapons that use readily obtainable ammunition. The inherent durability of firearms also means that they can be reused and resold repeatedly and hence their prices can be shaped by secondary and tertiary market activity rather than initial purchasing costs. In other words, the number of times a firearm has been sold or used in criminal activity determines its value, with firearms linked to prior crimes typically selling at lower prices due to increased risk, while newer and better quality and more reliable firearms tend to cost more (Cook et al., 1995 ). Related research in the United States shows that guns recovered from gang members tend to be relatively old—an average of 10 years—suggesting that many weapons pass through multiple owners and transactions before reaching their final users (Cook et al., 2015 ). Trafficking costs, risks and firearm prices Illicit firearm markets operate through complex, multi-channel supply networks in which costs accumulate across different stages and involve smuggling, theft, diversion from legal sources, brokerage, with each stage introducing additional risks, transaction costs, and vulnerabilities that directly influence final firearm prices. As firearms move through these supply chains, price formation reflects not only the characteristics of firearms but also the cumulative costs of concealment, transport, and risk management from law enforcement detection (Markowski et al., 2009 ). At a broader level, illicit firearm prices vary across regions depending on enforcement intensity, supply constraints, conflict dynamics, trafficking routes, geographical isolation and the operational capacity of criminal groups involved – all of which may influence pricing in one way or another (Marsh & McDougal, 2016 ; UNODC, 2020 ). Supply and scarcity Organised criminal groups play a key role in shaping illicit firearm markets through controlling supply channels, mediating transactions and managing risks associated with firearms transactions and distributions (von Lampe, 2016 ). These groups can dominate distribution networks, regulating access to firearms and influencing pricing within the territories they control (Varese, 2010). In some contexts, the monopoly of organised criminal groups over the illicit market can stabilise prices by reducing competition, while in others it enables opportunistic price increase, particularly where scarcity and limited alternatives increase demand. For example, in Italy, mafia organisations regulate access to firearms and determine prices through their control of supply channels and distribution networks (Strazzari & Zampagni, 2018 ). Furthermore, the organised crime group’s control over the illicit market is not merely economic, as firearms are strategic assets essential to criminal operations, meaning that prices sometimes reflect a firearm’s operational or symbolic value to the group rather than purely transactional considerations. Drawing on the above observations, we conclude that a number of key factors might be found to influence firearm price: (1) The influence of firearm scarcity, risk of detection, and search costs in shaping illicit firearm acquisition prices; (2) Social networks, trust, and relationally embedded dynamics also influence illicit firearms price; (3) The characteristics of firearms such as age, quality, and criminal histories can impact on their selling price; (4) The structure of supply chains and geographical context impact availability, supply and price; (5) The role of organised criminal groups in regulating access and supply and consequently shaping prices; and (6) The relevance of the strategic, symbolic, and functional value of firearms that may impact price beyond purely economic considerations (e.g., see Goldsmith et al., 2022 ). The overarching aim of the paper is to reveal the factors that influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets. To achieve this aim, the following research questions guided our analysis of interview transcripts: (1) What are the range of factors that influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets, and how do these factors influence price?; and (2) How do these factors influence the range of transaction types in illicit firearms markets (e.g., sale, lending, bartering)? Building on the existing literature and drawing on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states—South Australia and New South Wales - this paper examines the factors that influence the prices of illicit firearms. In doing so, this paper contributes new empirical insights into how illicit firearms prices are structured and negotiated, as well as the social and market forces that influence illicit firearm pricing. More broadly, this paper seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of illicit firearms prices as indicators of market structure, enforcement pressures and the social embeddedness of illicit firearm markets. Although the observations relate to the Australian illicit firearms market, similar factors are likely to drive price in other markets, even those with different features such as illicit firearms markets in the United States and Europe. Method This study draws on the qualitative research tradition of examining offending contexts, particularly approaches that employ in-depth interviews with so-called ‘hard-to-reach’ or marginalised populations (e.g., Contreras, 2013 ; Decker & Chapman, 2008 ; Desroches, 2005 ). In-depth interviewing is a valuable method when the primary objective is to understand the motivations, meanings, and contextual influences underlying specific behaviours or events (Hales et al., 2006 ). A total of 75 interviews were conducted with prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states: South Australia and New South Wales. Both jurisdictions have well-documented issues relating to firearm-related and organised crime (Bricknell, 2012 ). Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at [removed for review], the Ethics Committee of the South Australian Department for Correctional Services (CEN/15/0323), and the Ethics Committee of Corrective Services New South Wales (D16/320488). Participant recruitment was guided by purposive sampling. Three key groups were targeted for inclusion: drug traffickers, members of gangs and organised criminal groups, and armed robbers. These categories were selected to capture variation in the acquisition and use of firearms across organised criminal activities and among individuals associated with criminal networks. Eligibility criteria required that participants be aged 18 years or older, incarcerated in South Australia or New South Wales, and had an earliest possible release date after 1 January 2019 to ensure accessibility during the fieldwork period. Participants were also required to have served or be serving time for major firearm-related offences and to be willing to discuss the role of guns in their own life course and/or within the criminal networks or gangs to which they currently or previously belonged. Once an inmate agreed to participate, an interview was scheduled, and the researchers met the participant at the relevant correctional facility. At the time of the meeting, participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form. Those who provided informed consent were then interviewed by the researchers. Of the 75 participants, 74 were male and one was female, with ages ranging from 23 to 78 years and a mean age of 41 years. Twenty-eight participants (37%) had left school before completing Year 10. Forty-three (57%) identified as Caucasian, six (8%) as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Australians, and sixteen (21%) as from a Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Background. Ten participants (13%) did not disclose their cultural background. Individual prison sentences ranged from one and a half years to life imprisonment, with an average sentence length of eleven years. Time served prior to interview ranged from six months to twenty-two years, with a median of 4.8 years. While some participants were serving their first custodial sentence, others had spent much of their adult lives—and, in several cases, part of their adolescence—in custody. Interviews were conducted between October 2015 and December 2018 and ranged in duration from 30 minutes to three hours. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1992). Full transcripts were read and coded in detail by the research team using NVivo. Following an initial review of all transcripts, the authors identified and recorded preliminary patterns in the data, which informed the development of a first round of broad (primary) themes and associated subthemes (secondary themes) that related to prices of illicit firearms. In the second stage of the analysis, transcripts were systematically revisited and relevant segments of text were coded in NVivo according to the preliminary coding framework. Once the coding process was completed and the relevant excerpts had been organised within NVivo and Microsoft Word, the authors began drafting the results section. During this stage, the coding framework was further refined; that is, some codes were merged to reduce repetition and overlap, while others were removed where the available data were insufficient to support meaningful interpretation and conclusions. The final set of themes and subthemes formed the basis of the results that are presented in this paper. The analysis and interpretation of findings were then reviewed and revised collaboratively by the authors, and the final themes were triangulated with relevant existing literature to contextualise the findings. Results and Discussion Interviews with participants revealed that the price of illicit firearms is shaped by a combination of interrelated factors including: (1) the policy and legislative environment, (2) economic factors including supply and demand, (3) the characteristics of firearms being bought and sold, and (4) social and relational factors including interpersonal trust and social networks. We examine each of these factors in the analysis below. Throughout the analysis, we examine non-monetary transactions, including bartering and trading, and the exchange of illicit firearms for other illicit commodities such as illicit drugs. The paper concludes by presenting the key implications of this research including consideration of how the insights generated may inform policy and policing responses to illicit firearms markets. The influence of trust in firearm prices Several of the participants reported that their capacity to access illicit firearms depended on personal relationships and trust within the illicit market. Participants described that establishing a reputation for being trustworthy and credible and knowing the “right people” were critical for obtaining firearms and also for negotiating prices (see also Bright et al., 2023 ). Embeddedness with social networks influenced not only access to firearms, but also the prices paid for such firearms. For example, P23 described how personal connections influence firearm prices, noting that costs vary significantly depending on the source and the level of trust between buyer and seller: “A Glock you'd be paying anywhere between…depending on who you're getting it off…what source…15 hundred, five grand, six grand, 10 grand.” Similarly, P26 noted that having a trusted dealer can reduce search costs: “When people know you, that you're not an informant or anything or you've got a good reputation… they sort of want to deal with you, and it's easy to gain access to guns like that. It's just who you know.” (P26). Search time can be considered as one input to the total price of firearms; increased search time increases the total costs borne by the buyer. This suggests that being embedded within a social network that can facilitate access to firearms may reduce search time and thereby reduce the overall cost of illicit firearms. When asked how difficult it was to acquire a Glock and how long it might take, P27 linked access and timing to money and relationships and replied that it “depends how much money you got. If you say, look, I got 10 grand, you probably won't get one for a little bit, but if you know the right crew… you… can. You want to buy one…brand new in a box…probably few days, max a week brand new in the box.” Overall, analysis of the participants' responses suggests that the price of illicit firearms is shaped by interpersonal trust, reputation and social capital, factors that are unlikely to significantly influence prices in legal markets. Participants underscored that within closed illicit networks, knowing someone not only facilitates access to firearms and reduces indirect costs such as search costs, but can also reduce the transaction prices of illicit firearms. These findings are consistent with existing research. For example, Kinsella ( 2008 ) used social network analysis to demonstrate that access to illicit weapons is structured around trust-based relational networks, limiting opportunities for those outside these circles. Similarly, in a study of illegal firearm acquisition patterns, Morselli et al. (2010) found that buyers commonly rely on personal contacts, and that weak or absent social ties increase not only the effort required to locate a supplier but also overall costs. Broadhurst et al. ( 2021 ) also highlighted that despite the emergence of online and darknet venues, many illicit firearm transactions still depend on established interpersonal relationships, reinforcing the importance of trusted networks within the illicit firearms market. Our research extends this previous research by explicitly tying embeddedness with social networks and interpersonal trust with illicit firearm price. Policy/legislative context Legislation pushes firearms underground and drive-up prices Over one-third (27) of the participants opined that stricter firearm laws have had either a direct or indirect effect on prices in the illicit firearms market. Participants generally agreed that while these restrictive laws in Australia (especially post-1996) have made illicit firearms less accessible and have increased the prices of firearms in the illicit market. For example, P1 reflected on the legislative changes in firearms access prior to the Port Arthur Massacre of 1996 and recalled that: You'd go to a service station, and you could buy bullets off the shelf…..to buy a brand new gun from a gun shop it was $240 brand new in the box. There were that many guns out there …and anyone with a gun licence…would go buy a new gun... (P1) Similarly, P36 recalled that in the late 1980s “every second person had a rifle, and it wasn’t that big of a deal.” Over time, however, as rifles “started disappearing” handguns became more prominent and more expensive. He further added that, “I think a lot more of the handguns started to come to the surface… and [cost more] money. The rarer they got everything became more [expensive], people that had these things would say, oh, well, now this isn't worth $1,000, now it's worth $5,000.” These comments support the contention that as firearm laws tighten, prices in the illicit market become less predictable and are more dependent on changes in supply and demand. P46 linked price increases to government amnesties and constrained supply within illicit markets: “well, when they did the amnesty a lot of the guns got turned in [and] so now, if you wanted a gun, the price has…. gone up five [fold].” According to P46, firearm amnesties reduced illicit supply and increased prices while stricter penalties for possession and trafficking further inflated costs in the illicit market. According to P5, tighter gun laws have not only limited access to illicit firearms but have also made sellers in the illicit market more cautious. Additionally, some participants suggested that stricter regulations can encourage diversion from the illicit market, with some licensed owners allegedly selling their firearms illegally for profit before reporting them as stolen. For example, P10 explained that a 9mm Beretta would cost roughly three and half thousand dollars when purchased legally through a pistol club, whereas on the underground market it could cost around ten thousand dollars. This suggests that stricter laws and consequent increases in illicit firearms prices may inadvertently create financial incentives to divert firearms from the legal market, while also creating opportunities for those willing to exploit loopholes and take advantage of these circumstances. The relationship between risk and illicit firearms prices There is a clear relationship between the risks of participation in illicit markets and the price of illicit commodities such as illicit drugs (see Reuter and Kleiman, 1986 ). Risks include detection by police, arrest, conviction, and punishment (including lengthy prison sentences; see Reuter and Kleiman, 1986 ). Our results confirm the operation of a similar dynamic in illicit firearms markets. First, there are risks involved in making face-to-face purchases in illicit firearm markets. P39’s observation that “…a lot of people are informants or … they might even be a copper who you're trying to buy it off …” serves as an exemplar of the level of suspicion that characterises transactions in the illicit firearms market. Similarly, P5 remarked that “a lot of people just can’t get [firearms] anymore because no one wants to sell them,” suggesting that fear of detection by law enforcement has deterred suppliers from involvement in the illicit firearms market. Reflecting further on the risks involved with selling firearms, P5 explained the potential consequences of being convicted of selling firearms: “No one wants to sell them anymore because … if I sell my gun to you and then you go kill someone, you're going to be doing life and I'll do 12 [to]15 years with you.” There are also risks associated with particular types of firearms because they are banned or heavily restricted, such automatic and semi-automatic rapid fire machine guns. P36 described that he had purchased two AK-47s, and explained the risks associated with possessing such high-powered (and heavily restricted) firearms: “They were too hot. I was too scared of getting caught with them.… They're a high-powered semiautomatic.” These risks of buying and selling illicit firearms increase the prices of such firearms in illicit markets. While the risks associated with restrictive policy frameworks can increase firearms prices, risks linked to previously used firearms may have the opposite effect on firearms prices. In particular, firearms that may have been used in prior criminal activities can carry additional risks for buyers, which may reduce their value in the illicit market. P15 reflected on these risks and noted: If you buy one that's already been used, you don't know what it's been used for…and then you get caught with that gun and whatever that gun's done you are getting done for. Whether it was a murder, an armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, whatever, you're getting done for it... (P15) Similar issues were raised by convicted firearms offenders interviewed in other jurisdictions about having obtained a “dirty gun” (a firearm which had been used in prior criminal activities). For example, in the United Kingdom, offenders reported that firearm provenance was explicitly priced into the underground market. Handguns known to have been used in crime sold for as little as £150–£200, compared to £1,000–£1,400 for a new 9mm model, indicating that guns believed to have been used in crime were extremely cheap. Offenders also expressed reluctance to buy such firearms because of the risk of being linked to past crimes committed with them (Hales et al., 2006 ). Similarly, in the United States, interviewed offenders reported offloading dirty guns quickly because of the legal liability they carry, and several indicated they were willing to pay more for a clean firearm (Cook et al., 2015 ). Overall, the emerging patterns from interviews indicate that the restrictive firearms legislation in Australia has reshaped the illicit market by reducing legal availability, increasing risks to illicit actors and increasing the prices of illicit firearms. After the 1996–97 reforms and national buyback scheme, which resulted in the removal of over 650,000 firearms from private circulation in Australia, the legal supply of firearms was dramatically reduced according to some analysis (Reuter & Mouzos, 2003 ). These mixed outcomes leave open the possibility that many firearms either exited circulation, or as some participants in this study claim, were diverted or retained for illicit resale. With far fewer firearms available legally, firearms became harder to access which likely made the illegal market more profitable and illicit firearms more expensive. Constrained supply and illicit firearm prices More than half of the participants (41 out of 75) indicated that limited supply and risks and challenges associated with obtaining illicit firearms contributes to higher prices in the illicit market. These participants noted that a number of factors contribute to limited supply including the restricted availability of certain types of firearms (see above re policy/legislative restrictions) but also the differential possibility of detection by law enforcement for some firearm types. Participants noted that some firearms are regarded as high-risk weapons within the illicit market because they fall into categories of restricted or prohibited firearms under Australia’s National Firearms Agreement Act of 1996, which introduced strict controls and bans on many rapid-fire weapons such as automatic and semi-automatic refiles (Chapman et al., 2006). P26 stated that AK-47s (a Soviet designed military assault rifle known for its automatic fire capability) were hard to acquire in Australia and noted that “they would cost probably about 30 grand on the street.” P27 provided a similar perspective, recounting his own experience with trading a MAC-10 (a compact submachine gun): I bought a MAC-10 weapon for $15,000 [Australian dollars] and sold [it] for $30,000…this is a while ago, but now you'd probably get them cheaper but back then it was……pretty expensive…30 grand for a MAC-10, they were very hard to find. This reinforces the notion that limited availability and supply directly increases the market value of some illicit firearms. The MAC-10, developed by the Military Armament Corporation in the 1960s, is a compact military style firearm originally produced in both pistol and fully automatic submachine gun ( Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2015 ). In Australia – as in many other jurisdictions – civilians are prohibited from purchasing or possessing fully automatic firearms under the National Firearms Agreement (1996) and corresponding state legislations, rendering weapons such as the MAC-10 unavailable through legitimate markets (ACIC, 2020). This regulatory context helps explain why participants in this study reported the MAC-10 with high prices in the illicit market. Overall analysis of the findings indicates that, consistent with economic predictions based on supply and demand, illicit firearm prices are higher under conditions of limited supply. These findings are consistent with the United Nations’ global assessment of the illicit firearms market, which notes that illicit firearms usually cost more than legally purchased firearms due to the higher risks involved in supply and trafficking as well as variations in availability and demand within local illicit markets (UNODC, 2020 ). Similarly, research from the United States suggest that illicit firearm prices are considerably higher due to the illegality and limited availability and supply associated with the local illicit market (Cook et al., 2007 ). Types and characteristics of firearms and their link to price Firearm prices also vary according to their type and characteristics such as the type and quality of the firearm and whether it has been used before (especially in previous criminal activities). This is related to the above discussion on risk in which we outlined that heavily restricted firearms such as AK47s and MAC-10s are more difficult to source given they are in a category of restricted/banned firearms and therefore higher risk. For example, P42 addressed the variation in prices for different types of firearms and noted that, “A shotgun is about two grand. If you're looking for semiautomatics you're paying about five grand. SKSs [a semi-automatic military style rifle originally designed in the Soviet Union in the 1940s] you're looking at about 15 grand…and that doesn't include ammunition”. These prices are closely associated with the legislative categories of firearms under Australia’s National Firearms Agreement (1996). Shotguns are in one of the lowest categories in terms of restrictions and are therefore more available, while semi-automatics are in a heavily restricted/banned category, and SKSs are banned outright. P63 recalled buying “a single shot bolt action 22 calibre rifle that came in a case… with ammunition, everything…that was 200 bucks.” In contrast, participants reported that new Glock branded handguns could cost up to $ 20,000 on the black market. Confirming the high value of new and authentic models, P38 noted: I had access to a phase 3 [Glock pistol] for $ 3,000, like, that's the latest Glock out… the same as what the police are getting issued and I'll put it to a bloke that is a pretty big dealer in Kings Cross and [he offered] $ 20,000 straight away. (P38) P68 noted that shorter, modified long arms were inexpensive and more accessible: “cut down shotguns and rifles are cheap.” He said such weapons might sell for only a few hundred dollars or “maximum a thousand dollars” whereas pistols were much more costly: “five, six grand.” This suggests that certain firearm types, including those that are modified, can influence prices, and that as a general rule, rifles and shotguns are cheaper than handguns because they are easier to obtain. The UNODC’s Global Study on Firearms also found that non-standard modifications, altered long-arms or converted firearms tend to be less expensive in the illicit market (UNODC, 2020 ). P28 described purchasing a modified replica (i.e., not genuine) Glock for around $ 1,000, which is a comparatively low price and suggesting that modified weapons could be potentially cheaper than the real ones, and explained how such weapons are converted: It was more like a homemade gun. It was a replica of a Glock that had the barrel changed, because the replica used to shoot blanks and what they do is they get it and they change the barrels and then they shoot proper bullets. I think a thousand dollars, paid a thousand bucks for it. (P28) In sum, participants in this study linked firearms price to the types, characteristics and functionality of firearms. Semi-automatic rifles and handguns as well as new and fully functional firearms were reported to be associated with higher prices in the illicit market. In contrast, older, modified and replica firearms were reported to be cheaper as well as easier to obtain. These findings are consistent with research from the United Kingdom and the United States, which similarly shows that higher quality firearms tend to fetch higher prices in the illicit market, while lower quality or modified weapons are more commonly traded at lower price points (Hales et al., 2006 ; Cook et al., 2007 ; UNODC, 2020 ; Lee et al., 2024 ). Research from the United States further highlights that most underground firearm sales involve low-quality and inexpensive weapons. Australian research has also reported similar patterns, noting that specialist or tightly restricted firearms such as automatic weapons can command premium prices, while lower quality or improvised firearms, such as modified or replica weapons tend to be more affordable in the illicit market (Broadhurst et al., 2021 ). Considerations of non-monetary price: bartering and trading Bartering - exchanging goods or services directly without the use of money - constitutes an important feature of many illicit markets, including the illicit firearms market (Brooks, 2020). These transactions constitute an alternative to transactions involving the exchange of cash money for firearms. Several of the participants in this study, many of whom identified as mid-level dealers or habitual drug users, reported barter style exchanges where firearms, drugs and sometimes stolen goods circulated interchangeably. For example, P33 recalled purchasing his first pistol at age 17 for $ 1,200 – half paid in cash and half in drugs. He also observed that drug users in rural areas would steal firearms from relatives and trade them for methamphetamine: “a mate called me and said, ‘a bloke’s got guns for ice’ and I just went over, swapped [the guns for] ice.” Similarly, P25 noted that individuals buying drugs often offered firearms in exchange: “Once they know you like something [firearms], they bring it to you like that's for the drugs…it’s [firearm] currency.” Similarly, P1 described that, “low-level drug dealers that'll probably have guns swapped for gear” . Likewise, P52 recounted that: “ my…friend…swapped [drugs] for two firearms. One was a pretty serious assault style weapon.” In sum, findings suggest that firearms can act as a form of currency and exchangeable asset in the illicit market, often traded for drugs and used to settle debts. This aligns with research showing that guns are routinely treated as commodity-equivalents within criminal economies. Notably, Leuprecht and Aulthouse ( 2014 ) demonstrate that firearms often function as liquid assets within organised crime networks, facilitating barter and debt settlement. Mouzos and Borzycki ( 2006 ) similarly identify cases in Australia where firearms are exchanged directly for drugs or services within drug-using and drug-trafficking communities. From a broader perspective, the movement of firearms through the same social and logistical channels as illicit drugs also reflects well-established criminological patterns. Cook et al. ( 2009 ) show that in North America, guns and drugs are often co-trafficked through overlapping networks that rely on trust and reciprocity, while Leuprecht and Aulthouse ( 2014 ) similarly describe intertwined trafficking channels that move weapons alongside other illicit goods. More recently, UNODC ( 2024 ) underscores the global interconnectedness of firearm and drug trafficking routes, noting that shared actors, infrastructure and trust-based exchange practices allow weapons to cascade from higher-level suppliers to lower-tier users. Conclusions This paper draws on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states, New South Wales and South Australia. Participants included three groups of offenders involved in serious criminal activity and included drug traffickers, members of gangs and organised crime groups, and armed robbers. They were asked to share their experiences and insights regarding the use of firearms in illicit market and organised criminal activities. This paper specifically focused on the factors that influence firearm prices in the illicit market. A number of key insights emerge from these accounts. First, firearm prices tend to be elevated in restrictive policy environments such as Australia. Participants consistently described firearms as costly and relatively difficult to obtain, underscoring the limited supply within the illicit market. Second, firearm prices vary and depends on the types of weapons. Some types of firearms are more expensive than others, indicating both market demand and the risks associated with accessing particular weapons. Participants suggested that certain firearms are harder to obtain due to increased scrutiny, tighter regulation, or limited supply and risks associated with their acquisition, all of which contribute to higher prices within illicit market. Third, the participants also noted that the characteristics of firearms can affect their value in the illicit market. Putting aside the types of firearms, participants noted that guns that are new or have not previously been used in crime tend to have higher prices, as such firearms are perceived as less risky because they are less likely to be linked to prior offences or identifiable criminal histories. Fourth, social relationships play an important role in accessing firearms as well as in their prices. Participants noted that firearms are often cheaper and easier to obtain when individuals have trusted connections within criminal networks/illicit market, suggesting that personal relationships, reputation, and trust can therefore significantly affect both access and price in illicit firearm markets. Finally, participants also described that firearms are not always purchased with cash, and transactions may involve bartering or exchanges for drugs or other goods. They further noted that ammunition costs also form part of the broader illicit firearms transaction, and firearms are either sold with ammunition or could be acquired separately and either way, they may affect the pricing. Overall, our findings suggest that illicit firearm markets and prices are affected by a combination of restrictive policy environments, supply and demand dynamics, perceived risks of buying and selling illicit firearms, the characteristics of specific firearms, and social dynamics, social networks and interpersonal trust. By drawing on firsthand accounts from incarcerated offenders in Australia, this study offers direct insights into how illicit firearm prices can vary across the range of factors revealed in the analysis. Policy implications These findings bring to light a number of implications for policy and law enforcement responses to illicit firearm markets. First, the elevated price of firearms in restrictive policy environments suggests that limiting supply remains an important strategy. Continued efforts to reduce the diversion of legal firearms, strengthen border controls, and disrupt trafficking networks may help sustain or further increase prices in illicit markets. Higher prices may act as a barrier to access for some offenders and can increase the costs associated with criminal activity. Second, the variation in prices across firearm types indicates that risk plays an important role in shaping illicit markets. Policies that increase the risks associated with acquiring specific categories of firearms - through targeted enforcement, intelligence-led policing, and monitoring of trafficking channels - may raise prices and reduce accessibility. However, enforcement strategies should also consider the possibility of market adaptation, as offenders may shift towards alternative products when particular firearms become harder to obtain. One example is the potential growth of 3D-printed firearms, which may offer a lower-cost and lower-risk alternative to offenders. Third, the higher value placed on firearms without a criminal history suggests that strengthening firearm tracking and tracing systems may influence illicit market dynamics. Improved tracing can increase the risks associated with possessing or selling firearms that have previously been used in crime, potentially reducing their desirability and altering pricing structures. At the same time, the emergence of 3D-printed firearms may complicate these approaches, as such weapons may fall outside traditional tracing mechanisms. Finally, the importance of trust and social connections in firearm transactions highlights the role of criminal networks in facilitating access to weapons. Law enforcement strategies that target the relationships and intermediaries within these networks may help disrupt illicit firearm markets. By undermining trust and increasing uncertainty among participants, these approaches may make transactions more difficult, increase perceived risks, and ultimately raise the barriers to obtaining firearms. Declarations Author Contribution DB collected the data. HA and DB conducted analyses. DB and HA wrote the manuscript text. Acknowledgement The authors wish to acknowledge Mark Halsey, Andrew Goldsmith and Melissa de Vel Palumbo who assisted in conducting interviews. This work was supported by the Australian Research Council, grant number DP150100619 “Understanding and preventing gun violence: A qualitative study”. The authors wish to acknowledge Mark Halsey, Andrew Goldsmith and Melissa de Vel Palumbo who assisted in conducting interviews. Data Availability The data are not publically available due to ethics restrictions on making the raw data public. References Arsovska, J. (2015). Decoding Albanian organized crime: Culture, politics, and globalization (1 st ed.). University of California Press. Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. (2016). Illicit Firearms in Australia . Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. (2020). Illicit firearms in Australia . Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. Australian Federal Police. (2025). Illegal firearms and weapons. Australian Federal Police. Retrieved 10/07/2025 from https://www.afp.gov.au/crimes/illegal-firearms-and-weapons Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy , 76 (2), 169–217. Bourgois, P. (1996). Confronting anthropology, education, and inner-city apartheid. American Anthropologist , 249-258. Bricknell, S. (2010). Firearm theft in Australia 2008-09 . Australian Institute of Criminology. Bricknell, S. (2012). Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs . Australian Institute of Criminology. Bricknell, S. (2020). Firearm theft in Australia 2018 . Australian Institute of Criminology. Bright, D. (2024). Illicit Firearms Markets and Organized Crime: Global, Regional, and Local Perspectives (1 st ed.). Oxford University Press. Bright, D., & Halsey, M. (2025). ‘If You Get into the Business, You Have to Arm Up’: The Possession, Display and Discharge of Firearms by Members of Organized Criminal Groups. In Illicit Firearms Markets and Organized Crime: Global, Regional, and Local Perspectives (pp. 253-273). Oxford University Press. Bright, D., Halsey, M., Goldsmith, A., & Goudie, S. (2023). “I Know a Guy and He’s Got Guns Galore”: Accessing crime guns in the Australian illicit firearms market. Deviant Behavior , 44 (5), 671-689. Broadhurst, R., Foye, J., Jiang, C., & Ball, M. (2021). Illicit firearms and other weapons on darknet markets. Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice , 622 , 1-20. Brooks, R. R. W. (2020). Black markets and the exchange structure. Law and Contemporary Problems , 83 (2), 151-174. Chapman, S., Alpers, P., Agho, K., & Jones, M. (2006). Australia’s 1996 gun law reforms: faster falls in firearm deaths, firearm suicides, and a decade without mass shootings. Injury Prevention , 12 (6), 365–372. Contreras, R. (2013). The stickup kids: Race, drugs, violence, and the American dream . University of California Press. Cook, P. J., Cukier, W., & Krause, K. (2009). The illicit firearms trade in North America. Criminology & Criminal Justice , 9 (3), 265–286. Cook, P. J., Ludwig, J., Venkatesh, S., & Braga, A. A. (2007). Underground gun markets. The Economic Journal , 117 (524). Cook, P. J., Molliconi, S., & Cole, T. B. (1995). Regulating gun markets. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology , 86 (1), 59-92. Cook, P. J., Parker, S. T., & Pollack, H. A. (2015). Sources of guns to dangerous people: what we learn by asking them. Preventive Medicine , 79 , 28–36. Decker, S. H., & Chapman, M. T. (2008). Drug smugglers on drug smuggling: Lessons from the inside. Temple University Press. Desroches, F. J. (2005). The crime that pays: Drug trafficking and organized crime in Canada. Canadian Scholars’ Press. Dwyer, R., & Moore, D. (2010). Understanding illicit drug markets in Australia: Notes towards a critical reconceptualization. The British Journal of Criminology , 50 (1), 82–101. GI-TOC. (2025). Measuring the Scope and Scale of Illicit Arms Trafficking. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime: Vienna.Glaser, B. G. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis. Sociology Press. Goldsmith, A., Halsey, M., & Bright, D. (2022). Taking crime guns seriously: A socio- material perspective. Criminology & Criminal Justice , 22 (3), 462-479. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. (2015). Small Arms Survey 2015: weapons and the world. Cambridge University Press. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology , 91 (3), 481–510. Hales, G., Lewis, C., & Silverstone, D. (2006). Gun crime: the market in and use of illegal firearms . (Home Office research study; No. 298). Home Office. Halsey, M., & Deegan, S. (2015). Young Offenders: Crime, Prison and Struggles for Desistance (1st ed. 2015.). Palgrave Macmillan UK. Halsey, M., & Deegan, S. (2015). ‘Picking up the pieces’: Female significant others in the lives of young (ex)incarcerated males. Criminology & Criminal Justice , 15 (2), 131– 151. Kalesan, B., Mobily, M. E., Keiser, O., Fagan, J. A., & Galea, S. (2016). Firearm legislation and firearm mortality in the USA: a cross-sectional, state-level study. The Lancet , 387 (10030), 1847–1855. Kinsella, D. T. (2008) "The Illicit Arms Trade: a Social Network Analysis". P olitical Science Faculty Publications and Presentations . 12. Available at: http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/8904 Lee, J. R., Holt, T. J., & Smirnova, O. (2024). An assessment of the state of firearm sales on the Dark Web. Journal of Crime and Justice , 47 (1), 46-60. Leuprecht, C., & Aulthouse, A. (2014). Guns for hire: North America's intra-continental gun trafficking networks. Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society , 15 , 57-74. Markowski, S., Koorey, S., Hall, P., & Brauer, J. (2009). Multi-channel supply chain for illicit small arms. Defence and Peace Economics , 20 (3), 171–191. Marsh, N. J., & McDougal, T. L. (2016). Illicit small arms prices: Introducing two new datasets . Technical report, Small Arms Data Observatory. Morgan, A., Dowling, C., & Voce, I. (2020). Australian outlaw motorcycle gang involvement in violent and organised crime. Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice , 586 , 1-18. Mouzos, J., & Borzycki, M. (2006). Weapons, drugs and crime: the Australian experience. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice , 312 , 1. Reuter, P., & Kleiman, M. A. (1986). Risks and prices: An economic analysis of drug enforcement. Crime and Justice , 7 , 289–340. Reuter, P., & Mouzos, J. (2003). Australia: A massive buyback of low-risk guns. Evaluating gun policy: Effects on crime and violence , 121-156. Roberto, E., Braga, A. A., & Papachristos, A. V. (2018). Closer to guns: the role of street gangs in facilitating access to illegal firearms. Journal of Urban Health , 95 (3), 372–382. Savona, E. U., & Mancuso, M. (2017). Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level. Final Report of Project FIRE. Available at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Squires, P. (2021). Illegal firearms, illicit markets and weapon trafficking. In Firearms (pp. 51-71). Routledge. Strazzari, F., & Zampagni, F. (2018). Between organised crime and terrorism: Illicit firearms actors and market dynamics in Italy. Triggering Terror , 237. UNODC. (2020). Global Study on Firearms Trafficking . United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf UNODC. (2024). Firearms and Drugs: Partners in Transnational Crime. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2024/Firearms_and_Drugs_Partners_in_Transnational_Crime_web.pdf Van de Bunt, H., Siegel, D., & Zaitch, D. (2014). The Social Embeddednesss of Organized Crime. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime . Oxford University Press. von Lampe, K. (2016). Organized crime: Analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance (1st ed.). New York: Sage. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9298125","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":625329482,"identity":"1b049e9c-1ef8-45e1-b612-5e9f96d7388a","order_by":0,"name":"David Bright","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Deakin University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"David","middleName":"","lastName":"Bright","suffix":""},{"id":625329484,"identity":"951897b5-fa9c-48f6-a21e-fd9b03b84e2d","order_by":1,"name":"Hamid Azizi","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Deakin University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Hamid","middleName":"","lastName":"Azizi","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-04-02 04:53:44","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9298125/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9298125/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":107488877,"identity":"1dfa5479-4cba-4288-8084-db817d69ea2c","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-04-22 02:46:01","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":309501,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9298125/v1/8a6947da-fd48-439e-b575-600c8f37baad.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003e“Thirty grand for a MAC-10”: Revealing the factors that influence illicit firearms price\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIllicit firearm markets operate as embedded social and economic systems in which transactions are shaped by risk, scarcity, and legal constraints (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Squires, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). These markets constitute a significant component of global illicit economies and assume a central role in facilitating violent and organised criminal activities (see Bright \u0026amp; Halsey, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The trafficking of illicit firearms carries significant social and economic costs and places considerable strain on criminal justice systems. Despite restrictive legislation across many jurisdictions that aim to limit access to firearms, criminal actors continue to access firearms through a range of channels, particularly through trusted criminal networks and informal social connections (see Bright et al., 202023; Roberto et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal restrictions on firearms access often move demand further underground, where limited supply and persistent demand can drive large price differentials between illicit and legal firearms. Similar price differentials for legal and illegal products are also observed in other illicit markets, such as illicit drug markets (Becker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1968\u003c/span\u003e; Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e; Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Kalesan et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Reuter \u0026amp; Kleiman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e; UNODC, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Notwithstanding this broad observation about the relationship between tighter restrictions on firearms and prices in illicit markets, little is currently known about the factors that influence the prices of firearms in these illicit contexts. Other factors that might affect illicit firearms prices include the characteristics of individual firearms, such as the condition and functionality of weapons (Hales et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e), the nature of social relationships within illicit trading networks (Granovetter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e), and bartering or exchange involving other illicit commodities such as drugs, which underscore the interconnected nature of illicit markets (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current paper seeks to address this gap in knowledge by analysing interviews with illicit firearm market participants to extract the key factors that are related to the prices of firearms in illicit contexts. We first provide an overview of the illicit firearms market in Australia to set the scene and then turn to potential drivers of illicit firearm prices, with a specific focus on economic, social and policy factors that might influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets. We then outline our methodological approach before presenting and discussing findings from a thematic analysis of interviews conducted with 75 incarcerated offenders in Australia. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings on policy and practice.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eObtaining firearms in illicit markets\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe acquisition of illicit firearms, particularly among gang members and those affiliated with organised criminal groups, is frequently facilitated through social networks and personal connections (e.g., Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Bright et al., 2022). For instance, interviews with gang members in Chicago found that many individuals joined or remained in gangs primarily to gain access to firearms (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). In some cases, firearms are distributed by senior members to subordinates, often with explicit instructions to undertake specific criminal activities, such as transporting illicit drugs (e.g., Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Bright et al., 2022). Unlike other illicit commodities such as drugs, firearms are durable goods, and when properly maintained, they can circulate within illicit markets for decades, often being bought and sold multiple times over their lifespan (Savona \u0026amp; Mancuso, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Goldsmith et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). One driver for this observation is that illicit firearms are often used only once or a few times by an offender before being sold or transferred to another user (see Bright et al., 2022).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eIllicit firearms market in Australia\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAustralia\u0026rsquo;s illicit firearms market is rapidly evolving and despite the country\u0026rsquo;s robust regulatory framework, illicit firearms remain a persistent and serious problem. Illicit firearms contribute to firearm-related violence and broader social harms, while posing ongoing challenges for law enforcement agencies and policymakers seeking to keep pace with illicit market changes and to generate effective policy and policing responses (ACIC, 2020; Bright, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Bright et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Broadhurst et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe demand and supply of illicit firearms in Australia are driven primarily by members and associates of organised crime groups, who deploy firearms to protect their interests and commit violent acts (ACIC, 2016; Bright et al., 2022). Although the illicit market is not monopolised by any single group, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), organised criminals such as drug traffickers and terrorist groups have consistently been identified as key actors in the trafficking and distribution of illicit firearms (ACIC, 2016; AFP, 2025; Bricknell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Morgan et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Illicit firearms are acquired through diversion from legal markets, theft from licensed firearms owners, purchases from corrupt licensed dealers, and transactions conducted via darknet markets. Increasingly, privately manufactured firearms \u0026ndash; particularly 3D-printed weapons \u0026ndash; are also emerging as a prominent source of illicit supply (ACIC, 2020; Bricknell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Bright et al., 2022; Broadhurst et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA wide range of firearms are available within Australia\u0026rsquo;s illicit market, including rifles, shotguns, handguns, and, to a lesser extent, heavy machine firearms (Bricknell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Estimating the size of this market, however, remains difficult due to its covert nature. In 2016, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) conservatively estimated that approximately 260,000 firearms\u0026mdash;around 250,000 long arms and 10,000 handguns\u0026mdash;were circulating in the domestic illicit market (ACIC, 2016). However, deploying calculations recommended by the United Nations (see GITOC, 2025), which suggests that the global illicit firearms market account for roughly 10 to 20% of the number of firearms in licit market, suggest that the Australia\u0026rsquo;s illicit firearm market could range somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000. One area that has received very little attention in the academic literature is the dynamics of prices in illicit firearms markets.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFollowing the 1996 Port Arthur massacre, Australia implemented a national gun buyback program aimed at substantially reducing civilian firearm ownership. While the program was effective in many respects, a significant number of firearms remained in private hands, some of which subsequently entered the illicit market (see Bricknell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; ACIC 2016; 2020). Ongoing seizures of illegal weapons linked to serious organised crime underscore that the supply and accessibility of illicit firearms remain key priorities for law enforcement across Australian jurisdictions. Despite this, little is known about the supply-side dynamics of Australia\u0026rsquo;s illicit firearm market, including the types of transactions through which weapons are bought, sold, or exchanged (but see Bright et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), including the drivers of price for firearms in illicit markets. In order to develop effective policy levers designed to prevent and restrict the illicit firearm market, policy makers need information about the factors that influence the prices paid for illicit firearms. Enhanced knowledge of these dynamics may help to design policies that further increase illicit firearm prices, in order to further inhibit access to illicit firearms. Given the paucity of available research on illicit firearms price, we now provide a critical analysis of potential drivers of prices of firearms in illicit markets.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePotential drivers of illicit firearms price\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSocial dynamics\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe acquisition of firearms is embedded in social relations governed by trust and reputation. This focus on the social organisation of illicit firearm circulation can be examined through Granovetter\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e) argument that economic behaviour is embedded in social networks. Drawing on Granovetter\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e) theory of embeddedness, studies emphasise that criminal markets function through interpersonal ties rather than impersonal exchanges. Trust between participants reduces perceived risks and can result in flexible pricing, informal credit arrangements, or reciprocal exchanges. These dynamics are well documented in research on illicit markets, where actors use established social ties and shared histories to manage uncertainty and reduce transaction risks (Dwyer \u0026amp; Moore, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Van de Bunt et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, transactions between unfamiliar parties carry higher risks of betrayal, robbery, or law-enforcement infiltration, which can increase prices, limit willingness to transact, and reinforce a preference for closed, network-based exchanges within organised crime settings, including illicit firearms market. These patterns align with broader research on the social embeddedness of criminal markets, which shows that interpersonal ties, reciprocity, and network-based trust play a central role in shaping how firearms circulate and how prices are negotiated (Dwyer \u0026amp; Moore, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Van de Bunt et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Actors within illicit markets with weaker ties to organised crime groups or established criminal suppliers often face higher prices due to greater uncertainty, higher vulnerability to exploitation, and reliance on unfamiliar intermediaries (Van de Bunt et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCharacteristics of firearms\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe physical attributes of firearms also influence pricing. The durability of firearms as a commodity means that they can circulate in an illicit market for extended periods, accumulating histories and reputational meanings within criminal cultures (Arsovska, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Certain models or calibres may hold symbolic significance, serve particular operational functions, or confer status within organised groups, affecting their desirability and thus their price. Furthermore, Cook et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) note that ammunition availability can shape pricing behaviours in illicit firearm markets. Scarce ammunition types or calibres may significantly increase total acquisition costs, and offenders often place a premium on weapons that use readily obtainable ammunition.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe inherent durability of firearms also means that they can be reused and resold repeatedly and hence their prices can be shaped by secondary and tertiary market activity rather than initial purchasing costs. In other words, the number of times a firearm has been sold or used in criminal activity determines its value, with firearms linked to prior crimes typically selling at lower prices due to increased risk, while newer and better quality and more reliable firearms tend to cost more (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Related research in the United States shows that guns recovered from gang members tend to be relatively old\u0026mdash;an average of 10 years\u0026mdash;suggesting that many weapons pass through multiple owners and transactions before reaching their final users (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTrafficking costs, risks and firearm prices\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIllicit firearm markets operate through complex, multi-channel supply networks in which costs accumulate across different stages and involve smuggling, theft, diversion from legal sources, brokerage, with each stage introducing additional risks, transaction costs, and vulnerabilities that directly influence final firearm prices. As firearms move through these supply chains, price formation reflects not only the characteristics of firearms but also the cumulative costs of concealment, transport, and risk management from law enforcement detection (Markowski et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). At a broader level, illicit firearm prices vary across regions depending on enforcement intensity, supply constraints, conflict dynamics, trafficking routes, geographical isolation and the operational capacity of criminal groups involved \u0026ndash; all of which may influence pricing in one way or another (Marsh \u0026amp; McDougal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; UNODC, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSupply and scarcity\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOrganised criminal groups play a key role in shaping illicit firearm markets through controlling supply channels, mediating transactions and managing risks associated with firearms transactions and distributions (von Lampe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). These groups can dominate distribution networks, regulating access to firearms and influencing pricing within the territories they control (Varese, 2010). In some contexts, the monopoly of organised criminal groups over the illicit market can stabilise prices by reducing competition, while in others it enables opportunistic price increase, particularly where scarcity and limited alternatives increase demand. For example, in Italy, mafia organisations regulate access to firearms and determine prices through their control of supply channels and distribution networks (Strazzari \u0026amp; Zampagni, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, the organised crime group\u0026rsquo;s control over the illicit market is not merely economic, as firearms are strategic assets essential to criminal operations, meaning that prices sometimes reflect a firearm\u0026rsquo;s operational or symbolic value to the group rather than purely transactional considerations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDrawing on the above observations, we conclude that a number of key factors might be found to influence firearm price: (1) The influence of firearm scarcity, risk of detection, and search costs in shaping illicit firearm acquisition prices; (2) Social networks, trust, and relationally embedded dynamics also influence illicit firearms price; (3) The characteristics of firearms such as age, quality, and criminal histories can impact on their selling price; (4) The structure of supply chains and geographical context impact availability, supply and price; (5) The role of organised criminal groups in regulating access and supply and consequently shaping prices; and (6) The relevance of the strategic, symbolic, and functional value of firearms that may impact price beyond purely economic considerations (e.g., see Goldsmith et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe overarching aim of the paper is to reveal the factors that influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets. To achieve this aim, the following research questions guided our analysis of interview transcripts: (1) What are the range of factors that influence the prices of firearms in illicit markets, and how do these factors influence price?; and (2) How do these factors influence the range of transaction types in illicit firearms markets (e.g., sale, lending, bartering)?\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding on the existing literature and drawing on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states\u0026mdash;South Australia and New South Wales - this paper examines the factors that influence the prices of illicit firearms. In doing so, this paper contributes new empirical insights into how illicit firearms prices are structured and negotiated, as well as the social and market forces that influence illicit firearm pricing. More broadly, this paper seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of illicit firearms prices as indicators of market structure, enforcement pressures and the social embeddedness of illicit firearm markets. Although the observations relate to the Australian illicit firearms market, similar factors are likely to drive price in other markets, even those with different features such as illicit firearms markets in the United States and Europe.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Method","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study draws on the qualitative research tradition of examining offending contexts, particularly approaches that employ in-depth interviews with so-called \u0026lsquo;hard-to-reach\u0026rsquo; or marginalised populations (e.g., Contreras, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Decker \u0026amp; Chapman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Desroches, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). In-depth interviewing is a valuable method when the primary objective is to understand the motivations, meanings, and contextual influences underlying specific behaviours or events (Hales et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA total of 75 interviews were conducted with prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states: South Australia and New South Wales. Both jurisdictions have well-documented issues relating to firearm-related and organised crime (Bricknell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at [removed for review], the Ethics Committee of the South Australian Department for Correctional Services (CEN/15/0323), and the Ethics Committee of Corrective Services New South Wales (D16/320488).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipant recruitment was guided by purposive sampling. Three key groups were targeted for inclusion: drug traffickers, members of gangs and organised criminal groups, and armed robbers. These categories were selected to capture variation in the acquisition and use of firearms across organised criminal activities and among individuals associated with criminal networks. Eligibility criteria required that participants be aged 18 years or older, incarcerated in South Australia or New South Wales, and had an earliest possible release date after 1 January 2019 to ensure accessibility during the fieldwork period. Participants were also required to have served or be serving time for major firearm-related offences and to be willing to discuss the role of guns in their own life course and/or within the criminal networks or gangs to which they currently or previously belonged. Once an inmate agreed to participate, an interview was scheduled, and the researchers met the participant at the relevant correctional facility. At the time of the meeting, participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form. Those who provided informed consent were then interviewed by the researchers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOf the 75 participants, 74 were male and one was female, with ages ranging from 23 to 78 years and a mean age of 41 years. Twenty-eight participants (37%) had left school before completing Year 10. Forty-three (57%) identified as Caucasian, six (8%) as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Australians, and sixteen (21%) as from a Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Background. Ten participants (13%) did not disclose their cultural background. Individual prison sentences ranged from one and a half years to life imprisonment, with an average sentence length of eleven years. Time served prior to interview ranged from six months to twenty-two years, with a median of 4.8 years. While some participants were serving their first custodial sentence, others had spent much of their adult lives\u0026mdash;and, in several cases, part of their adolescence\u0026mdash;in custody.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterviews were conducted between October 2015 and December 2018 and ranged in duration from 30 minutes to three hours. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1992). Full transcripts were read and coded in detail by the research team using NVivo. Following an initial review of all transcripts, the authors identified and recorded preliminary patterns in the data, which informed the development of a first round of broad (primary) themes and associated subthemes (secondary themes) that related to prices of illicit firearms. In the second stage of the analysis, transcripts were systematically revisited and relevant segments of text were coded in NVivo according to the preliminary coding framework. Once the coding process was completed and the relevant excerpts had been organised within NVivo and Microsoft Word, the authors began drafting the results section. During this stage, the coding framework was further refined; that is, some codes were merged to reduce repetition and overlap, while others were removed where the available data were insufficient to support meaningful interpretation and conclusions. The final set of themes and subthemes formed the basis of the results that are presented in this paper. The analysis and interpretation of findings were then reviewed and revised collaboratively by the authors, and the final themes were triangulated with relevant existing literature to contextualise the findings.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eInterviews with participants revealed that the price of illicit firearms is shaped by a combination of interrelated factors including: (1) the policy and legislative environment, (2) economic factors including supply and demand, (3) the characteristics of firearms being bought and sold, and (4) social and relational factors including interpersonal trust and social networks. We examine each of these factors in the analysis below. Throughout the analysis, we examine non-monetary transactions, including bartering and trading, and the exchange of illicit firearms for other illicit commodities such as illicit drugs. The paper concludes by presenting the key implications of this research including consideration of how the insights generated may inform policy and policing responses to illicit firearms markets.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eThe influence of trust in firearm prices\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral of the participants reported that their capacity to access illicit firearms depended on personal relationships and trust within the illicit market. Participants described that establishing a reputation for being trustworthy and credible and knowing the \u0026ldquo;right people\u0026rdquo; were critical for obtaining firearms and also for negotiating prices (see also Bright et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Embeddedness with social networks influenced not only access to firearms, but also the prices paid for such firearms.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor example, P23 described how personal connections influence firearm prices, noting that costs vary significantly depending on the source and the level of trust between buyer and seller: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;A Glock you'd be paying anywhere between\u0026hellip;depending on who you're getting it off\u0026hellip;what source\u0026hellip;15 hundred, five grand, six grand, 10 grand.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e Similarly, P26 noted that having a trusted dealer can reduce search costs: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;When people know you, that you're not an informant or anything or you've got a good reputation\u0026hellip; they sort of want to deal with you, and it's easy to gain access to guns like that. It's just who you know.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (P26).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSearch time can be considered as one input to the total price of firearms; increased search time increases the total costs borne by the buyer. This suggests that being embedded within a social network that can facilitate access to firearms may reduce search time and thereby reduce the overall cost of illicit firearms. When asked how difficult it was to acquire a Glock and how long it might take, P27 linked access and timing to money and relationships and replied that it \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;depends how much money you got. If you say, look, I got 10 grand, you probably won't get one for a little bit, but if you know the right crew\u0026hellip; you\u0026hellip; can. You want to buy one\u0026hellip;brand new in a box\u0026hellip;probably few days, max a week brand new in the box.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, analysis of the participants' responses suggests that the price of illicit firearms is shaped by interpersonal trust, reputation and social capital, factors that are unlikely to significantly influence prices in legal markets. Participants underscored that within closed illicit networks, knowing someone not only facilitates access to firearms and reduces indirect costs such as search costs, but can also reduce the transaction prices of illicit firearms. These findings are consistent with existing research. For example, Kinsella (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) used social network analysis to demonstrate that access to illicit weapons is structured around trust-based relational networks, limiting opportunities for those outside these circles. Similarly, in a study of illegal firearm acquisition patterns, Morselli et al. (2010) found that buyers commonly rely on personal contacts, and that weak or absent social ties increase not only the effort required to locate a supplier but also overall costs. Broadhurst et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) also highlighted that despite the emergence of online and darknet venues, many illicit firearm transactions still depend on established interpersonal relationships, reinforcing the importance of trusted networks within the illicit firearms market. Our research extends this previous research by explicitly tying embeddedness with social networks and interpersonal trust with illicit firearm price.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003ePolicy/legislative context\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eLegislation pushes firearms underground and drive-up prices\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOver one-third (27) of the participants opined that stricter firearm laws have had either a direct or indirect effect on prices in the illicit firearms market. Participants generally agreed that while these restrictive laws in Australia (especially post-1996) have made illicit firearms less accessible and have increased the prices of firearms in the illicit market.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor example, P1 reflected on the legislative changes in firearms access prior to the Port Arthur Massacre of 1996 and recalled that:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eYou'd go to a service station, and you could buy bullets off the shelf\u0026hellip;..to buy a brand new gun from a gun shop it was $240 brand new in the box. There were that many guns out there \u0026hellip;and anyone with a gun licence\u0026hellip;would go buy a new gun... (P1)\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, P36 recalled that in the late 1980s \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;every second person had a rifle, and it wasn\u0026rsquo;t that big of a deal.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e Over time, however, as rifles \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;started disappearing\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e handguns became more prominent and more expensive. He further added that, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I think a lot more of the handguns started to come to the surface\u0026hellip; and [cost more] money. The rarer they got everything became more [expensive], people that had these things would say, oh, well, now this isn't worth $1,000, now it's worth $5,000.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e These comments support the contention that as firearm laws tighten, prices in the illicit market become less predictable and are more dependent on changes in supply and demand.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eP46 linked price increases to government amnesties and constrained supply within illicit markets: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;well, when they did the amnesty a lot of the guns got turned in [and] so now, if you wanted a gun, the price has\u0026hellip;. gone up five [fold].\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e According to P46, firearm amnesties reduced illicit supply and increased prices while stricter penalties for possession and trafficking further inflated costs in the illicit market. According to P5, tighter gun laws have not only limited access to illicit firearms but have also made sellers in the illicit market more cautious.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdditionally, some participants suggested that stricter regulations can encourage diversion from the illicit market, with some licensed owners allegedly selling their firearms illegally for profit before reporting them as stolen. For example, P10 explained that a 9mm Beretta would cost roughly three and half thousand dollars when purchased legally through a pistol club, whereas on the underground market it could cost around ten thousand dollars. This suggests that stricter laws and consequent increases in illicit firearms prices may inadvertently create financial incentives to divert firearms from the legal market, while also creating opportunities for those willing to exploit loopholes and take advantage of these circumstances.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eThe relationship between risk and illicit firearms prices\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere is a clear relationship between the risks of participation in illicit markets and the price of illicit commodities such as illicit drugs (see Reuter and Kleiman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e). Risks include detection by police, arrest, conviction, and punishment (including lengthy prison sentences; see Reuter and Kleiman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e). Our results confirm the operation of a similar dynamic in illicit firearms markets. First, there are risks involved in making face-to-face purchases in illicit firearm markets. P39\u0026rsquo;s observation that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u0026hellip;a lot of people are informants or \u0026hellip; they might even be a copper who you're trying to buy it off \u0026hellip;\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e serves as an exemplar of the level of suspicion that characterises transactions in the illicit firearms market. Similarly, P5 remarked that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;a lot of people just can\u0026rsquo;t get [firearms] anymore because no one wants to sell them,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e suggesting that fear of detection by law enforcement has deterred suppliers from involvement in the illicit firearms market. Reflecting further on the risks involved with selling firearms, P5 explained the potential consequences of being convicted of selling firearms: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;No one wants to sell them anymore because \u0026hellip; if I sell my gun to you and then you go kill someone, you're going to be doing life and I'll do 12 [to]15 years with you.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere are also risks associated with particular types of firearms because they are banned or heavily restricted, such automatic and semi-automatic rapid fire machine guns. P36 described that he had purchased two AK-47s, and explained the risks associated with possessing such high-powered (and heavily restricted) firearms: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;They were too hot. I was too scared of getting caught with them.\u0026hellip; They're a high-powered semiautomatic.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese risks of buying and selling illicit firearms increase the prices of such firearms in illicit markets. While the risks associated with restrictive policy frameworks can increase firearms prices, risks linked to previously used firearms may have the opposite effect on firearms prices. In particular, firearms that may have been used in prior criminal activities can carry additional risks for buyers, which may reduce their value in the illicit market. P15 reflected on these risks and noted:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIf you buy one that's already been used, you don't know what it's been used for\u0026hellip;and then you get caught with that gun and whatever that gun's done you are getting done for. Whether it was a murder, an armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, whatever, you're getting done for it... (P15)\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilar issues were raised by convicted firearms offenders interviewed in other jurisdictions about having obtained a \u0026ldquo;dirty gun\u0026rdquo; (a firearm which had been used in prior criminal activities). For example, in the United Kingdom, offenders reported that firearm provenance was explicitly priced into the underground market. Handguns known to have been used in crime sold for as little as \u0026pound;150\u0026ndash;\u0026pound;200, compared to \u0026pound;1,000\u0026ndash;\u0026pound;1,400 for a new 9mm model, indicating that guns believed to have been used in crime were extremely cheap. Offenders also expressed reluctance to buy such firearms because of the risk of being linked to past crimes committed with them (Hales et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, in the United States, interviewed offenders reported offloading dirty guns quickly because of the legal liability they carry, and several indicated they were willing to pay more for a clean firearm (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, the emerging patterns from interviews indicate that the restrictive firearms legislation in Australia has reshaped the illicit market by reducing legal availability, increasing risks to illicit actors and increasing the prices of illicit firearms. After the 1996\u0026ndash;97 reforms and national buyback scheme, which resulted in the removal of over 650,000 firearms from private circulation in Australia, the legal supply of firearms was dramatically reduced according to some analysis (Reuter \u0026amp; Mouzos, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). These mixed outcomes leave open the possibility that many firearms either exited circulation, or as some participants in this study claim, were diverted or retained for illicit resale. With far fewer firearms available legally, firearms became harder to access which likely made the illegal market more profitable and illicit firearms more expensive.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eConstrained supply and illicit firearm prices\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eMore than half of the participants (41 out of 75) indicated that limited supply and risks and challenges associated with obtaining illicit firearms contributes to higher prices in the illicit market. These participants noted that a number of factors contribute to limited supply including the restricted availability of certain types of firearms (see above re policy/legislative restrictions) but also the differential possibility of detection by law enforcement for some firearm types.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants noted that some firearms are regarded as high-risk weapons within the illicit market because they fall into categories of restricted or prohibited firearms under Australia\u0026rsquo;s National Firearms Agreement Act of 1996, which introduced strict controls and bans on many rapid-fire weapons such as automatic and semi-automatic refiles (Chapman et al., 2006). P26 stated that AK-47s (a Soviet designed military assault rifle known for its automatic fire capability) were hard to acquire in Australia and noted that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;they would cost probably about 30 grand on the street.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e P27 provided a similar perspective, recounting his own experience with trading a MAC-10 (a compact submachine gun):\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eI bought a MAC-10 weapon for $15,000 [Australian dollars] and sold [it] for $30,000\u0026hellip;this is a while ago, but now you'd probably get them cheaper but back then it was\u0026hellip;\u0026hellip;pretty expensive\u0026hellip;30 grand for a MAC-10, they were very hard to find.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis reinforces the notion that limited availability and supply directly increases the market value of some illicit firearms. The MAC-10, developed by the Military Armament Corporation in the 1960s, is a compact military style firearm originally produced in both pistol and fully automatic submachine gun ( Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). In Australia \u0026ndash; as in many other jurisdictions \u0026ndash; civilians are prohibited from purchasing or possessing fully automatic firearms under the National Firearms Agreement (1996) and corresponding state legislations, rendering weapons such as the MAC-10 unavailable through legitimate markets (ACIC, 2020). This regulatory context helps explain why participants in this study reported the MAC-10 with high prices in the illicit market.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall analysis of the findings indicates that, consistent with economic predictions based on supply and demand, illicit firearm prices are higher under conditions of limited supply. These findings are consistent with the United Nations\u0026rsquo; global assessment of the illicit firearms market, which notes that illicit firearms usually cost more than legally purchased firearms due to the higher risks involved in supply and trafficking as well as variations in availability and demand within local illicit markets (UNODC, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, research from the United States suggest that illicit firearm prices are considerably higher due to the illegality and limited availability and supply associated with the local illicit market (Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eTypes and characteristics of firearms and their link to price\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirearm prices also vary according to their type and characteristics such as the type and quality of the firearm and whether it has been used before (especially in previous criminal activities). This is related to the above discussion on risk in which we outlined that heavily restricted firearms such as AK47s and MAC-10s are more difficult to source given they are in a category of restricted/banned firearms and therefore higher risk. For example, P42 addressed the variation in prices for different types of firearms and noted that, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;A shotgun is about two grand. If you're looking for semiautomatics you're paying about five grand. SKSs [a semi-automatic military style rifle originally designed in the Soviet Union in the 1940s] you're looking at about 15 grand\u0026hellip;and that doesn't include ammunition\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/em\u003e These prices are closely associated with the legislative categories of firearms under Australia\u0026rsquo;s National Firearms Agreement (1996). Shotguns are in one of the lowest categories in terms of restrictions and are therefore more available, while semi-automatics are in a heavily restricted/banned category, and SKSs are banned outright.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eP63 recalled buying \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;a single shot bolt action 22 calibre rifle that came in a case\u0026hellip; with ammunition, everything\u0026hellip;that was 200 bucks.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e In contrast, participants reported that new Glock branded handguns could cost up to \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e20,000 on the black market. Confirming the high value of new and authentic models, P38 noted:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eI had access to a phase 3 [Glock pistol] for \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e3,000, like, that's the latest Glock out\u0026hellip; the same as what the police are getting issued and I'll put it to a bloke that is a pretty big dealer in Kings Cross and [he offered] \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e20,000 straight away.\u003c/em\u003e (P38)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eP68 noted that shorter, modified long arms were inexpensive and more accessible: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;cut down shotguns and rifles are cheap.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e He said such weapons might sell for only a few hundred dollars or \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;maximum a thousand dollars\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e whereas pistols were much more costly: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;five, six grand.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e This suggests that certain firearm types, including those that are modified, can influence prices, and that as a general rule, rifles and shotguns are cheaper than handguns because they are easier to obtain. The UNODC\u0026rsquo;s Global Study on Firearms also found that non-standard modifications, altered long-arms or converted firearms tend to be less expensive in the illicit market (UNODC, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eP28 described purchasing a modified replica (i.e., not genuine) Glock for around \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1,000, which is a comparatively low price and suggesting that modified weapons could be potentially cheaper than the real ones, and explained how such weapons are converted:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIt was more like a homemade gun. It was a replica of a Glock that had the barrel changed, because the replica used to shoot blanks and what they do is they get it and they change the barrels and then they shoot proper bullets. I think a thousand dollars, paid a thousand bucks for it. (P28)\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, participants in this study linked firearms price to the types, characteristics and functionality of firearms. Semi-automatic rifles and handguns as well as new and fully functional firearms were reported to be associated with higher prices in the illicit market. In contrast, older, modified and replica firearms were reported to be cheaper as well as easier to obtain. These findings are consistent with research from the United Kingdom and the United States, which similarly shows that higher quality firearms tend to fetch higher prices in the illicit market, while lower quality or modified weapons are more commonly traded at lower price points (Hales et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Cook et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; UNODC, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Lee et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Research from the United States further highlights that most underground firearm sales involve low-quality and inexpensive weapons. Australian research has also reported similar patterns, noting that specialist or tightly restricted firearms such as automatic weapons can command premium prices, while lower quality or improvised firearms, such as modified or replica weapons tend to be more affordable in the illicit market (Broadhurst et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eConsiderations of non-monetary price: bartering and trading\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBartering - exchanging goods or services directly without the use of money - constitutes an important feature of many illicit markets, including the illicit firearms market (Brooks, 2020). These transactions constitute an alternative to transactions involving the exchange of cash money for firearms. Several of the participants in this study, many of whom identified as mid-level dealers or habitual drug users, reported barter style exchanges where firearms, drugs and sometimes stolen goods circulated interchangeably. For example, P33 recalled purchasing his first pistol at age 17 for \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1,200 \u0026ndash; half paid in cash and half in drugs. He also observed that drug users in rural areas would steal firearms from relatives and trade them for methamphetamine: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;a mate called me and said, \u0026lsquo;a bloke\u0026rsquo;s got guns for ice\u0026rsquo; and I just went over, swapped [the guns for] ice.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, P25 noted that individuals buying drugs often offered firearms in exchange: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Once they know you like something [firearms], they bring it to you like that's for the drugs\u0026hellip;it\u0026rsquo;s [firearm] currency.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e Similarly, P1 described that, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;low-level drug dealers that'll probably have guns swapped for gear\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e. Likewise, P52 recounted that: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003emy\u0026hellip;friend\u0026hellip;swapped [drugs] for two firearms. One was a pretty serious assault style weapon.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, findings suggest that firearms can act as a form of currency and exchangeable asset in the illicit market, often traded for drugs and used to settle debts. This aligns with research showing that guns are routinely treated as commodity-equivalents within criminal economies. Notably, Leuprecht and Aulthouse (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrate that firearms often function as liquid assets within organised crime networks, facilitating barter and debt settlement. Mouzos and Borzycki (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e) similarly identify cases in Australia where firearms are exchanged directly for drugs or services within drug-using and drug-trafficking communities. From a broader perspective, the movement of firearms through the same social and logistical channels as illicit drugs also reflects well-established criminological patterns. Cook et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) show that in North America, guns and drugs are often co-trafficked through overlapping networks that rely on trust and reciprocity, while Leuprecht and Aulthouse (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) similarly describe intertwined trafficking channels that move weapons alongside other illicit goods. More recently, UNODC (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR82\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) underscores the global interconnectedness of firearm and drug trafficking routes, noting that shared actors, infrastructure and trust-based exchange practices allow weapons to cascade from higher-level suppliers to lower-tier users.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper draws on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states, New South Wales and South Australia. Participants included three groups of offenders involved in serious criminal activity and included drug traffickers, members of gangs and organised crime groups, and armed robbers. They were asked to share their experiences and insights regarding the use of firearms in illicit market and organised criminal activities. This paper specifically focused on the factors that influence firearm prices in the illicit market.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA number of key insights emerge from these accounts. First, firearm prices tend to be elevated in restrictive policy environments such as Australia. Participants consistently described firearms as costly and relatively difficult to obtain, underscoring the limited supply within the illicit market. Second, firearm prices vary and depends on the types of weapons. Some types of firearms are more expensive than others, indicating both market demand and the risks associated with accessing particular weapons. Participants suggested that certain firearms are harder to obtain due to increased scrutiny, tighter regulation, or limited supply and risks associated with their acquisition, all of which contribute to higher prices within illicit market. Third, the participants also noted that the characteristics of firearms can affect their value in the illicit market. Putting aside the types of firearms, participants noted that guns that are new or have not previously been used in crime tend to have higher prices, as such firearms are perceived as less risky because they are less likely to be linked to prior offences or identifiable criminal histories. Fourth, social relationships play an important role in accessing firearms as well as in their prices. Participants noted that firearms are often cheaper and easier to obtain when individuals have trusted connections within criminal networks/illicit market, suggesting that personal relationships, reputation, and trust can therefore significantly affect both access and price in illicit firearm markets. Finally, participants also described that firearms are not always purchased with cash, and transactions may involve bartering or exchanges for drugs or other goods. They further noted that ammunition costs also form part of the broader illicit firearms transaction, and firearms are either sold with ammunition or could be acquired separately and either way, they may affect the pricing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, our findings suggest that illicit firearm markets and prices are affected by a combination of restrictive policy environments, supply and demand dynamics, perceived risks of buying and selling illicit firearms, the characteristics of specific firearms, and social dynamics, social networks and interpersonal trust. By drawing on firsthand accounts from incarcerated offenders in Australia, this study offers direct insights into how illicit firearm prices can vary across the range of factors revealed in the analysis.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003ePolicy implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese findings bring to light a number of implications for policy and law enforcement responses to illicit firearm markets. First, the elevated price of firearms in restrictive policy environments suggests that limiting supply remains an important strategy. Continued efforts to reduce the diversion of legal firearms, strengthen border controls, and disrupt trafficking networks may help sustain or further increase prices in illicit markets. Higher prices may act as a barrier to access for some offenders and can increase the costs associated with criminal activity. Second, the variation in prices across firearm types indicates that risk plays an important role in shaping illicit markets. Policies that increase the risks associated with acquiring specific categories of firearms - through targeted enforcement, intelligence-led policing, and monitoring of trafficking channels - may raise prices and reduce accessibility. However, enforcement strategies should also consider the possibility of market adaptation, as offenders may shift towards alternative products when particular firearms become harder to obtain. One example is the potential growth of 3D-printed firearms, which may offer a lower-cost and lower-risk alternative to offenders. Third, the higher value placed on firearms without a criminal history suggests that strengthening firearm tracking and tracing systems may influence illicit market dynamics. Improved tracing can increase the risks associated with possessing or selling firearms that have previously been used in crime, potentially reducing their desirability and altering pricing structures. At the same time, the emergence of 3D-printed firearms may complicate these approaches, as such weapons may fall outside traditional tracing mechanisms. Finally, the importance of trust and social connections in firearm transactions highlights the role of criminal networks in facilitating access to weapons. Law enforcement strategies that target the relationships and intermediaries within these networks may help disrupt illicit firearm markets. By undermining trust and increasing uncertainty among participants, these approaches may make transactions more difficult, increase perceived risks, and ultimately raise the barriers to obtaining firearms.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDB collected the data. HA and DB conducted analyses. DB and HA wrote the manuscript text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors wish to acknowledge Mark Halsey, Andrew Goldsmith and Melissa de Vel Palumbo who assisted in conducting interviews.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis work was supported by the Australian Research Council, grant number DP150100619 \u0026ldquo;Understanding and preventing gun violence: A qualitative study\u0026rdquo;. The authors wish to acknowledge Mark Halsey, Andrew Goldsmith and Melissa de Vel Palumbo who assisted in conducting interviews.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe data are not publically available due to ethics restrictions on making the raw data public.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003cp\u003eArsovska, J. (2015). \u003cem\u003eDecoding Albanian organized crime: Culture, politics, and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eglobalization\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(1\u003csup\u003est\u003c/sup\u003e ed.). University of California Press.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. (2016). \u003cem\u003eIllicit Firearms in Australia\u003c/em\u003e.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAustralian Criminal Intelligence Commission.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAustralian Criminal Intelligence Commission. 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Paoli (Ed.), \u003cem\u003eThe Oxford\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;Handbook of Organized Crime\u003c/em\u003e. Oxford University Press.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003evon Lampe, K. (2016). \u003cem\u003eOrganized crime: Analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eextra-legal governance\u003c/em\u003e (1st ed.). New York: Sage.\u003c/p\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"trends-in-organized-crime","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"tioc","sideBox":"Learn more about [Trends in Organized Crime](http://link.springer.com/journal/12117)","snPcode":"12117","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/12117/3","title":"Trends in Organized Crime","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"illicit firearms, illicit firearm markets, trafficking, price, interviews","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9298125/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9298125/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eIllicit firearm markets constitute a significant component of global illicit economies and assume a central role in facilitating violent and organised criminal activities. Despite restrictive legislation across many jurisdictions that aim to limit access to firearms, criminal actors continue to access firearms through a range of channels, particularly via criminal networks and informal social connections. However, little is currently known about the factors that influence the prices of firearms in these illicit contexts. Building on the existing literature and drawing on interviews with 75 prisoners incarcerated across sixteen correctional centres in two Australian states\u0026mdash;South Australia and New South Wales - this paper examines the factors that influence the prices of illicit firearms. In doing so, this paper contributes new empirical insights into how illicit firearms prices are structured and negotiated, as well as the social and market forces that influence illicit firearm pricing. Overall, our findings suggest that illicit firearm prices are affected by a combination of restrictive policy environments, supply and demand dynamics, perceived risks of buying and selling illicit firearms, the unique characteristics of specific firearms, and social dynamics including closed social networks and interpersonal trust. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings on policy and practice.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"“Thirty grand for a MAC-10”: Revealing the factors that influence illicit firearms price","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-04-20 19:32:54","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9298125/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"186195594438245450936926175738960853220","date":"2026-04-10T16:52:41+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-04-08T07:18:50+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-04-07T23:56:20+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-04-07T23:55:47+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Trends in Organized Crime","date":"2026-04-02T04:47:47+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"trends-in-organized-crime","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"tioc","sideBox":"Learn more about [Trends in Organized Crime](http://link.springer.com/journal/12117)","snPcode":"12117","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/12117/3","title":"Trends in Organized Crime","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"18d78e53-f0c9-4b9e-9caf-eb4633ebddc9","owner":[],"postedDate":"April 20th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-20T19:32:54+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-04-20 19:32:54","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-9298125","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-9298125","identity":"rs-9298125","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}