Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Multiple Stakeholders in Inclusive Green Growth

Abstract Inclusive green growth has been set as an important initiative to solve the severe problems of environmental degradation and severe income inequality. It requires the joint participation of local government, enterprise and public. However, these stakeholders are not enthusiasm enough as there are divergences among their interest goals. Hence, this paper analyses how to balance the stakeholders’ interest goals based on the central supervision and local regulation in environmental protection and income inequity alleviation. Therefore, an evolutionary game model between central and local government, and an evolutionary game model among local government and enterprise and public are conducted. The conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) The local government should play a leading role in promoting IGG, and the decrease of the economy proportion in the assessment on local government will significantly promote its enthusiasm; (2) When the penalty on enterprise increase, both enterprise and the public will choose positive participate behavior faster; (3) The high public monitoring cost will hinder both enterprise and public’s participation. Finally, some recommendations are put forward.