The three world problem: How to do philosophy of mind without metaphysics
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Abstract
This article suggests that the influence of philosophy of mind and metaphysics in the study of consciousness, has become excessive and is not well-founded. Metaphysical terms are often ill-defined and equivocal, and philosophy of mind relies largely on weak, concrete arguments which lack the power of more abstract mathematical formulations. An example is given of a mathematical argument, the Three Worlds Problem, which cannot be adequately addressed or challenged within a traditional metaphysical framework.
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Source provenance
- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00
- unpaywall
- last seen: 2026-05-27T02:00:06.600101+00:00
License: Public-Domain