Compromising (On) the General Conditionality Mechanism and the Rule of Law
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Abstract
There was a sigh of relief at the European Council meeting in December 2020. After weeks of uncertainty, the Hungarian and Polish governments were persuaded not to veto the adoption of the new EU financial package. The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the “Next Generation EU” (NGEU) instrument were seemingly saved; the recovery of COVID-19-afflicted Europe could finally begin. The way the settlement was reached is, however, less cause for celebration.
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- europepmc
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