Positional Dynamics in Competition: Introducing Targeted Position Games

preprint OA: closed CC-BY-4.0
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Abstract

Modern competitive scenarios often demand more nuanced strategies than merely winning or losing. This has given rise to Targeted Position Games (TPGs), which shift the focus from outright maximization to achieving specific targeted rankings. In this paper, we formalize the concept of TPGs and delve into their intricate dynamics. We derive foundational theorems, establishing the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and exploring the influence of strategic foresight. Particularly interesting is the parallel between TPGs and the quantum world, where the Pauli Exclusion Principle dictates electron behavior, providing a unique equilibrium that echoes the results from our TPGs framework. We also extend the TPGs analysis into areas of information asymmetry, emphasizing the role of prediction in strategy formulation. Further, we shed light on how TPGs can offer valuable insights for artificial intelligence and the digital economy, shaping the way we think about ranking, competition, and strategic decision-making. This work paves the way for a new understanding of competitive positioning and its extensive potential applications.

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europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00
unpaywall
last seen: 2026-05-24T02:00:01.246996+00:00
License: CC-BY-4.0