Evolutionary Game Analysis of UGC Copyright Infringement Governance
preprint
OA: closed
CC-BY-4.0
Abstract
Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of "government-platform-platform user," discusses the strategic interaction between different subjects and the influence effect of various factors, and explores the copyright governance mechanism of UGC in China. It is found that: The UGC copyright governance mechanism is a mechanism for the collaborative participation of multiple subjects at different levels, in which government departments are in a leading position in the construction of the mechanism, and platform participation in governance can significantly improve regulatory efficiency. Increasing the severity of government penalties, reducing the excess revenue of passive filtering of platforms, and the extra payment of users' infringing use can accelerate the realization of evolutionary stability strategies. There is a practical threshold for government incentives for platforms.
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- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00
- unpaywall
- last seen: 2026-05-26T02:00:01.498150+00:00
License: CC-BY-4.0