Representation as power: voter inequality in scientific collaborations

Representation as power: voter inequality in scientific collaborations | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Representation as power: voter inequality in scientific collaborations Michael K. Wilkinson This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6448666/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract A novel method of evaluating the voting power of coalitions in at-large elections to representative bodies is developed by applying economic and other indices to representation. It is developed in the context of international scientific collaborations, specifically CODEX-b, but is also applicable more generally. The political salience of power is taken to be the necessity of keeping member institutions in collaboration, reassuring members that their interests are represented by the governing body in order to discourage them from defecting. Such an approach leads to the consideration of representation as power , in contrast to much of the existing literature, which focuses on voters' ability to influence the passage of resolutions before a voting body. The method evaluates how voting rules, voting weights, and representation guarantees affect the inequality of fractional representation among individuals, institutions, and geographical clusters of institutions. Voter preferences are modeled based on the geographical locations of their home institutions in order to investigate the a priori power of those institutions under different assumptions of member loyalty. Finally, the method is applied to several illustrative example scenarios. JEL Classification: D72 power index representation voting weights voting rules voting coalitions scientific collaborations Full Text Additional Declarations Competing interest reported. The author is a member of the CODEX-b collaboration and receives a salary from the University of Cincinnati. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6448666","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":443579889,"identity":"9d3d9abb-b4d1-426d-a19c-4f194e797114","order_by":0,"name":"Michael K. 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