Cognitive Warfare as a Strategic Dilemma: A Game-Theoretic Model of Censorship and Distrust

Cognitive Warfare as a Strategic Dilemma: A Game-Theoretic Model of Censorship and Distrust | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Cognitive Warfare as a Strategic Dilemma: A Game-Theoretic Model of Censorship and Distrust Roberto Dillon, K. Thirumaran This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7874553/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Cognitive warfare is an area of increased scrutiny and concern worldwide. This paper argues that States that are increasingly employing censorship under the guise of combating "misinformation" may inadvertently replicate the cognitive warfare tactics they seek to defeat, to their own detriment. An iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework is proposed here to model such self-defeating strategies, where fear and anger drive societies toward distrust of their own government as well as an irrational acceptance of non-aligned information and propaganda. We formalize the role of the discount factor ( δ ) in determining whether states prioritize short-term control or long-term trust and analyze how censorship, in practice, fuels conspiracy theories, exemplified by the COVID-19 suppression of lab-leak hypotheses, later suggested by evidence. The model demonstrates that pluralistic discourse, not restrictive measures, is the dominant strategy for increasing δ and, ultimately, democratic resilience. Social science/Politics and international relations Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology Prisoner’s Dilemma Covid-19 Cognitive Warfare Censorship Cooperation Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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This paper argues that States that are increasingly employing censorship under the guise of combating \"misinformation\" may inadvertently replicate the cognitive warfare tactics they seek to defeat, to their own detriment. An iterated Prisoner\u0026rsquo;s Dilemma framework is proposed here to model such self-defeating strategies, where fear and anger drive societies toward distrust of their own government as well as an irrational acceptance of non-aligned information and propaganda. We formalize the role of the discount factor (\u003cem\u003eδ\u003c/em\u003e) in determining whether states prioritize short-term control or long-term trust and analyze how censorship, in practice, fuels conspiracy theories, exemplified by the COVID-19 suppression of lab-leak hypotheses, later suggested by evidence. 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