Nonmoral beliefs are better predictors of moral judgments than moral values

Nonmoral beliefs are better predictors of moral judgments than moral values | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Nonmoral beliefs are better predictors of moral judgments than moral values Bree Laran Beal, Joshua Rottman This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-5027212/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Moral psychologists typically explain moral cognition by invoking abstract moral values like fairness and loyalty. We argue that this approach is inadequate, particularly in accounting for moral disagreements between people who share similar values. Our new paradigm addresses this problem by instead modeling moral cognition as a function of relevant nonmoral beliefs. One hypothesis stemming from this “Is→Ought” model is that relevant beliefs will predict moral judgments on controversial issues better than abstract moral values like the “moral foundations”. We found strong support for this hypothesis: Across two studies of U.S. adults ( N = 361), nonmoral beliefs outperformed values in predicting moral judgments on each of eight controversial topics. When controlling for political affiliation, relevant beliefs were the only robust predictors. These findings support the view that people’s moral divisions are determined not, as presently assumed, by their values, but instead by their different views on relevant details. Philosophy Psychology Moral Cognition Moral Disagreement Moral Foundations Ontological Frames Full Text Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. Supplementary Files SupplementaryMaterialsBeliefsBeatValues.pdf Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-5027212","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":349141838,"identity":"94fbb589-c28f-41ef-9e0f-81be716a2cb3","order_by":0,"name":"Bree Laran Beal","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Bree","middleName":"Laran","lastName":"Beal","suffix":""},{"id":349141881,"identity":"df29c736-2caf-4b30-87a4-d21a3c4bf5c8","order_by":1,"name":"Joshua Rottman","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Joshua","middleName":"","lastName":"Rottman","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2024-09-03 20:20:33","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":true,"vertebrateSubjects":false,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":false,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":true,"humanSubjectConsent":true,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5027212/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5027212/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":63997333,"identity":"177091e4-3ff5-4a6b-85b2-30d366e43010","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-09-04 17:10:06","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":261372,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"BeliefsBeatValues.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-5027212/v1_covered_517ebaab-18bd-4540-b726-2cc83c6ed224.pdf"},{"id":63996916,"identity":"2234c27b-aebf-4a0f-95ac-f7ceac7ed7fe","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-09-04 17:02:00","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":488326,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryMaterialsBeliefsBeatValues.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-5027212/v1/0e316805013dbab0918e5691.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare no competing interests.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNonmoral beliefs are better predictors of moral judgments than moral values\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"Oxford College of Emory University","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Moral Cognition, Moral Disagreement, Moral Foundations, Ontological Frames","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5027212/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5027212/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eMoral psychologists typically explain moral cognition by invoking abstract moral values like fairness and loyalty. We argue that this approach is inadequate, particularly in accounting for moral disagreements between people who share similar values. Our new paradigm addresses this problem by instead modeling moral cognition as a function of relevant nonmoral beliefs. One hypothesis stemming from this “Is→Ought” model is that relevant beliefs will predict moral judgments on controversial issues better than abstract moral values like the “moral foundations”. We found strong support for this hypothesis: Across two studies of U.S. adults (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e = 361), nonmoral beliefs outperformed values in predicting moral judgments on each of eight controversial topics. When controlling for political affiliation, relevant beliefs were the only robust predictors. 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