Straightening the ‘Value-Laden Turn’: Minimising the Influence of Values in Science

Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science, this paper argues that the influence of non-scientific values should be minimised – not excluded – in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the epistemic integrity of science, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed by proponents of the value-laden ideal, it proposes four prerequisites for any model for values in the acceptance / rejection phase of scientific inquiry, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: 1) to ensure the epistemic integrity of scientific knowledge; 2) to state clearly the uncertainties associated with scientific claims; 3) to distinguish between claims accepted into the scientific corpus and claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of 4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from international institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Hansson’s corpus model (preserving the epistemic integrity of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) and Betz’s conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) is proposed. Future directions for research regarding the relevance and the consequences of the philosophical debate on values in science are finally suggested.