The Watching Eyes Effect Predicts In-Game Penalties for Professional Sports

preprint OA: closed CC-BY-4.0
🔓 Open OA copy View at publisher

Abstract

The “watching eyes effect” suggests implicit surveillance cues like eyes can facilitate prosocial behavior, or at least a reduction in antisocial behavior compared to situations without such cues. This effect has been replicated and extended in various domains, yet mixed and heterogenous findings at the meta-analytic level require additional research to understand how eye cues may link to behavioral outcomes in different settings. The current study tested the watching eyes effect in a field study using National Football League data from 2016-2022 (N = 930 games), using penalties per game as a proxy for antisocial behavior (e.g., behavior that is reputationally damaging to oneself or one’s group) in professional sport. Teams playing opponents with eyes in their logos had nearly 7% fewer penalties per game, on average, than teams playing opponents without eyes, largely supporting the reputational hypothesis that argues eye cues (compared to the absence of eye cues) link to a reduction in antisocial behavior out of concern for being seen as a good, competent, or credible player for one’s team. Exploratory analyses further suggested the area of the eye in each logo was negatively associated with penalty rates, indicating how eye size is a critical component of the watching eyes effect as well. Implications for this replication study are discussed.

My notes (saved in your browser only)

Citation neighborhood (no data yet)

We don't have any in-corpus citations linked to this paper yet. The paper's references may be in our DB but unresolved to ``paper_id`` (resolution happens at ingest when the cited DOI matches a row we already have). Run the cross-source citation reconcile pass to retry.

Source provenance

europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00
unpaywall
last seen: 2026-05-27T02:00:06.600101+00:00
License: CC-BY-4.0