Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion

preprint OA: closed CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
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Abstract

Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet very little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We developed a Bayesian modeling framework and a novel psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while participants experienced a motion after-effect illusion. Participants could incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all showed signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.

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europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00
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License: CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0