The Buffer Role of Emotions in International Conflict: Theoretical Evidence Supporting for Patriotic Education

Some scholars express concerns that patriotic education may increase the risk of international conflict by making people more emotional. However, their research may overlook other countries’ challenges to the status quo before international disputes. In this research, we use the behavioural economic paradigm and introduce four emotions into a two-stage bargaining model to study the role of emotions in forming and preventing international conflict. By comparing the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the bargaining game, we draw the following conclusions: when the strength of two countries matches their initial resource shares, neither side has the incentive to initiate a conflict. However, one side is motivated to provoke a dispute when a mismatch occurs. The negative emotions arising from compromising with other countries and facing other countries’ resistance serve as a buffer to some extent. Patriotic education elicits national-dignity-related emotions among the populace, thereby reducing the occurrence of conflict to some extent. This research may contribute to the field of international relations through the lens of behavioural game theory and offer some game-theoretical insights into the impact of patriotic education and emotions on international conflict.