Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction

Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction Paulina Szwed, Ewa Szumowska This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 15 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract In everyday life, we encounter information that contradicts our beliefs, often disrupting our self-concept and triggering cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) suggests that discrepancies between cognitions create discomfort, motivating individuals to restore psychological consistency. It indicates that the magnitude of dissonance depends on the importance of conflicting beliefs, yet the role of importance has not been fully explored. Our hypothesis posits that the importance of a cognition moderates’ motivation to reduce dissonance. Two studies (N = 640) were conducted to test how people respond to discrepancy about their abilities. Study 1 showed that dissonance led to greater motivation toward reduction, but only for those who found those abilities as important. Study 2 (with a measure of the dissonance state) confirmed that dissonance magnitude and importance interact, influencing motivation to reduce dissonance. This research expands CDT by highlighting the role of importance in dissonance reduction. dissonance dissonant state importance self-concept effort Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Introduction In our daily lives, we frequently encounter information that contradicts our existing knowledge, whether it’s about the world or even ourselves. Often, this information is provided as feedback, which can disrupt our self-concept. The natural setting for receiving feedback is education or broader learning processes, such as in work, relationships, or games, often from teachers or peers (as in science). Regardless of the source or nature of the feedback, when it conflicts with our current understanding of ourselves, obtaining it can be an unpleasant experience. This discomfort can be explained in terms of cognitive dissonance. We can say that holding an opinion about ourselves and getting inconsistent feedback creates a discrepancy between two cognitive elements. The discrepancy should lead to an unpleasant arousal state, which should inspire strategies to reduce or eliminate it. The Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) is now almost 70 years old, and still is the one of the most influential theories in psychological science (Cooper, 2007; Harmon-Jones, 2019). Festinger's (1957) theory suggests that humans strive for internal psychological consistency and seek to restore it whenever it is disrupted. Cognitive dissonance theory posits that a discrepancy between cognitive elements leads to an unpleasant state of tension, motivating individuals to reduce it. The classical view suggests that the magnitude of the dissonance depends on the relative weight (importance) of conflicting cognitions within the cognitive system (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). In details, Festinger argued that the magnitude of evoked dissonance varies with two factors: the importance of cognition (1) i.e., the higher the personal value of the elements, the greater the magnitude of the dissonance in the relation, and ratio of cognition (2) the proportion of the weight of relevant information that is contrary to (i.e., dissonant with) the most resistant cognition (typically a behavioral commitment, of one self-concept) ( ibidem ). More in detail, the magnitude of dissonance should be computed in relation to the cognition that is most resistant to change. The greater the weight of the dissonant relevant information (sum of the dissonant cognitions weighted by their importance) relative to the weight of all relevant information (sum of all relevant cognitions weighted by their importance), the greater should be the dissonance. However, the role of importance has not been thoroughly empirically examined. On the contrary, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) often selects inductions that target cognitions with high importance for an individual, aiming to induce a lasting state of dissonance (Batson, 1975) to have perfect setting to examine the reduction modes. It is because much of the research within CDT has predominantly focused on dissonance reduction strategies rather than on the foundational model itself (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978; Vaidis & Bran, 2019; Weick, 1965; Vaidis & Gosling, 2011). To address this gap, we incorporated varying levels of importance in our studies, positing that the significance attributed to the cognitions involved moderates the motivation to reduce dissonance. Developments of the theory Cognitive Dissonance Theory, as originally proposed by Festinger (1957), ambiguously uses the term "dissonance" to refer to the theory itself, the triggering discrepancy, and the resulting arousal state. This lack of clarity has led to imprecise studies (Vaidis & Bran, 2018; Martinie et al., 2017; Cancino-Montecinos et al., 2018), and such terminological issues may affect our understanding of dissonance reduction. Festinger (1957) suggested that there are strategies to reduce "dissonance," but it remains unclear whether this refers to resolving the discrepancy or reducing the arousal. Additionally, Festinger discussed the concept of the "importance of the cognition(s)" and how it can increase the magnitude of dissonance, but it is not clear how this relates to the epistemic aspects or to the post-discrepancy state. In this article, we define "dissonance" as the discrepancy between cognitions and use the term "dissonant state" to describe the arousal that follows the discrepancy (following the suggestion from Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). More recent research has found that even simple discrepancies can trigger discomfort (Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, & Bettencourt, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005). Studies have also shown that cognitive discrepancies alone can evoke an affective state associated with dissonance (e.g., E. Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Levy, 2015; Levy, Harmon-Jones, & E. Harmon-Jones, 2018). Similarly, Proulx, Inzlicht, and Harmon-Jones (2012) argued that simple discrepancies can be understood in the same terms as dissonance. According to the original theory, when one of the two dissonant cognitions lacks sufficient importance, dissonance dissipates before producing any observable effects (Festinger, 1957/1985, p. 28). Yet, the underlying assumption remains that some form of dissonance will still arise—manifesting as a dissonant state, arousal following the discrepancy. These findings indicate that even small discrepancies can create dissonance-related tension, suggesting that arousal can be interpreted as a result of dissonance conceptualized simply as a discrepancy. Given this, where does importance fit within the model? The importance Given the complexities in understanding cognitive dissonance, it is crucial to explore the role of belief (cognitions) importance. Importance is not a fixed attribute—it varies along a spectrum from negligible to highly significant. The impact of discovering that I am not as skilled a cook as I believed will differ depending on whether I am a psychologist or a professional chef. In both cases, the information is unexpected and contradicts my prior knowledge. My initial belief may be strong and deeply held in either scenario, or both can trigger dissonance. However, while dissonance (discrepancy) will arise in both instances, the level of importance assigned to the belief will vary. To gain a clearer understanding of how importance is connected to dissonance or the dissonant state, it is useful to explore research on how it is processed in the brain. Neuroscientific research on semantic and affective importance—key factors in determining the subjective significance of a belief—suggests that this processing typically occurs between 400 and 600 milliseconds after stimulus onset, as indicated by Late Positive Potential (LPP) components (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Schacht et al., 2012). This later stage of processing involves brain regions such as the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, implying that belief importance does not influence the initial detection of cognitive inconsistency (see also Gawronski & Strack, 2012). Therefore, contrary to Festinger’s (1957) original assumption, belief importance may not directly affect the magnitude of dissonance at the cognitive level but instead plays a role in subsequent stages of the process. While the brain quickly detects inconsistencies, regardless of their subjective importance, this rapid detection might not align with how belief importance shapes later stages of the process. In contrast, research on discrepancy detection shows that the brain identifies inconsistencies rapidly, irrespective of their subjective importance. Event-related potential (ERP) studies reveal that the initial processing of inconsistencies occurs approximately 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset, marked by components like N200 (Bartholow et al., 2005; Botvinick et al., 2004). At this point, the brain has not yet evaluated the significance of the detected conflict. While discrepancy detection occurs swiftly, this does not mean that the brain immediately processes the importance of the conflict. Instead, the role of importance is revealed in later stages of cognitive dissonance processing. Although previous empirical studies (e.g., Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones et al., 2015) suggest that conflict involving beliefs of high importance is associated with stronger motivation to reduce dissonance, the existing evidence remains indirect. In most experiments, dissonance and its reduction effects were operationalized through the observation of attitude or behavior changes, so it didn’t really “allowed to test” where importance should be placed in the model. In other words, while the results suggest that dissonance caused by inconsistency with central beliefs is more intense, it has not been definitively shown whether the importance of these beliefs modifies this relationship anyhow. Not mentioning that the lack of measurement of the dissonant state, coupled with the focus on the reduction process, led to a problem in drawing clear conclusions from these tests. For years, the observed reduction was used both as an indicator of the occurrence of the dissonance state and as its primary effect (Vaidis & Bran, 2018). Hardyck and Kardush (1968) and Leippe and Eisenstadt (1999) discussed the use of dissonance reduction strategies as a function of cognition importance, underlining how belief importance influences the intensity and direction of dissonance reduction efforts. These studies suggest that individuals are more motivated to reduce dissonance when the conflicting cognition pertains to beliefs central to their identity or worldview. However, despite the recognition of the role of belief importance, it remains unclear what is the relationship between dissonance magnitude, dissonant state, importance and motivation to reduce it; basically, where is the place of the importance in the whole model. In fact, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) carefully selects its inductions to target cognitions that are sufficiently important and resistant, ensuring they provoke a lasting state of dissonance (Batson, 1975). Therefore, directly testing the role of cognitions importance is crucial. It would allow for more precise identification of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive dissonance and a better understanding of how belief centrality influences the process of dissonance reduction. Given the inconsistencies in how cognition importance has been theorized to affect dissonance (or dissonance state) reduction, our hypothesis (build on Hardyck and Kardush) is that the importance of a cognition moderates the relationship between the magnitude of dissonance (discrepancy) and the motivation to reduce it. Specifically, we predict that individuals will be more motivated to engage in effortful strategies when the conflicting cognition is of high importance to their self-concept, as opposed to when it is of low importance. Overview of the studies In both studies we induce cognitive dissonance (the discrepancy between cognitions). To achieve that, we embed our studies in a classical concept of self-discrepancy, the idea along with Higgins (1987) that cognitive dissonance should be evoked when the gap between two self-guides occurred. This kind of cognitive dissonance is well-founded in many psychological theories such as symbolic self-completion (e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), self-evaluation maintenance (e.g., Tesser,1988), self-verification (e.g., Swann, 1984), action identification (e.g., Vallacher & Wegner, 1985) as well as many others based on cognitive dissonance phenomena. To sum it, our idea is like Steele’s (1988) that dissonance does not arise as consequences of inconsistency itself; instead, it is caused by the threats that result from inconsistency toward self-integrity (see also Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993). Also, this perspective seems to be the most important to investigate from a practical point of view, for example, to a cognitive-behavioral therapist who struggles with many dysfunctional self-concepts in their patients. For the self-based revisions of CDT, individuals are motivated to defend their self-view (see Aronson, 1992 and further commentaries for a historical comprehensive overview of self-theories of dissonance; Stone & Cooper, 2001 for an integrative model; and Vaidis, 2014 for an overview). Thus, in both studies, we measure dissonance by assessing the strength of participants' initial beliefs about multitasking. Since all participants received negative feedback, they all experienced a discrepancy. However, the magnitude of this discrepancy depended on the strength of their initial beliefs. We operationalize this as the magnitude of the dissonance. In first study, we measured also participants declared importance of being good at multitasking and in the second study we manipulated the level of the importance of this consonant cognition (the cognition embedded in the individual prior to encounter inconsistent information, i.e. dissonant cognition). During the manipulation we tried in one condition to increase the importance of the consonant cognition (along with decrease the importance of dissonance cognition) and in the second reversely we lower the importance of the consonant cognition and increase the importance of the dissonance cognition. In both studies, we measured at the end the motivation for dissonance reduction, i.e. the willingness of an individual to exert effort (address to the task giving the potential of definite discrepancy reduction). Why multitasking? In the presented program, we decided to use a context of a multitasking, as it should be interesting for young people these days. Internet analysis brings up to us the reflection that for a large group of people is very important to have excellent multitasking skills. The reason can be an urban legend that in modern societies multitasking, it is one of the most important abilities and that multitaskers were way intelligent than those who are not good at this kind of activity. At the end of each study, there was an information that feedback was false and independent of their actual skills or level of abilities. Also, participants were assured that the use of false feedback was unavoidable and necessary to examine the phenomena in question – so that their trust in psychology as a science is not undermined. All sample sizes declared in the proposal were calculated using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) for medium-small effect size (.10) and recommended .80 power level (Cohen, 1988). All data are publicly available at the Open Science Framework https://osf.io/te4k7/?view_only=8a978996d9014f70ba671c73d1646f05. Study 1 Method Participants Our sample initially consisted of 358 Polish participants (287 females, 70 males, and 1 who did not provide a response; M age= 23.67, SD age= 6.12, range: 18–70) who were recruited via and online advertisement posted on social media sites for people interested in taking part in psychological research. Some of participants did not answer all questions leaving the missing data in the crucial variables. Thus, the final sample size constated of 294 participants (237 females, 57 Males; M age= 23.39, SD age= 5.12, range: 18–51). The study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the local Commission of Research Ethics (based on the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki). All measures used in the study are reported. All participants took part in the lottery to win some luxury office accessories (pens, notebooks, pencils etc.) Measures and Procedure Participants assessed how good they are in making two or more tasks at the same time (exact question “ Please rate your multitasking abilities on the scale below, understood as the ability to perform two or more tasks/activities simultaneously ” on the scale 1 my multitasking abilities are very low to 9- my multitasking abilities are very high; M = 5.57, SD = 1.80), and then they declared how important it is for them to have good multitasking skills (exact question: “ How important is it to you to be good at multitasking, that is, to efficiently perform two or more tasks at the same time? “on the scale: not important at all -1 to 9 - very important; M = 5.93, SD = 2.13). After that they filed the battery of multitasking questionaries (Multitasking Preference Inventory, Poposki & Oswald, 2010; Short Measure of Media Multitasking Inventory, Baumgartner et al., 2017); the cover story was that those questionaries can diagnose their “objective” level of multitasking abilities. Going further, negative feedback was provided to all. The idea was that participants who think about themselves as very good in multitasking will experience greater dissonance resulting from inconsistency toward self-concept. At the end they were asked on the scale: not at all 1 to defiantly yes- 6 if they want to fill the effortful multitasking procedure (exact question: “ If you were given the opportunity right now to perform a multitasking procedure in the form of a cognitive task—would you be willing to do it?”M = 4.23, SD = 1.40). Results We analyze the data using PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis). We controlled for age and gender. Upon analysis we found two significant simple effects of dissonance magnitude and importance of the cognitions on participant willingness to invest effort (b = .56, SE = 0.24, t = 2.35, p = .020, 95% CI [.09; 1.03]; b = .40, SE = 0.19, t = 2.08, p = .043, 95% CI [.02; .77], respectively. What is more important there was an significant interaction between the dissonance and importance of having good multitasking skills (importance of the cognition) b = .61, SE = 0.30, t = 2.03, p = .043, 95% CI [.02; 1.21], revealing that participants declaring higher level of importance were more motivated to reduce dissonance in effortful way (b = .87, SE = 0.31, t = 2.79, p = .006, 95% CI [.26; 1.49], that they counterparts; slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = .23, SE = 0.26, t = .90, p = .370, 95% CI [-.27; .73]. The results are presented in Fig. 1. Results of this study showed that the magnitude of dissonance was positively linked to participants' willingness to exert effort in reducing the dissonance, with a similar effect observed for the perceived importance of the issue. This finding aligns with Festinger’s original theory. However, it also revealed that when test in the model an interaction effects the situation looks very differently. When the magnitude of dissonance is low, importance has little impact on motivation to reduction, but when dissonance is high, importance becomes crucial. Participants who rated the issue as highly important were willing to invest significantly more effort than those who considered it less important. These results indicate that, aside from the direct effects of dissonance magnitude and importance, the latter also acts as a moderator in this relationship. Nonetheless, this study has some limitations—it is correlational, and most importantly, it did not verify whether the dissonance was evoked in the participants. To address these gaps, we conducted another study, this time employing an experimental design. Study 2 Method Participants Our sample initially consisted of 398 Polish participants (331females, 58 males, 3 nonbinary, and 6 who did not provide a response; M age= 23.05; SD age= 5.04, range: 18–49) who were recruited via and online advertisement posted on social media sites for people interested in taking part in psychological research. In this study, we measure time and decide to exclude from analysis all those whose duration of the study was less then 6 minutes, figuring that this was the minimal time to fill the study with proper quality. Thus, the final sample size constated of 346 participants (287 females, 52 Males, 2 nonbinary, and 5 who did not provide a response; M age= 25.92, SD age= 7.31, range: 18–56). All measures used in the study are reported. The study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the local Commission of Research Ethics (based on the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki). All participants took part in the lottery to win some luxury office accessories (pens, notebooks, pencils etc.) and money. Measures and Procedure Participants assessed how good they are in making two or more tasks at the same time (exact question “ Please rate your multitasking abilities on the scale below, understood as the ability to perform two or more tasks/activities simultaneously ” on the scale 1 my multitasking abilities are very low to 9- my multitasking abilities are very high; M = 5.87, SD = 1.68) and then they declared how important it is for them to have good multitasking skills (exact question: “ How important is it to you to be good at multitasking, that is, to efficiently perform two or more tasks at the same time? “on the scale: not important at all -1 to 9 - very important; M = 5.93, SD = 2.05). After that they filed the battery of multitasking questionaries (Multitasking Preference Inventory, Poposki & Oswald, 2010; Short Measure of Media Multitasking Inventory, Baumgartner et al., 2017); the cover story was that those questionnaires can diagnose their “objective” level of multitasking abilities. This measure was used this time to be controlled in the analysis. Then, they were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions: 0-lowering the importance of having good multitasking skills (and increasing the importance of being monotasked) and 1-increasing the importance of having good multitasking skills (and lowering importance of being good in monotasking). The experimental manipulation involved asking participants to wait approximately one minute under the pretend that their data was being transmitted to a server to calculate their multitasking test score. During this waiting period, participants were provided with detailed information emphasizing the significance (1) or lack of significance (0) of multitasking and monotasking. Specifically, they were told that previous research has linked strong multitasking abilities to higher (1) vs. lower (0) academic performance and later professional success, suggesting that such skills are directly associated with higher intelligence (1) or lower (0). Three were direct information such as “In other words, it’s beneficial (vs. not beneficial) to be good at monotasking”. The manipulation also framed the study as an effort to estimate the distribution of multitasking ability among students at Krakow’s higher education institutions and to assess the test’s psychometric properties. The full text of the manipulation can be found in the supplementary material, and the chronology of it is presented in Fig. 2. Going further, negative feedback was provided to all. The idea was that participants who think about themselves as very good in multitasking will experience grater dissonance resulting from discrepancy toward self-concept. Thus, the measure of assessing own multitasking skills was treated as a measure of magnitude of the dissonance. After that participants were asked this time if they want to fill the effortful multitasking or monotasking procedure (exact question: “ If you now had the opportunity to perform a very difficult procedure in the form of a cognitive task, would you prefer it to be a monotasking or multitasking task? Please indicate your preference on the scale below using the slider.” on the scale: -5 monotasking procedure to 5 multitasking procedure; M = -.93, SD = 3.12). Participants’ physiological and affective responses to cognitive dissonance were assessed using self-report items adapted from previous research on dissonance-related arousal (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). After receiving their calculated result, participants answered the following questions: "Did your heart beat faster when you received your result?" ; "Did you feel warmth in your body when you saw your result?" ; "Did you experience a strange sensation upon seeing your result?". These measures align with prior findings that cognitive dissonance can activate the autonomic nervous system, leading to physiological responses such as increased heart rate, heightened body temperature, and a general sense of discomfort (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008).Those question served as an index of dissonance state (arousal; M = 2.74, SD = 1.00; α = .61). We also asked participants about other emotional states, including positive ( feeling good, being happy ) and negative affect ( being sad, angry or sorry ), to determine whether the arousal we observed was specifically due the dissonance rather than a general physiological response linked to either positive emotions or negative affect (the first was indexed to the positive affect ( M = 2.93, SD = 1.28; α = .83) and latter to the negative affect ( M = 2.93, SD = 1.55; α = .91). All of question in this section were asked on the scale 1-7 Likert scale, definitely not agree to definitely agree. Another manipulation check was also provided, we asked participants “ In your opinion, is it better to be a monotasker or a multitasker? (Indicate on the scale using the slider ” on a scale 1 to 9, definitely better to be a monotasker to definitely it better to be multitasker; ( M = 5.82, SD = 2.01). Results Manipulation checks Dissonance evocation To check if we really evoked the dissonance after the negative feedback information, we asked our participants how they felt when they faced the information that they are bad in multitasking. It occurred that the magnitude of the dissonance measure positively and significantly correlated with measure of the dissonance state (arousal) Pearson’s r : r (398) = .224, p < .001, but not with negative nor positive affect measures (respectively: Pearson’s r : r (398) = .091, p = .070; Pearson’s r : r (398) = -.031, p = .543). Thus, it can be concluded that we indeed evoke dissonance state effectively. Experiment manipulation To check if our manipulation of importance of having good multitasking skills was effective with run simple one-way ANOVA, controlling for age, gender and initial importance of having multitasking skills. The test revealed a significant effect of condition on option is it better to be monotasker or multitasker: F (1, 345) = 26.85, p < .001, η² = .073 (in high importance M = 6.26, SD = 1.96 compared to the condition of low importance M = 5.44, SD = 1.98). So, indeed our manipulation worked as expected. Main Results We analyze the data using again PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis, the condition were coded: 1- high importance of cognition and 0- low importance of cognition. We controlled for age and gender and the initial declaration how important is to have multitasking skills. Upon analysis we found two significant simple effects of dissonance magnitude and condition on participant willingness to invest effort (b = .47, SE = 0.09, t = 5.01, p < .001, 95% CI [.29; .66]; b = 2.29, SE = 0.28, t = 8.05, p < .001, 95% CI [1.73; 2.85], respectively. What is more important there was an significant interaction between the magnitude of the dissonance and condition b = .51, SE = 0.17, t = 3.01, p = .003, 95% CI [.18; .84], revealing that participants in high importance condition were more motivated to reduce dissonance (if it is high) in effortful way i.e. by doing multitasking procedure when (b = .74, SE = 0.13, t = 5.70, p < .001, 95% CI [.49; 1.00], that they counterparts, slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = .23, SE = 0.12, t =1 .89, p = .060, 95% CI [-.01; .48]. The results are presented in Fig. 3. Further exploratory analysis We decide to go little bit exploratory and check if similar moderation by importance will occur between the dissonant state and the motivation to reduction. We again analyze the data using again PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis, the condition were coded: 1- high importance of consonant cognition and 0- low importance of consonant cognition. We controlled for age and gender and the initial declaration how important is to have multitasking skills. Upon analysis, we found significant simple effect of condition (importance manipulation) on participant willingness to invest effort (b = 2.30, SE = 0.29, t = 7.84, p < .001, 95% CI [1.73; 2.88]). What is interesting, we found no significant relation between the dissonant state measure (arousal) and the willingness to invest effort (b = .23, SE = 0.15, t = 1.50, p = .137, 95% CI [-.07; .53]). There was found an significant interaction between the dissonance state (arousal) and condition b = .86, SE = 0.29, t = 2.92, p = .004, 95% CI [.28; 1.43] on willingness to invest effort, revealing that participants in high importance condition were more motivated to reduce dissonance (when it is high) in effortful way i.e. by doing multitasking procedure (b = .67, SE = 0.22, t = 3.14, p = .002, 95% CI [.25; 1.10], that they counterparts, slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = -.18, SE = 0.21, t =- 0.85, p = .396, 95% CI [-.58; .23]. We also checked to see if our manipulation of importance affected the dissonate state directly. To check it, we ran a simple one-way ANOVA, controlling for age, gender and initial importance of having multitasking skills. The test revealed a non-significant effect of condition on dissonant state (arousal): F (1, 345) = .374, p = .541, η² = .001. Discussion We conducted one correlational and one experimental (N=640) study. In each, dissonance was induced through negative feedback regarding participants' self-beliefs. Participants were asked to assess their own multitasking skills and rate them on a scale. During a masking procedure, they answered various questions designed to diagnose their actual level of multitasking ability. Then, all participants received negative feedback. This method induced cognitive dissonance as a discrepancy between their self-belief (consonant cognition) and the diagnostic information provided by the researchers (dissonant cognition). In the first correlational study, participants were also asked to rate the importance of having strong multitasking skills. At the end of the procedure, they were asked how willing they would be to undertake a difficult multitasking task that could more accurately assess their actual abilities but would require significant effort. As expected, willingness to invest effort increased as the importance of the belief (consonant cognition) increased. The study demonstrated that the magnitude of dissonance alone is the factor shaping the willingness to invest effort (reduce the dissonance). It can be assumed that when dissonance occurs, even at a high level, individuals do not necessarily regulate it through effortful means, as Festinger originally proposed. Likely, when importance is low, dissonance is balanced or reduced through some other, non-effortful pathway. Importance is the factor that compels individuals to engage in more difficult (effortful) reduction strategies. In the next study (this time within an experimental design), we wanted to address some limitations of the first one and find if our results would replicate. This time, instead of measuring the declared importance of beliefs, it was manipulated experimentally. Also, participants' emotional states were measured, as those experiencing cognitive dissonance should feel a distinct discomfort. Again, as in the previous studies, dissonance was induced, importance was manipulated, and willingness to invest effort was measured. The tested effect was replicated. Only in the high-importance condition participants who did experience dissonance expressed a willingness to invest effort to reduce it. This time, the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation in increasing and decreasing belief importance (consonant cognitions) was also tested. The manipulation proved to be effective. Additionally, the effectiveness of dissonance induction was verified, yielding positive results. Participants in whom dissonance was induced reported feeling strange, warm, and, most importantly, that their heart rate had increased. Thus, it can be assumed that dissonance was successfully induced, particularly considering the self-reported tachycardia (arousal). Our research provides new evidence that importance serves as a moderator between the magnitude of the dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. A key element of our approach was distinguishing between the magnitude of dissonance and its personal significance, which determines an individual's willingness to invest effort in reducing it. Festinger’s (1957) classic theory suggested that the magnitude of dissonance is a function of the importance and proportion of inconsistent information. However, our results suggest that personal importance may act rather as a moderator than predictor of dissonance magnitude. We demonstrated that importance moderates the relationship between the magnitude of dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. Additionally, we tested a similar exploratory model, this time using the dissonant state as a predictor. The interaction was also significant, which is not surprising given the correlation between the magnitude of dissonance and the dissonant state. However, it is worth noting that this correlation was lower than 1, indicating that these phenomena are distinct and should be differentiated. Moreover, when comparing the two models, we found that the simple effect of dissonance magnitude on the motivation for reduction was significant, suggesting a direct influence. In contrast, the simple effect of the dissonant state on motivation for reduction was not significant. These preliminary findings suggest that the dissonant state following dissonance is not directly associated with motivation for reduction. Instead, reduction strategies may be aimed at resolving the discrepancy rather than merely alleviating arousal. Future studies should further explore this. As a cognitive phenomenon, dissonance refers to the discrepancy between beliefs, but as noted, Festinger’s writings sometimes blur the distinction between cognitive conflict and emotional arousal (Festinger, 1957). The challenge lies in understanding how these components interact. While dissonance can be viewed as a cognitive conflict arising from inconsistent beliefs, it is equally important to consider the emotional response that follows the recognition of this conflict. This dual perspective complicates the understanding of the phenomenon. Researchers often measure arousal to determine whether dissonance has been induced, treating it as a direct indicator of dissonance itself. This approach assumes that dissonance and the state of dissonance are essentially the same. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective, measuring dissonance and the dissonance state separately. We believe this distinction is an advantage of the proposed research approach. Despite its many strengths, our study has some limitations. First, our studies relied mostly on participants’ self-reports, which may involve some measurement bias. Future research should incorporate more objective measures of dissonance experience, such as psychophysiological indicators, if possible. Also, the declaration measures of effort are not ideal. Measuring participants’ SBP or PEP would be more reliable; however, we conducted this study during the pandemic, so the methodology was adjusted to the current epidemiological situation. In the future, psychophysiological studies would be very beneficial to replicate current results. Another limitation is the samples of the studies, i.e. we did have underrepresented male participants. We do not have any direct hypothesis for gender, so only mitigation measure was to have demographics in control when analyzing the results. Thirdly, one can argue that another and significant limitation is to examine the dissonance phenomena without using the classic paradigms. Much contemporary research on cognitive dissonance appears to emphasize the replication of classic experimental paradigms rather than the advancement of its theoretical foundations, as evidenced by the persistent use of procedures originally established by Festinger (1957) and Festinger and Carlsmith (1959); while these paradigms reliably demonstrate dissonance effects, they tend to limit the exploration of underlying cognitive mechanisms and contextual factors that might broaden or refine the theory, ultimately prioritizing methodological consistency over theoretical innovation. This methodological focus ensures the robustness of dissonance effects yet may inadvertently constrain theoretical innovation by prioritizing empirical reproducibility over the exploration of alternative explanations and boundary conditions, ultimately reinforcing established assumptions instead of critically challenging or refining the theory (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Aronson, 1992). We believe that our research contributes to understanding the mechanisms of cognitive dissonance by showing that personal importance can act as a moderator in the relationship between dissonance and the motivation to reduce it (e.g., Hardyck & Kardush, 1968; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1999). The findings suggest that dissonance theory should incorporate a new perspective how importance influence the dissonance process. We hope that our discoveries will inspire further research on the dynamics of the cognitive dissonance and its reduction processes. References Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303–311 . Bartholow, B. D., Fabiani, M., Gratton, G., & Bettencourt, B. A. (2005). A psychophysiological examination of cognitive and affective responses to social expectancy violations. Psychological Science, 16 (8), 692–699. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01594.x Baumgartner, S. E., Lemmens, J. S., Weeda, W. D., & Huizinga, M. (2017). Measuring media multitasking: development of a short measure for media multitasking in adolescents. Journal of Media Psychology , 29 (2), 92- 101. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000167 Batson, C. D. (1975). Rational processing or rationalization? The effect of disconfirming information on a stated religious belief. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32 (1), 176–184. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076771 Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8 (12), 539–546. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 Cancino-Montecinos, S., Björklund, F., & Lindholm, T. (2018). Motivated to change? A study of motivational orientation in relation to attitude change and dissonance-reduction strategies. Motivation and Emotion, 42 (6), 841–854. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-018-9711-2 Cooper, J. M. (2007). Cognitive dissonance: 50 years of a classic theory. SAGE Croyle, R. T., & Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (4), 782–791. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.782 Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.Festinger, L. (1959). Cognitive dissonance. New York, Harper & Row. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2012). Cognitive consistency: A fundamental principle in social cognition. Guilford Press. Greenwald, A. G., & Ronis, D. L. (1978). Twenty years of cognitive dissonance: Case study of the evolution of a theory. Psychological Review, 85 (1), 53–57. Hajcak, G., & Foti, D. (2008). Errors are aversive: Defensive motivation and the error-related negativity. Psychological Science, 19 (2), 103–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02053.x Hardyck, J. A., & Kardush, M. (1968). A modest modish model for dissonance reduction. Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook , 684-692. Harmon-Jones, E., Amodio, D. M., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2008). Action-based model of dissonance: A review, integration, and expansion of conceptions of cognitive conflict. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 41 , 119–166. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00403-6 Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., Fearn, M., Sigelman, J. D., & Johnson, P. (2015). Left frontal cortical activation and spreading of alternatives: Tests of the action-based model of dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94 (1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.1.1 Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. American Psychological Association. Leippe, M. R., & Eisenstadt, D. (1999). A self-accountability model of dissonance reduction: Multiple modes on a continuum of elaboration. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 31 , 235–289. Martinie, M.-A., Olive, T., & Milland, L. (2017). Cognitive dissonance and action: Analyzing the impact of effort justification on subsequent behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146 (8), 1158–1175. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000314 Poposki, E. M., & Oswald, F. L. (2010). Multitasking Preference Inventory (MPI) [Database record]. APA PsycTests. Proulx, T., Inzlicht, M., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2012). Understanding all inconsistencies: A theory of meaning maintenance and the action-based model of dissonance. Psychological Inquiry, 23 (4), 320–335. Schacht, A., Dimigen, O., & Sommer, W. (2012). Emotions in context: A neurophysiological study on the role of situational information in affective processing. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7 (8), 884–892. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr071 Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21 , 261–302. Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21 , 181–227. Vaidis, D. C., & Bran, A. (2018). Revisiting the paradigm of induced compliance: Current advances in dissonance theory. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 12 (4), e12373. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12373 Vaidis, D. C., & Gosling, P. (2011). The influence of causal complexity on attitude change in response to counter-attitudinal behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41 (3), 371–377. Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1985). A theory of action identification. Psychological Review, 94 (1), 3–15. Weick, K. E. (1965). Laboratory experimentation with organizations. Handbook of Organizations, 3 , 194–223. Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1982). Symbolic self-completion. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6339316","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":466008449,"identity":"847c7000-62cb-4c11-9925-162c072efdfc","order_by":0,"name":"Paulina Szwed","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Jagiellonian University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Paulina","middleName":"","lastName":"Szwed","suffix":""},{"id":466008450,"identity":"4f13c1c3-03f7-455c-b682-a97dec9a96be","order_by":1,"name":"Ewa Szumowska","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Jagiellonian University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Ewa","middleName":"","lastName":"Szumowska","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-03-30 15:38:08","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":83902897,"identity":"94eb4d7b-2611-4e1f-b2ce-65756ff8ddb2","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-04 09:50:01","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":28412,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eDifferences in willingness of effort investment depending on magnitude of the dissonance and importance of the cognition (study 1).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6339316/v1/0a9a9608231877df05c40ad8.png"},{"id":83902455,"identity":"9d7597ed-4b75-4fc1-8a6b-8070f00acdf4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-04 09:42:01","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":94040,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePresenting the chronology of the experimental study. The detailed description can be found in the main text.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6339316/v1/9e009217fe88f57cc1fd8883.png"},{"id":83902457,"identity":"ffb0df39-80b8-4814-9754-738965ab9c42","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-04 09:42:02","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":35271,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eDifferences in willingness of effort investment depending on magnitude of the dissonance and condition (study 2).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6339316/v1/20b3943db9116976a2dcc510.png"},{"id":83904148,"identity":"171aa5ac-b886-4f28-970a-9b4d72c35d55","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-04 09:58:02","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":581623,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6339316/v1/97ffac52-d65c-4946-860e-513df67e01aa.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn our daily lives, we frequently encounter information that contradicts our existing knowledge, whether it’s about the world or even ourselves. Often, this information is provided as feedback, which can disrupt our self-concept. The natural setting for receiving feedback is education or broader learning processes, such as in work, relationships, or games, often from teachers or peers (as in science). Regardless of the source or nature of the feedback, when it conflicts with our current understanding of ourselves, obtaining it can be an unpleasant experience. This discomfort can be explained in terms of cognitive dissonance. We can say that holding an opinion about ourselves and getting inconsistent feedback creates a discrepancy between two cognitive elements. The discrepancy should lead to an unpleasant arousal state, which should inspire strategies to reduce or eliminate it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) is now almost 70 years old, and still is the one of the most influential theories in psychological science (Cooper, 2007; Harmon-Jones, 2019). Festinger's (1957) theory suggests that humans strive for internal psychological consistency and seek to restore it whenever it is disrupted. Cognitive dissonance theory posits that a discrepancy between cognitive elements leads to an unpleasant state of tension, motivating individuals to reduce it. The classical view suggests that the magnitude of the dissonance depends on the relative weight (importance) of conflicting cognitions within the cognitive system (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones \u0026amp; Mills, 1999). In details, Festinger argued that the magnitude of evoked dissonance varies with two factors: the importance of cognition (1) i.e., the higher the personal value of the elements, the greater the magnitude of the dissonance in the relation, and ratio of cognition (2) the proportion of the weight of relevant information that is contrary to (i.e., dissonant with) the most resistant cognition (typically a behavioral commitment, of one self-concept) (\u003cem\u003eibidem\u003c/em\u003e). More in detail, the magnitude of dissonance should be computed in relation to the cognition that is most resistant to change. The greater the weight of the dissonant relevant information (sum of the dissonant cognitions weighted by their importance) relative to the weight of all relevant information (sum of all relevant cognitions weighted by their importance), the greater should be the dissonance. However, the role of importance has not been thoroughly empirically examined. On the contrary, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) often selects inductions that target cognitions with high importance for an individual, aiming to induce a lasting state of dissonance (Batson, 1975) to have perfect setting to examine the reduction modes. It is because much of the research within CDT has predominantly focused on dissonance reduction strategies rather than on the foundational model itself (Greenwald \u0026amp; Ronis, 1978; Vaidis \u0026amp; Bran, 2019; Weick, 1965; Vaidis \u0026amp; Gosling, 2011). To address this gap, we incorporated varying levels of importance in our studies, positing that the significance attributed to the cognitions involved moderates the motivation to reduce dissonance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDevelopments of the theory\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCognitive Dissonance Theory, as originally proposed by Festinger (1957), ambiguously uses the term \"dissonance\" to refer to the theory itself, the triggering discrepancy, and the resulting arousal state. This lack of clarity has led to imprecise studies (Vaidis \u0026amp; Bran, 2018; Martinie et al., 2017; Cancino-Montecinos et al., 2018), and such terminological issues may affect our understanding of dissonance reduction. Festinger (1957) suggested that there are strategies to reduce \"dissonance,\" but it remains unclear whether this refers to resolving the discrepancy or reducing the arousal. Additionally, Festinger discussed the concept of the \"importance of the cognition(s)\" and how it can increase the magnitude of dissonance, but it is not clear how this relates to the epistemic aspects or to the post-discrepancy state. In this article, we define \"dissonance\" as the discrepancy between cognitions and use the term \"dissonant state\" to describe the arousal that follows the discrepancy (following the suggestion from Harmon-Jones et al., 2009).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;More recent research has found that even simple discrepancies can trigger discomfort (Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, \u0026amp; Bettencourt, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, \u0026amp; Jost, 2007; Plaks, Grant, \u0026amp; Dweck, 2005). Studies have also shown that cognitive discrepancies alone can evoke an affective state associated with dissonance (e.g., E. Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, \u0026amp; Levy, 2015; Levy, Harmon-Jones, \u0026amp; E. Harmon-Jones, 2018). Similarly, Proulx, Inzlicht, and Harmon-Jones (2012) argued that simple discrepancies can be understood in the same terms as dissonance. According to the original theory, when one of the two dissonant cognitions lacks sufficient importance, dissonance dissipates before producing any observable effects (Festinger, 1957/1985, p. 28). Yet, the underlying assumption remains that some form of dissonance will still arise—manifesting as a dissonant state, arousal following the discrepancy. These findings indicate that even small discrepancies can create dissonance-related tension, suggesting that arousal can be interpreted as a result of dissonance conceptualized simply as a discrepancy. Given this, where does importance fit within the model?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe importance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGiven the complexities in understanding cognitive dissonance, it is crucial to explore the role of belief (cognitions) importance. Importance is not a fixed attribute—it varies along a spectrum from negligible to highly significant. The impact of discovering that I am not as skilled a cook as I believed will differ depending on whether I am a psychologist or a professional chef. In both cases, the information is unexpected and contradicts my prior knowledge. My initial belief may be strong and deeply held in either scenario, or both can trigger dissonance. However, while dissonance (discrepancy) will arise in both instances, the level of importance assigned to the belief will vary.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo gain a clearer understanding of how importance is connected to dissonance or the dissonant state, it is useful to explore research on how it is processed in the brain. Neuroscientific research on semantic and affective importance—key factors in determining the subjective significance of a belief—suggests that this processing typically occurs between 400 and 600 milliseconds after stimulus onset, as indicated by Late Positive Potential (LPP) components (Hajcak \u0026amp; Foti, 2008; Schacht et al., 2012). This later stage of processing involves brain regions such as the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, implying that belief importance does not influence the initial detection of cognitive inconsistency (see also Gawronski \u0026amp; Strack, 2012). Therefore, contrary to Festinger’s (1957) original assumption, belief importance may not directly affect the magnitude of dissonance at the cognitive level but instead plays a role in subsequent stages of the process. While the brain quickly detects inconsistencies, regardless of their subjective importance, this rapid detection might not align with how belief importance shapes later stages of the process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast, research on discrepancy detection shows that the brain identifies inconsistencies rapidly, irrespective of their subjective importance. Event-related potential (ERP) studies reveal that the initial processing of inconsistencies occurs approximately 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset, marked by components like N200 (Bartholow et al., 2005; Botvinick et al., 2004). At this point, the brain has not yet evaluated the significance of the detected conflict. While discrepancy detection occurs swiftly, this does not mean that the brain immediately processes the importance of the conflict. Instead, the role of importance is revealed in later stages of cognitive dissonance processing.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;Although previous empirical studies (e.g., Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones et al., 2015) suggest that conflict involving beliefs of high importance is associated with stronger motivation to reduce dissonance, the existing evidence remains indirect. In most experiments, dissonance and its reduction effects were operationalized through the observation of attitude or behavior changes, so it didn’t really “allowed to test” where importance should be placed in the model. In other words, while the results suggest that dissonance caused by inconsistency with central beliefs is more intense, it has not been definitively shown whether the importance of these beliefs modifies this relationship anyhow. \u0026nbsp;Not mentioning that the lack of measurement of the dissonant state, coupled with the focus on the reduction process, led to a problem in drawing clear conclusions from these tests. For years, the observed reduction was used both as an indicator of the occurrence of the dissonance state and as its primary effect (Vaidis \u0026amp; Bran, 2018).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHardyck and Kardush (1968) and Leippe and Eisenstadt (1999) discussed the use of dissonance reduction strategies as a function of cognition importance, underlining how belief importance influences the intensity and direction of dissonance reduction efforts. These studies suggest that individuals are more motivated to reduce dissonance when the conflicting cognition pertains to beliefs central to their identity or worldview. However, despite the recognition of the role of belief importance, it remains unclear what is the relationship between dissonance magnitude, dissonant state, importance and motivation to reduce it; basically, where is the place of the importance in the whole model. In fact, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) carefully selects its inductions to target cognitions that are sufficiently important and resistant, ensuring they provoke a lasting state of dissonance (Batson, 1975).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTherefore, directly testing the role of cognitions importance is crucial. It would allow for more precise identification of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive dissonance and a better understanding of how belief centrality influences the process of dissonance reduction.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGiven the inconsistencies in how cognition importance has been theorized to affect dissonance (or dissonance state) reduction, our hypothesis (build on Hardyck and Kardush) is that the importance of a cognition moderates the relationship between the magnitude of dissonance (discrepancy) and the motivation to reduce it. Specifically, we predict that individuals will be more motivated to engage in effortful strategies when the conflicting cognition is of high importance to their self-concept, as opposed to when it is of low importance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOverview of the studies\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn both studies we induce cognitive dissonance (the discrepancy between cognitions). To achieve that, we embed our studies in a classical concept of self-discrepancy, the idea along with Higgins (1987) that cognitive dissonance should be evoked when the gap between two self-guides occurred. This kind of cognitive dissonance is well-founded in many psychological theories such as symbolic self-completion (e.g., Wicklund \u0026amp; Gollwitzer, 1982), self-evaluation maintenance (e.g., Tesser,1988), self-verification (e.g., Swann, 1984), action identification (e.g., Vallacher \u0026amp; Wegner, 1985) as well as many others based on cognitive dissonance phenomena. To sum it, our idea is like Steele’s (1988) that dissonance does not arise as consequences of inconsistency itself; instead, it is caused by the threats that result from inconsistency toward self-integrity (see also Steele, Spencer \u0026amp; Lynch, 1993). Also, this perspective seems to be the most important to investigate from a practical point of view, for example, to a cognitive-behavioral therapist who struggles with many dysfunctional self-concepts in their patients. For the self-based revisions of CDT, individuals are motivated to defend their self-view (see Aronson, 1992 and further commentaries for a historical comprehensive overview of self-theories of dissonance; Stone \u0026amp; Cooper, 2001 for an integrative model; and Vaidis, 2014 for an overview). Thus, in both studies, we measure dissonance by assessing the strength of participants' initial beliefs about multitasking. Since all participants received negative feedback, they all experienced a discrepancy. However, the magnitude of this discrepancy depended on the strength of their initial beliefs. We operationalize this as the magnitude of the dissonance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn first study, we measured also participants declared importance of being good at multitasking and in the second study we manipulated the level of the importance of this consonant cognition (the cognition embedded in the individual prior to encounter inconsistent information, i.e. dissonant cognition). During the manipulation we tried in one condition to increase the importance of the consonant cognition (along with decrease the importance of dissonance cognition) and in the second reversely we lower the importance of the consonant cognition and increase the importance of the dissonance cognition. In both studies, we measured at the end the motivation for dissonance reduction, i.e. the willingness of an individual to exert effort (address to the task giving the potential of definite discrepancy reduction).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhy multitasking? In the presented program, we decided to use a context of \u0026nbsp;a multitasking, as it \u0026nbsp;should be interesting for young people these days. Internet analysis brings up to us the reflection that for a large group of people is very important to have excellent multitasking skills. The reason can be an urban legend that in modern societies multitasking, it is one of the most important abilities and that multitaskers were way intelligent than those who are not good at this kind of activity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the end of each study, there was an information that feedback was false and independent of their actual skills or level of abilities. Also, participants were assured that the use of false feedback was unavoidable and necessary to examine the phenomena in question – so that their trust in psychology as a science is not undermined.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;All sample sizes declared in the proposal were calculated using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, \u0026amp; Lang, 2009) for medium-small effect size (.10) and recommended .80 power level (Cohen, 1988). All data are publicly available at the Open Science Framework https://osf.io/te4k7/?view_only=8a978996d9014f70ba671c73d1646f05.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Study 1","content":"\u003ch2\u003eMethod\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cem\u003eParticipants\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur sample initially consisted of 358 Polish participants (287 females, 70 males, and 1 who did not provide a response; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003eage= 23.67, \u003cem\u003eSD\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eage= 6.12, range: 18–70) who were recruited via and online advertisement posted on social media sites for people interested in taking part in psychological research. Some of participants did not answer all questions leaving the missing data in the crucial variables. Thus, the final sample size constated of 294 participants (237 females, 57 Males; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003eage= 23.39, \u003cem\u003eSD\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eage= 5.12, range: 18–51).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the local Commission of Research Ethics (based on the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki). All measures used in the study are reported. All participants took part in the lottery to win some luxury office accessories (pens, notebooks, pencils etc.)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cem\u003eMeasures and Procedure\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants assessed how good they are in making two or more tasks at the same time (exact question “\u003cem\u003ePlease rate your multitasking abilities on the scale below, understood as the ability to perform two or more tasks/activities simultaneously\u003c/em\u003e” on the scale 1 my multitasking abilities are very low to 9- my multitasking abilities are very high; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.57, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.80), and then they declared how important it is for them to have good multitasking skills (exact question: “\u003cem\u003eHow important is it to you to be good at multitasking, that is, to efficiently perform two or more tasks at the same time?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e“on the scale: not important at all -1 to 9 - very important; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.93, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 2.13). After that they filed the battery of multitasking questionaries (Multitasking Preference Inventory, Poposki \u0026amp; Oswald, 2010; Short Measure of Media Multitasking Inventory, Baumgartner et al., 2017); the cover story was that those questionaries can diagnose their “objective” level of multitasking abilities. Going further, negative feedback was provided to all. The idea was that participants who think about themselves as very good in multitasking will experience greater dissonance resulting from inconsistency toward self-concept. At the end they were asked on the scale: not at all 1 to defiantly yes- 6 if they want to fill the effortful multitasking procedure (exact question: “\u003cem\u003eIf you were given the opportunity right now to perform a multitasking procedure in the form of a cognitive task—would you be willing to do it?”M\u003c/em\u003e= 4.23, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.40).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eResults\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe analyze the data using PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis). \u0026nbsp;We controlled for age and gender.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUpon analysis we found two significant simple effects of dissonance magnitude and importance of the cognitions on participant willingness to invest effort (b = .56, SE = 0.24, t = 2.35, p = .020, 95% CI [.09; 1.03]; b = .40, SE = 0.19, t = 2.08, p = .043, 95% CI [.02; .77], respectively.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is more important there was an significant interaction between the dissonance and importance of having good multitasking skills (importance of the cognition) b = .61, SE = 0.30, t = 2.03, p = .043, 95% CI [.02; 1.21], revealing that participants declaring higher level of importance were more motivated to reduce dissonance in effortful way (b = .87, SE = 0.31, t = 2.79, p = .006, 95% CI [.26; 1.49], that they counterparts; slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = .23, SE = 0.26, t = .90, p = .370, 95% CI [-.27; .73]. The results are presented in Fig. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResults of this study showed that the magnitude of dissonance was positively linked to participants' willingness to exert effort in reducing the dissonance, with a similar effect observed for the perceived importance of the issue. This finding aligns with Festinger’s original theory. However, it also revealed that when test in the model an interaction effects the situation looks very differently. When the magnitude of dissonance is low, importance has little impact on motivation to reduction, but when dissonance is high, importance becomes crucial. Participants who rated the issue as highly important were willing to invest significantly more effort than those who considered it less important. These results indicate that, aside from the direct effects of dissonance magnitude and importance, the latter also acts as a moderator in this relationship. Nonetheless, this study has some limitations—it is correlational, and most importantly, it did not verify whether the dissonance was evoked in the participants. To address these gaps, we conducted another study, this time employing an experimental design.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Study 2","content":"\u003ch2\u003eMethod\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cem\u003eParticipants\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur sample initially consisted of 398 Polish participants (331females, 58 males, 3 nonbinary, and 6 who did not provide a response; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003eage= 23.05; \u003cem\u003eSD\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eage= 5.04, range: 18–49) who were recruited via and online advertisement posted on social media sites for people interested in taking part in psychological research.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this study, we measure time and decide to exclude from analysis all those whose duration of the study was less then 6 minutes, figuring that this was the minimal time to fill the study with proper quality. Thus, the final sample size constated of 346 participants (287 females, 52 Males, 2 nonbinary, and 5 who did not provide a response; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003eage= 25.92, \u003cem\u003eSD\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eage= 7.31, range: 18–56). All measures used in the study are reported. The study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the local Commission of Research Ethics (based on the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;All participants took part in the lottery to win some luxury office accessories (pens, notebooks, pencils etc.) and money. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cem\u003eMeasures and Procedure\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants assessed how good they are in making two or more tasks at the same time (exact question “\u003cem\u003ePlease rate your multitasking abilities on the scale below, understood as the ability to perform two or more tasks/activities simultaneously\u003c/em\u003e” on the scale 1 my multitasking abilities are very low to 9- my multitasking abilities are very high; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.87, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.68) and then they declared how important it is for them to have good multitasking skills (exact question: “\u003cem\u003eHow important is it to you to be good at multitasking, that is, to efficiently perform two or more tasks at the same time?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e“on the scale: not important at all -1 to 9 - very important; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.93, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 2.05). After that they filed the battery of multitasking questionaries (Multitasking Preference Inventory, Poposki \u0026amp; Oswald, 2010; Short Measure of Media Multitasking Inventory, Baumgartner et al., 2017); the cover story was that those questionnaires can diagnose their “objective” level of multitasking abilities. This measure was used this time to be controlled in the analysis. Then, they were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions: 0-lowering the importance of having good multitasking skills (and increasing the importance of being monotasked) and 1-increasing the importance of having good multitasking skills (and lowering importance of being good in monotasking). The experimental manipulation involved asking participants to wait approximately one minute under the pretend that their data was being transmitted to a server to calculate their multitasking test score. During this waiting period, participants were provided with detailed information emphasizing the significance (1) or lack of significance (0) of multitasking and monotasking. Specifically, they were told that previous research has linked strong multitasking abilities to higher (1) vs. lower (0) academic performance and later professional success, suggesting that such skills are directly associated with higher intelligence (1) or lower (0). Three were direct information such as \u003cem\u003e“In other words, it’s beneficial (vs. not beneficial) to be good at monotasking”.\u003c/em\u003e The manipulation also framed the study as an effort to estimate the distribution of multitasking ability among students at Krakow’s higher education institutions and to assess the test’s psychometric properties. The full text of the manipulation can be found in the supplementary material, and the chronology of it is presented in Fig. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGoing further, negative feedback was provided to all. The idea was that participants who think about themselves as very good in multitasking will experience grater dissonance resulting from discrepancy toward self-concept. Thus, the measure of assessing own multitasking skills was treated as a measure of magnitude of the dissonance. After that participants were asked this time if they want to fill the effortful multitasking or monotasking procedure (exact question: “\u003cem\u003eIf you now had the opportunity to perform a very difficult procedure in the form of a cognitive task, would you prefer it to be a monotasking or multitasking task? Please indicate your preference on the scale below using the slider.”\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eon the scale: -5 monotasking procedure to 5 multitasking procedure; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= -.93, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 3.12).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants’ physiological and affective responses to cognitive dissonance were assessed using self-report items adapted from previous research on dissonance-related arousal (Croyle \u0026amp; Cooper, 1983; Harmon-Jones et al., 2015). After receiving their calculated result, participants answered the following questions: \u003cem\u003e\"Did your heart beat faster when you received your result?\"\u003c/em\u003e; \u003cem\u003e\"Did you feel warmth in your body when you saw your result?\"\u003c/em\u003e; \u003cem\u003e\"Did you experience a strange sensation upon seeing your result?\".\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eThese measures align with prior findings that cognitive dissonance can activate the autonomic nervous system, leading to physiological responses such as increased heart rate, heightened body temperature, and a general sense of discomfort (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008).Those question served as an index of dissonance state (arousal; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 2.74, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.00;\u0026nbsp;α = .61). We also asked participants about other emotional states, including positive (\u003cem\u003efeeling good, being happy\u003c/em\u003e) and negative affect (\u003cem\u003ebeing sad, angry or sorry\u003c/em\u003e), to determine whether the arousal we observed was specifically due the dissonance rather than a general physiological response linked to either positive emotions or negative affect (the first was indexed to the positive affect (\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 2.93, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.28; \u0026nbsp;α = .83) and latter to the negative affect (\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 2.93, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.55; \u0026nbsp;α = .91). All of question in this section were asked on the scale 1-7 Likert scale, definitely not agree to definitely agree.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;Another manipulation check was also provided, we asked participants “\u003cem\u003eIn your opinion, is it better to be a monotasker or a multitasker? (Indicate on the scale using the slider\u003c/em\u003e” on a scale 1 to 9, definitely better to be a monotasker to definitely it better to be multitasker; (\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.82, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 2.01).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eResults\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eManipulation checks\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDissonance evocation\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo check if we really evoked the dissonance after the negative feedback information, we asked our participants how they felt when they faced the information that they are bad in multitasking. It occurred that the magnitude of the dissonance measure positively and significantly correlated with measure of the dissonance state (arousal) \u003cem\u003ePearson’s r\u003c/em\u003e: \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e(398) = .224, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, but not with negative nor positive affect measures (respectively: \u003cem\u003ePearson’s r\u003c/em\u003e: \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e(398) = .091, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .070; \u003cem\u003ePearson’s r\u003c/em\u003e: \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e(398) = -.031, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .543). Thus, it can be concluded that we indeed evoke dissonance state effectively.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExperiment manipulation\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo check if our manipulation of importance of having good multitasking skills was effective with run simple one-way ANOVA, controlling for age, gender and initial importance of having multitasking skills. The test revealed a significant effect of condition on option is it better to be monotasker or multitasker: \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 345) = 26.85, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, \u003cem\u003eη²\u003c/em\u003e = .073 (in high importance \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 6.26, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.96 compared to the condition of low importance \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e= 5.44, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e= 1.98). So, indeed our manipulation worked as expected.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Main Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe analyze the data using again PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis, the condition were coded: 1- high importance of cognition and 0- low importance of cognition. We controlled for age and gender and the initial declaration how important is to have multitasking skills.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUpon analysis we found two significant simple effects of dissonance magnitude and condition on participant willingness to invest effort (b = .47, SE = 0.09, t = 5.01, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, 95% CI [.29; .66]; b = 2.29, SE = 0.28, t = 8.05, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, 95% CI [1.73; 2.85], respectively.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is more important there was an significant interaction between the magnitude of the dissonance and condition b = .51, SE = 0.17, t = 3.01, p = .003, 95% CI [.18; .84], revealing that participants in high importance condition were more motivated to reduce dissonance (if it is high) in effortful way i.e. by doing multitasking procedure when (b = .74, SE = 0.13, t = 5.70, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, 95% CI [.49; 1.00], that they counterparts, slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = .23, SE = 0.12, t =1 .89, p = .060, 95% CI [-.01; .48]. The results are presented in Fig. 3.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFurther exploratory analysis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe decide to go little bit exploratory and check if similar moderation by importance will occur between the dissonant state and the motivation to reduction.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe again analyze the data using again PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, model 1, with 20,000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples, all variables were mean centered prior to analysis, the condition were coded: 1- high importance of consonant cognition and 0- low importance of consonant cognition. We controlled for age and gender and the initial declaration how important is to have multitasking skills.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUpon analysis, we found significant simple effect of condition (importance manipulation) on participant willingness to invest effort (b = 2.30, SE = 0.29, t = 7.84, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, 95% CI [1.73; 2.88]). What is interesting, we found no significant relation between the dissonant state measure (arousal) and the willingness to invest effort (b = .23, SE = 0.15, t = 1.50, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .137, 95% CI [-.07; .53]).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere was found an significant interaction between the dissonance state (arousal) and condition b = .86, SE = 0.29, t = 2.92, p = .004, 95% CI [.28; 1.43] on willingness to invest effort, revealing that participants in high importance condition were more motivated to reduce dissonance (when it is high) in effortful way i.e. by doing multitasking procedure \u0026nbsp;(b = .67, SE = 0.22, t = 3.14, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .002, 95% CI [.25; 1.10], that they counterparts, slope for them slope remain insignificant, (b = -.18, SE = 0.21, t =- 0.85, p = .396, 95% CI [-.58; .23].\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe also checked to see if our manipulation of importance affected the dissonate state directly. To check it, we ran a simple one-way ANOVA, controlling for age, gender and initial importance of having multitasking skills. The test revealed a non-significant effect of condition on dissonant state (arousal): \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 345) = .374, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .541, \u003cem\u003e\u0026eta;\u0026sup2;\u003c/em\u003e = .001.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe conducted one correlational and one experimental (N=640) study. In each, dissonance was induced through negative feedback regarding participants\u0026apos; self-beliefs. Participants were asked to assess their own multitasking skills and rate them on a scale. During a masking procedure, they answered various questions designed to diagnose their actual level of multitasking ability. Then, all participants received negative feedback. This method induced cognitive dissonance as a discrepancy between their self-belief (consonant cognition) and the diagnostic information provided by the researchers (dissonant cognition). In the first correlational study, participants were also asked to rate the importance of having strong multitasking skills. At the end of the procedure, they were asked how willing they would be to undertake a difficult multitasking task that could more accurately assess their actual abilities but would require significant effort. As expected, willingness to invest effort increased as the importance of the belief (consonant cognition) increased. The study demonstrated that the magnitude of dissonance alone is the factor shaping the willingness to invest effort (reduce the dissonance).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt can be assumed that when dissonance occurs, even at a high level, individuals do not necessarily regulate it through effortful means, as Festinger originally proposed. Likely, when importance is low, dissonance is balanced or reduced through some other, non-effortful pathway. Importance is the factor that compels individuals to engage in more difficult (effortful) reduction strategies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next study (this time within an experimental design), we wanted to address some limitations of the first one and find if our results would replicate. This time, instead of measuring the declared importance of beliefs, it was manipulated experimentally. Also, participants\u0026apos; emotional states were measured, as those experiencing cognitive dissonance should feel a distinct discomfort. Again, as in the previous studies, dissonance was induced, importance was manipulated, and willingness to invest effort was measured. The tested effect was replicated. Only in the high-importance condition participants who did experience dissonance expressed a willingness to invest effort to reduce it. This time, the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation in increasing and decreasing belief importance (consonant cognitions) was also tested. The manipulation proved to be effective. Additionally, the effectiveness of dissonance induction was verified, yielding positive results. Participants in whom dissonance was induced reported feeling strange, warm, and, most importantly, that their heart rate had increased. Thus, it can be assumed that dissonance was successfully induced, particularly considering the self-reported tachycardia (arousal).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur research provides new evidence that importance serves as a moderator between the magnitude of the dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. A key element of our approach was distinguishing between the magnitude of dissonance and its personal significance, which determines an individual\u0026apos;s willingness to invest effort in reducing it. Festinger\u0026rsquo;s (1957) classic theory suggested that the magnitude of dissonance is a function of the importance and proportion of inconsistent information. However, our results suggest that personal importance may act rather as a moderator than predictor of dissonance magnitude.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe demonstrated that importance moderates the relationship between the magnitude of dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. Additionally, we tested a similar exploratory model, this time using the dissonant state as a predictor. The interaction was also significant, which is not surprising given the correlation between the magnitude of dissonance and the dissonant state. However, it is worth noting that this correlation was lower than 1, indicating that these phenomena are distinct and should be differentiated.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, when comparing the two models, we found that the simple effect of dissonance magnitude on the motivation for reduction was significant, suggesting a direct influence. In contrast, the simple effect of the dissonant state on motivation for reduction was not significant. These preliminary findings suggest that the dissonant state following dissonance is not directly associated with motivation for reduction. Instead, reduction strategies may be aimed at resolving the discrepancy rather than merely alleviating arousal. Future studies should further explore this.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs a\u0026nbsp;cognitive phenomenon, dissonance refers to the\u0026nbsp;discrepancy between beliefs, but as noted, Festinger\u0026rsquo;s writings sometimes blur the distinction between\u0026nbsp;cognitive conflict\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;emotional arousal\u0026nbsp;(Festinger, 1957). The challenge lies in understanding how these components interact. While dissonance can be viewed as a cognitive conflict arising from inconsistent beliefs, it is equally important to consider the emotional response that follows the recognition of this conflict. This dual perspective complicates the understanding of the phenomenon. Researchers often measure arousal to determine whether dissonance has been induced, treating it as a direct indicator of dissonance itself. This approach assumes that dissonance and the state of dissonance are essentially the same. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective, measuring dissonance and the dissonance state separately. We believe this distinction is an advantage of the proposed research approach.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite its many strengths, our study has some limitations. First, our studies relied mostly on participants\u0026rsquo; self-reports, which may involve some measurement bias. Future research should incorporate more objective measures of dissonance experience, such as psychophysiological indicators, if possible. Also, the declaration measures of effort are not ideal. Measuring participants\u0026rsquo; SBP or PEP would be more reliable; however, we conducted this study during the pandemic, so the methodology was adjusted to the current epidemiological situation. In the future, psychophysiological studies would be very beneficial to replicate current results. Another limitation is the samples of the studies, i.e. we did have underrepresented male participants. We do not have any direct hypothesis for gender, so only mitigation measure was to have demographics in control when analyzing the results. Thirdly, one can argue that another and significant limitation is to examine the dissonance phenomena without using the classic paradigms. \u0026nbsp;Much contemporary research on cognitive dissonance appears to emphasize the replication of classic experimental paradigms rather than the advancement of its theoretical foundations, as evidenced by the persistent use of procedures originally established by Festinger (1957) and Festinger and Carlsmith (1959); while these paradigms reliably demonstrate dissonance effects, they tend to limit the exploration of underlying cognitive mechanisms and contextual factors that might broaden or refine the theory, ultimately prioritizing methodological consistency over theoretical innovation. This methodological focus ensures the robustness of dissonance effects yet may inadvertently constrain theoretical innovation by prioritizing empirical reproducibility over the exploration of alternative explanations and boundary conditions, ultimately reinforcing established assumptions instead of critically challenging or refining the theory (Harmon-Jones \u0026amp; Mills, 1999; Aronson, 1992).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe believe that our research contributes to understanding the mechanisms of cognitive dissonance by showing that personal importance can act as a moderator in the relationship between dissonance and the motivation to reduce it (e.g., Hardyck \u0026amp; Kardush, 1968; Leippe \u0026amp; Eisenstadt, 1999). The findings suggest that dissonance theory should incorporate a new perspective how importance influence the dissonance process. We hope that our discoveries will inspire further research on the dynamics of the cognitive dissonance and its reduction processes.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303\u0026ndash;311\u003cstrong\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBartholow, B. D., Fabiani, M., Gratton, G., \u0026amp; Bettencourt, B. A. (2005). A psychophysiological examination of cognitive and affective responses to social expectancy violations. \u003cem\u003ePsychological Science, 16\u003c/em\u003e(8), 692\u0026ndash;699. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01594.x\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBaumgartner, S. E., Lemmens, J. S., Weeda, W. D., \u0026amp; Huizinga, M. (2017). 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Laboratory experimentation with organizations. \u003cem\u003eHandbook of Organizations, 3\u003c/em\u003e, 194\u0026ndash;223.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWicklund, R. A., \u0026amp; Gollwitzer, P. M. (1982). Symbolic self-completion. \u003cem\u003eHillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"motivation-and-emotion","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Motivation and Emotion](https://link.springer.com/journal/11031)","snPcode":"11031","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/11031/3","title":"Motivation and Emotion","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"dissonance, dissonant state, importance, self-concept, effort","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"In everyday life, we encounter information that contradicts our beliefs, often disrupting our self-concept and triggering cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) suggests that discrepancies between cognitions create discomfort, motivating individuals to restore psychological consistency. It indicates that the magnitude of dissonance depends on the importance of conflicting beliefs, yet the role of importance has not been fully explored. Our hypothesis posits that the importance of a cognition moderates’ motivation to reduce dissonance. Two studies (N = 640) were conducted to test how people respond to discrepancy about their abilities. Study 1 showed that dissonance led to greater motivation toward reduction, but only for those who found those abilities as important. Study 2 (with a measure of the dissonance state) confirmed that dissonance magnitude and importance interact, influencing motivation to reduce dissonance. This research expands CDT by highlighting the role of importance in dissonance reduction.","manuscriptTitle":"Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-06-04 09:41:57","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6339316/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-10-27T11:16:44+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-09-12T07:04:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-07-21T19:42:47+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-07-09T10:20:08+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-07-03T03:31:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"327393316399568718105963736483917992684","date":"2025-07-01T08:35:46+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"232682334547150291385420954794342193852","date":"2025-06-29T23:20:56+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"151061005731082577865177366902993715260","date":"2025-06-29T14:51:21+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"87417701934300576666418595795104070850","date":"2025-06-26T17:28:05+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-06-24T13:09:53+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"168504920951753459370068372632810513789","date":"2025-06-05T07:05:10+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-06-02T15:41:15+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-04-02T06:47:50+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-04-02T06:45:45+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Motivation and Emotion","date":"2025-03-30T15:23:32+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"motivation-and-emotion","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Motivation and Emotion](https://link.springer.com/journal/11031)","snPcode":"11031","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/11031/3","title":"Motivation and Emotion","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"bea2db0a-9710-4b75-b4a5-1b33aa3a0bfb","owner":[],"postedDate":"June 4th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-01-05T12:09:11+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-06-04 09:41:57","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6339316","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6339316","identity":"rs-6339316","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}