The role of causal structure in implicit evaluation

Causal relationships, unlike mere co-occurrence, allow humans to obtain rewards and avoid punishments by intervening on their environment. Accordingly, explicit (controlled) evaluations of stimuli encountered in the environment are known to be sensitive to causal relationships above and beyond mere co-occurrence. In this project, we conduct stringent tests of whether implicit (automatic) evaluation also reflects causal relationships and begin to probe the representational mechanisms underlying such sensitivity. Participants (N = 4836) observed causal events during which two stimuli were equally contingent with positive or negative outcomes but only one of them was causally responsible for these outcomes. Across 6 studies, varying in design and amount of verbal scaffolding provided, differences in causal status consistently guided not only explicit measures of evaluation (Likert and slider scales; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen’s d = .28, BF10 > 10^46) but also their implicit counterparts (Implicit Association Tests; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen’s d = .22, BF10 > 10^29). However, unlike their explicit counterparts, implicit evaluations were not sensitive to causal relationships that had to be flexibly derived by combining disparate past experiences. Taken together, these studies suggest that implicit evaluations are sensitive to causal information. Such sensitivity seems to be mediated via precompiled, causally informed value representations rather than online computations over a causal model.