Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions

Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions Shuping Wu, Simon Stevenson, James Young, Zan Yang This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Urban land in China is state-owned and primarily allocated by the government via a two-stage auction process. Compared with auction mechanisms in other markets and countries, China’s two-stage land auctions have a unique structure in that the first stage is an open-bid survival auction with a fixed deadline. This paper uses bid history data for land auctions in Beijing to analyze jump bidding behavior, investigating its effects on subsequent bidding and the final sale price achieved. We find that jump bidding increases the likelihood that the next bid is also a jump bid and that it accelerates the bid submission process in the first stage. Furthermore, jump bidding generates two-way effects on the land price. While it prevents lower-value bidders from entering the second stage, it can also trigger a ‘jump war’ between higher-value bidders. The findings in this paper suggest alternative bidding strategies within the two-stage auction structure and also provide an auction-based behavioral explanation for urban land price dynamics in China. land price land auction structure jump bidding sniping bid history data Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8894141","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":599675696,"identity":"18b29985-9042-48e9-8b94-3799596f0bb4","order_by":0,"name":"Shuping Wu","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Beijing Jiaotong University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shuping","middleName":"","lastName":"Wu","suffix":""},{"id":599675697,"identity":"b047b3c7-6c2d-4953-bf66-baf3f7f05e6e","order_by":1,"name":"Simon Stevenson","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Old Dominion University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Simon","middleName":"","lastName":"Stevenson","suffix":""},{"id":599675698,"identity":"0b2c5a53-b67b-4b20-83ea-babba817db09","order_by":2,"name":"James Young","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Oklahoma","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"James","middleName":"","lastName":"Young","suffix":""},{"id":599675699,"identity":"d323b8bb-660d-4c12-9422-7ca02edfc948","order_by":3,"name":"Zan Yang","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"KTH Royal Institute of Technology","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Zan","middleName":"","lastName":"Yang","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-02-16 14:53:59","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":103975665,"identity":"e9146e82-cf06-492b-b11d-25fe2162f414","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-05 08:35:58","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":478344,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8894141/v1_covered_5dcd4082-b9a8-4aff-8598-0b81ead1b620.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"land price, land auction structure, jump bidding, sniping, bid history data","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eUrban land in China is state-owned and primarily allocated by the government via a two-stage auction process. Compared with auction mechanisms in other markets and countries, China\u0026rsquo;s two-stage land auctions have a unique structure in that the first stage is an open-bid survival auction with a fixed deadline. This paper uses bid history data for land auctions in Beijing to analyze jump bidding behavior, investigating its effects on subsequent bidding and the final sale price achieved. We find that jump bidding increases the likelihood that the next bid is also a jump bid and that it accelerates the bid submission process in the first stage. Furthermore, jump bidding generates two-way effects on the land price. While it prevents lower-value bidders from entering the second stage, it can also trigger a \u0026lsquo;jump war\u0026rsquo; between higher-value bidders. The findings in this paper suggest alternative bidding strategies within the two-stage auction structure and also provide an auction-based behavioral explanation for urban land price dynamics in China.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-03-05 08:35:36","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8894141/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"dda66a84-f102-4a23-8f2e-c2caa997094b","owner":[],"postedDate":"March 5th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-09T19:09:03+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-03-05 08:35:36","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8894141","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8894141","identity":"rs-8894141","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}