When nomenclature matters: Is the “new paradigm” really a new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning?

For most its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary exten-sional logic. The “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief centre stage, often represented as probabilities. The term “new paradigm” refers to Thomas Kuhn’s popular theory of science, which describes scientific progress as discontinues process of alternating "normal" and "revolutionary" phases. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision on what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that before the new de-velopments, the psychology of reasoning was neither in a phase of normal science, nor is the alleged new paradigm as revolutionary as the term suggests. Based on this analysis, we argue that the supposed opposition between a “new” and “old” para-digms hinders progress in the field. A more productive view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs stimulate each other in a fruitful way. The article closes with some topics where further connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in the psychology of reasoning.