How Interviewees Determine What Interviewers Want to Know
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Abstract
We examine the mechanisms by which interviewees in investigative interviews mentally organize information when deciphering what an interviewer wants to know. The overarching idea is that such a process stems from the extent to which an interviewer’s question specifies an objective. Our initial test (i.e., Neequaye & Lorson, 2023) suggested two competing mechanisms: High-specificity questions lead interviewees to focus on particularly relevant details to the exclusion of other information, while low-specificity questions make interviewees focus on a broader range of information items (Mechanism-1)—versus—Interviewees generally assume that interviewers want to know all the information at their disposal, irrespective of question specificity (Mechanism-2). We conducted two conceptual replications to gain clarity (Replication 1, N = 318; Replication 2, N = 292). The results were similar across the board. The more specific the questions an interviewer posed, the more likely interviewees honed in on the details that should provide a pragmatic response to those questions. And interviewees’ disposition, whether cooperative, semi-cooperative, or resistant, had no effect on information-item designations. Contrary to our expectations, interviewees remained confident that they had identified what their interviewer wanted to know, irrespective of question-specificity. This result held irrespective of whether the interviewer mixed high- and low-specificity questions (Replication 1) or consistently asked high- versus low-specificity questions (Replication 2). Thus, at this point in the research program, we lean more toward Mechanism-1.
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- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00
- unpaywall
- last seen: 2026-05-27T02:00:06.600101+00:00
License: CC-BY-4.0