Hushing-up: a social epistemic practice for overcoming partisan ignorance

Much feminist social epistemology shares the basic assumption that ignorance generated by silencing (and related phenomena) is undesirable (Dotson 2011, 2012, 2014; Dotson & Gilbert, 2014; Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2011, 2012, 2023; Pohlhaus, 2012). While true in the contexts those theorists consider, I depart from that consensus, introducing and offering a philosophical account of a social epistemic practice that I term ‘hushing-up.’ This practice has emerged organically in response and in resistance to sectarian bigotry in Northern Ireland (NI), and contributes to post-conflict transitions away from social and political polarisation and its derivative harms to individuals and collectives. In spaces where hushing-up is deployed, ignorance of peoples’ community background is intentionally cultivated as a strategy in opposition to bigotry, while bigoted or sectarian displays incur social costs. Positioning hushing-up against existing accounts of political ignorance, including those by Williams (2021), Brennan (2016), and Somin (2013, 2015), and contributing to Mills’ (1997) idea of an epistemology of ignorance, I distinguish between performative partisanship (involving ignorance driven by social rewards for showing group allegiance) and pressured partisanship (involving ignorance driven by the avoidance of social sanctions for displaying indicators of disloyalty to a group). On the account I defend, shifts in social norms are central to addressing some forms of harmful ignorance. I argue that hushing-up succeeds in doing this in two ways: first, by reducing the rationality of pressured partisanship by providing alternative social support to that provided in polarised social spaces such that the cost of dissent is lowered; and secondly, by disincentivising performative partisanship through increasing the difficulty of identifying targets and ensuring that bigoted displays are met with disapproval in spaces where that norm is in force.