Interrogating Competing Tensions among Procedure, Expertise and Local Communities in Public Participation Processes in Urban Renewal in Kenya: The Case of KISIP Project

Interrogating Competing Tensions among Procedure, Expertise and Local Communities in Public Participation Processes in Urban Renewal in Kenya: The Case of KISIP Project | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Interrogating Competing Tensions among Procedure, Expertise and Local Communities in Public Participation Processes in Urban Renewal in Kenya: The Case of KISIP Project Fawcett O. KOMOLLO, Lawrence S. ESHO, Joseph M. KEDOGO, Jason M. MOCHACHE, and 1 more This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 11 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Public participation has become a notoriously thorny subject for the state, communities, experts and other actors in Kenya; often exposing a litany of differences among them and slowing down decision-making and project implementation processes. This paper examines state-society, state-statute and statute-society critical junctures of public participation in slum upgrading projects and examines its value proposition to those respective relationships. It explores the normative, procedural and substantive bounds of public participation and investigates potential sources of conflicts. The study considers the justifiably progressive practice of slum upgrading in Kenya as exemplified by the Kenya Informal Slum Upgrading Project (KISIP). This project represents the main contemporary paradigm for slum upgrading which has been attempted in a number of settlements across the country to solve the slum menace. Using elite theory and Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of participation as theoretical models, the study reveals submerged ironies and contradictions in the implementation of public participation in planning, including lack of clarity, exclusion, systemic malfunctions, contradictions, rigidities, insurgencies, differences and interests, and an inherent fear of close engagement with the fundamentals of public participation by both sides. This study ultimately reveals that though hailed as a fundamental right, public participation remains vague and interminably devious, and in need of proper delineation of roles. At the end, the paper recommends an all-inclusive, collaborative model which diminishes tensions between the state and the society and their respective allies, by leveraging statutes as enablers. collaboration cooperation inclusivity consultation participationism “participators ” citizens’ forum Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Labels of tyranny against participation in development (1,2) have been intense since the turn of the millennium, but there still seem to be concerns with it to date. Conversely, public participation (PP) has also been applauded as a crucial component for successful development, including urban development and renewal (3), [2]. Many studies have outlined its benefits in tempering power dynamics in project delivery in deprived communities (3–5), broadening strategic agendas and influencing specific policies and programmes (6), and ultimately strengthening and legitimizing state decisions, actions and development interventions (7). PP literature, however, displays lots of contradictions, ironies and lack of clarity which render the otherwise desirable normative practice with lots of controversies, questions and doubts (3). In the US, it is seen as far from meeting its goals, is “counterproductive”, causes “anger and mistrust” (8). Despite the challenges, effective PP has been said to strengthen and promote governance, which is key in legitimizing governmental action (6). Similarly, public participation has gained traction in Kenya particularly after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The Constitution treasures PP as a right and a requirement for policymaking, including urban development [3, 4, 5]. Consequently, many state interventions have been contested on grounds of PP violations: “We were not consulted!” “The law was not followed!” “The process of public participation was flawed!” (12) being examples of common claims from constitutional petitions. Available case laws demonstrate that some of the cited violations were that either PP was not seen to have been conducted in accordance with the ‘prescriptions’ of the law, or because of perceptions and expectations of involved communities which appeared not to be met. Thus, while PP has been labelled as a cornerstone for democratic governance, and while it is seen to play a key role towards sustainable development (5,11), its practice has remained contentious. A dearth of constitutional and legislative clarity on normative application of PP (12) has created room for doubts (3), ambiguity (6,12), confusion on approach, and other political barriers to its implementation of PP (6); but partly because of misunderstanding and wrong perceptions from citizens. The type and method of PP has also been flagged as a critical concern on the involvement of the public (3). Public participation is even more important in spatial planning as it gives the public a voice and an opportunity to shape the environments in which they live, work and play (13) for their present and future lives. Spatial planning deals with the allocation and regulation of use of land and its resources which affects the entire population for all subsequent generations. Ensuring effective public participation within the spatial planning process makes sure there are effective, inclusive and sustainable development outcomes. However, despite its institutionalization in spatial planning, public participation in Kenya faces numerous barriers—ranging from political manipulation and technical gatekeeping to structural exclusions based on gender, class, and geography (14). 1.1 Critical Perspectives on Participation as tyranny Participation especially in the urban development field can be broadly divided into two main categories: expert-driven and people-driven. Urban development heavily relies on the technical expertise of professionals such as urban planners, urban designers, architects among others. The urban development process is also technical because it prioritizes regulatory frameworks. While these frameworks are important as they set the standards guiding urban development processes and activities, they rely heavily on professional judgement (15). This in turn isolates the communities that are directly and heavily impacted by the planning outcomes. On the other hand, people-driven models of participation prioritize local knowledge and experiences. This approach has been lauded as good as it ensures development processes are inclusive and reflect the needs of the local community. However, emphasis on this model poses the risk of dismissing professional input in urban development processes. This results in implementation of projects that do not meet the required standard which in turn further risks reducing the role of professionals to merely rubber stamping the decisions made by the public (16). The struggle to balance these two models of participation raises questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy and power in participatory urban development and renewal processes, and whether the practice is optimal. Participation’s tyrannical potential is also systemic which introduces the aspect of ‘tyranny of methods.’ The tools and methods used in participation are often used without being adapted to the local contexts which results in participation being a technical exercise rather than sincere conversation. Finally, tyranny of masses can be viewed in two ways. First, group dynamics can lead to decisions that only benefit the interests of those whose voices are dominant (2). The tyranny of masses can also be viewed from the perspective alluded to in the introduction. The public is empowered and in the case of Kenya they have lodged cases in court citing inadequate participation in spatial planning processes. The result of these cases is usually delay in the development activities that had been proposed. The critiques above call for a critical look into who sets the agenda, who benefits from participatory processes and who gets to speak. To understand the crucial nature of public participation, both diachronic and synchronic perspectives are essential (Brélaz and Rose 2021; Lefebvre 1968) for two reasons: diachronic perspective to understand how the practice has been developing over time and synchronic perspective to understand the application at the specific context, in a specific moment. 1.2 Slum upgrading as urban renewal and urban development UN-Habitat (17) defines slums as settlements located within cities marred with challenges of inadequate housing, poor or absent infrastructure and poor sanitation, and insecurity of tenure, and poor access and circulation within the settlement. Population densities of slums are often high exceeding the supply of the basic infrastructure hence the strain. Nairobi County is witnessing over 60% of its population live within informal settlements which account for only 6% of its land. In response to the proliferation of slums, governments have spearheaded several programs as interventions to improve informal settlements which have been referred to as ‘slum upgrading initiatives’ such as KENSUP. Slum upgrading as a form of urban renewal seeks to improve the living conditions in informal settlements which is primarily by integrating them into the formal structure of the city (18). Slum upgrading focuses on providing access to basic services, improving security of tenure, improving quality of housing and enhancing community participation and social inclusion within informal settlements. Urban renewal has historically encompassed demolishing old neighbourhoods and rebuilding them in an ideal way guided by a development plan. However, in many cities of the Global South, urban renewal has been plagued by challenges of displacement of the urban poor emphasising social inequalities and corroding community and social networks (19). In this regard, slum upgrading is emerging as a progressive form of urban renewal that is built on in-situ improvements, reduced displacement, vigorous community participation and incremental development. Slum upgrading also includes urban transformation as it serves as a catalyst for broader transformation of a city. Slum upgrading contributes to urban development by reducing inequalities and marginalization within urban areas, improving access to urban infrastructure, and enhancing environmental sustainability. However, while slum upgrading holds promise, its implementation has encountered several issues with a main one being tokenistic participation. Community engagement in these initiatives is mostly limited to members of the community validating pre-decided plans. 1.3 Legal Framework of Participation in Kenya As aforementioned, the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) enshrined participation as a national value and a principle of governance under Article 10, creating the watershed for public participation in development in Kenya. As a key focus on Kenya’s governance and devolution strategies. This importance is highlighted in the Constitution of Kenya (9) which provides for the foundation of its legal framework. Article 1 of the Constitution states that all sovereign power is vested in the people of Kenya, the exercise of which may be directly or indirectly, at the national and county levels. Similarly, other articles like 118 1 (b); 196 1 (b); 174 (c); 184 1 (c); and 232 1 (d), inter alia , have various express provisions for public/ citizen provision and appeals to various bodies, persons, organizations, institutions, among others, to ensure that PP as the foundation of formulation of plans and budgets and in the design of development programmes and projects. Public and stakeholder participation therefore emerges as an important component in the planning process, including the identification of community visions and plans, infrastructure and services delivery process, housing, economic and livelihood strategies, among others. The challenge is not in bringing into being a public participation platform, but in taking care/ accommodating all the competing, often antagonistic interests of various stakeholders in the planning process. For urban and regional planning programme and projects, constitutional provisions for public participation are given substance in specific laws such as the Urban areas and Cities Act (UACA) of 2011 (Amendment 2019), County Governments Act (CGA) (2012) and the Physical and Land Use Planning Act of 2019 creating very specific invitations to public participation as highlighted below. 1.3.1 Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011, Amendment 2019) The earliest post 2010 statutory provision for public participation is found in the Urban Areas and Cities Act (UACA) of 2011. Comparable to Greek cities down to the Roman imperial period where a substantial share of power in running city affairs was conceded to ordinary citizens through popular assemblies and other public activities (Brélaz and Rose 2021), section 22 of the Urban Areas and Cities Act provides for establishment of citizen fora to facilitate the participation of citizens in the management of their urban area (20). As a normative practice, a citizen forum can create the opportunity for a deeper and more fundamental involvement of all actors, based on the idea that a networked society is evolving, creating new relationships between a vast array of actors and new forms of management and decision-making (15,21). It UACA reaffirms the value and benefits of participation of residents of a city or urban area in decision making by submitting comments or opinions to a board or town committee. It also outlines that a town or city board shall put in place measures that will support active public participation and carry out capacity building to empower citizens to participate in the affairs of urban areas including physical and land use planning. The act is also inclusive by stipulating that minority and marginalized groups should be included in the public participation processes and mechanisms (20). 1.3.2 County Government Act (2012) To operationalize the County Governments, the County Governments Act (CGA)of 2012 was formulated. The act under Part VIII provides for principles of citizen participation which include timely access to information related to policy formulation and implementation and reasonable access to the process of formulating and implementing policies, laws and regulations which includes the approval of development proposals. Formulation of County Spatial Plans and County Integrated Development Plans serve as the primary planning instruments at the county level and should be developed through thorough public engagement. The act mandates county assemblies to come up with laws and regulations that will give effect to citizen participation in development planning. The act has proposed the following structures for citizen participation: information communication technology-based platforms, town hall meetings, budget preparation and validation fora, notice boards and development project sites. The act has clearly left operationalizing of public participation to county assemblies all through the country. 1.3.3 Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019) The Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019) prescribes publication of notices in newspaper dailies, the Kenya Gazette and electronic media as an invitation for the public to participate in matters physical and land use planning(22). The act also adds that the planning authority shall publicly display draft physical and land use development plans to allow for public scrutiny for a specific period, usually sixty (60) days after the publication of the Notice of Completion of the Plan . The public are invited to make comments and give opinions on the draft development plans and the planning authority is mandated to review the comments for inclusion in the plan before approval. While the Act consistently stresses the need to include the public in physical and land use planning processes, it does not specify other channels for operationalising this. This has left a gap that has been filled using stakeholder workshops as the primary form of public participation in the formulation of physical and land use development plans. There are three stakeholder workshops categorised as follows: awareness and sensitization workshop, situational analysis, draft plan presentation and final plan presentation. While stakeholder forums are seen to be the most common form of public participation, there are no clear guidelines on how to integrate associative and participatory democracy in the public participation processes. This presents another gap which is the lack of clear guidelines on a structured and balanced approach that incorporates. The planner takes on the role of a facilitator of participation by organizing the forums, guiding participatory mapping and interpreting technical concepts ensuring communities make informed decisions . However, typically, in meetings, the technocratic language of Planners and lay language used by communities, make communication inefficient in. such workshops. Planners also serve as neutral mediators balancing the needs and priorities of all stakeholders and ensuring. In community-led planning, planners act as co-creators not commanders. They empower communities while upholding professional standards resulting in better planning outcomes. The centrality of public participation is asserted in the County Spatial Guidelines (10). Visioning as a tenet for public participation is defined as a process by which a community with the guidance of the planning team decides the future it wants and then plans how to achieve it. The key fundamental questions to ask include: (1) Where are we (the community) now? (2) Where are we (the community) going? (3) Where do we (the community) want to be? And (4) how do we (the community) get there? The primary purpose of the visioning process is to develop a set of vision statements, community goals, and objectives that best articulate the desires of the residents about the future (10). In this framework, the role of the state as ‘provider’ is gradually moving towards that of an ‘enabler,’ in the process sometimes taking on an ‘entrepreneurial’ style (15,22). 1.4 Problematizing Public Participation Practice: A critical view The High Court in Kenya has problematized PP by highlighting that that though it is an important principle, it has not been coded comprehensively through legislation, with the CoK staying silent on what it constitutes (12). While numerous constitutional petitions have led to the reinforcement of public participation as a constitutional right and not a discretionary activity, they have also led to the delay, suspension and cancellation of urban development projects. This clearly demonstrates the power of the ‘masses’ in the urban development and renewal processes meaning they can halt even well-intentioned projects that may benefit our urban areas if well implemented on the basis of inadequate public participation. Similarly, as noted by the High Court and other commentators, the absence of a national legislation on public participation which provides a comprehensive definition and parameters on what constitutes PP has contributed to making it less understood (12), difficult to enforce and less effective (11). Because of that lack of clarity, participation in Kenya, especially in development projects, has often been hailed as a “core value” (9) to be applied in environmental protection, lawmaking and other business of Parliament and County Assemblies, and as a principle of public finance (11). Lack of effort towards understanding how the public perceive their rights and what obstacles they are facing in accessing these rights contributes to undermining public participation. The first obstacle is exclusion where minority groups, the urban poor, women, youth and persons with disability are often excluded from planning processes. Another challenge that is found within public participation processes in Kenya is ‘elite capture’ where participatory spaces are dominated by political, technical or economic elites who advance their own interests. This results in the community being subordinate to those in power (often the experts and those in political positions) which becomes a hindrance to obtaining real change. County-level PP forums are often attended and ‘hijacked’ by political and local allies undermining inclusivity, further reinforcing existing inequalities (3). Public participation, especially at the county-level, is hampered by institutional constraints. Lack of capacity, inadequate funding, unclear guidelines for operationalizing participation and the absence of proper participatory planning tools are major challenges hindering adequate public participation. Many counties also do not have a well-structured feedback mechanism meaning most public participation forums are often done just for show (11). Lack of capacity also means planning documents which often have technical jargon are not translated into local languages or simplified for the understanding of the general public, hence, participation remains the prerogative of ‘experts’ since they are the only ones who can understand the technical language (23). 1.5 Aim, Objectives and Questions Despite many different attempts to address slums in Kenya, there appears to be the concerns that the “challenge” of slums persists. The question “why slum upgrading plans fail” thus remains an ever present theoretical, epistemic and practical problem which might be answered by addressing the different components of the planning process and product. PP thus becomes of interest in seeking to establish its potential contribution to this failure. While there is broad acknowledgement that there are different methods for implementing stakeholder consultation (3), the key question that this paper seeks to address is whether the practice has strengthened the planning process and bequeathed it the advantages that have been ascribed to it or not. Thus, while the paper acknowledges the multiplicity of actors within the PP process, and the embeddedness of interests among them, the paper seeks to understand how these interests can be better understood. Finally, what interventions are possible for the reconciliation of varied, competing, sometimes antagonistic interests of actors for effective and balanced implementation of PP so that each category of actors accesses the desired empowering environment for achieving their goals. 1.6 Definition of key terms Public participation (PP) has been defined as the process by which citizens, as individuals, groups or communities, take part in the conduct of public affairs, interact with the state and other non-state actors to influence decisions, policies, programs, legislation and provide oversight in service delivery, development and other matters concerning their governance and public interest, either directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives (7). This definition is key because it identifies what PP is, who is involved in it, in which areas it is applicable and to what ends, the Department of Physical Planning, under the State Department for Lands and Physical Planning has prescribed the application of these objectives in the planning process (10). With the coming of devolution, lots of publications are now available on how PP has been instrumental in County Governance (11,24), budgeting(7,14) etc. As a result, participationism as a school of thought that weaponizes PP as an instrument for advancing other agendas separate from the planning goal seems to have emerged. Participationism thus, implies the belief that PP is the key procedural, substantive and normative objective of development planning, and that no government intervention can successfully be implemented without participation, and only where certain interests take central stage, often shifting the desired goal. In keeping with participationism is the emergence of a category of actors that we call participators , usually citizens acting on their own capacity to attend PP meetings for purposes of earning money or in representation of some other agencies, usually Civil Society Organization (CSOs) or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In this study, the term is used, alongside participationism , to draw a distinction with participants (2) and what is emergent as interest- and agency-driven, trouble-some participation which often makes effective participation difficult to achieve. Another challenge that makes PP difficult is the ‘expert’s conundrum’, which is defined as the difficult position that experts are subjected to in the implementation of PP. Caught between the strong forces of state, society and statutes, experts often are forced to operate in the fear of crossing any of the lines. And since statutes typically are applicable one way or the other and can always be enlisted by the more powerful of the two, the expert is left exposed, waiting to see where the wind blows. 2.0 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK In urban planning studies and practice, various works have pitched for public/ citizen participation under a variety of titles: community development (25), public participation (26), stakeholder engagement (27), collaboration (3) among others. The conceptualization of this paper is based on a critique of Karl Mannheim’s (28) ideas on the forces of centralization and participation as the factors that shape social structure. Centralization is defined by Mannheim as a form of top-down system of decision-making while participation refers to a framework that allows for the free expression of citizens. According to Manheim, these two forces combine to produce four distinct social structures viz: dictatorship, democracy, anarchy and anomie by their degree of participation and centralization, and straight out asserts his preference of democracy which offers both a high level of centralization and high level of participation (28,29). While mainstream planning theory has increasingly focused on the procedural applications, external developments on the substantive side are increasingly pushing the profession in new directions and demanding responses (30). Although grounded in the mundane, planners help nurture a community’s deepest aspirations, such as love, hope and beauty. Planners translate theoretical, and to a greater sense, actual goals into specific actions. Planning often deals with in-between issues and so requires perception of what artists call negative space (spaces between objects)’ (31). This definition of the role of the planner is quite elastic and might be stretched to include almost all the activities, thoughts, feelings, aspirations, imaginations and dreams of the community and the society (terms not to be used interchangeably in this study, but in concord with the sociological concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft from Toennies 1887 and Durkheim’s Society in De la Division du Travail Social. Community-led planning is a shift from expert-driven models and top-down approach to physical and land use planning where members of the community are actively involved in identifying their needs, and setting their priorities based on their aspirations and lived experiences (Healey, 1997). Communities are seen as co-creators of spatial interventions which fosters a sense of ownership. It is built on the premise that residents of an area understand their challenges and potentials best, hence development proposals will align with their needs and aspirations. Community-led planning is built on the principles of community ownership, collaboration and partnership and empowerment (32). 2.1 Communities and the essence of participation The result of a good plan is that residents are more likely to be supportive of plans, they have actively helped create. This way, ‘planners create connections between different agencies, sectors and jurisdictions. As a result, they must collaborate with diverse interest groups’ (31). Where such climate is provided, communities will gain their space to participate by clamouring for and gaining significant voice both in debate, discussion and decision-making processes (15) in creating the desired visions for their settlements and cities. Here, democracy as a strong tenet for the involvement of communities becomes a strong vehicle for achieving PP. Mazrui, though, highlights the need to distinguish democracy as means and democracy as goals and identifies four fundamental goals of democracy as accountable rulers, active participating citizens, an open society and social justice (33). 2.2 Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation Sherry Arnstein’s 1969 article titled A Ladder of Citizen Participation (26) became foundational in the understanding of public participation. In it, participation was conceptualized into three main categories with eight rungs: non-participation (manipulation and therapy), tokenism (informing, consultation, placation) and citizen power (partnership, delegated power and citizen control) (26); focusing on the degree of power citizens can or should have in decision-making (15). Arnstein’s main highlight is that mere consultation does not equate actual influence. Central to the claim of this model is that top-down participation procedures have been seen to pay lip service to ‘information and consultation’ and is often used as ‘oil’ to smooth over the authorities’ decision-making engines – at its worst, an instrument to manipulate citizens (15). Manipulation is defined as an illusory form of participation where government officials mislead citizens into having them believe that they have power in a process where they have intentionally been denied power. Citizens serve the purpose of rubber stamping what the government has already decided to do (26). In this model, citizen power, which is the ultimate goal of PP, encompasses partnership, delegated power and citizen control. Partnership occurs when citizens and those in authority collaborate and share decision-making responsibilities mainly through negotiation and joint committees. However, power holders do not voluntarily yield power, and citizens have to take it through actions such as protests, campaign and community organizing (26). Delegated power is when citizens are allowed to have significant authority which is achieved by power holders yielding some of their power and influence allowing citizens to make decisions. Finally, citizen control is when citizens are fully in-charge of a program, policy or project and marks the highest form of influence and participation. There have been claims that PP in Kenya largely falls within the tokenism, consultation and placation levels of participation considered as low level of public participation as shown in Fig. 2, which is the Government’s own adaptation of Arnstein’s ladder for spatial planning (10). This is mainly due to the absence of a feedback mechanism leading to participation forums being avenues for airing views without any communication on how that feedback will have informed the policy or plan being discussed. Secondly, many County Governments lack the capacity to translate development and renewal plans into local languages or simplified versions that do not have technical jargon (23). To cure this deficiency, the County Spatial Planning Guidelines (10) has prescribed the adaptation of Arnstein’s ladder. A horizontal-vertical schematic that favours greater output of PP in Planning where the highest level of public participation (26) emerges from the goals of empowerment of communities who are provided with an opportunity to make decisions for themselves through visioning, and policy and strategy formulation. As a theoretical model, other variations exist for operationalization. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the ladder of participation was applied in Singapore with some variations to get the country on a trajectory of development. A model which integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches but offers the best outcomes. He says that by trial and error, he learnt that if he wanted to get an important proposal accepted at all levels; he would float his ideas with his ministers, who would then float the ideas with permanent secretaries who would then float them with lower-level officials. After he got their reactions, he would have the proposal discussed among those who had to make it work [the technocrats]. If the proposals concerned large numbers of people, he would then get the issue in the media for public discussion. Yew (2000) acknowledges that there are some sensitive matters that cannot be debated. One such issues is in the eradication of slums(34). Faced with slums like Geylang Serai, which [along with Kampong Ubi and Kampong Kembangan] housed tens of thousands of slum dwellers under depressed conditions, poor housing and a lack of essential services, he provided unequivocal leadership by committing to eradicate the slums by ‘demolishing it’ and in its place “build a modern high-rise housing estate.” This was implemented, and a comprehensive process for eradicating slums was launched which not only eradicated the slums, but also eradicated the social ties that bound the slums dwellers through distribution by random balloting (34). As asserted by Van Den Broeck, et al., (15), the overall responsibility for collective goods is a specific mandate of the public sector which has increasingly been expanded to accommodate more private responsibilities of the individual through public participation. However, as aforementioned, there appears to be an element of exclusion of the private interest in participation processes in Kenya which presents itself in experts hijacking the participation process be it by government officials, NGOs and CSOs as was the case in Mukuru Special Planning Area (3). Placation is clearly demonstrated here as a few people may be involved without accountability to the wider community. The key obstacles that hinder public participation in Kenya from moving to higher rungs are lack of capacity, elite/expert capture, grey areas in the law and power asymmetries. 2.3 Elite Theory This theory posits that a small group of individuals (elites or experts) wield significant power and influence over decision making and other structures within the society. This minority often consists of policymakers and leaders who make decisions on behalf of the majority, and who influence public policy, (35) There is a significant power imbalance between the elite and the general public and the decisions made by the elite are often influenced by the elite rather than the general public’s needs (35). In the case of urban development and renewal in Kenya, decisions are mostly made by experts and policymakers. While the law, which is also largely formulated by the elite, may have provided for public participation, but it does not give a clear guideline on the mechanisms of conducting effective and adequate participation. This has left room for superficiality in compliance tying to tokenism within the participation processes in Kenya undermining equitable participation and public interest. Elite capture in urban development and renewal processes can take the following forms: economic incentives, technical complexity, representation filtering and agenda-setting control. Devolution was seen as an opportunity of eradicating elite domination by devolving power and decision making to the grassroots. However, new elite classes have been formed at the county level with governors, MCAs and other stakeholders such as contractors colluding in decisions pertaining to resource allocation (35). The elite further entrench themselves by failing to properly empower citizens by providing them with information and support need to engage meaningfully. The concept of elite capture and that of special interest groups as propounded by (35) imply that any given decision-making platform should critically assess the interests of the elites to reduce interference. 3.0 APPROACH AND METHODS In this study, both qualitative and empirical methods are applied in evaluating the applicability of socio-technical planning approaches and public participation in slum upgrading under the KISIP project, similar to what has been applied by other studies such as (3). It is falsely asserted by (36) that the KISIP project has been concluded - only Phase I was concluded and interventions on other sites kickstarted under Phase II. This paper reviews projects that were implemented in the first phase of KISIP. As shown above, various technical processes are involved in a slum upgrading exercise. In the KISIP process, both quantitative, qualitative, spatial and legal analysis techniques were applied in achieving various goals. For instance, in the process of socio-economic survey which was done through census enumeration, the number and socio-economic characteristics of households in each of the settlements was established, and detailed mapping was done to establish the boundaries of the settlements as well as to map each structure. Further, various aspects of spatial, quantitative and qualitative methods were applied in spatial analysis of each settlement (37,38). In seeking to understand the planning approach, various aspects of the planning process are evaluated, including acceptability of the project, acceptability of the planning standards, acceptability of community desires, visions and aspirations, negotiations between the community on one hand and the government on the other. Overall analysis of KISIP is done using both secondary and primary data collection methods. Three key document categories are involved in this, including the State department of Housing and Urban Developments (SDHUD) web page, (SDHUD 2017) World Bank’s web pages (39,40), socio-economic profiles of sampled settlements prepared by the consultancy team that was tasked with the assignment e.g., (38) and (41), and the various physical development plans (PDPs) e.g., (37,42). All these sources combine to offer various aspects of data that form the main spine of empirical data for the paper. In this sense, broader concerns such as the KISIP project conceptualization and design, the planning approach and methodology, execution of various tasks under the various components are analysed. Twenty-one slums which were earmarked for upgrading under KISIP I between 2014 and 2018 have been highlighted to provide the grounds for a close reflection on the process of slum upgrading. Table 1 provides a summary of these settlements across Nairobi City (11), Mombasa City (6), Kiambu County (2) and Embu County (2). These reflections provide the basis for inference on current prospects and constraints of slum upgrading in Kenya, and its future possibilities. Overall, a number of issues were identified which included the current status of the slums, ownership status, the position of tenants, project design to accommodate the tenants in slums who constitute the vast majority, but who are subject to the powers of the minority structure owners, among others. Table 1: Sampled settlements planned under the KISIP 1 project between 2014 – 2018. Source: Adapted from VSPL, OOPL, and MoTIHUD (2017b; 2017a; 2017c; 2016a; 2016b) S/ No Informal Settlements Particulars County Key Concerns Formal approval status Community approval 1 Kambi Moto Nairobi Self-help housing, infrastructure, access to services, tenure security Approved Approved 2 Ghetto Self-help housing, water, sanitation, access Approved Approved 3 Kosovo Housing, access, sanitation Approved Approved 4 Mashimoni Housing, access, sanitation Approved Approved 5 Embakasi Tenure security, access to services Approved Approved 6 Kitui Housing, infrastructure, sanitation, tenure Approved 7 Redeemed Economy, access, energy supply, industrial use Approved Approved 8 Kinyago Kanuku Housing, economy, tenure security Approved 9 Gitathuru Sanitation, Water, security, housing, environmentally fragile location Approved Approved 10 Njiku Rural suburbs, housing, tenure, land conflicts Approved Approved 11 Kisii Village Not planned as the community rejected the intervention Not applicable Rejected 12 Kahawa Soweto Sanitation, services, tenure security, access Approved Approved 13 Likoni - Mombasa Mombasa Sanitation, Access to electricity, rental units, recreational spaces Approved Approved 14 Majaoni Agriculture, housing/ settlements, tenure security, livelihoods, historical injustices Approved Approved 15-17 Chaani – (3 settlements – Kalahari, Mathare and Kwa Rasi) Sanitation, Access to electricity, environmental protection/ environmentally fragile location of Kwarasi and Kalahari settlements, pollution, landslides Approved Approved 18 Ganahola Mikindani Abandoned midway through as the community did not have faith in the process Not applicable/ Not Planned Not applicable/ Contested ownership 19 Ugweri 3 Embu Not planned after the community resisted the process before the start Not applicable/ Not Planned Abandoned 20 Kimangaru Sanitation, rental units, Markets, Farming, Social services Approved Approved 21 Umoja Kiambu Tenure security, services, settlements, sanitation Not approved Approved A sample-frame of twenty-one (21) settlements, highlighted in the table above, is provided for an in-depth study regarding the status of implementation of the project, especially on the achievement of components 1 and 2; components 3 and 4 are not reviewed as the particular contract did not get to those levels. Informal settlements are distributed throughout Nairobi. For a detailed understanding of all the issues in context, however, Kahawa Soweto has been purposefully selected. It is an informal settlement in the northern reaches of Nairobi City. The settlement has been selected for three reasons: first because of its consideration as part of the KISIP project; secondly because there have been other attempts prior to the KISIP process to provide perspective on challenges/ and or failures of slum upgrading, and thirdly because it has been studied in a related study on supply of basic services Let there be Light: Towards a Hybridized Electricity Supply Paradigm in Slums in Kenya (43) and in another evaluative study the Global-Local Intersections: Lessons from Slum Upgrading in Kenya - the KISIP Experience Between 2011 to 2022 (18). 4.0 FINDINGS: EXPECTATIONS AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Kahawa Soweto is administratively part of Kasarani sub-county. It is situated in the north-eastern fringes of Nairobi City County located adjacent to the Kahawa Military Barracks, separated only by the railway line in whose reserve it finds its access (37,38). Kahawa Soweto’s origins date back to 1977, when a limited number of rural-urban immigrants invaded a stretch of unoccupied public land. Since then, the numbers have marginally grown. The residents, devoid of ownership rights, struggle to lay claim to the land, and resident groups often are in confrontation with each other. There also have been several government attempts at evicting the settlement’s residents either in part or the whole. In 1988, there was an eviction notice from the court citing environmental concerns as the southern edges of the settlement adjoins an abandoned quarry. According to the Socio-Economic Report for Kahawa Soweto (38), residents however stayed put which justified the move by the Government of Kenya to recommend its improvement under KISIP (38). Through the census enumeration exercise done in 2015 in the KISIP project, the population of Kahawa Soweto was established at 3197, growing at the rate of 3.9% per annum. With a spatial imprint of just under 6 hectares, Kahawa Soweto has a population density of 717 persons per hectare in 2022, compared to the city’s average of 66 person per hectare. Projection using the compounded annual growth rate method indicates that the population of the settlement will increase to 5,675 with a population density of 973 persons per hectare in 2030 compared to the estimated city’s average of 93 (43). It is true that there are a number of challenges in slums. According to data available under the KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto Informal Settlement. Kahawa Soweto is characterized by haphazard development without the guidance of formal planning principles. The housing typology is predominantly temporary low-rise tenement row housing (43). The horizontal densities are high, thereby rendering the settlement inaccessible, a situation execrated by the narrow nature of the paths and streets. Typically, these paths measure approximately 1.5 meters, and consequently do not lend themselves for use as wayleaves for trunk utilities. However, there exists reliable electricity connectivity within the vicinity of the settlement for public amenities and industries including Kahawa Soweto Primary School and Health Centre. The materials used to construct their residential structures are a clear indicator of economic status of the residents and the deemed security and permanence of their habitat. According to (44), security of tenure influences the quality of housing in a settlement; households with titles even in informal settlements are viewed to more likely have permanent units unlike their counterparts without tenure security, though questions are rife on whether the existence of titles predisposes slum dwellers to gentrification, loss of residence and the subsequent formation of new slums. An analysis of housing structures was done based on three components - wall, floor and roof. Most of the structures are constructed with locally available materials such as mud and other (often reused) construction materials, including corrugated galvanized (CGI) iron-sheets, mud and timber. Majority of walls are made of iron sheets (57%), followed by wood (10%). The materials used for flooring of the structures are cement and earth with the latter having a share of 70% (38). 4.1 Mapping actors and plotting antagonistic claims: Slum upgrading as multi-actor interaction A multi-actor approach to slum upgrading allows for resource sharing and more responsive planning ( Fig. 1 ). However, as it has been established, there is a risk of power imbalances and conflicting priorities. For instance, in the case of Kahawa Soweto, the government prioritized infrastructure development and tenure security while the community was more interested in owning the structures that they live in and no other proposals were attractive to them. This is where planners come in to act as mediators and knowledge translators among the stakeholders making sure the voices of the community are not drowned out by technocratic or donor-driven imperatives. Slum upgrading is a multi-actor endeavour that brings together stakeholders with varying and sometimes conflicting interests. Due to the complex nature of slum upgrading planning processes, there is need for participation and involvement of a diverse range of stakeholders to ensure success of the proposed initiatives. According to Rigon (45), slum upgrading seeks to enable and empower communities hence they become the major actor in the process. There are also NGOs which take up the role of facilitators and intermediaries between the community and the government. KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto appreciated the important role residents play in the upgrading process and formulated Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) which served as a bridge between the community and other stakeholders (KISIP team, Government) to ensure grassroots concerns are captured (KISIP, 2020). Civil society groups such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji took up the role of empowering residents making sure they are appraised of their rights and responsibilities within the planning process. The State has the key role of policy formulation and spearheading the slum upgrading initiatives such as KISIP. The local community has the main role of identifying local issues and needs. Their main interests were increased access to basic infrastructure, quality housing and employment opportunities. They also have the role of shaping development proposals by providing their input in the planning process. However, this presented a challenge where they were keener on owning the structures they lived in, and no other planning proposals were attractive to them. This meant that they were not interested in whether planning standards were upheld and there was a bit of resistance to government plan proposals that they felt were likely to evict them. Planning and politics cannot be separated, and politicians play a crucial role which is facilitating the preparation and approval of plans by allocating resources. Politicians also have the key role of shaping urban renewal and development by preparing and approving legislations and zoning regulations. However, sometimes these roles may be overshadowed by certain interests. The need for votes and political support pushes politicians to maintain the status quo since the existence of depressing conditions may mean more campaign promises or skewed policies to benefit specific constituencies. To bargain with politicians over policies and resources individuals mobilize to form interest groups. Agents who manage to overcome collective action problems and organize themselves into a lobby have more influence than less organized groups and are thus likely to receive more benefits (35). They may also compromise the planning process since improvement of slum conditions may lead to the electorate's reduced dependence on them. The slum upgrading process in Kahawa Soweto revealed some resistance from the politicians since some were against any measures for relocation as they raise concerns of gerrymandering of electoral boundaries/ slum boundaries. It is the role of the expert to come in and balance these interests while ensuring the community needs are taken into account and the planning outcome is adequately achieved. The main concerns in Kahawa Soweto were access to sanitation services and other utilities such as electricity which meant that utility companies were a major stakeholder. Utility companies have the role of providing essential services to the community while ensuring the protection of their infrastructure. Finally, the shelter/structure owners have the primary role of providing shelter. Their keen interest in collecting land rents was a catalyst to them inciting residents to resist planning processes in a bid to ‘protect their investments’. Through the Kahawa Soweto upgrading process, it is clear that interests of structure owners need to be understood and reconciled with those of tenants. Sensitization is crucial in communicating to structure owners that slum improvement is for all and may in the long run translate to higher rents due to improvement of general conditions such as access and economic empowerment of the community. 4.2 Rings of action: Identifying the multi-scalarity of actors in slums As shown in Fig. 1 , actors in the slum upgrading process operate across multiple and overlapping scales forming layers of decision-making and implementation which ultimately shapes the process and outcomes of the urban renewal process. In the case of upgrading Kahawa Soweto, the outermost ring consists of World Bank which is the development partner behind KISIP. World Bank set the conditions under which the KISIP project was done, funded and evaluated (KISIP, 2020). They also set up funding conditions and monitoring, evaluation and learning requirements. The ring that follows is the national scale which is the Ministry of Lands, Public Works, Housing and Urban Development. This actor develops legal and institutional frameworks that support and guide the slum upgrading process while providing oversight, coordination and legitimacy for receiving donor support. The third ring is the state at the county level which is the Nairobi City County whose role is organizing meetings, approving the spatial plans and working alongside consultants by supervision (37). The fourth circle represents the local community scale comprising CBOs, residents’ association, Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) among others. They act as the link between policy and lived experiences. They represent the public’s interests and shape the agenda setting and validate priorities. At the heart of decision-making on residential locations are individual choices. Individual rationality in decision-making has been established as a consequential determinant of where an individual lives. As parts of households, individual rationality is closely tied with the decisions of households on where they will live. In slum upgrading projects, these constitute the lowest levels of beneficiaries. Their participation is mainly through public barazas /community meetings and grievance redress mechanisms. They may be limited by lack of institutional power; however, they determine the success, legitimacy and sustainability of the plan proposals. Multi-scalarity calls for recognition that the participation of the actors above is layered and politicized, calling for equitable facilitation and capacity building to ensure coherence between global objectives and local realities. Table 2 summarizes these competing/ antagonistic interests from the slums that were studied. As can be seen, each actor category has their interests and face unique challenges. At the same time, each actor views itself from an internal lens which might be different from external perspectives of other actors. Because of interests, there are gains which each actor category expects to reap, while all actors will appear to posture as if they are pursuing the goals of residents of slum dwellers. Table 2: Sketching Antagonistic interests among actors in slums. Source: Authors, 2025 Actor Interest The problem Perspectives What the interests will gain/ lose What slum dwellers will/ gain/ lose 1 The state Land Land rents A good quality of life for its people Political support for the incumbent government Security of tenure for the people Environmental sustainability investments The planning process is expensive The government feels entitled as they own the land Planning is about implementation of standards in the given contexts: currently there are no relaxed standards for informal settlements Initiation of the planning process. Willingness to provide security of tenure to residents of slums. What precedence will they set? Enhancement of quality of life of slum-dwellers? According to which parameters? Wouldn’t it just be enough to give title deeds without so much of a fuss? Collection of taxes Control of “law and order” Control of spatial order Control of unsanctioned access to utilities like electricity Safety of government installations like oil pipelines and railways Safety and security Community social equilibrium will be lost They will pay land rents/ land rents Gentrification from well-to-do urban dwellers Slums will lose identity Government surveillance will increase, hence constrained freedoms Structure owners will lose their power 2 County Governments Land Rates Environmental sustainability Political support Good quality of life for residents investments County governments feel entitled because of their constitutional mandate to plan. Have minimum standards for development control. Set the zoning regulations for developments Initiation of planning process and service delivery? Have the current failed? Willingness to provide security of tenure. Why? Could this be a form of land redistribution? Accommodation of informal settlement zones standards? Why? Collection of rates and other taxes for licenses Control of “law and order” Control of spatial order Constitutional mandate Control of unsanctioned access to utilities like water Payment of land rates from the local residents Local government inefficiency will replace local mechanisms 3 Local community Land Housing Infrastructure and services Economic activities Political and administrative leadership that protects their interests Water and sanitation Environmental sanitation Employment opportunities The local communities are suspicious and resistant of all government initiative as they feel that the government is setting to evict them Feel entitled to live where they live Are mainly interested in owning the structures that they live in and no other proposals are attractive Fear of eviction Fear of gentrification Need to be left alone to occupy current niche? Acceptance and support of the planning process? Why now? What new gains will be obtained? Will the settlements retain their solidarity structures human? Willingness to provide setbacks for installation of trunk and other services? Understanding that they are invaders of government or private land who need accommodation. Need to understand that slum improvement is for their benefit? Really? According to whom? “Better housing” measured by adequacy and affordability Law and order Clean and environmentally safe environments Increased access to utilities like water and electricity They will no longer be left alone Government policing and surveillance will multiply Role in political change will diminish The collapse of the alternative economy Increased suffering as a result of collapse of alternative economy Reduced happiness Utilities will be charged Government inefficiency will be introduced 4 Politicians (Local and national) Land Votes and political support Empowerment of their electorate Environmental sustainability Reduced dependency Suspicious of the planning process as they feel others will take credit to get votes Are against any measures for relocation as they raise concerns of gerrymandering of electoral boundaries/ slum boundaries. Incitement of the local residents Acceptance and support of the planning process? But what about the votes? Need to understand that the process of slum upgrading is not in cross-purposes with their ambitions? Really? Where do they meet? Mobilization of all manner of support for slum upgrading. Is this realistic? In-migration means increase in votes Existence of depressing conditions mean more campaign promises Use of spatial character of slums, including high densities, proximity to key trunk infrastructures and difficulty in surveillance as bargaining tools in political contests Loss of votes and loss of power Loss of influence, loss of political influence Increased control of the state/ emasculation by the state Potential for dictatorship by the state 5 Utility companies Reticulation of infrastructure Collection of charges for utilities Environmental sustainability Safety of residents Safety of their installations Low maintenance costs Efficient services Increased profits Have minimum demands and standards for supply of infrastructure which need to be met Are also concerned with safety of their installations as well as that of the residents hence impose stringent standards Potential for court cases in cases of harm from the utility lines Protection of their wayleaves. Reduced vandalism. Payment for their services They will get to sell their utilities at great profits. Market share created by over 75 % of urban dwellers. Reduction of illegal connections Safety of residents and infrastructure Formulation of standards that accommodate informal settlements Protected wayleaves. Sale of utilities at market rates Increased surveillance and policing/ curtailed freedoms Free/ cheap cartel-generated services will be lost Unprotected wayleaves, lack of bargaining chips (railway lines, pipelines etc) will be gone Political power/ influence will be controlled 6 Shelter Owners/ structure Provision of housing Collection of rents Insecure tenure In some cases, they are also residents Are mainly interested in protecting their ‘investment in housing’ as well as their rights to ‘their’ land. Incitement of communities to resist planning processes Fear of redistribution of government land They would be more satisfied if they got security of tenure, but who needs security of tenure, structure owners of dwellers? Need to understand that slum improvement is for all Mobilization of all stakeholders to embrace slum upgrading efforts Allowing setbacks or demolitions to accommodate provision for infrastructure Property rights Rents which they collect Influence and control/ power Loss of housing/ shelter Loss of incomes Loss of power and influence Obnoxious local government policing/ space for Nairobi City County ‘kanjo askari’ security personnel Controlled development/ payment of development fees Enforced peaceful coexistence 5.0 DISCUSSION: EMERGING PICTURE AND CHARACTER OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SLUM UPGRADING In the previous section, the implementation of PP in slum upgrading has been made apparent; its nature is clouded in mystery and opacity, and a sort of muddling through. As a result, the contestations that arise from It emerges from the foregoing that slum upgrading as urban renewal encompasses procedural, normative and substantive dimensions. Participation goes beyond the inclusion of voice to also include values. Goals, rules and actors. Procedural context of public participation highlights how participation is carried out: the steps, structures and tools used. These are shaped by legal structures such as the Constitution of Kenya (2010), Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019), Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) among others. Examples of these tools include barazas, notices, workshops, focus group discussions and digital platforms. Normative aspects of public participation are the values and principles that justify it as a practice. Public participation is enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and is grounded on the principles of transparency, accountability and inclusion. This is a key aspect especially in regard to the KISIP programs because people in informal settlements have long been excluded from planning processes. Finally, participation can be assessed as a substantive outcome bringing in the measurable dimension of development effectiveness. World Bank under the KISIP program monitored and evaluated participation through indicators like attendance rates, stakeholder diversity and satisfaction levels (KISIP, 2020). The program in Kahawa Soweto utilized participatory enumeration, mapping and election of SECs to document and capture community engagement. However, participation in the KISIP program is largely shaped by the donor conditions (World Bank), which influence how the local experts and the government conduct themselves. The tools of participation, scope of engagement and timing have all been designed under the auspices of these arrangements, creating rigidity of approach and a tyranny of sorts. This resulted in tensions between the experts and local community since the plans to be prepared had to align with these conditions. The experts were also largely left confused on how to follow them fully while remaining alert to the standards of planning risking rejection of the plans by the community. This portrays the need for co-creation models of participation that allows communities to shape not only the outcomes but also the tools and standards alongside the other partners. Public participation is a fundamental right aimed at democratizing decision making. It is guided by the principle that all who will be affected by a decision have the right to be involved in the making of that decision. In the context of urban renewal, public participation allows all stakeholders (the public, state and professional experts) to contribute their lived experiences, voice their concerns, influence policy and shape the environments they live. Public participation goes beyond consultation to include shared responsibility, mutual accountability and active engagement with feedback. In the context of KISIP, public participation is structured around community mobilization, participatory planning, and grievance redress mechanisms. This structure has the goal of building trust within the community and providing community-owned data. 5.1 multi-level governance in slums Multi-level governance refers to a system where government stakeholders (National & County government, utility companies) and non-governmental stakeholders (international donors, CSOs) work together to develop and implement policies. The actors involved in the Kahawa Soweto slum upgrading program and their interrelationships are depicted in the Fig. 4 above. The KISIP program acknowledged the importance of the local community and the role they play in ensuring the success of the program. Hence the government sought to empower them to fully participate in the planning and infrastructure development process. In slum upgrading, local community was empowered through the formation of the Settlement Executive Committees (SECs). The committee members facilitated communication between the community and other stakeholders. They also supported implementation, represented community interests and ensured social and environmental safeguards. To achieve this, the government in partnership with World Bank trained the committee members on social and environmental safeguards, gender-based violence (GBV) and grievance and conflict management. This can be seen as a bid by the government to share its power with the community to facilitate ownership and success of the project. Civil Society Organizations such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji, known simply as Muungano and Shack Dwellers International (SDI) championed for the involvement of the community in land enumeration to facilitate tenure by actively engaging with Nairobi City County officials (Rema, 2011). Muungano wa Wanavijiji worked to empower residents to raise money through a daily savings system which goes towards construction of quality housing once they have secured their land through the upgrading process. Mobilizing communities to come together for saving also created a platform through which the residents could voice their needs and concerns for inclusion in the planning process. The interplay among the various actors made participation a multi-level governance practice which aided in strengthening transparency, accountability and responsiveness across all levels. 5.2 Participation as power: the emergence of serial “participators”. Protocols for PP exercises require that stakeholders are identified through structured, rational processes. Stakeholder analysis is done in consultation with communities, institutions working with them, local administration, political representatives, among other local stakeholders. Because this model presupposes equal representation, all the stakeholders are allowed to air their views in an open, transparent forum. Never to be considered with a more formal cadre of experts referred to as public participation experts, there have emerged in Kenyan slum upgrading a covert group of “expert participants” who take part in public consultative processes for pay. “Participators/ consultators” as we prefer to call them, are ambitious individuals with wide experience in governmental and NGO project cycles, and who use the loopholes presented by it to share their experience but also to find monetary gain from the process. In slum upgrading projects such as KISIP, “participators” were readily at hand to defend “the interests of the communities,” and when they were done, they would get paid for their roles. According to key informant interviews, these actors are ever in communication, planning and strategy meetings with CSOs, Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) and NGOs, always prepared to magnify ‘injustices against local communities’ to the outside world with the objective for raising funds. Consultation to them might mean attending ‘participation’ in hotels and at the end receive some ‘facilitation for fare’ (equivalent to US $4). They are always available for “consultations” and attending public meetings, and their ‘businesses’ can always be locked for the day as they ‘assist wageni (visitors)’ who come to their settlements to bring maendeleo (development). Some “participators” have fashioned themselves as community gatekeepers and are often inclined to incite local communities if they are excluded from any on-going projects. Having learnt the art of weaving narratives of misery and resilience to earn a living, they rendered themselves champions of slum-planning and like to posture that without them nothing can be achieved. They have contact information of local leaders and vigilante leaders alike, some are on first-name basis with members of local rendes or mbugis , (gangs and crime families) whom they sometimes use to magnify their influence in communities. Using such networks, some participators even block local experts from accessing the slum communities. This way, the Constitution of Kenya appears to have restricted the planning experts and uncannily handed power not only to communities but to gatekeepers. While they need to be empowered, it is crucial to contextualize what type of power communities have, whether it is progressive, repressive or retrogressive vis-à-vis the role of experts. Researchers hesitate to acknowledge the existence of such ground-based power as genuine power. The proper understanding of what really constitutes empowerment remains a detail that needs to be clearly properly delineated. In this study, empowerment is looked at as the ability of communities to make decisions, whether good or bad, progressive, repressive or retrogressive which outlines the expression of their agency. 5.3 Public Participation as a Right The law has granted every citizen the right to participate in decision-making in matters physical and land use planning. However, access is often monopolized by experts and state actors, and where public participation is done, sometimes commandeered by participators. The KISIP program is largely shaped by World Bank, technical experts and the government dominating agenda-setting and decision-making processes. Kahawa Soweto also saw political actors manipulate participation by inciting the residents to resist the plan for their own selfish gain. While community participation was an integral part of the KISIP program with the formation of the Settlement Executive Committee (SECs) among other initiatives, the process was still guided by the existing and predetermined frameworks limiting co-creation and the community’s ability to shape outcomes. Public participation is not absolute since it should be done under the confines of the law. This is why even though the KISIP program utilised a fairly creative approach towards community participation, the process had to be guided by predefined frameworks which limited creativity and autonomy. Public participation is also relative to other rights and interests. The community may not always determine the final outcome because their input has to be subjected to the laws and procedures, expert judgement and donor requirements. Residents end up feeling like the output was manipulated pushing a reaction such as lodging cases in court citing inadequate public participation. This brings in the need for clear guidelines since it is evident that despite participation being founded in the law, it can be exclusive in its practice and implementation. 5.4 Public participation as knowledge and basis of power contests Public participation is also a context of knowledge, who produces it, and how it informs the planning process. In Kenya, it is a battle between expert-driven knowledge and community lived experiences. Urban planning is a technical endeavour built on components such as GIS maps, planning reports among others which is guided by a legal framework. However, these outputs are often at the experience of community knowledge meaning experts often ‘reframe’ outputs from the community to fit ‘plannable’ formats often resulting in the loss of nuance and complexity. Hence, participation becomes a selective exercise where experts filter what they have heard on the basis of whether they fit the predefined standards. Thus, while all groups seem to tussle to exert their influence in the city, power becomes a constant item of contestation in the city and struggles for participation in the city are an embodiment of struggles for power (3). 5.5 Public participation as a clash of language It has been established that public participation especially at the county level is marred by the inability of counties to translate technical planning documents into a language that can be well understood and appreciated by the local community. The use of terms like ‘tenure regularization’ while professionally accurate serve as a barrier to community understanding of planning documents. This reduces their participation to reacting to proposals rather than it being a co-creative process where they generate proposals too making participation consultative rather than deliberative. Another distinct language is political language where politicians and government officials view public participation as an opportunity to make promises and rhetorical appeals to development. Politicians often package public participation as an act of goodwill to the community or a favour rather presenting it as what it is: a non-negotiable right. Participation becomes performative since the real decisions are often made behind closed doors and participation is used to ‘rubber stamp’ these decisions. The result is a disgruntled population which expects tangible outcomes from political promises only to realise they were just a means to an end. Lay language refers to the everyday expressions and narratives used by the community reflecting lived experiences and realities. The community may express themselves in Swahili or sheng which is then translated by elite representatives such as experts and politicians or through technical meetings. This results in information being diluted or reframed to fit institutional preferences. The result is a power imbalance whereby those who are most affected have the least ability to shape the outcomes and their attendance is viewed as consent to the development proposals. The clash of the technical, political and lay languages presents the dire need to have these languages convert and interact. Experts such as planners need to take up the role of facilitators, politicians have to listen, and the community needs to be empowered to boldly communicate and there needs to be a feedback mechanism that incorporates their input. 5.6 Public Participation as changing practice Participation has evolved from tokenism to empowerment and co-creation. For a long time, public participation in Kenya has been consultative, however, the KISIP program introduced a community-anchored form of stakeholder engagement. Formal structures such as SECs provided communities with a formal and representative voice within the planning process. This extended their engagement from just the typical stakeholder workshops. This was enriched by participation enumeration exercises and community mapping. Despite efforts by KISIP to revolutionize public participation, the process was still greatly affected by donor expectations and centralized control, especially by the State. One challenge is that there is no frequent re-election of the committee members even though they are supposed to serve for two years. This positions SECs to be gatekeeping bodies where they dominate the discussions disregarding input from other members of the community leading to elite capture and further marginalization. Participation in Kahawa Soweto was marred by inadequate engagement where the residents were left without a proper understanding of housing affordability and civil society organizations such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji had to intervene. 5.7 Public Participation and development Public participation is a key driver of development. The essence of development is not just transformation of physical spaces but it's also the transformation of the social, economic and institutional aspects of people’s lives. People-centred approach to development contributes to shared ownership, capacity building and resource responsibility. Participation also fosters transparency and accountability especially in the development of informal settlements which for a long time have been plagued by mistrust of the government and elite capture. However, from the analysis above it is clear that public participation has been instrumentalized as a checkbox for legal and donor requirements. Communities are experiencing participation fatigue since they do not see the real impact of their participation. Domination of the participation process by elites (SECs, State, politicians) has further reinforced the existing inequalities which is a hindrance to achieving the broader goals of development: empowerment and equity. However, the KISIP program is a testament to the role that participation plays in enhancing sustainable development especially in informal settlements. Collaborative agency has helped the program especially in Kahawa Soweto achieve tenure regularization and facilitated access which would otherwise not be successful without the involvement of the community. 5.8 Concretizing the state-statute-society triad: The experts’ conundrum The role of the state in presiding over development has been uncontested in development discourses in the modern times. Seen as “top-down”, the paradigm of state-led development has always enlisted the authority of statutes on one hand, and that of experts on the other. Through this, the state has always the latitude to direct which direction development was to take. In slum upgrading, this implied the use of violent force in forcefully evict slum dwellers as had been the norm in Kenya over the years. However, with the expansion of the democratic space, people began to challenge this authority. From its early days in the Global North, the ostensible aim of public participation was to make ‘people’ (society as per (7)) central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence (2). However, over time, there seems to have been a period where the ‘society’s’ space at the table was commandeered by other expectations and other interests. Though laws and policies (statutes) were formed to guide public participation, there remains a vacuum, which experts have been unable to mediate. In the KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto and in the other settlements, whenever the society was more assertive, the consultants (the experts) tended to gravitate towards the direction of influence for fear of the community’s rebellion and possible eviction from the project, in which case the contract would be jeopardized, which constituted the tyranny of the society. Similarly, whenever the state tended to be assertive in their demands, the experts again gravitated towards the direction of the state’s demands, once again, for fear of the contract being jeopardised. This constitutes the tyranny of the state. As illustrated, the catch twenty-two in which the expert was thrown implied that always, the experts were always navigating between two potential tyrannies. In slum upgrading, this has always been the expert’s conundrum. 5.8.1 Scenario 1: The clamp of the State (Disproportionate statutory and societal control) The “clamp of the society” represents the first scenario where the society, with the enlistment of experts and statutes seek to influence the outcomes of participation illustrated in Fig. 2 . In this regard, society is backed up with CBOs, FBOs, CSOs and other actors who seem to support their needs while simultaneously pursuing theirs. International development agencies (IDAs) might not act directly on the side of communities, but are always backing the other CSOs, NGOs and CBOs through funding to promote community activities such as advocacy. These result in manipulation of the participation, rendering the state ineffective. Questions have been asked whether communities have become manipulative and tyrannical in their conduct in PP. As the society becomes stronger and stronger, and the more allies it is able to enlist, the more the society becomes tyrannical. Under this environment, most interventions are challenged in court, thereby occasioning delays in implementation of projects. In certain cases, questions have been asked whether courts have become activist to the extent of always going against the state in their judgements in such cases. For projects whose implementation is time-bound, this poses a challenge in implementation The common grounds of non-consultation have been cited in (12). It should be clear that these authors are not in any way belittling the concerns raised in the constitutional petitions and are only interested in the petition to identify areas in which PP as a normative endeavour might be strengthened. As shown in the implementation of KISIP PP can be very gruelling but the technical value of the consultation in planning might appear to be low. In this example, the more PP was encouraged, the more the public became powerful to the extent that the technical processes needed to adopt them as part of the technical processes. The emergence of public participation thus acted perpendicular to technical expertise, pitting the two “forces” of participation and centralization. 5.8.2 Scenario 2: The clamp of society (Disproportionate statutory and societal control) The “clamp of the state” represents the second scenario where the state, with the aid of experts and statutes seek to influence the outcomes of PP. Backed with the other actors such as County Governments and semi-autonomous, citizens and markets, the state’s mandates appear to be more diverse. In Kenya, under the World Bank regulations, slum upgrading takes place against a backdrop of lengthy and costly PP which the state sometimes finds monotonous. During the planning process, the slums dwellers will argue strongly against the planning standards and seek to negotiate to have them reduced, and if the negotiations are not concluded in the favour of their immediate interests [which might be to complete the plans, to prevent demolitions or grant them ownership documents as the case may be] they are likely to resist and reject the process illustrated in Fig. 3 below. In this case, the IDAs act as an arbiter in calling for the democratic accommodation of communities; a paradox since some of the rigidities inherent in slum upgrading result from the stringent conditions of the grants. With the elaborate state machinery, the state has the power to enlist the statutes to push its agenda. Unchecked, this leads to the use of coercion as a strategy to pass the plans and initiate action. At the end of the day, the statutes which recommend the procedure end up facilitating the clamping of the society, making it difficult for them to effectively share their position. In a strong state, when the communities proceed to court, judgements might be issued to back the stand of the state. 5.9 Conflicts/ synergies between communities and experts Notably in the KISIP project, public participation was an integral part of the planning process, and the involvement of the communities in distinct stages of problematizing their communities (at the formative stages of the plan-making process) and in visioning (in the latter stages) were followed. This way, the communities, in their own style, and in seeking to capture their aspirations provided a basis upon which the plans were prepared. Notable synergies and differences exist between community-produced plans and expert-produced plans in the KISIP. Technical quality of the plans, qualitative and quantitative considerations, and the capacity of the plans to be implementable appear to distinctly differ in the favour of the expert plans. While community plans might exhibit the identified shortcomings, it is important to note that the plans reflect the respective capacities of the communities relative to that of the experts, but also present the desires and aspirations of the communities. This tug-of-war led to the emergence of the two (2) typical contestations of the planning outcomes: rejection of plans by the government and rejection of the plans by the communities. In all this, the consultant, whose role it is to reconcile the community aspirations and planning standards is caught in the expert’s conundrum. 5.9.1 Rejection of plans by communities Physical Planning is a clear-cut discipline with established protocols for training, anchoring philosophies, guiding principles, techniques, procedures, laws and approval mechanisms. Planning Standards (PSs) have their role in development and development control in many modern societies. As demonstrated in Table 3 , however, planning doesn’t appear to converge with community aspirations, and indeed, is often viewed by the communities as potentially disruptive to their daily lives. Whereas the planning process implemented under KISIP was participatory in nature and in line with the constitutional and legal provisions of participation, the plans ultimate subjection to the rigorous evaluation by the written laws, standards, regulations and codes did not please many communities. As has been identified previously, communities generally view the formal standards as too stringent, and the proposals from the communities on most occasions fall short of the standards. This led to plans being prepared through a combination of threats, high calibre public relations and persuasions to enable completion of the planning process. In principle, such a brand of public participation is an exercise of window-dressing that amounts to nothing in the end. As soon as the plans are approved by the government, implementation becomes impossible as the communities reject the plans citing mass relocation, suspicion, among other challenges. This continues to impair any attempts towards planning for slums and improving the supply of essential services. The pathway to delay approval of slum upgrading plans is illustrated in Fig. 4 . A number of considerations were made by communities in rejecting the plans. Table 3 below is a compilation of ten typical statements from various settlements between 2014-2018 in opposition to the KISIP planning process and outcomes: Table 3: Summary of response from residents of slums in the KISIP process . Source: Author’s compilation, 2020 TECHNICAL CONCERN JUSTIFICATION/ TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT EXAMPLES OF SETTLEMENTS RESPONSE FROM COMMUNITY/ TYPICAL QUESTIONS/ CONCERNS 1 On the need for planning Planning to provide. Framework for upgrading, land surveying, tenure regularization and titling Kisii village (Embakasi Nairobi), Ganahola (Mombasa), Ugweri (Embu), Umoja (Thika) “We do not want plans. Plans will be used as grounds to have us evicted.” “These parcels are not government land. This is our land.” 2 Infrastructure upgrading Settlement upgrading; land use projection; population projection Likoni (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) ‘We do not want infrastructure; we want title deeds only!” “What we have been using is infrastructure” 3 Expansion of roads in the settlements Road planning standards; Physical planning standards; land use projections; population projection Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) “We do not want wider (9m) roads; the paths that exist (1.5m) in our settlement are adequate for us.” “We do not have motor vehicles which will drive on those roads, neither do/ will our children.” 4 The need of a plan to guide development of the settlement Precondition for titling; donor requirement; statutory requirement Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) “We do not want a plan; we currently live peacefully and would not want that peaceful coexistence to disturbed.” “Planners will use those plans to grab our land and get titles for them.” “We already have our plans which are approved (Kambi moto).” 5 On the need to implement Physical Planning Standards Physical Planning Standards/ statutory requirements of plans Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) “You have not consulted us on the standards.” “We have our standards which you have ignored.” “We were told that our land is a special planning area and therefore the standards do not apply (Kambi moto).” 6 On procedures for approval of plans Plan approval procedures Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) “If the Director of Physical Planning won’t approve the plan, just take it to the governor or the president, they have been here, and they will approve it.” “The governor and the president understand us better.” 7 On typology of plan; separation of land uses Incompatibility of land uses Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi) “Our settlement is mixed use already, just draw the plan as it exists.” “Where we live are our markets and we cannot accept to be separated from our livelihoods” 8 On the need to include tenants as part of the list of beneficiaries Precondition by donor organizations Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi), Umoja (Thika). “Tenants cannot be given any plots in this settlement, they are outsiders; these are people’s plots.” “These tenants might move out tonight (That very night there is talk of forceful eviction of tenants!).” On the need to expand the scope of stakeholders Stakeholder analysis; precondition by donor organizations Likoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi), Umoja (Thika). “Determination of our representatives is our responsibility.” Tenants cannot be stakeholders in this project because they do not have land here.” Source: Komollo and Kedogo, 2025 Typical of concerns of collective rationality in projects such as KISIP, it is not quickly apparent why communities would make some of the claims such as these cited in Table 3 above which would appear cognitively dissonant (46). However, the bottom-line for the communities in each of the positions that they took was their own preservation and the interest of their members. It would appear that the whole community was pursuing the same goal, but as it would be revealed through key informant interviews, sections of the communities pursued individual interests and goals by cloaking them as collective goals. Ultimately, as highlighted by Freedman (2013) that each of these individuals and communities had their strategies which might appear, as it were, in Table 3, as obnoxious and irrational (46), but which to the affected residents, are noble. Regarding the KISIP planning process, residents of various settlements appreciated the participatory methodologies that were used. However, because of the stringent planning standards limiting certain provisions, for example those that recommend minimum road reserves at 9 metres, the communities used different approaches to oppose the move. Some communities like Likoni wrote letters asking for those standards to be waived, highlighting their contentedness with the existing smaller pathways, while other communities like Kambi Moto sought to demonstrate that their settlement had been designated a ‘special planning area’ (SPA) and gazetted as such in the Kenya Gazette, meaning that they were exempted from the stringent standards. 5.9.2 Rejection of plans by the government Rejection of plans by the government is a typical end to many draft plans under KISIP which focus more on the desires and aspirations of communities as opposed to compliance to the extant to laws and standards. The main cause of the government’s disapprobation of the plans is the failure to meet the formal standards, legal requirements on land sizes and on urban development as illustrated in Fig. 5 . In practice, most plans in Kenya are prepared using public participation. However, the final evaluation of the plans is done by weighing the plans against laws and standards which are usually enforced to the latter for formal settlements, sometimes even for greenfield sites. Because slums are already congested sites with many contests for space, communities are hard-pressed to concede grounds to the written planning codes, which ultimately lead to the disapproval of the plans. When the government fails to approve the plans, implementation becomes difficult and may sometimes lead to restarting the planning all over again. The intention, in the author’s opinion, is to find more agreeable way to find consensus with the communities, without diminishing their views. 6.0 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION For effective slum upgrading, knowledge control and power imbalance have been identified as critical barriers and enablers which must be directly addressed when designing PP programmes. Striking these balances ensures that participants especially the public are protected from coercion more so by dominant interests of powerful elites and the state. As a basis of slum upgrading, planning has been described both as a professional and activist discipline – dealing not only with planning places, but also negotiating, forecasting, researching, surveying and organizing financing (47). It is an abstract role to the extent that deals with theoretical goals and non-binding methods that need to be guided by theories, philosophies, ideals, ethics, standards, regulations, laws and constitutional provisions that are meant to steer planning in a manner that makes it responsive to societal need which are not to be separated, wholly and singularly without prejudice. This definition of the role of the planner is quite elastic and might be stretched to include almost all the activities, thoughts, feelings, aspirations, imaginations and dreams of the community and the society. In consideration of that, and to temper the potential tyrannical excesses of planning, collaboration in slum upgrading process should be ensured to elevate spatial planners beyond the realm of the physical planning where they are viewed to be most powerful to the realms of the human: social, legal, economic, aesthetical, cultural, inter alia, which may be diverse, and defined by different levels of emotions and feelings. Collaboration here is to be understood to be in an environment of cognitive sensory overloads, emotional stimulation, psychological balance, satisfaction, avarice, social well-being, desire for success, or lack of thereof, among other human feelings and impulses, which dictate how humans relate amongst themselves and how they relate with space. In such an environment, interests become difficult to allocate or adjudicate. Decision-makers (usually agencies of government) would prefer the bureaucratic (or autocratic) way of doing things while others in society might prefer the expert-led technocratic processes. Various ways of handling spatial conflict of interest have been proven productive or counterproductive in various jurisdictions, but spatial challenges still abound that call for processes that will ensure higher levels of success of whatever process is followed. 6.1 Mediating state-society divide using statutes as enablers As notes Van Den Broeck et al. , competition and cooperation between actors, and sometimes partners, is not necessarily contradictory. Furthermore, both can be combined and none of them should be neglected if the intention is to develop a feasible and realistic policy (15). The planner’s role in space production has been noted as a delicate balancing act that needs to be clearly understood and navigated well. To effectively address the planning objective, the relational position of the state and the society as competing-yet-ideally-complementary components vis-à-vis the statutes should be critically understood. Plagued with the possibility of suspicion and uncertainty by communities from the onset, the statutory provisions and the prescriptive procedures that Planning comes with notwithstanding, a strategic orientation of each of the components is critical. This calls for evaluating how the state and society can each achieve their optimal objectives without limiting the others’ capacity to achieve their own. To do this, it is critical to leverage each of the actors relative to their allies: society with the NGOs, CBOs, CSOs and FBOs among others and the state with citizens, policies and others, respectively. Across these relationships, the role of experts remains crucial. Urban Planners, Architects, Urban Designers, Land Surveyors, Sociologists and Economists, for instance, form the bulk of professionals involved in slum upgrading. Other experts such as lawyers, valuers are also crucial, and regardless of the respective actors the experts are allied with, it is imperative that there is convergence of purpose among them. Since the statutes have been demonstrated to abet the individual tyrannies of whichever components enlist them ( Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 ), leading to the failure of public participation, and since the extant statutes (including standards) have been established to clash with community aspirations thus directly leading to the failure of planning ( Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 ) mobilization of the statutory instruments thus becomes a crucial factor in ensuring that there is harmony between the state and the society. In this way, statutes become the fulcrum upon which collaboration and facilitation of the state and society is hinged, thus becoming a crucial feature of completing the tripartite arrangement among the state, society and statutes as shown in Fig. 6 . With such a framework, and in the event of conflict between the state and the society, the courts of law will be allied to no component, except in implementing the just provisions of the law to facilitate resolution of the conflicts. This will see to it that decisions of the court will not be interpretable as partisan to any one component. In this framework, PP will thus be well defined and well bounded, and ultimately, will be well-guarded and regulated towards the prioritization of the good of the community. 6.2 Participation as a strategy for mediating strategies Every actor in every situation has a strategy (46). There have been claims that the Bretton Woods institutions are vehicles for Western neo-imperialist agendas (see for example Mueller, 2011). Their fixation with public participation is seen as their point d’ access of mischief. At the core of this approach lies that impoverishing fallacy that the African poor [including the ignorant, the hungry and their local political representatives] have the power to determine their development objectives in a manner that is more responsive to their conditions and needs [hence more sustainable] and that which will make better advantages of their local knowledge. Declarations Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Philbert Siama, Clinton Patroba, Anne Rose Maina, Gregory Oduor and Joy Gesare for supporting in data collection using questionnaires in Kahawa Soweto and other settlements in Nairobi. VSPL are acknowledged by F K for the opportunity to work in slum upgrading projects for 4 years. Author contributions F. K.: Conceptualization, data curation, writing, original draft preparation, methodology, formal analysis; L. E.: Conceptualization, review, supervision; J. K.: Conceptualization, review, supervision and visualization of figures and Tables; J. M.: Conceptualization, review, supervision; and E. M.: Writing, Review, link with practice, and Editing. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript. Funding The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work. Data availability Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. Ethics All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the National Council for Science and Technology and with the Science Technology and Innovation Act 2013. The study was approved by the School of Graduate Studies of Technical University of Kenya ( App/05136/2017 ) and National Council for Science and Technology under License Number NACOSTI/P/24/34108. Consent to participate Verbal informed consent was obtained from key informants (KIs) prior to the interview while the respective reports (cited) on public participation in slum upgrading projects in Kenya are publicly available. All KI participants were aged above 18 years. Consent to publish The authors affirm that human research participant KIs provided informed consent for publication, on condition that no names are published. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. References Hickey S, Mohan G. Towards Participation as a Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges. In: Hickey S, Mohan G, editors. Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development [Internet]. 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ESHO","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Technical University of Kenya","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Lawrence","middleName":"S.","lastName":"ESHO","suffix":""},{"id":492401033,"identity":"72c2ded0-44e7-47b1-8de3-4a9b1052afcb","order_by":2,"name":"Joseph M. KEDOGO","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Technical University of Kenya","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Joseph","middleName":"M.","lastName":"KEDOGO","suffix":""},{"id":492401034,"identity":"665a6f6e-9867-4831-b02b-ad58f1023f0c","order_by":3,"name":"Jason M. MOCHACHE","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Technical University of Kenya","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Jason","middleName":"M.","lastName":"MOCHACHE","suffix":""},{"id":492401035,"identity":"4f7146b4-332f-4dc8-9dcf-e8a3ad3fb0fc","order_by":4,"name":"Eve I. MURIITHI","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"County Government of Uasin Gishu","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Eve","middleName":"I.","lastName":"MURIITHI","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-30 17:23:14","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":88036117,"identity":"86ca96e1-a380-41b1-957a-8bb982b2aed8","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:21:51","extension":"jpg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":284577,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003emulti-level governance in slums\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, 2025\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image1.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/63bcd119e7d1eca53a071b9b.jpg"},{"id":88037421,"identity":"075c974b-e472-4284-b9d0-4575bbff7ffc","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:29:51","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":301178,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThe clamp of the State\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, 2025\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/ffa46cafb92f88ca87d5fc5e.png"},{"id":88037422,"identity":"a9ba8b3e-b7d1-4c27-a3e8-e0297d90d19a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:29:51","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":97860,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThe clamp of Society\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, 2025\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/5e4d37bfa6a24eacfc70f1f1.png"},{"id":88036119,"identity":"b776c232-91cb-43e0-beef-0885b9579ef1","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:21:51","extension":"jpg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":105826,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePathway 1 on why slum upgrading plans delay for approval\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Komollo and Kedogo (2025)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image4.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/d6040d02d0d6474e95d6c02d.jpg"},{"id":88036118,"identity":"04fb6d7f-aee5-481e-89f3-5158b70360a9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:21:51","extension":"jpg","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":107134,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePathway 2 on why KISIP plans failed to be approved: Rejection by the state\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors Construct, 2025\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image5.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/c3a998e6b53941fc3a2840a3.jpg"},{"id":88037423,"identity":"c0e9936c-878d-4e0c-8489-1075d4318e33","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:29:51","extension":"png","order_by":6,"title":"Figure 6","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":315242,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eExploring an optimal public participation framework\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, 2025\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image6.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/ac2ad9fb045ebff95247a480.png"},{"id":88038170,"identity":"35f070a4-0bf5-40c6-b065-95d9ddf2205b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-31 16:37:54","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":3053182,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7013073/v1/ee3533bd-5321-4059-9304-edf0531ac8d0.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Interrogating Competing Tensions among Procedure, Expertise and Local Communities in Public Participation Processes in Urban Renewal in Kenya: The Case of KISIP Project","fulltext":[{"header":"1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND","content":"\u003cp\u003eLabels of tyranny against participation in development (1,2) have been intense since the turn of the millennium, but there still seem to be concerns with it to date. \u0026nbsp;Conversely, public participation (PP) has also been applauded as a crucial component for successful development, including urban development and renewal (3), [2]. Many studies have outlined its benefits in tempering power dynamics in project delivery in deprived communities (3\u0026ndash;5), broadening strategic agendas and influencing specific policies and programmes (6), and ultimately strengthening and legitimizing state decisions, actions and development interventions (7). PP literature, however, displays lots of contradictions, ironies and lack of clarity which render the otherwise desirable normative practice with lots of controversies, questions and doubts (3). In the US, it is seen as far from meeting its goals, is \u0026ldquo;counterproductive\u0026rdquo;, causes \u0026ldquo;anger and mistrust\u0026rdquo; (8). Despite the challenges, effective PP has been said to strengthen and promote governance, which is key in legitimizing governmental action (6). Similarly, public participation has gained traction in Kenya particularly after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The Constitution treasures PP as a right and a requirement for policymaking, including urban development [3, 4, 5]. \u0026nbsp; Consequently, many state interventions have been contested on grounds of PP violations: \u0026ldquo;We were not consulted!\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;The law was not followed!\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;The process of public participation was flawed!\u0026rdquo; (12) being examples of\u0026nbsp;common claims from constitutional petitions. Available case laws demonstrate that some of the cited violations were that either PP was not seen to have been conducted in accordance with the \u0026lsquo;prescriptions\u0026rsquo; of the law, or because of perceptions and expectations of involved communities which appeared not to be met. Thus, while\u0026nbsp;PP has been labelled as a cornerstone for democratic governance, and while it is seen to play a key role towards sustainable development (5,11), its practice has remained contentious. A dearth of constitutional and legislative clarity on normative application of PP (12) has created room for doubts (3), ambiguity (6,12), confusion on approach, and other political barriers to its implementation of PP (6); but partly because of misunderstanding and wrong perceptions from citizens. The type and method of PP has also been flagged as a critical concern on the involvement of the public (3).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic participation is even more important in spatial planning as it gives the public a voice and an opportunity to shape the environments in which they live, work and play (13) for their present and future lives. Spatial planning deals with the allocation and regulation of use of land and its resources which affects the entire population for all subsequent generations. Ensuring effective public participation within the spatial planning process makes sure there are effective, inclusive and sustainable development outcomes. However, despite its institutionalization in spatial planning, public participation in Kenya faces numerous barriers\u0026mdash;ranging from political manipulation and technical gatekeeping to structural exclusions based on gender, class, and geography (14).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.1 Critical Perspectives on Participation as tyranny\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipation especially in the urban development field can be broadly divided into two main categories: expert-driven and people-driven. Urban development heavily relies on the technical expertise of professionals such as urban planners, urban designers, architects among others. The urban development process is also technical because it prioritizes regulatory frameworks. While these frameworks are important as they set the standards guiding urban development processes and activities, they rely heavily on professional judgement (15). This in turn isolates the communities that are directly and heavily impacted by the planning outcomes. On the other hand, people-driven models of participation prioritize local knowledge and experiences. This approach has been lauded as good as it ensures development processes are inclusive and reflect the needs of the local community. However, emphasis on this model poses the risk of dismissing professional input in urban development processes. This results in implementation of projects that do not meet the required standard which in turn further risks reducing the role of professionals to merely rubber stamping the decisions made by the public (16). The struggle to balance these two models of participation raises questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy and power in participatory urban development and renewal processes, and whether the practice is optimal.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipation\u0026rsquo;s tyrannical potential is also systemic which introduces the aspect of \u0026lsquo;tyranny of methods.\u0026rsquo; The tools and methods used in participation are often used without being adapted to the local contexts which results in participation being a technical exercise rather than sincere conversation. Finally, tyranny of masses can be viewed in two ways. First, group dynamics can lead to decisions that only benefit the interests of those whose voices are dominant (2). The tyranny of masses can also be viewed from the perspective alluded to in the introduction. The public is empowered and in the case of Kenya they have lodged cases in court citing inadequate participation in spatial planning processes. The result of these cases is usually delay in the development activities that had been proposed. The critiques above call for a critical look into who sets the agenda, who benefits from participatory processes and who gets to speak. To understand the crucial nature of public participation, both diachronic and synchronic perspectives are essential (Br\u0026eacute;laz and Rose 2021; Lefebvre 1968) for two reasons: diachronic perspective to understand how the practice has been developing over time and synchronic perspective to understand the application at the specific context, in a specific moment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.2 Slum upgrading as urban renewal and urban development\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUN-Habitat (17) defines slums as settlements located within cities marred with challenges of inadequate housing, poor or absent infrastructure and poor sanitation, and insecurity of tenure, and poor access and circulation within the settlement. Population densities of slums are often high exceeding the supply of the basic infrastructure hence the strain. Nairobi County is witnessing over 60% of its population live within informal settlements which account for only 6% of its land. In response to the proliferation of slums, governments have spearheaded several programs as interventions to improve informal settlements which have been referred to as \u0026lsquo;slum upgrading initiatives\u0026rsquo; such as KENSUP. Slum upgrading as a form of urban renewal seeks to improve the living conditions in informal settlements which is primarily by integrating them into the formal structure of the city (18).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSlum upgrading focuses on providing access to basic services, improving security of tenure, improving quality of housing and enhancing community participation and social inclusion within informal settlements. Urban renewal has historically encompassed demolishing old neighbourhoods and rebuilding them in an ideal way guided by a development plan. However, in many cities of the Global South, urban renewal has been plagued by challenges of displacement of the urban poor emphasising social inequalities and corroding community and social networks (19). In this regard, slum upgrading is emerging as a progressive form of urban renewal that is built on \u003cem\u003ein-situ\u003c/em\u003e improvements, reduced displacement, vigorous community participation and incremental development. Slum upgrading also includes urban transformation as it serves as a catalyst for broader transformation of a city. Slum upgrading contributes to urban development by reducing inequalities and marginalization within urban areas, improving access to urban infrastructure, and enhancing environmental sustainability. \u0026nbsp;However, while slum upgrading holds promise, its implementation has encountered several issues with a main one being tokenistic participation. Community engagement in these initiatives is mostly limited to members of the community validating pre-decided plans.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.3 Legal Framework of Participation in Kenya\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs aforementioned, the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) enshrined participation as a national value and a principle of governance under Article 10, creating the watershed for public participation in development in Kenya. As a key focus on Kenya\u0026rsquo;s governance and devolution strategies. This importance is highlighted in the Constitution of Kenya (9) which provides for the foundation of its legal framework. Article 1 of the Constitution states that all sovereign power is vested in the people of Kenya, the exercise of which may be directly or indirectly, at the national and county levels. Similarly, other articles like 118 1 (b); 196 1 (b); 174 (c); 184 1 (c); and 232 1 (d), \u003cem\u003einter alia\u003c/em\u003e, have various express provisions for public/ citizen provision and appeals to various bodies, persons, organizations, institutions, among others, to ensure that PP as the foundation of formulation of plans and budgets and in the design of development programmes and projects. Public and stakeholder participation therefore emerges as an important component in the planning process, including the identification of community visions and plans, infrastructure and services delivery process, housing, economic and livelihood strategies, among others. The challenge is not in bringing into being a public participation platform, but in taking care/ accommodating all the competing, often antagonistic interests of various stakeholders in the planning process. For urban and regional planning programme and projects, constitutional provisions for public participation are given substance in specific laws such as the Urban areas and Cities Act (UACA) of 2011 (Amendment 2019), County Governments Act (CGA) (2012) and the Physical and Land Use Planning Act of 2019 creating very specific invitations to public participation as highlighted below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e1.3.1 Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011, Amendment 2019)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe earliest post 2010 statutory provision for public participation is found in the Urban Areas and Cities Act (UACA) of 2011. Comparable to Greek cities down to the Roman imperial period where a substantial share of power in running city affairs was conceded to ordinary citizens through popular assemblies and other public activities (Br\u0026eacute;laz and Rose 2021), section 22 of the Urban Areas and Cities Act provides for establishment of citizen fora to facilitate the participation of citizens in the management of their urban area (20). As a normative practice, a citizen forum can create the opportunity for a deeper and more fundamental involvement of all actors, based on the idea that a networked society is evolving, creating new relationships between a vast array of actors and new forms of management and decision-making (15,21). It UACA reaffirms the value and benefits of participation of residents of a city or urban area in decision making by submitting comments or opinions to a board or town committee. It also outlines that a town or city board shall put in place measures that will support active public participation and carry out capacity building to empower citizens to participate in the affairs of urban areas including physical and land use planning. The act is also inclusive by stipulating that minority and marginalized groups should be included in the public participation processes and mechanisms (20).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e1.3.2 County Government Act (2012)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo operationalize the County Governments, the County Governments Act (CGA)of 2012 was formulated. The act under Part VIII provides for principles of citizen participation which include timely access to information related to policy formulation and implementation and reasonable access to the process of formulating and implementing policies, laws and regulations which includes the approval of development proposals. Formulation of County Spatial Plans and County Integrated Development Plans serve as the primary planning instruments at the county level and should be developed through thorough public engagement. The act mandates county assemblies to come up with laws and regulations that will give effect to citizen participation in development planning. The act has proposed the following structures for citizen participation: information communication technology-based platforms, town hall meetings, budget preparation and validation fora, notice boards and development project sites. The act has clearly left operationalizing of public participation to county assemblies all through the country.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e1.3.3 Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019) prescribes publication of notices in newspaper dailies, the Kenya Gazette and electronic media as an invitation for the public to participate in matters physical and land use planning(22). The act also adds that the planning authority shall publicly display draft physical and land use development plans to allow for public scrutiny for a specific period, usually sixty (60) days after the publication of the \u003cem\u003eNotice of Completion of the Plan\u003c/em\u003e. The public are invited to make comments and give opinions on the draft development plans and the planning authority is mandated to review the comments for inclusion in the plan before approval. While the Act consistently stresses the need to include the public in physical and land use planning processes, it does not specify other channels for operationalising this. This has left a gap that has been filled using stakeholder workshops as the primary form of public participation in the formulation of physical and land use development plans. There are three stakeholder workshops categorised as follows: awareness and sensitization workshop, situational analysis, draft plan presentation and final plan presentation. While stakeholder forums are seen to be the most common form of public participation, there are no clear guidelines on how to integrate associative and participatory democracy in the public participation processes. This presents another gap which is the lack of clear guidelines on a structured and balanced approach that incorporates.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe planner takes on the role of a facilitator of participation by organizing the forums, guiding participatory mapping and interpreting technical concepts ensuring communities make informed decisions\u003cstrong\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e However, typically, in meetings, the technocratic language of Planners and lay language used by communities, make communication inefficient in. such workshops. Planners also serve as neutral mediators balancing the needs and priorities of all stakeholders and ensuring. In community-led planning, planners act as co-creators not commanders. They empower communities while upholding professional standards resulting in better planning outcomes. The centrality of public participation is asserted in the County Spatial Guidelines (10). Visioning as a tenet for public participation is defined as a process by which a community with the guidance of the planning team decides the future it wants and then plans how to achieve it. The key fundamental questions to ask include: (1) Where are we (the community) now? (2) Where are we (the community) going? (3) Where do we (the community) want to be? And (4) how do we (the community) get there? The primary purpose of the visioning process is to develop a set of vision statements, community goals, and objectives that best articulate the desires of the residents about the future (10). In this framework, the role of the state as \u0026lsquo;provider\u0026rsquo; is gradually moving towards that of an \u0026lsquo;enabler,\u0026rsquo; in the process sometimes taking on an \u0026lsquo;entrepreneurial\u0026rsquo; style (15,22).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.4 Problematizing Public Participation Practice: A critical view\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe High Court in Kenya has problematized PP by highlighting that that though it is an important principle, it has not been coded comprehensively through legislation, with the CoK staying silent on what it constitutes (12). While numerous constitutional petitions have led to the reinforcement of public participation as a constitutional right and not a discretionary activity, they have also led to the delay, suspension and cancellation of urban development projects. This clearly demonstrates the power of the \u0026lsquo;masses\u0026rsquo; in the urban development and renewal processes meaning they can halt even well-intentioned projects that may benefit our urban areas if well implemented on the basis of inadequate public participation. Similarly, as noted by the High Court and other commentators, the absence of a national legislation on public participation which provides a comprehensive definition and parameters on what constitutes PP has contributed to making it less understood (12), difficult to enforce and less effective (11). Because of that lack of clarity, participation in Kenya, especially in development projects, has often been hailed as a \u0026ldquo;core value\u0026rdquo; (9) to be applied in environmental protection, lawmaking and other business of Parliament and County Assemblies, and as a principle of public finance (11). Lack of effort towards understanding how the public perceive their rights and what obstacles they are facing in accessing these rights contributes to undermining public participation. The first obstacle is exclusion where minority groups, the urban poor, women, youth and persons with disability are often excluded from planning processes.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAnother challenge that is found within public participation processes in Kenya is \u0026lsquo;elite capture\u0026rsquo; where participatory spaces are dominated by political, technical or economic elites who advance their own interests. This results in the community being subordinate to those in power (often the experts and those in political positions) which becomes a hindrance to obtaining real change. County-level PP forums are often attended and \u0026lsquo;hijacked\u0026rsquo; by political and local allies undermining inclusivity, further reinforcing existing inequalities (3).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic participation, especially at the county-level, is hampered by institutional constraints. Lack of capacity, inadequate funding, unclear guidelines for operationalizing participation and the absence of proper participatory planning tools are major challenges hindering adequate public participation. Many counties also do not have a well-structured feedback mechanism meaning most public participation forums are often done just for show (11). Lack of capacity also means planning documents which often have technical jargon are not translated into local languages or simplified for the understanding of the general public, hence, participation remains the prerogative of \u0026lsquo;experts\u0026rsquo; since they are the only ones who can understand the technical language (23). \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.5 Aim, Objectives and Questions\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite many different attempts to address slums in Kenya, there appears to be the concerns that the \u0026ldquo;challenge\u0026rdquo; of slums persists. The question \u0026ldquo;why slum upgrading plans fail\u0026rdquo; thus remains an ever present theoretical, epistemic and practical problem which might be answered by addressing the different components of the planning process and product. PP thus becomes of interest in seeking to establish its potential contribution to this failure. While there is broad acknowledgement that there are different methods for implementing stakeholder consultation (3), the key question that this paper seeks to address is whether the practice has strengthened the planning process and bequeathed it the advantages that have been ascribed to it or not. Thus, while the paper acknowledges the multiplicity of actors within the PP process, and the embeddedness of interests among them, the paper seeks to understand how these interests can be better understood. Finally, what interventions are possible for the reconciliation of varied, competing, sometimes antagonistic interests of actors for effective and balanced implementation of PP so that each category of actors accesses the desired empowering environment for achieving their goals.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e1.6 Definition of key terms\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic participation (PP) has been defined as the process by which citizens, as individuals, groups or communities, take part in the conduct of public affairs, interact with the state and other non-state actors to influence decisions, policies, programs, legislation and provide oversight in service delivery, development and other matters concerning their governance and public interest, either directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives (7). This definition is key because it identifies what PP is, who is involved in it, in which areas it is applicable and to what ends, the Department of Physical Planning, under the State Department for Lands and Physical Planning has prescribed the application of these objectives in the planning process\u0026nbsp;(10).\u0026nbsp;With the coming of devolution, lots of publications are now available on how PP has been instrumental in County Governance (11,24), budgeting(7,14) etc.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs a result, \u003cem\u003eparticipationism\u003c/em\u003e as a school of thought that weaponizes PP as an instrument for advancing other agendas separate from the planning goal seems to have emerged. \u003cem\u003eParticipationism\u003c/em\u003e thus, implies the belief that PP is the key procedural, substantive and normative objective of development planning, and that no government intervention can successfully be implemented without participation, and only where certain interests take central stage, often shifting the desired goal. In keeping with \u003cem\u003eparticipationism\u003c/em\u003e is the emergence of a category of actors that we call \u003cem\u003eparticipators\u003c/em\u003e, usually citizens acting on their own capacity to attend PP meetings for purposes of earning money or in representation of some other agencies, usually Civil Society Organization (CSOs) or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In this study, the term is used, alongside \u003cem\u003eparticipationism\u003c/em\u003e, to draw a distinction with participants (2) and what is emergent as interest- and agency-driven, trouble-some participation which often makes effective participation difficult to achieve. Another challenge that makes PP difficult is the \u0026lsquo;expert\u0026rsquo;s conundrum\u0026rsquo;, which is defined as the difficult position that experts are subjected to in the implementation of PP. Caught between the strong forces of state, society and statutes, experts often are forced to operate in the fear of crossing any of the lines. And since statutes typically are applicable one way or the other and can always be enlisted by the more powerful of the two, the expert is left exposed, waiting to see where the wind blows.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2.0 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn urban planning studies and practice, various works have pitched for public/ citizen participation under a variety of titles: community development (25), public participation (26), stakeholder engagement (27), collaboration (3) among others. The conceptualization of this paper is based on a critique of Karl Mannheim\u0026rsquo;s (28) ideas on the forces of centralization and participation as the factors that shape social structure. Centralization is defined by Mannheim as a form of top-down system of decision-making while participation refers to a framework that allows for the free expression of citizens. According to Manheim, these two forces combine to produce four distinct social structures viz: dictatorship, democracy, anarchy and anomie by their degree of participation and centralization, and straight out asserts his preference of democracy which offers both a high level of centralization and high level of participation \u0026nbsp;(28,29). While mainstream planning theory has increasingly focused on the procedural applications, external developments on the substantive side are increasingly pushing the profession in new directions and demanding responses (30).\u0026nbsp;Although grounded in the mundane, planners help nurture a community\u0026rsquo;s deepest aspirations, such as love, hope and beauty. Planners translate theoretical, and to a greater sense, actual goals into specific actions. Planning often deals with \u003cem\u003ein-between issues\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eand so requires perception of what artists call \u003cem\u003enegative space\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(spaces between objects)\u0026rsquo; (31).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis definition of the role of the planner is quite elastic and might be stretched to include almost all the activities, thoughts, feelings, aspirations, imaginations and dreams of the community and the society (terms not to be used interchangeably in this study, but in concord with the sociological concepts of \u003cem\u003eGemeinschaft\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eGesellschaft\u003c/em\u003e from Toennies 1887 and Durkheim\u0026rsquo;s Society in \u003cem\u003eDe la Division du Travail Social.\u003c/em\u003e Community-led planning is a shift from expert-driven models and top-down approach to physical and land use planning where members of the community are actively involved in identifying their needs, and setting their priorities based on their aspirations and lived experiences (Healey, 1997). Communities are seen as co-creators of spatial interventions which fosters a sense of ownership. It is built on the premise that residents of an area understand their challenges and potentials best, hence development proposals will align with their needs and aspirations. Community-led planning is built on the principles of community ownership, collaboration and partnership and empowerment (32).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e2.1 Communities and the essence of participation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe result of a good plan is that residents are more likely to be supportive of plans, they have actively helped create. This way, \u0026lsquo;planners create connections between different agencies, sectors and jurisdictions. As a result, they must collaborate with diverse interest groups\u0026rsquo; (31). Where such climate is provided, communities will gain their space to participate by clamouring for and gaining significant voice both in debate, discussion and decision-making processes (15) in creating the desired visions for their settlements and cities. Here, democracy as a strong tenet for the involvement of communities becomes a strong vehicle for achieving PP.\u0026nbsp;Mazrui, though, highlights the need to distinguish democracy as means and democracy as goals and identifies four fundamental goals of democracy as accountable rulers, active participating citizens, an open society and social justice (33).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e2.2 Arnstein\u0026rsquo;s Ladder of Citizen Participation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSherry Arnstein\u0026rsquo;s 1969 article titled \u003cem\u003eA Ladder of Citizen Participation\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(26) became foundational in the understanding of public participation. In it, participation was conceptualized into three main categories with eight rungs: non-participation (manipulation and therapy), tokenism (informing, consultation, placation) and citizen power (partnership, delegated power and citizen control) (26); focusing on the degree of power citizens can or should have in decision-making (15). Arnstein\u0026rsquo;s main highlight is that mere consultation does not equate actual influence. Central to the claim of this model is that top-down participation procedures have been seen to pay lip service to \u0026lsquo;information and consultation\u0026rsquo; and is often used as \u0026lsquo;oil\u0026rsquo; to smooth over the authorities\u0026rsquo; decision-making engines \u0026ndash; at its worst, an instrument to manipulate citizens (15). Manipulation is defined as an illusory form of participation where government officials mislead citizens into having them believe that they have power in a process where they have intentionally been denied power. Citizens serve the purpose of rubber stamping what the government has already decided to do (26). \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this model, citizen power, which is the ultimate goal of PP, encompasses partnership, delegated power and citizen control. Partnership occurs when citizens and those in authority collaborate and share decision-making responsibilities mainly through negotiation and joint committees. However, power holders do not voluntarily yield power, and citizens have to take it through actions such as protests, campaign and community organizing (26). Delegated power is when citizens are allowed to have significant authority which is achieved by power holders yielding some of their power and influence allowing citizens to make decisions. Finally, citizen control is when citizens are fully in-charge of a program, policy or project and marks the highest form of influence and participation. There have been claims that PP in Kenya largely falls within the tokenism, consultation and placation levels of participation considered as low level of public participation as shown in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 2,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003ewhich is the Government\u0026rsquo;s own adaptation of Arnstein\u0026rsquo;s ladder for spatial planning (10). This is mainly due to the absence of a feedback mechanism leading to participation forums being avenues for airing views without any communication on how that feedback will have informed the policy or plan being discussed. Secondly, many County Governments lack the capacity to translate development and renewal plans into local languages or simplified versions that do not have technical jargon (23). To cure this deficiency, the \u003cem\u003eCounty Spatial Planning Guidelines\u003c/em\u003e (10) has prescribed the adaptation of Arnstein\u0026rsquo;s ladder. A horizontal-vertical schematic that favours greater output of PP in Planning where the highest level of public participation (26) emerges from the goals of empowerment of communities who are provided with an opportunity to make decisions for themselves through visioning, and policy and strategy formulation. As a theoretical model, other variations exist for operationalization.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBetween the 1960s and 1990s, the ladder of participation was applied in Singapore with some variations to get the country on a trajectory of development. A model which integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches but offers the best outcomes. He says that by trial and error, he learnt that if he wanted to get an important proposal accepted at all levels; he would float his ideas with his ministers, who would then float the ideas with permanent secretaries who would then float them with lower-level officials. After he got their reactions, he would have the proposal discussed among those who had to make it work [the technocrats]. If the proposals concerned large numbers of people, he would then get the issue in the media for public discussion. Yew (2000) acknowledges that there are some sensitive matters that cannot be debated. One such issues is in the eradication of slums(34). Faced with slums like Geylang Serai, which [along with Kampong Ubi and Kampong Kembangan] housed tens of thousands of slum dwellers under depressed conditions, poor housing and a lack of essential services, he provided unequivocal leadership by committing to eradicate the slums by \u0026lsquo;demolishing it\u0026rsquo; and in its place \u0026ldquo;build a modern high-rise housing estate.\u0026rdquo; This was implemented, and a comprehensive process for eradicating slums was launched which not only eradicated the slums, but also eradicated the social ties that bound the slums dwellers through distribution by random balloting (34).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs asserted by Van Den Broeck, et al., (15), the overall responsibility for collective goods is a specific mandate of the public sector which has increasingly been expanded to accommodate more private responsibilities of the individual through public participation.\u0026nbsp;However, as aforementioned, there appears to be an element of exclusion of the private interest in participation processes in Kenya which presents itself in experts hijacking the participation process be it by government officials, NGOs and CSOs as was the case in Mukuru Special Planning Area (3). Placation is clearly demonstrated here as a few people may be involved without accountability to the wider community. The key obstacles that hinder public participation in Kenya from moving to higher rungs are lack of capacity, elite/expert capture, grey areas in the law and power asymmetries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e2.3 Elite Theory\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis theory posits that a small group of individuals (elites or experts) wield significant power and influence over decision making and other structures within the society. This minority often consists of policymakers and leaders who make decisions on behalf of the majority, and who influence public policy, (35) There is a significant power imbalance between the elite and the general public and the decisions made by the elite are often influenced by the elite rather than the general public\u0026rsquo;s needs (35). In the case of urban development and renewal in Kenya, decisions are mostly made by experts and policymakers. While the law, which is also largely formulated by the elite, may have provided for public participation, but it does not give a clear guideline on the mechanisms of conducting effective and adequate participation. This has left room for superficiality in compliance tying to tokenism within the participation processes in Kenya undermining equitable participation and public interest. Elite capture in urban development and renewal processes can take the following forms: economic incentives, technical complexity, representation filtering and agenda-setting control. Devolution was seen as an opportunity of eradicating elite domination by devolving power and decision making to the grassroots. However, new elite classes have been formed at the county level with governors, MCAs and other stakeholders such as contractors colluding in decisions pertaining to resource allocation (35). The elite further entrench themselves by failing to properly empower citizens by providing them with information and support need to engage meaningfully. The concept of elite capture and that of special interest groups as propounded by (35) imply that any given decision-making platform should critically assess the interests of the elites to reduce interference.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3.0 APPROACH AND METHODS","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn this study, both qualitative and empirical methods are applied in evaluating the applicability of socio-technical planning approaches and public participation in slum upgrading under the KISIP project, similar to what has been applied by other studies such as (3). It is falsely asserted by (36) that the KISIP project has been concluded \u0026nbsp; - only Phase I was concluded and interventions on other sites kickstarted under Phase II. This paper reviews projects that were implemented in the first phase of KISIP.\u0026nbsp;As shown above, various technical processes are involved in a slum upgrading exercise. In the KISIP process, both quantitative, qualitative, spatial and legal analysis techniques were applied in achieving various goals. For instance, in the process of socio-economic survey which was done through census enumeration, the number and socio-economic characteristics of households in each of the settlements was established, and detailed mapping was done to establish the boundaries of the settlements as well as to map each structure. Further, various aspects of spatial, quantitative and qualitative methods were applied in spatial analysis of each settlement (37,38).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn seeking to understand the planning approach, various aspects of the planning process are evaluated, including acceptability of the project, acceptability of the planning standards, acceptability of community desires, visions and aspirations, negotiations between the community on one hand and the government on the other. Overall analysis of KISIP is done using both secondary and primary data collection methods. Three key document categories are involved in this, including the State department of Housing and Urban Developments (SDHUD) web page, (SDHUD 2017)\u0026nbsp; World Bank\u0026rsquo;s web pages (39,40), socio-economic profiles of sampled settlements prepared by the consultancy team that was tasked with the assignment e.g., (38) and (41), and the various physical development plans (PDPs) e.g., (37,42). All these sources combine to offer various aspects of data that form the main spine of empirical data for the paper. In this sense, broader concerns such as the KISIP project conceptualization and design, the planning approach and methodology, execution of various tasks under the various components are analysed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwenty-one slums which were earmarked for upgrading under KISIP I between 2014 and 2018 have been highlighted to provide the grounds for a close reflection on the process of slum upgrading. \u003cstrong\u003eTable 1\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eprovides a summary\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eof these settlements across Nairobi City (11), Mombasa City (6), Kiambu County (2) and Embu County (2). These reflections provide the basis for inference on current prospects and constraints of slum upgrading in Kenya, and its future possibilities. Overall, a number of issues were identified which included the current status of the slums, ownership status, the position of tenants, project design to accommodate the tenants in slums who constitute the vast majority, but who are subject to the powers of the minority structure owners, among others.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1:\u003c/strong\u003e Sampled settlements planned under the KISIP 1 project between 2014 \u0026ndash; 2018.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Adapted from VSPL, OOPL, and MoTIHUD (2017b; 2017a; 2017c; 2016a; 2016b)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"652\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eS/ No\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformal Settlements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 380px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eParticulars\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCounty\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eKey Concerns\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFormal approval status\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCommunity approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKambi Moto\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"12\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNairobi\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSelf-help housing, infrastructure, access to services, tenure security\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGhetto\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSelf-help housing, water, sanitation, access\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKosovo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHousing, access, sanitation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMashimoni\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHousing, access, sanitation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmbakasi\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTenure security, access to services\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKitui\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHousing, infrastructure, sanitation, tenure\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRedeemed\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEconomy, access, energy supply, industrial use\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKinyago Kanuku\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHousing, economy, tenure security\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGitathuru\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSanitation, Water, security, housing, environmentally fragile location\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNjiku\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRural suburbs, housing, tenure, land conflicts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKisii Village\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot planned as the community rejected the intervention\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot applicable\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRejected\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKahawa Soweto\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSanitation, services, tenure security, access\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni - Mombasa\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMombasa\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSanitation, Access to electricity, rental units, recreational spaces\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMajaoni\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAgriculture, housing/ settlements, tenure security, livelihoods, historical injustices\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15-17\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eChaani \u0026ndash; (3 settlements \u0026ndash; Kalahari, Mathare and Kwa Rasi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSanitation, Access to electricity, environmental protection/ environmentally fragile location of Kwarasi and Kalahari settlements, pollution, landslides\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGanahola Mikindani\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAbandoned midway through as the community did not have faith in the process\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot applicable/ Not Planned\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot applicable/ Contested ownership\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eUgweri 3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmbu\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot planned after the community resisted the process before the start\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot applicable/ Not Planned\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAbandoned\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKimangaru\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSanitation, rental units, Markets, Farming, Social services\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eUmoja\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKiambu\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 220px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTenure security, services, settlements, sanitation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot approved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 83px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eApproved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA sample-frame of twenty-one (21) settlements, highlighted in the table above, is provided for an in-depth study regarding the status of implementation of the project, especially on the achievement of components 1 and 2; components 3 and 4 are not reviewed as the particular contract did not get to those levels. Informal settlements are distributed throughout Nairobi. For a detailed understanding of all the issues in context, however, Kahawa Soweto has been purposefully selected. It is an informal settlement in the northern reaches of Nairobi City. The settlement has been selected for three reasons: first because of its consideration as part of the KISIP project; secondly because there have been other attempts prior to the KISIP process to provide perspective on challenges/ and or failures of slum upgrading, and thirdly because it has been studied in a related study on supply of basic services \u003cem\u003eLet there be Light: Towards a Hybridized Electricity Supply Paradigm in Slums in Kenya\u003c/em\u003e (43) and in another evaluative study the \u003cem\u003eGlobal-Local Intersections: Lessons from Slum Upgrading in Kenya - the KISIP Experience Between 2011 to 2022\u003c/em\u003e (18).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4.0 FINDINGS: EXPECTATIONS AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION","content":"\u003cp\u003eKahawa Soweto is administratively part of Kasarani sub-county. It is situated in the north-eastern fringes of Nairobi City County located adjacent to the Kahawa Military Barracks, separated only by the railway line in whose reserve it finds its access (37,38). \u0026nbsp; Kahawa Soweto\u0026rsquo;s origins date back to 1977, when a limited number of rural-urban immigrants invaded a stretch of unoccupied public land. Since then, the numbers have marginally grown. The residents, devoid of ownership rights, struggle to lay claim to the land, and resident groups often are in confrontation with each other. There also have been several government attempts at evicting the settlement\u0026rsquo;s residents either in part or the whole. In 1988, there was an eviction notice from the court citing environmental concerns as the southern edges of the settlement adjoins an abandoned quarry. According to the Socio-Economic Report for Kahawa Soweto (38), residents however stayed put which justified the move by the Government of Kenya to recommend its improvement under KISIP (38).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThrough the census enumeration exercise done in 2015 in the KISIP project, the population of Kahawa Soweto was established at 3197, growing at the rate of 3.9% per annum. With a spatial imprint of just under 6 hectares, Kahawa Soweto has a population density of 717 persons per hectare in 2022, compared to the city\u0026rsquo;s average of 66 person per hectare. Projection using the compounded annual growth rate method indicates that the population of the settlement will increase to 5,675 with a population density of 973 persons per hectare in 2030 compared to the estimated city\u0026rsquo;s average of 93 (43). It is true that there are a number of challenges in slums. According to data available under the KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto Informal Settlement. Kahawa Soweto is characterized by haphazard development without the guidance of formal planning principles. The housing typology is predominantly temporary low-rise tenement row housing (43). The horizontal densities are high, thereby rendering the settlement inaccessible, a situation execrated by the narrow nature of the paths and streets. Typically, these paths measure approximately 1.5 meters, and consequently do not lend themselves for use as wayleaves for trunk utilities. However, there exists reliable electricity connectivity within the vicinity of the settlement for public amenities and industries including Kahawa Soweto Primary School and Health Centre.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe materials used to construct their residential structures are a clear indicator of economic status of the residents and the deemed security and permanence of their habitat. According to (44), security of tenure influences the quality of housing in a settlement; households with titles even in informal settlements are viewed to more likely have permanent units unlike their counterparts without tenure security, though questions are rife on whether the existence of titles predisposes slum dwellers to gentrification, loss of residence and the subsequent formation of new slums. An analysis of housing structures was done based on three components - wall, floor and roof. Most of the structures are constructed with locally available materials such as mud and other (often reused) construction materials, including corrugated galvanized (CGI) iron-sheets, mud and timber. Majority of walls are made of iron sheets (57%), followed by wood (10%). The materials used for flooring of the structures are cement and earth with the latter having a share of 70% (38).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e4.1 Mapping actors and plotting antagonistic claims: Slum upgrading as multi-actor interaction\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA multi-actor approach to slum upgrading allows for resource sharing and more responsive planning (\u003cstrong\u003eFig. 1\u003c/strong\u003e). However, as it has been established, there is a risk of power imbalances and conflicting priorities. For instance, in the case of Kahawa Soweto, the government prioritized infrastructure development and tenure security while the community was more interested in owning the structures that they live in and no other proposals were attractive to them. This is where planners come in to act as mediators and knowledge translators among the stakeholders making sure the voices of the community are not drowned out by technocratic or donor-driven imperatives. Slum upgrading is a multi-actor endeavour that brings together stakeholders with varying and sometimes conflicting interests. Due to the complex nature of slum upgrading planning processes, there is need for participation and involvement of a diverse range of stakeholders to ensure success of the proposed initiatives. According to Rigon (45), slum upgrading seeks to enable and empower communities hence they become the major actor in the process. There are also NGOs which take up the role of facilitators and intermediaries between the community and the government. KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto appreciated the important role residents play in the upgrading process and formulated Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) which served as a bridge between the community and other stakeholders (KISIP team, Government) to ensure grassroots concerns are captured (KISIP, 2020). Civil society groups such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji took up the role of empowering residents making sure they are appraised of their rights and responsibilities within the planning process. The State has the key role of policy formulation and spearheading the slum upgrading initiatives such as KISIP.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe local community has the main role of identifying local issues and needs. Their main interests were increased access to basic infrastructure, quality housing and employment opportunities. They also have the role of shaping development proposals by providing their input in the planning process. However, this presented a challenge where they were keener on owning the structures they lived in, and no other planning proposals were attractive to them. This meant that they were not interested in whether planning standards were upheld and there was a bit of resistance to government plan proposals that they felt were likely to evict them.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePlanning and politics cannot be separated, and politicians play a crucial role which is facilitating the preparation and approval of plans by allocating resources. Politicians also have the key role of shaping urban renewal and development by preparing and approving legislations and zoning regulations. However, sometimes these roles may be overshadowed by certain interests. The need for votes and political support pushes politicians to maintain the status quo since the existence of depressing conditions may mean more campaign promises or skewed policies to benefit specific constituencies. To bargain with politicians over policies and resources individuals mobilize to form interest groups. Agents who manage to overcome collective action problems and organize themselves into a lobby have more influence than less organized groups and are thus likely to receive more benefits (35). They may also compromise the planning process since improvement of slum conditions may lead to the electorate\u0026apos;s reduced dependence on them. The slum upgrading process in Kahawa Soweto revealed some resistance from the politicians since some were against any measures for relocation as they raise concerns of gerrymandering of electoral boundaries/ slum boundaries. It is the role of the expert to come in and balance these interests while ensuring the community needs are taken into account and the planning outcome is adequately achieved.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe main concerns in Kahawa Soweto were access to sanitation services and other utilities such as electricity which meant that utility companies were a major stakeholder. Utility companies have the role of providing essential services to the community while ensuring the protection of their infrastructure. Finally, the shelter/structure owners have the primary role of providing shelter. Their keen interest in collecting land rents was a catalyst to them inciting residents to resist planning processes in a bid to \u0026lsquo;protect their investments\u0026rsquo;. Through the Kahawa Soweto upgrading process, it is clear that interests of structure owners need to be understood and reconciled with those of tenants. Sensitization is crucial in communicating to structure owners that slum improvement is for all and may in the long run translate to higher rents due to improvement of general conditions such as access and economic empowerment of the community.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e4.2 Rings of action: Identifying the multi-scalarity of actors in slums\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs shown in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 1\u003c/strong\u003e, actors in the slum upgrading process operate across multiple and overlapping scales forming layers of decision-making and implementation which ultimately shapes the process and outcomes of the urban renewal process. In the case of upgrading Kahawa Soweto, the outermost ring consists of World Bank which is the development partner behind KISIP. World Bank set the conditions under which the KISIP project was done, funded and evaluated (KISIP, 2020). They also set up funding conditions and monitoring, evaluation and learning requirements. The ring that follows is the national scale which is the Ministry of Lands, Public Works, Housing and Urban Development. This actor develops legal and institutional frameworks that support and guide the slum upgrading process while providing oversight, coordination and legitimacy for receiving donor support.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe third ring is the state at the county level which is the Nairobi City County whose role is organizing meetings, approving the spatial plans and working alongside consultants by supervision (37). The fourth circle represents the local community scale comprising CBOs, residents\u0026rsquo; association, Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) among others. They act as the link between policy and lived experiences. They represent the public\u0026rsquo;s interests and shape the agenda setting and validate priorities. At the heart of decision-making on residential locations are individual choices. Individual rationality in decision-making has been established as a consequential determinant of where an individual lives. As parts of households, individual rationality is closely tied with the decisions of households on where they will live. In slum upgrading projects, these constitute the lowest levels of beneficiaries. Their participation is mainly through public \u003cem\u003ebarazas\u003c/em\u003e/community meetings and grievance redress mechanisms. They may be limited by lack of institutional power; however, they determine the success, legitimacy and sustainability of the plan proposals. Multi-scalarity calls for recognition that the participation of the actors above is layered and politicized, calling for equitable facilitation and capacity building to ensure coherence between global objectives and local realities.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2\u003c/strong\u003e summarizes these competing/ antagonistic interests from the slums that were studied. As can be seen, each actor category has their interests and face unique challenges. At the same time, each actor views itself from an internal lens which might be different from external perspectives of other actors. Because of interests, there are gains which each actor category expects to reap, while all actors will appear to posture as if they are pursuing the goals of residents of slum dwellers.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eSketching Antagonistic interests among actors in slums.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, 2025\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"917\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 120px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eActor\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eInterest\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe problem\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePerspectives\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhat the interests will gain/ lose\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhat slum dwellers will/ gain/ lose\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe state\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLand\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLand rents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eA good quality of life for its people\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePolitical support for the incumbent government\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSecurity of tenure for the people\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnvironmental sustainability\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003einvestments\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe planning process is expensive\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe government feels entitled as they own the land\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePlanning is about implementation of standards in the given contexts: currently there are no relaxed standards for informal settlements\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInitiation of the planning process.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWillingness to provide security of tenure to residents of slums. What precedence will they set?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnhancement of quality of life of slum-dwellers? According to which parameters?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWouldn\u0026rsquo;t it just be enough to give title deeds without so much of a fuss?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCollection of taxes\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of \u0026ldquo;law and order\u0026rdquo;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of spatial order\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of unsanctioned access to utilities like electricity\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSafety of government installations like oil pipelines and railways\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSafety and security\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCommunity social equilibrium will be lost\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThey will pay land rents/ land rents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGentrification from well-to-do urban dwellers\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSlums will lose identity\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGovernment surveillance will increase, hence constrained freedoms\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eStructure owners will lose their power\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCounty Governments\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLand\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRates\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnvironmental sustainability\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePolitical support\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGood quality of life for residents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003einvestments\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCounty governments feel entitled because of their constitutional mandate to plan.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHave minimum standards for development control.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSet the zoning regulations for developments\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInitiation of planning process and service delivery? Have the current failed?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWillingness to provide security of tenure. Why? Could this be a form of land redistribution?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAccommodation of informal settlement zones standards? Why?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCollection of rates and other taxes for licenses\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of \u0026ldquo;law and order\u0026rdquo;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of spatial order\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eConstitutional mandate\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControl of unsanctioned access to utilities like water\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePayment of land rates from the local residents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLocal government inefficiency will replace local mechanisms\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLocal community\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLand\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHousing\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInfrastructure and services\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEconomic activities\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePolitical and administrative leadership that protects their interests\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWater and sanitation\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnvironmental sanitation\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEmployment opportunities\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe local communities are suspicious and resistant of all government initiative as they feel that the government is setting to evict them\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFeel entitled to live where they live\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAre mainly interested in owning the structures that they live in and no other proposals are attractive\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFear of eviction\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFear of gentrification\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNeed to be left alone to occupy current niche?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAcceptance and support of the planning process? Why now? What new gains will be obtained? Will the settlements retain their solidarity structures human?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWillingness to provide setbacks for installation of trunk and other services?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eUnderstanding that they are invaders of government or private land who need accommodation.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNeed to understand that slum improvement is for their benefit? Really? According to whom?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u0026ldquo;Better housing\u0026rdquo; measured by adequacy and affordability\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLaw and order\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eClean and environmentally safe environments\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncreased access to utilities like water and electricity\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThey will no longer be left alone\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGovernment policing and surveillance will multiply\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRole in political change will diminish\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe collapse of the alternative economy\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncreased suffering as a result of collapse of alternative economy\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eReduced happiness\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eUtilities will be charged\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGovernment inefficiency will be introduced\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePoliticians (Local and national)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLand\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVotes and political support\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEmpowerment of their electorate\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnvironmental sustainability\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eReduced dependency\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSuspicious of the planning process as they feel others will take credit to get votes\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAre against any measures for relocation as they raise concerns of gerrymandering of electoral boundaries/ slum boundaries.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncitement of the local residents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAcceptance and support of the planning process? But what about the votes?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNeed to understand that the process of slum upgrading is not in cross-purposes with their ambitions? Really? Where do they meet?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMobilization of all manner of support for slum upgrading. Is this realistic?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIn-migration means increase in votes\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eExistence of depressing conditions mean more campaign promises\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eUse of spatial character of slums, including high densities, proximity to key trunk infrastructures and difficulty in surveillance as bargaining tools in political contests\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLoss of votes and loss of power\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLoss of influence, loss of political influence\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncreased control of the state/ emasculation by the state\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePotential for dictatorship by the state\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUtility companies\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eReticulation of infrastructure\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCollection of charges for utilities\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnvironmental sustainability\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSafety of residents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSafety of their installations\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLow maintenance costs\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEfficient services\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncreased profits\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHave minimum demands and standards for supply of infrastructure which need to be met\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAre also concerned with safety of their installations as well as that of the residents hence impose stringent standards\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePotential for court cases in cases of harm from the utility lines\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eProtection of their wayleaves. Reduced vandalism.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePayment for their services They will get to sell their utilities at great profits. Market share created by over 75 % of urban dwellers.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eReduction of illegal connections\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSafety of residents and infrastructure\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFormulation of standards that accommodate informal settlements\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eProtected wayleaves.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSale of utilities at market rates\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncreased surveillance and policing/ curtailed freedoms\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFree/ cheap cartel-generated services will be lost\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eUnprotected wayleaves, lack of bargaining chips (railway lines, pipelines etc) will be gone\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePolitical power/ influence will be controlled\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 39px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 81px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eShelter Owners/ structure\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 125px;\"\u003e\n \u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eProvision of housing\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCollection of rents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInsecure tenure\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIn some cases, they are also residents\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ol\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 189px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAre mainly interested in protecting their \u0026lsquo;investment in housing\u0026rsquo; as well as their rights to \u0026lsquo;their\u0026rsquo; land.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eIncitement of communities to resist planning processes\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFear of redistribution of government land\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThey would be more satisfied if they got security of tenure, but who needs security of tenure, structure owners of dwellers?\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNeed to understand that slum improvement is for all\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMobilization of all stakeholders to embrace slum upgrading efforts\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAllowing setbacks or demolitions to accommodate provision for infrastructure\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eProperty rights\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRents which they collect\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInfluence and control/ power\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLoss of housing/ shelter\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLoss of incomes\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLoss of power and influence\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eObnoxious local government policing/ space for Nairobi City County \u003cem\u003e\u0026lsquo;kanjo askari\u0026rsquo;\u003c/em\u003e security personnel\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eControlled development/ payment of development fees\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEnforced peaceful coexistence\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e"},{"header":"5.0 DISCUSSION: EMERGING PICTURE AND CHARACTER OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SLUM UPGRADING","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the previous section, the implementation of PP in slum upgrading has been made apparent; its nature is clouded in mystery and opacity, and a sort of muddling through. As a result, the contestations that arise from It emerges from the foregoing that slum upgrading as urban renewal encompasses procedural, normative and substantive dimensions. Participation goes beyond the inclusion of voice to also include values. Goals, rules and actors. Procedural context of public participation highlights how participation is carried out: the steps, structures and tools used. These are shaped by legal structures such as the Constitution of Kenya (2010), Physical and Land Use Planning Act (2019), Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) among others. Examples of these tools include barazas, notices, workshops, focus group discussions and digital platforms. Normative aspects of public participation are the values and principles that justify it as a practice. Public participation is enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and is grounded on the principles of transparency, accountability and inclusion. This is a key aspect especially in regard to the KISIP programs because people in informal settlements have long been excluded from planning processes. Finally, participation can be assessed as a substantive outcome bringing in the measurable dimension of development effectiveness. World Bank under the KISIP program monitored and evaluated participation through indicators like attendance rates, stakeholder diversity and satisfaction levels (KISIP, 2020). The program in Kahawa Soweto utilized participatory enumeration, mapping and election of SECs to document and capture community engagement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, participation in the KISIP program is largely shaped by the donor conditions (World Bank), which influence how the local experts and the government conduct themselves. The tools of participation, scope of engagement and timing have all been designed under the auspices of these arrangements, creating rigidity of approach and a tyranny of sorts. This resulted in tensions between the experts and local community since the plans to be prepared had to align with these conditions. The experts were also largely left confused on how to follow them fully while remaining alert to the standards of planning risking rejection of the plans by the community. This portrays the need for co-creation models of participation that allows communities to shape not only the outcomes but also the tools and standards alongside the other partners. Public participation is a fundamental right aimed at democratizing decision making. It is guided by the principle that all who will be affected by a decision have the right to be involved in the making of that decision. In the context of urban renewal, public participation allows all stakeholders (the public, state and professional experts) to contribute their lived experiences, voice their concerns, influence policy and shape the environments they live. Public participation goes beyond consultation to include shared responsibility, mutual accountability and active engagement with feedback. In the context of KISIP, public participation is structured around community mobilization, participatory planning, and grievance redress mechanisms. This structure has the goal of building trust within the community and providing community-owned data.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.1 multi-level governance in slums\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMulti-level governance refers to a system where government stakeholders (National \u0026amp; County government, utility companies) and non-governmental stakeholders (international donors, CSOs) work together to develop and implement policies. The actors involved in the Kahawa Soweto slum upgrading program and their interrelationships are depicted in the \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 4\u003c/strong\u003e above. The KISIP program acknowledged the importance of the local community and the role they play in ensuring the success of the program. Hence the government sought to empower them to fully participate in the planning and infrastructure development process.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn slum upgrading, local community was empowered through the formation of the Settlement Executive Committees (SECs). The committee members facilitated communication between the community and other stakeholders. They also supported implementation, represented community interests and ensured social and environmental safeguards. To achieve this, the government in partnership with World Bank trained the committee members on social and environmental safeguards, gender-based violence (GBV) and grievance and conflict management. This can be seen as a bid by the government to share its power with the community to facilitate ownership and success of the project. Civil Society Organizations such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji, known simply as Muungano and Shack Dwellers International (SDI) championed for the involvement of the community in land enumeration to facilitate tenure by actively engaging with Nairobi City County officials (Rema, 2011). Muungano wa Wanavijiji worked to empower residents to raise money through a daily savings system which goes towards construction of quality housing once they have secured their land through the upgrading process. Mobilizing communities to come together for saving also created a platform through which the residents could voice their needs and concerns for inclusion in the planning process. The interplay among the various actors made participation a multi-level governance practice which aided in strengthening transparency, accountability and responsiveness across all levels.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.2 Participation as power: the emergence of serial \u0026ldquo;participators\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProtocols for PP exercises require that stakeholders are identified through structured, rational processes. Stakeholder analysis is done in consultation with communities, institutions working with them, local administration, political representatives, among other local stakeholders. Because this model presupposes equal representation, all the stakeholders are allowed to air their views in an open, transparent forum.\u0026nbsp;Never to be considered with a more formal cadre of experts referred to as public participation experts, there have emerged in Kenyan slum upgrading a covert group of \u0026ldquo;expert participants\u0026rdquo; who take part in public consultative processes for pay. \u0026ldquo;Participators/ consultators\u0026rdquo; as we prefer to call them, are ambitious individuals with wide experience in governmental and NGO project cycles, and who use the loopholes presented by it to share their experience but also to find monetary gain from the process. In slum upgrading projects such as KISIP, \u0026ldquo;participators\u0026rdquo; were readily at hand to defend \u0026ldquo;the interests of the communities,\u0026rdquo; and when they were done, they would get paid for their roles.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to key informant interviews, these actors are ever in communication, planning and strategy meetings with CSOs, Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) and NGOs, always prepared to magnify \u0026lsquo;injustices against local communities\u0026rsquo; to the outside world with the objective for raising funds. Consultation to them might mean attending \u0026lsquo;participation\u0026rsquo; in hotels and at the end receive some \u0026lsquo;facilitation for fare\u0026rsquo; (equivalent to US $4). They are always available for \u0026ldquo;consultations\u0026rdquo; and attending public meetings, and their \u0026lsquo;businesses\u0026rsquo; can always be locked for the day as they \u0026lsquo;assist \u003cem\u003ewageni\u003c/em\u003e (visitors)\u0026rsquo; who come to their settlements to bring \u003cem\u003emaendeleo\u003c/em\u003e (development). Some \u0026ldquo;participators\u0026rdquo; have fashioned themselves as community gatekeepers and are often inclined to incite local communities if they are excluded from any on-going projects. Having learnt the art of weaving narratives of misery and resilience to earn a living, they rendered themselves champions of slum-planning and like to posture that without them nothing can be achieved. They have contact information of local leaders and vigilante leaders alike, some are on first-name basis with members of local \u003cem\u003erendes\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003embugis\u003c/em\u003e, (gangs and crime families) whom they sometimes use to magnify their influence in communities. Using such networks, some participators even block local experts from accessing the slum communities. This way, the Constitution of Kenya appears to have restricted the planning experts and uncannily handed power not only to communities but to gatekeepers. While they need to be empowered, it is crucial to contextualize what type of power communities have, whether it is progressive, repressive or retrogressive vis-\u0026agrave;-vis the role of experts. Researchers hesitate to acknowledge the existence of such ground-based power as genuine power. The proper understanding of what really constitutes empowerment remains a detail that needs to be clearly properly delineated. In this study, empowerment is looked at as the ability of communities to make decisions, whether good or bad, progressive, repressive or retrogressive which outlines the expression of their agency.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.3 Public Participation as a Right\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe law has granted every citizen the right to participate in decision-making in matters physical and land use planning. However, access is often monopolized by experts and state actors, and where public participation is done, sometimes commandeered by participators. The KISIP program is largely shaped by World Bank, technical experts and the government dominating agenda-setting and decision-making processes. Kahawa Soweto also saw political actors manipulate participation by inciting the residents to resist the plan for their own selfish gain. While community participation was an integral part of the KISIP program with the formation of the Settlement Executive Committee (SECs) among other initiatives, the process was still guided by the existing and predetermined frameworks limiting co-creation and the community\u0026rsquo;s ability to shape outcomes. Public participation is not absolute since it should be done under the confines of the law. This is why even though the KISIP program utilised a fairly creative approach towards community participation, the process had to be guided by predefined frameworks which limited creativity and autonomy. Public participation is also relative to other rights and interests. The community may not always determine the final outcome because their input has to be subjected to the laws and procedures, expert judgement and donor requirements. Residents end up feeling like the output was manipulated pushing a reaction such as lodging cases in court citing inadequate public participation. This brings in the need for clear guidelines since it is evident that despite participation being founded in the law, it can be exclusive in its practice and implementation.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.4 Public participation as knowledge and basis of power contests\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic participation is also a context of knowledge, who produces it, and how it informs the planning process. In Kenya, it is a battle between expert-driven knowledge and community lived experiences. Urban planning is a technical endeavour built on components such as GIS maps, planning reports among others which is guided by a legal framework. However, these outputs are often at the experience of community knowledge meaning experts often \u0026lsquo;reframe\u0026rsquo; outputs from the community to fit \u0026lsquo;plannable\u0026rsquo; formats often resulting in the loss of nuance and complexity. Hence, participation becomes a selective exercise where experts filter what they have heard on the basis of whether they fit the predefined standards. Thus, while all groups seem to tussle to exert their influence in the city, power becomes a constant item of contestation in the city and struggles for participation in the city are an embodiment of struggles for power (3).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.5 Public participation as a clash of language\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been established that public participation especially at the county level is marred by the inability of counties to translate technical planning documents into a language that can be well understood and appreciated by the local community. The use of terms like \u0026lsquo;tenure regularization\u0026rsquo; while professionally accurate serve as a barrier to community understanding of planning documents. This reduces their participation to reacting to proposals rather than it being a co-creative process where they generate proposals too making participation consultative rather than deliberative. Another distinct language is political language where politicians and government officials view public participation as an opportunity to make promises and rhetorical appeals to development. Politicians often package public participation as an act of goodwill to the community or a favour rather presenting it as what it is: a non-negotiable right. Participation becomes performative since the real decisions are often made behind closed doors and participation is used to \u0026lsquo;rubber stamp\u0026rsquo; these decisions. The result is a disgruntled population which expects tangible outcomes from political promises only to realise they were just a means to an end.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLay language refers to the everyday expressions and narratives used by the community reflecting lived experiences and realities. The community may express themselves in Swahili or sheng which is then translated by elite representatives such as experts and politicians or through technical meetings. This results in information being diluted or reframed to fit institutional preferences. The result is a power imbalance whereby those who are most affected have the least ability to shape the outcomes and their attendance is viewed as consent to the development proposals. The clash of the technical, political and lay languages presents the dire need to have these languages convert and interact. Experts such as planners need to take up the role of facilitators, politicians have to listen, and the community needs to be empowered to boldly communicate and there needs to be a feedback mechanism that incorporates their input.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.6 Public Participation as changing practice\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipation has evolved from tokenism to empowerment and co-creation. For a long time, public participation in Kenya has been consultative, however, the KISIP program introduced a community-anchored form of stakeholder engagement. Formal structures such as SECs provided communities with a formal and representative voice within the planning process. This extended their engagement from just the typical stakeholder workshops. This was enriched by participation enumeration exercises and community mapping. Despite efforts by KISIP to revolutionize public participation, the process was still greatly affected by donor expectations and centralized control, especially by the State. One challenge is that there is no frequent re-election of the committee members even though they are supposed to serve for two years. This positions SECs to be gatekeeping bodies where they dominate the discussions disregarding input from other members of the community leading to elite capture and further marginalization. Participation in Kahawa Soweto was marred by inadequate engagement where the residents were left without a proper understanding of housing affordability and civil society organizations such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji had to intervene.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.7 Public Participation and development\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic participation is a key driver of development. The essence of development is not just transformation of physical spaces but it\u0026apos;s also the transformation of the social, economic and institutional aspects of people\u0026rsquo;s lives. People-centred approach to development contributes to shared ownership, capacity building and resource responsibility. Participation also fosters transparency and accountability especially in the development of informal settlements which for a long time have been plagued by mistrust of the government and elite capture. However, from the analysis above it is clear that public participation has been instrumentalized as a checkbox for legal and donor requirements. Communities are experiencing participation fatigue since they do not see the real impact of their participation. Domination of the participation process by elites (SECs, State, politicians) has further reinforced the existing inequalities which is a hindrance to achieving the broader goals of development: empowerment and equity. However, the KISIP program is a testament to the role that participation plays in enhancing sustainable development especially in informal settlements. Collaborative agency has helped the program especially in Kahawa Soweto achieve tenure regularization and facilitated access which would otherwise not be successful without the involvement of the community.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.8 Concretizing the state-statute-society triad: The experts\u0026rsquo; conundrum\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe role of the state in presiding over development has been uncontested in development discourses in the modern times. Seen as \u0026ldquo;top-down\u0026rdquo;, the paradigm of state-led development has always enlisted the authority of statutes on one hand, and that of experts on the other. Through this, the state has always the latitude to direct which direction development was to take. In slum upgrading, this implied the use of violent force in forcefully evict slum dwellers as had been the norm in Kenya over the years. However, with the expansion of the democratic space, people began to challenge this authority. From its early days in the Global North, the ostensible aim of public participation was to make \u0026lsquo;people\u0026rsquo; (society as per (7)) central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence (2). However, over time, there seems to have been a period where the \u0026lsquo;society\u0026rsquo;s\u0026rsquo; space at the table was commandeered by other expectations and other interests. Though laws and policies (statutes) were formed to guide public participation, there remains a vacuum, which experts have been unable to mediate. In the KISIP project in Kahawa Soweto and in the other settlements, whenever the society was more assertive, the consultants (the experts) tended to gravitate towards the direction of influence for fear of the community\u0026rsquo;s rebellion and possible eviction from the project, in which case the contract would be jeopardized, which constituted the tyranny of the society. Similarly, whenever the state tended to be assertive in their demands, the experts again gravitated towards the direction of the state\u0026rsquo;s demands, once again, for fear of the contract being jeopardised. This constitutes the tyranny of the state. As illustrated, the catch twenty-two in which the expert was thrown implied that always, the experts were always navigating between two potential tyrannies. In slum upgrading, this has always been the expert\u0026rsquo;s conundrum.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e5.8.1 Scenario 1: The clamp of the State (Disproportionate statutory and societal control)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0026ldquo;clamp of the society\u0026rdquo; represents the first scenario where the society, with the enlistment of experts and statutes seek to influence the outcomes of participation illustrated in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 2\u003c/strong\u003e. In this regard, society is backed up with CBOs, FBOs, CSOs and other actors who seem to support their needs while simultaneously pursuing theirs. International development agencies (IDAs) might not act directly on the side of communities, but are always backing the other CSOs, NGOs and CBOs through funding to promote community activities such as advocacy. These result in manipulation of the participation, rendering the state ineffective. Questions have been asked whether communities have become manipulative and tyrannical in their conduct in PP. As the society becomes stronger and stronger, and the more allies it is able to enlist, the more the society becomes tyrannical. Under this environment, most interventions are challenged in court, thereby occasioning delays in implementation of projects. In certain cases, questions have been asked whether courts have become activist to the extent of always going against the state in their judgements in such cases. For projects whose implementation is time-bound, this poses a challenge in implementation\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe common grounds of non-consultation have been cited in (12). It should be clear that these authors are not in any way belittling the concerns raised in the constitutional petitions and are only interested in the petition to identify areas in which PP as a normative endeavour might be strengthened. As shown in the implementation of KISIP PP can be very gruelling but the technical value of the consultation in planning might appear to be low. In this example, the more PP was encouraged, the more the public became powerful to the extent that the technical processes needed to adopt them as part of the technical processes. The emergence of public participation thus acted perpendicular to technical expertise, pitting the two \u0026ldquo;forces\u0026rdquo; of participation and centralization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e5.8.2 Scenario 2: The clamp of society (Disproportionate statutory and societal control)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0026ldquo;clamp of the state\u0026rdquo; represents the second scenario where the state, with the aid of experts and statutes seek to influence the outcomes of PP. Backed with the other actors such as County Governments and semi-autonomous, citizens and markets, the state\u0026rsquo;s mandates appear to be more diverse. In Kenya, under the World Bank regulations, slum upgrading takes place against a backdrop of lengthy and costly PP which the state sometimes finds monotonous. During the planning process, the slums dwellers will argue strongly against the planning standards and seek to negotiate to have them reduced, and if the negotiations are not concluded in the favour of their immediate interests [which might be to complete the plans, to prevent demolitions or grant them ownership documents as the case may be] they are likely to resist and reject the process illustrated in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 3\u003c/strong\u003e below. In this case, the IDAs act as an arbiter in calling for the democratic accommodation of communities; a paradox since some of the rigidities inherent in slum upgrading result from the stringent conditions of the grants.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWith the elaborate state machinery, the state has the power to enlist the statutes to push its agenda. Unchecked, this leads to the use of coercion as a strategy to pass the plans and initiate action. At the end of the day, the statutes which recommend the procedure end up facilitating the clamping of the society, making it difficult for them to effectively share their position. In a strong state, when the communities proceed to court, judgements might be issued to back the stand of the state.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e5.9 Conflicts/ synergies between communities and experts\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNotably in the KISIP project, public participation was an integral part of the planning process, and the involvement of the communities in distinct stages of problematizing their communities (at the formative stages of the plan-making process) and in visioning (in the latter stages) were followed. This way, the communities, in their own style, and in seeking to capture their aspirations provided a basis upon which the plans were prepared. Notable synergies and differences exist between community-produced plans and expert-produced plans in the KISIP. Technical quality of the plans, qualitative and quantitative considerations, and the capacity of the plans to be implementable appear to distinctly differ in the favour of the expert plans. While community plans might exhibit the identified shortcomings, it is important to note that the plans reflect the respective capacities of the communities relative to that of the experts, but also present the desires and aspirations of the communities. This tug-of-war led to the emergence of the two (2) typical contestations of the planning outcomes: rejection of plans by the government and rejection of the plans by the communities. In all this, the consultant, whose role it is to reconcile the community aspirations and planning standards is caught in the expert\u0026rsquo;s conundrum.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e5.9.1 Rejection of plans by communities\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePhysical Planning is a clear-cut discipline with established protocols for training, anchoring philosophies, guiding principles, techniques, procedures, laws and approval mechanisms. Planning Standards (PSs) have their role in development and development control in many modern societies. As demonstrated in \u003cstrong\u003eTable 3\u003c/strong\u003e, however, planning doesn\u0026rsquo;t appear to converge with community aspirations, and indeed, is often viewed by the communities as potentially disruptive to their daily lives. Whereas the planning process implemented under KISIP was participatory in nature and in line with the constitutional and legal provisions of participation, the plans ultimate subjection to the rigorous evaluation by the written laws, standards, regulations and codes did not please many communities. As has been identified previously, communities generally view the formal standards as too stringent, and the proposals from the communities on most occasions fall short of the standards. This led to plans being prepared through a combination of threats, high calibre public relations and persuasions to enable completion of the planning process. In principle, such a brand of public participation is an exercise of window-dressing that amounts to nothing in the end. As soon as the plans are approved by the government, implementation becomes impossible as the communities reject the plans citing mass relocation, suspicion, among other challenges. This continues to impair any attempts towards planning for slums and improving the supply of essential services. The pathway to delay approval of slum upgrading plans is illustrated in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 4\u003c/strong\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA number of considerations were made by communities in rejecting the plans. \u003cstrong\u003eTable 3\u003c/strong\u003e below is a compilation of ten typical statements from various settlements between 2014-2018 in opposition to the KISIP planning process and outcomes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 3:\u003c/strong\u003e Summary of response from residents of slums in the KISIP process\u003cstrong\u003e.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eSource: Author\u0026rsquo;s compilation, 2020\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"652\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTECHNICAL CONCERN\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eJUSTIFICATION/ TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEXAMPLES OF SETTLEMENTS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRESPONSE FROM COMMUNITY/ TYPICAL QUESTIONS/ CONCERNS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn the need for planning\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePlanning to provide. Framework for upgrading, land surveying, tenure regularization and titling\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKisii village (Embakasi Nairobi), Ganahola (Mombasa), Ugweri (Embu), Umoja (Thika)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We do not want plans. Plans will be used as grounds to have us evicted.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;These parcels are not government land. This is our land.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInfrastructure upgrading\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSettlement upgrading; land use projection; population projection\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;We do not want infrastructure; we want title deeds only!\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;What we have been using is infrastructure\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eExpansion of roads in the settlements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRoad planning standards; Physical planning standards; land use projections; population projection\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We do not want wider (9m) roads; the paths that exist (1.5m) in our settlement are adequate for us.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We do not have motor vehicles which will drive on those roads, neither do/ will our children.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe need of a plan to guide development of the settlement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrecondition for titling; donor requirement; statutory requirement\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We do not want a plan; we currently live peacefully and would not want that peaceful coexistence to disturbed.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Planners will use those plans to grab our land and get titles for them.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We already have our plans which are approved (Kambi moto).\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn the need to implement Physical Planning Standards\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePhysical Planning Standards/ statutory requirements of plans\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;You have not consulted us on the standards.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We have our standards which you have ignored.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;We were told that our land is a special planning area and therefore the standards do not apply (Kambi moto).\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e6\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn procedures for approval of plans\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePlan approval procedures\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;If the Director of Physical Planning won\u0026rsquo;t approve the plan, just take it to the governor or the president, they have been here, and they will approve it.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;The governor and the president understand us better.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e7\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn typology of plan; separation of land uses\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIncompatibility of land uses\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Our settlement is mixed use already, just draw the plan as it exists.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Where we live are our markets and we cannot accept to be separated from our livelihoods\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e8\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn the need to include tenants as part of the list of beneficiaries\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrecondition by donor organizations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi), Umoja (Thika).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Tenants cannot be given any plots in this settlement, they are outsiders; these are people\u0026rsquo;s plots.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;These tenants might move out tonight (That very night there is talk of forceful eviction of tenants!).\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 24px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 89px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn the need to expand the scope of stakeholders\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 161px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eStakeholder analysis; precondition by donor organizations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 142px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikoni, Majaoni, Chaani (Mombasa), Kambi Moto, Mashimoni, Kosovo and Kahawa Soweto (Nairobi), Umoja (Thika).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Determination of our representatives is our responsibility.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTenants cannot be stakeholders in this project because they do not have land here.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Komollo and Kedogo, 2025\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTypical of concerns of collective rationality in projects such as KISIP, it is not quickly apparent why communities would make some of the claims such as these cited in Table 3 above which would appear cognitively dissonant (46). However, the bottom-line for the communities in each of the positions that they took was their own preservation and the interest of their members. It would appear that the whole community was pursuing the same goal, but as it would be revealed through key informant interviews, sections of the communities pursued individual interests and goals by cloaking them as collective goals. Ultimately, as highlighted by Freedman (2013) that each of these individuals and communities had their strategies which might appear, as it were, in Table 3, as obnoxious and irrational (46), but which to the affected residents, are noble.\u0026nbsp;Regarding the KISIP planning process, residents of various settlements appreciated the participatory methodologies that were used. However, because of the stringent planning standards limiting certain provisions, for example those that recommend minimum road reserves at 9 metres, the communities used different approaches to oppose the move. Some communities like Likoni wrote letters asking for those standards to be waived, highlighting their contentedness with the existing smaller pathways, while other communities like Kambi Moto sought to demonstrate that their settlement had been designated a \u0026lsquo;special planning area\u0026rsquo; (SPA) and gazetted as such in the Kenya Gazette, meaning that they were exempted from the stringent standards.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e5.9.2 Rejection of plans by the government\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRejection of plans by the government is a typical end to many draft plans under KISIP which focus more on the desires and aspirations of communities as opposed to compliance to the extant to laws and standards. The main cause of the government\u0026rsquo;s disapprobation of the plans is the failure to meet the formal standards, legal requirements on land sizes and on urban development as illustrated in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 5\u003c/strong\u003e. In practice, most plans in Kenya are prepared using public participation. However, the final evaluation of the plans is done by weighing the plans against laws and standards which are usually enforced to the latter for formal settlements, sometimes even for greenfield sites. Because slums are already congested sites with many contests for space, communities are hard-pressed to concede grounds to the written planning codes, which ultimately lead to the disapproval of the plans. When the government fails to approve the plans, implementation becomes difficult and may sometimes lead to restarting the planning all over again. The intention, in the author\u0026rsquo;s opinion, is to find more agreeable way to find consensus with the communities, without diminishing their views.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"6.0 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION","content":"\u003cp\u003eFor effective slum upgrading, knowledge control and power imbalance have been identified as critical barriers and enablers which must be directly addressed when designing PP programmes. Striking these balances ensures that participants especially the public are protected from coercion more so by dominant interests of powerful elites and the state. As a basis of slum upgrading, planning has been described both as a professional and activist discipline \u0026ndash; dealing not only with planning places, but also negotiating, forecasting, researching, surveying and organizing financing (47). It is an abstract role to the extent that deals with theoretical goals and non-binding methods that need to be guided by theories, philosophies, ideals, ethics, standards, regulations, laws and constitutional provisions that are meant to steer planning in a manner that makes it responsive to societal need which are not to be separated, wholly and singularly without prejudice. This definition of the role of the planner is quite elastic and might be stretched to include almost all the activities, thoughts, feelings, aspirations, imaginations and dreams of the community and the society.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn consideration of that, and to temper the potential tyrannical excesses of planning, collaboration in slum upgrading process should be ensured to elevate spatial planners beyond the realm of the physical planning where they are viewed to be most powerful to the realms of the human: social, legal, economic, aesthetical, cultural, \u003cem\u003einter alia,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003ewhich may be diverse, and defined by different levels of emotions and feelings. Collaboration here is to be understood to be in an environment of cognitive sensory overloads, emotional stimulation, psychological balance, satisfaction, avarice, social well-being, desire for success, or lack of thereof, among other human feelings and impulses, which dictate how humans relate amongst themselves and how they relate with space. In such an environment, interests become difficult to allocate or adjudicate. Decision-makers (usually agencies of government) would prefer the bureaucratic (or autocratic) way of doing things while others in society might prefer the expert-led technocratic processes. Various ways of handling spatial conflict of interest have been proven productive or counterproductive in various jurisdictions, but spatial challenges still abound that call for processes that will ensure higher levels of success of whatever process is followed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e6.1 Mediating state-society divide using statutes as enablers\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs notes Van Den Broeck \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, competition and cooperation between actors, and sometimes partners, is not necessarily contradictory. Furthermore, both can be combined and none of them should be neglected if the intention is to develop a feasible and realistic policy (15). The planner\u0026rsquo;s role in space production has been noted as a delicate balancing act that needs to be clearly understood and navigated well. To effectively address the planning objective, the relational position of the state and the society as competing-yet-ideally-complementary components vis-\u0026agrave;-vis the statutes should be critically understood. Plagued with the possibility of suspicion and uncertainty by communities from the onset, the statutory provisions and the prescriptive procedures that Planning comes with notwithstanding, a strategic orientation of each of the components is critical. This calls for evaluating how the state and society can each achieve their optimal objectives without limiting the others\u0026rsquo; capacity to achieve their own.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo do this, it is critical to leverage each of the actors relative to their allies: society with the NGOs, CBOs, CSOs and FBOs among others and the state with citizens, policies and others, respectively. Across these relationships, the role of experts remains crucial. Urban Planners, Architects, Urban Designers, Land Surveyors, Sociologists and Economists, for instance, form the bulk of professionals involved in slum upgrading. Other experts such as lawyers, valuers are also crucial, and regardless of the respective actors the experts are allied with, it is imperative that there is convergence of purpose among them. Since the statutes have been demonstrated to abet the individual tyrannies of whichever components enlist them (\u003cstrong\u003eFig. 2\u003c/strong\u003e and \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 3\u003c/strong\u003e), leading to the failure of public participation, and since the extant statutes (including standards) have been established to clash with community aspirations thus directly leading to the failure of planning (\u003cstrong\u003eFig. 4\u003c/strong\u003e and \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 5\u003c/strong\u003e) mobilization of the statutory instruments thus becomes a crucial factor in ensuring that there is harmony between the state and the society. In this way, statutes become the fulcrum upon which collaboration and facilitation of the state and society is hinged, thus becoming a crucial feature of completing the tripartite arrangement among the state, society and statutes as shown in \u003cstrong\u003eFig. 6\u003c/strong\u003e.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWith such a framework, and in the event of conflict between the state and the society, the courts of law will be allied to no component, except in implementing the just provisions of the law to facilitate resolution of the conflicts. This will see to it that decisions of the court will not be interpretable as partisan to any one component. In this framework, PP will thus be well defined and well bounded, and ultimately, will be well-guarded and regulated towards the prioritization of the good of the community.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e6.2 Participation as a strategy for mediating strategies\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEvery actor in every situation has a strategy (46). There have been claims that the Bretton Woods institutions are vehicles for Western neo-imperialist agendas (see for example Mueller, 2011). Their fixation with public participation is seen as their point d\u0026rsquo; access of mischief. At the core of this approach lies that impoverishing fallacy that the African poor [including the ignorant, the hungry and their local political representatives] have the power to determine their development objectives in a manner that is more responsive to their conditions and needs [hence more sustainable] and that which will make better advantages of their local knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgements\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors are grateful to Philbert Siama, Clinton Patroba, Anne Rose Maina, Gregory Oduor and Joy Gesare for supporting in data collection using questionnaires in Kahawa Soweto and other settlements in Nairobi. VSPL are acknowledged by F K for the opportunity to work in slum upgrading projects for 4 years.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor contributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eF. K.: Conceptualization, data curation, writing, original draft preparation, methodology, formal analysis; L. E.: Conceptualization, review, supervision; J. K.: Conceptualization, review, supervision and visualization of figures and Tables; J. M.: Conceptualization, review, supervision; and E. M.: Writing, Review, link with practice, and Editing. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the National Council for Science and Technology and with the Science Technology and Innovation Act 2013. The study was approved by the School of Graduate Studies of Technical University of Kenya (\u003cstrong\u003eApp/05136/2017\u003c/strong\u003e) and National Council for Science and Technology under License Number \u003cstrong\u003eNACOSTI/P/24/34108.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to participate\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVerbal informed consent was obtained from key informants (KIs) prior to the interview while the respective reports (cited) on public participation in slum upgrading projects in Kenya are publicly available. All KI participants were aged above 18 years.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to publish\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors affirm that human research participant KIs provided informed consent for publication, on condition that no names are published.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHickey S, Mohan G. Towards Participation as a Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges. In: Hickey S, Mohan G, editors. Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development [Internet]. London and New York: Zed Books; [cited 2025 Jun 29]. Available from: https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=CrDnCCymayYC\u0026amp;printsec=frontcover\u0026amp;vq=%22Making+Spaces,+Changing+Pl\u003cbr\u003eaces%22\u0026amp;source=gbs_citations_module_r\u0026amp;cad=3#v=onepage\u0026amp;q=%22Making%20Spaces%2C%20Changing%20Places%22\u0026amp;f=false\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eCooke B, Kothari U. The Case for Participation and Tyranny. In: Cooke B, Kothari U, editors. Participation: The New Tyranny? London and New York: Zed Books; 2001.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eOuma S. Participation as \u0026lsquo;city-making\u0026rsquo;: a critical assessment of participatory planning in the Mukuru Special Planning Area in Nairobi, Kenya. Environ Urban [Internet]. 2023 Oct 1 [cited 2025 Jun 23];35(2):470\u0026ndash;89. Available from: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09562478231175031#:~:text=https://doi.org/10.1177/09562478231175031\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBarnes M, Newman J, Sullivan Helen. Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation. Barnes, Marian. Bristol, UK: The policy press; 2012.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe National Assembly. Public Participation in the Legislative Process. Nairobi; 2017. Report No.: 27.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMcArthur A. The Active Involvement of Local Residents in Strategic Community Partnerships. The Policy Press. 1995 Jan 1;23(1):61\u0026ndash;71.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eOffice of the Attorney General and Department of Justice. Kenya Policy on Public Participation. Nairobi; 2023 Apr.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eInnes JE, Booher DE. Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century. Planning Theory \u0026amp; Practice . 2007;5(4):419\u0026ndash;36.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRepublic of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General; 2010.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMinistry of Lands and Physical Planning \u0026amp; Council of Governors. County Spatial Planning Guidelines. Nairobi: Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning \u0026amp; Council of Governors; 2018.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGhai JC. Engaging in a public participation law [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2025 Jun 24]. Available from: https://katibainstitute.org/engaging-in-a-public-participation-law/\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eKenya Law. http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/228264/. 2022 [cited 2025 Jun 23]. Mugo \u0026amp; 14 others v Matiang\u0026rsquo;i \u0026amp; another; Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission of Kenya \u0026amp; 19 others (Interested Party) (Constitutional Petition 4 of 2019) [2022] KEHC 158 (KLR) (12 January 2022) (Judgment). Available from: http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/228264/\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLynch K. 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London and Sterling VA; 2003.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eKomollo FO, Kedogo JM. Global-Local Intersections: Lessons from Slum Upgrading in Kenya - the KISIP Experience Between 2011 to 2022. Forthcoming. 2025;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSteinbrink M, Haferburg C, Ley A. Festivalisation and urban renewal in the Global South: socio-spatial consequences of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. South African Geographical Journal= Suid-Afrikaanse Geografiese Tydskrif,. 2011;93(1):15\u0026ndash;28.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRepublic of Kenya. Urban Areas and Cities (Amendment) Act Number 3 of 2019. Government Printers, 3 Kenya: http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=9255; 2019.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVan den Broeck P, Sadiq A, Hiergens I, Molina MQ, Vershure H, Moulaert F. The Hybrid of Land Taking and Land Making. In: Van den Broeck P, Sadiq A, Hiergens I, Molina MQ, Vershure H, Moulaert F, editors. Communities, Land and Social Innovation: Land Taking and Land Making. 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Institute of Development Studies; 2002.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMazrui AA. Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future. In: Bujra A, editor. Democracy, Development and Poverty: The Debate and the Struggle Continues. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF); 2002. p. 15\u0026ndash;22.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eYew KL. From Third World to Second World. New York: Harper Business; 2011.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eDafe F. No Business like Slum Business The Political Economy of the Continued Existence of Slums: A case study of Nairobi. London; 2009 Feb. (98). Report No.: 09.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSolym\u0026aacute;ri D, Mangera J, Czirj\u0026aacute;k R, Tarr\u0026oacute;sy I. Overview of Kenyan Government Initiatives in Slum Upgrading: The Case of KENSUP and KISIP Projects. Hungarian Journal for African Studies. 2021;15(3):37\u0026ndash;59.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVSPL, OOPL, MoTIHUD. Kahawa Soweto Local Physical Development Plan. Nairobi; 2017.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVSPL, OOPL, MoTIHUD. Socio-Economic Survey Report for Kahawa Soweto under the KISIP Project. Nairobi; 2016.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWorld Bank. Economy Profile of Kenya: Doing Business 2020 Indicators. Washington Dc; 2020.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eThe World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/08/07/kenya-receives-150-million-to-improve-living-conditions-for-17-million-residents-in-urban-informal-settlements. 2020. Kenya Receives $150 Million to Improve Living Conditions for 1.7 Million Residents in Urban Informal Settlements.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVSPL, OOPL, MoTIHUD. Socio-Economic Survey Report for Mathare Mashimoni under the KISIP Project. Nairobi; 2016.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVSPL, OOPL, MoTIHUD. Physical Development Plan for Mathare Mashimoni under the KISIP Project. Nairobi; 2017.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eKomollo FO, Otieno JN, Esho LS, Van den Broeck P. Let There be Light: A Beyond-the-norm Hybridized Approach to Electricity Supply in Kenyan Informal Settlements. Nairobi: Unpublished; 2022.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMangira P, Mbathi M. Tenure-Infrastructure - Livelihoods (T-I-L) Nexus in slum upgrading: An emerging paradigm. Africa Habitat Review Journal. 2020 Dec;14(3):2025\u0026ndash;34.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRigon A. Building Local Governance: Participation and Elite Capture in Slum-upgrading in Kenya. Dev Change. 2014;45(2):257\u0026ndash;83.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFreedman L. Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford University Press; 2013.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFainstein S. New Directions in Planning Theory. In: Fainstein S, Campbell S, editors. Readings in Planning Theory. Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; 2003. p. 173\u0026ndash;95.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-cities","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Cities](https://www.springer.com/journal/44327)","snPcode":"44327","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/44327/3","title":"Discover Cities","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"collaboration, cooperation, inclusivity, consultation, participationism, “participators,” citizens’ forum","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"Public participation has become a notoriously thorny subject for the state, communities, experts and other actors in Kenya; often exposing a litany of differences among them and slowing down decision-making and project implementation processes. This paper examines state-society, state-statute and statute-society critical junctures of public participation in slum upgrading projects and examines its value proposition to those respective relationships. It explores the normative, procedural and substantive bounds of public participation and investigates potential sources of conflicts. The study considers the justifiably progressive practice of slum upgrading in Kenya as exemplified by the Kenya Informal Slum Upgrading Project (KISIP). This project represents the main contemporary paradigm for slum upgrading which has been attempted in a number of settlements across the country to solve the slum menace. Using elite theory and Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of participation as theoretical models, the study reveals submerged ironies and contradictions in the implementation of public participation in planning, including lack of clarity, exclusion, systemic malfunctions, contradictions, rigidities, insurgencies, differences and interests, and an inherent fear of close engagement with the fundamentals of public participation by both sides. This study ultimately reveals that though hailed as a fundamental right, public participation remains vague and interminably devious, and in need of proper delineation of roles. At the end, the paper recommends an all-inclusive, collaborative model which diminishes tensions between the state and the society and their respective allies, by leveraging statutes as enablers.","manuscriptTitle":"Interrogating Competing Tensions among Procedure, Expertise and Local Communities in Public Participation Processes in Urban Renewal in Kenya: The Case of KISIP Project","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-07-31 16:21:46","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7013073/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-08-19T06:39:42+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-08-13T07:56:08+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-08-06T06:55:30+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-08-05T14:51:22+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"212420692473404922128690453230764153148","date":"2025-08-05T14:01:33+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"316807055320959027758602617445604623850","date":"2025-07-29T07:07:35+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"89247223990630850564710322022044954317","date":"2025-07-29T06:02:22+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-07-29T05:18:12+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-07-24T05:08:20+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-07-17T00:28:46+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Cities","date":"2025-07-17T00:27:27+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-cities","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Cities](https://www.springer.com/journal/44327)","snPcode":"44327","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/44327/3","title":"Discover Cities","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"a1a2b884-b97f-4fb0-a867-be8fe7a1da8c","owner":[],"postedDate":"July 31st, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-16T14:53:29+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-07-31 16:21:46","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7013073","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7013073","identity":"rs-7013073","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}