Do State and Trait General and Social Anxiety Affect Theory of Mind?

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Charlotte Foulds, Valeria Khudiakova, Surtees Andrew This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 05 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in Scientific Reports → Version 1 posted 9 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Introduction Theory of mind is an important skill to function in society. There is evidence that anxiety can impair the ability to use this skill effectively, however, current research is inconclusive, heterogeneously measures of theory of mind, and lacks distinction between anxiety types despite these being known to present differently in clinical populations. False belief tasks are standard practice for assessing theory of mind in children and autistic participants and have also been found to adequately detect theory of mind differences in neurotypical adults. Yet these are not systematically used throughout the current literature. Method One hundred and sixty-eight participants completed the Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) and the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) prior to being randomly allocated to a general anxiety, social anxiety, or neutral mood condition. Following mood manipulation, participants completed a false belief task with either privileged knowledge or no knowledge. Results A 3x2 ANOVA found no significant main or interaction effects of general or social anxiety and false belief knowledge on performance, despite a reported increase of anxiety in the anxiety groups. There were also no significant correlations between trait general or social anxiety on theory of mind. Discussion The findings from this study do not support the previous evidence that anxiety increases egocentrism. Future studies should continue to distinguish systematically between state, trait, general, and social anxiety, and use reliable theory of mind measures. Biological sciences/Psychology Biological sciences/Psychology/Human behaviour theory of mind anxiety general anxiety social anxiety state anxiety trait anxiety Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Introduction In a fundamentally social world, developing social relationships and understanding others is an important skill. Thinking about another person’s mental state, referred to as theory of mind, is a process through which this skill is possible. Many factors can affect this ability, including emotions such as anxiety, which exists in a variety of categories (general, social), and can be experienced intermittently (state) and more persistently (trait). Some emotions may improve our theory of mind ability and others may reduce it. It is currently not clear whether state, trait, general, or social anxiety differ in their impact on theory of mind. Given the prevalence of anxiety disorders [ 1 ], and the need for an improved understanding and treatment of conditions that negatively impact social interactions, it is important to understand how theory of mind processes, such as belief reasoning, vary in relation to different sorts of experiences of anxiety. Theory of Mind Social interactions are a ubiquitous aspect of human life [ 2 , 3 , 4 ]. Our world is inherently social; to survive and thrive as individuals, as well as increase social capital, effectiveness at socialising with others is crucial [ 5 ]. Understanding our own behaviours, intentions, and mental states as well as those of others is necessary for the effective management of social encounters. Various definitions have been used for these processes, most often “mentalizing” and “theory of mind” [ 6 ]. Quesque et al. (2024) [ 7 ] suggest that mentalizing refers to the ability to attribute mental states, while theory of mind encompasses mentalizing in addition to the theory that the process of attributing mental states is affected by other concepts (e.g., behaviour). Traditional ways of thinking about theory of mind emerged from literature in children and non-human animals [ 8 ] and have tended to focus on broad group differences, neglecting that while different people vary in theory of mind ability, this can also vary within an individual from moment to moment. Individual differences in theory of mind ability have been well researched in terms of age [ 9 ], culture [ 10 ], language ability [ 11 ], autism, visual impairments, and auditory impairments [ 12 ]. Todd & Tamir (2024) [ 13 ] include some of the more transitory factors in their review of factors that that can lead to an over-reliance on self-information when making inferences about another’s mental state, including incidental emotions (emotions brought about by something unrelated to the main task). Converse et al. (2008) [ 14 ] found that incidental emotions that are positive in valence increase egocentrism (an over-reliance on self-information when making inferences about another’s mental state), yet Yip & Schweitzer (2019) [ 15 ] found a negatively valanced emotion, anger, to also reduce theory of mind accuracy. Other studies have found that emotions high in uncertainty, such as anxiety, are also more likely to increase egocentrism [ 5 , 16 , 17 ]. Anxiety and Theory of Mind Anxiety is a future-oriented [ 18 ], pervasive and valuable emotion that indicates potential threat and is designed to promote action to reduce susceptibility [ 19 ], such as seeking and using advice [ 20 ]. It has been described as negative in valence and high in physiological arousal [ 21 ]. State and trait anxiety differ; the former is a common and momentary emotion, and the latter reflects a chronic predisposition. Similarly, social and general anxiety differ; Khdour et al., (2016) [ 22 ] note the differences between social anxiety disorder (SAD) and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) symptomology, including in cognitive domains. While SAD has been found to produce impairments in attentive, executive, and visuo-spatial functions [ 22 ], no correlation between cognitive deficits and GAD have been reported, although there has been limited investigation into cognitive function in GAD in particular [ 22 , 23 ]. Surtees et al., (2024) [ 24 ] propose that anxiety increases egocentrism, as it creates a motivation to reduce uncertainty, which results in an over-reliance on our own thoughts and beliefs to predict those of others. However, there is limited and inconsistent literature regarding the impact of state anxiety, both general and social, on theory of mind. Some of these inconsistencies may have arisen from varied methodological approaches to measuring theory of mind, and some may be a result of researchers not distinguishing between general and social anxiety. Using spatial and conceptual perspective-taking tasks to measure theory of mind, along with an autobiographical writing task to induce state anxiety that did not distinguish between general and social anxiety, Todd et al. (2015) [ 5 ] found increased egocentrism in anxious participants compared to anger, disgust, and neutral mood conditions. Similarly, Todd and Simpson (2016) [ 25 ] used a visual perspective-taking task and an autobiographical writing task and again did not distinguish between general and social anxiety. They found that anxiety, relative to anger and neutral feelings, impaired ability to use theory of mind with other people but notably not non-human objects, highlighting a link between social aspects of cognition and a reduced theory of mind ability. Dyer et al. (2021) [ 26 ], on the other hand, distinguish between both state and trait, and general and social anxiety. In their study, state anxiety was induced through inhalations of 7.5% carbon dioxide enriched air, which they compare to the physiological and physical symptoms experienced in GAD and note that anxiety induction methods that incorporate a social element may produce different outcomes. The effects of this on emotion recognition task performance (emotion recognition is often closely related to theory of mind [ 27 ]) found high state anxiety to reduce emotion recognition accuracy. They also found that trait anxiety did not have an impact or moderate the impact of state anxiety on emotion recognition despite previous findings. The findings from Dyer et al. (2021) [ 26 ] highlight that there is also a lack of clarity at the trait level. A meta-analysis by Baez et al. (2023) [ 28 ] found that individuals with SAD performed worse than healthy controls on theory of mind tests but were unable to draw any conclusions on GAD as only two studies met inclusion criteria. The outcomes of the included SAD studies varied in their findings. Some studies reported that social anxiety disorder can lead to excessive theory of mind use [ 29 , 30 ]. Although this may be context dependent [ 31 ], other studies have suggested that SAD is negatively associated with theory of mind ability [ 32 ]. Furthermore, Lenton-Brym et al. (2018) [ 33 ] found no significant differences on a social cognition task when they grouped participants based on their scores on the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) into sub-clinical high socially anxious and low socially anxious. For GAD, Zainal and Newman (2018) [ 34 ] found that individuals with GAD performed better than controls at cognitive reasoning theory of mind tasks when induced with worry compared to when given a relaxation exercise, but also performed better when worried and presented with negative social stimuli compared to controls. Baez et al. (2023) [ 28 ] note that the substantial heterogeneity in outcomes across the included SAD studies may be due to the diversity of tests used to assess theory of mind; of the 18 SAD studies included in this meta-analysis, 13 different theory of mind tasks were used. They conclude that further studies with large homogeneous samples were needed to better understand the factors that influence social cognition outcomes in both SAD and GAD. Quesque and Rossetti (2020) [ 35 ] identify two criteria that a task must meet to measure theory of mind: 1) the task must involve attributing mental states to others (mentalizing), and 2) participants must maintain a distinction between their own and others’ mental states, which they label the “non-merging” criterion. While they note that many tasks do not meet these criteria, they determine that false belief tasks are an adequate method of measuring theory of mind. False belief tasks require participants to infer another person’s false belief about a particular scenario where they may or may not have privileged information about the scenario. Birch and Bloom (2007) [ 36 ] suggest that a curse of knowledge bias in false belief reasoning can detect deficits in adult participants, i.e., if specific knowledge about an outcome increases egocentrism, and the study by Converse et al. (2008) [ 14 ] has shown that mood manipulation can affect participants’ responses on this task. Current Study The current study attempted to address the lack of clarity on distinguishing how state and trait, and general and social anxiety impact theory of mind. General and social state anxiety were manipulated, and general and social trait anxiety were measured. It also attempted to address the inconsistencies and oversights in measuring theory of mind by using a typical measure of theory of mind that has been well established in the literature. A widely used false belief task [ 36 ] measured theory of mind in participants that were randomised to either a general anxiety, social anxiety, or neutral condition. It was predicted that the anxiety conditions would demonstrate a reduced theory of mind ability when compared to the neutral condition, and that the social anxiety condition would perform worse than the general anxiety condition. Methods Methods were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework ( https://osf.io/zc3pf/ ). Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University of Birmingham Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics Ethics Committee. All methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations. The study followed a 3x2 between-subjects experimental design. Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of three mood conditions (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) and one of two knowledge conditions (no knowledge, privileged knowledge). Participants A G*power analysis based on Converse et al., (2008) [ 14 ], to give 80% power to detect a medium effect size (ηp 2 = .06) at α < .05, returned a suggested sample size of 155. One hundred and sixty-eight participants were recruited, exceeding the minimum sample size required to detect a medium effect size. Participants were split evenly (56 in each group) across the general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral mood conditions. Half of each group received privileged knowledge and half received no knowledge for Vicki’s violin task (see below). Most of the participants were female and white. Mean age of participants was 19.06 (SD 1.38), with a range of 18–32. Demographic information across conditions can be found in Table 1 . Participants received research credits for taking part. Participants were ineligible to take part if they were under 18, had a diagnosed psychiatric condition and/or neurodevelopmental disorder, their English language proficiency was below that required to perform the experiment, or if they were already participating in a trial using the same or similar protocol. Table 1 Demographic Information by Condition Condition Total General anxiety Social anxiety Neutral No knowledge Privileged knowledge No knowledge Privileged knowledge No knowledge Privileged knowledge M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD Age 19 .90 19 .86 18.96 .84 18.89 .99 18.96 .69 19.54 2.80 19.06 1.38 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % Gender Female 24 85.7 24 85.7 24 85.7 24 85.7 23 82.1 25 89.3 144 85.71 Male 2 7.1 4 14.3 4 14.3 4 14.3 5 17.9 3 10.7 22 13.10 Non-binary 2 7.1 - - - - - - - - - - 2 1.19 Ethnicity White 14 50 14 50 13 46.4 15 53.6 19 67.9 12 42.9 87 51.79 Black 6 21.4 1 3.6 3 10.7 2 7.1 4 14.3 3 10.7 19 11.31 Asian 6 21.4 11 39.3 10 35.7 8 28.6 2 7.1 9 32.1 46 27.38 Mixed 1 3.6 2 7.1 - - 2 7.1 3 10.7 4 14.3 12 7.14 Other 1 3.6 - - 2 7.14 1 3.6 - - - - 4 2.38 N total 28 28 28 28 28 28 168 Note . Aggregated scores were used for ethnicity. Procedure On arrival at the lab, a QR code was scanned by participants to access and complete the information sheet and consent form via Qualtrix, along with the GAD-7 and the SPIN to measure trait general and social anxiety. Participants were then pseudo-randomly allocated to one of the general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral conditions, and given the relevant written instructions (detailed below) for the respective mood manipulation task. This was followed by a mood manipulation check, Vicki’s violin task (described below), and the debrief form. Trait Anxiety Measures The GAD-7 is a brief, validated tool for measuring generalised anxiety and its severity, and has shown excellent internal consistency (α = .92), good test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation = .83) and good criterion, construct, factorial, and procedural validity [ 37 ]. Participants are asked to consider the extent to which they have experienced seven items over the past 2 weeks. Responses range from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Nearly every day’. A score between 5–9 indicates mild general anxiety, 10–14 moderate general anxiety, and 15–21 severe general anxiety. The SPIN is a 17-item, validated self-rating scale assessing fear, avoidance, and physiological symptoms of social anxiety. It has shown good test-retest reliability ( r = .78-.89), excellent internal consistency for the full scale (α = .94), and good convergent validity [ 38 ]. Participants are asked to rate the extent to which each statement applied to them over the past week. Responses range from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Extremely’. A score of 21–30 indicates mild social anxiety, 31–40 moderate, 41–50 severe, and above 50 very severe social anxiety. Mood Manipulation Each of the mood manipulation tasks consisted of a relevant a writing task as well the prospect of a future follow-up task, as anxiety is a future-oriented emotion [ 18 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 ]. This procedure has been shown to induce anxiety in healthy participants [ 43 ]. For consistency, the neutral condition also received a prospective future follow-up task. Participants in the social anxiety condition were asked to complete an autobiographical writing task of a time at which they were worried before or during a social event: “Think about a time you felt anxious about having to speak in public. This might be a presentation or speech. When you have decided on a memory, write about it for 5 minutes. You are encouraged to think about thoughts that crossed your mind, how other people looking at you made you feel, and any physical sensations you experienced”. Participants were also told that they will have to present what they have written: “At the end of these tasks, you will be asked to present on what you wrote for a further 5 minutes”. Participants in the general anxiety condition were asked to complete a writing task, in which they describe a time when they felt worried about an exam: “Think about a time you had to take an important or difficult test/exam. The memory you think of should be of a time you were feeling anxious about taking the test/exam. When you have thought of the memory, spend 5 minutes recounting this experience. You are encouraged to think about how you felt, worries you had, and any physical sensations you experienced”. They were also informed that following the writing task, they will be given a test that will be marked: “At some point throughout these tasks, you will be given a test that will be marked and your result fed back to you”. Participants in the neutral condition were asked to write about the last items they purchased from the grocery store, as used by Todd et al., 2015 [ 5 ]: “Think about what you bought the last time you went shopping. You will have 5 minutes to write about the items you bought. You are encouraged to think about the items in detail; how much they cost, if you had bought them before, etc”. Participants were informed that after completing the writing task, they will be asked to engage in a prospective neutral task: “Following this you will be asked to look at pictures of items from a shopping list”. Manipulation Check Following the writing tasks, all participants were asked to complete a self-report questionnaire on their mood. This consisted of a 7-item Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Very much so” on how strongly they felt anxious, nervous, tense, calm, indifferent, neutral, unemotional, alert, aroused, energetic, and excited (adapted from Todd et al., 2015 [ 5 ]). False Belief Task Following the writing task and manipulation check, participants from each condition then completed ‘Vicki’s violin’ task as shown in Fig. 1 (adapted from [ 14 ]). Participants were randomly allocated either to a privileged knowledge condition or to receive the same knowledge that Vicki had. Both conditions receive the following text and visual: “This is Vicki. She finishes playing her violin and puts it in the blue container. Then she goes outside to play”. The privileged knowledge group read: “While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, moves the violin to the red container”. The no knowledge condition received the same knowledge as Vicki, which read: “While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, comes into the room”. Both conditions receive the following text and image: “Then, Denise rearranges the containers in the room until the room looks like the picture below. When Vicki returns, she wants to play her violin. What are the chances Vicki will first look for her violin in each of the below containers? Write your answers in percentages in the space below each box”. The key dependent variable is the estimated likelihood, as a percentage, that the participant attributes to the red box. In the privileged knowledge condition, if participants estimate a higher likelihood of Vicki looking in the red box compared to the no knowledge condition, this demonstrates egocentrism. The no knowledge condition acts as a control, in that the percentage estimates reflect how often participants identify the red box on the basis of it being moved alone. Responses on the false belief task that were more than 3 SDs from the overall mean were removed from the analysis, as described in Converse et al. (2008) [ 14 ]. Once participants had completed the mood manipulation and false-belief tasks, they were presented with a debrief form that requested they do not share any details with their peers, as well as information regarding services that can be accessed for support with any prolonged anxiety that might be experienced. Statistical Analyses SPSS 29.0 was used to conduct statistical analyses. The dependent variable was recorded as a scaled percentage of what participants recorded as the likelihood of Vicki looking in the red box. For most participants, this reflected the percentage score they reported. Due to some participants providing a total percentage (for all boxes) that did not equal 100%, a scaled percentage value for the dependent variable was calculated by dividing 100 by the total percentage participants gave (for all boxes) and then multiplying this by the original red percentage value. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests were carried out to assess for any differences between mood conditions and knowledge conditions in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. ANOVA were also carried out to assess for any differences between group scores on the GAD-7 and SPIN, as well as on the manipulation check variables, with Scheffe post hoc tests. A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to find any main or interaction effects between the two independent variables of mood condition (general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral) and knowledge condition (no knowledge and privileged knowledge) and their impact on the dependent variable. Where relevant, effect sizes are reported as partial eta squared (η²). Spearman’s r correlations were performed for exploring the effects of trait anxiety on false belief task response. Results Although data were not normally distributed, an ANOVA was still conducted as these are typically considered robust to variations from non-normal distributions, particularly when group sizes are balanced (Blanca et al., 2017) and with sample sizes exceeding 30 [ 44 ]. The current study meets both criteria. Descriptive Statistics There was no significant main effect of mood condition, F (2, 166) = .83, p = .54., or knowledge condition F (1, 166) = .59, p = .44, and no significant interaction between the two, F (2, 166) = .90, p = .41, in terms of age. There was no significant difference between the gender of participants across the three mood conditions (χ2(4) = 4.26, p = .37). Within each of the mood conditions, there was also no difference between the gender of participants across knowledge conditions (General, χ2(2) = 2.67, p = .26; Social, χ2(2) = 0, p = 1; Neutral, χ2(2) = .58, p = .45). There was no significant difference between the ethnicity of participants across the three mood conditions (χ2(34) = 29.93, p = .67). Within each of the mood conditions, there was also no difference between the gender of participants across knowledge conditions (General, χ2(12) = 12.15, p = .43; Social, χ2(13) = 11.49, p = .57; Neutral, χ2(12) = 14.38, p = .28). There were also no significant differences between the combined conditions and scores on the GAD-7 or SPIN, F (5, 166) = 1.53, p = .22. Means and SDs for each group are shown in Table 2 , demonstrating that the groups were equally matched for trait anxiety. Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Scores on the GAD-7 and SPIN by Study Condition Condition General anxiety Social anxiety Neutral No knowledge Privileged knowledge No knowledge Privileged knowledge No knowledge Privileged knowledge Total M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD GAD 5.29 3.57 6.00 3.80 5.11 2.97 6.86 4.21 6.50 4.26 5.86 4.32 5.93 3.87 SPIN 19.04 10.59 24.54 12.46 21.14 9.93 24.07 12.63 19.86 11.79 19.32 10.96 21.33 11.48 On the GAD-7, 66 participants scores fell within the minimal range, 75 within the mild range, 21 within the moderate range, and 6 within the severe range. On the SPIN, 86 participants scored within the minimal range, 42 within the mild rage, 32 within the moderate range, 6 within the severe range, and 2 within the very severe range. Manipulation Check An ANOVA looking at differences between each of the manipulation check items and the three mood conditions found there were significant differences between condition (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) and the extent to which participants reported feeling anxious F (2, 165) = 15.41, p Neutral, nervous F (2, 165) = 9.77, p Neutral, tense F (2, 165) = 13.35 p Neutral, calm F (2, 165) = 6.71, p = .08, η² = .06, General = Social < Neutral, and neutral F (2, 165) = 7.27, p < .001, η² = .08, General = Social < Neutral. This suggests that the manipulation induction was successful, in that the anxious groups reported increased anxiety with similar intensity for both social and non-social situations. No other mood manipulation items were significantly different between mood conditions. Results for each mood manipulation check item can be found in Table 3 . Table 3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results of Manipulation Check Items Condition ANOVA Scheffe post-hoc General anxiety Social anxiety Neutral General v social General v neutral Social v neutral M SD M SD M SD F p p p p Anxious 2.96 1.35 2.95 1.21 1.82 1.18 15.41 < .001 1 < .001 < .001 Nervous 2.73 1.57 2.79 1.35 1.77 1.18 9.77 < .001 1 .001 < .001 Tense 2.79 1.53 3.04 1.43 1.79 1.06 13.35 < .001 .62 < .001 < .001 Calm 3.30 1.55 3.55 1.72 4.37 1.59 17.60 .002 .72 .003 .03 Indifferent 2.95 1.59 3.02 1.69 3.66 1.81 3.00 .05 .98 .09 .14 Neutral 3.23 1.75 3.61 1.89 4.48 1.71 7.27 < .001 .54 .001 .04 Emotional 2.95 1.78 3.21 1.78 3.64 1.85 2.12 .12 .74 .13 .46 Alert 3.43 1.59 3.87 1.64 3.79 1.53 1.24 .29 .33 .50 .96 Aroused 2.07 1.26 2.45 1.55 2.12 1.18 1.29 .28 .34 .98 .45 Energetic 2.48 1.19 2.29 1.41 2.61 1.17 .92 .40 .71 .87 .71 Excited 2.39 1.37 2.16 1.46 2.41 1.30 .57 .57 .67 1 .63 The Impact of State Anxiety on False Belief Reasoning Thirty-six participants’ percentages on the false belief task did not add up to 100%, varying from 90–330%, and therefore data was scaled for all participants’ responses as described in the method. One outlier was greater than 3 SDs from the mean and was therefore removed from analysis. A 3 (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) x 2 (privileged knowledge, no knowledge) between-subjects ANOVA yielded no main effect of mood condition, F (2, 161) = .88, p = .42, η² = .01, or knowledge condition, F (1, 161) = 2.08, p = .15, η² = .01 on participants’ prediction of how likely Vicki was to look in the red box. The interaction effect was also non-significant, F (5, 161) = .08, p = .92), η² < .01, see Fig. 2. Correlation Between Trait Anxiety and False Belief Reasoning Spearman’s correlations revealed a significant correlation between trait general and social anxiety in the no knowledge condition, r = .45, p < .001, but no significant correlations between trait general anxiety and scaled red box response r = − .03, p = .82, or trait social anxiety and scaled red box response, r = .21, p = .06. Similarly, for the privileged knowledge condition, there was a significant correlation between trait general and social anxiety, r = .39, p < .001, but no significant correlations between trait general anxiety and scaled red box response r = − .18, p = .11, or trait social anxiety and scaled red box response, r = .05, p = .64. Discussion In this study, participants’ state general and social anxiety was effectively manipulated after completing an autobiographical writing task, with a prospective future follow-up task. There was, however, no evidence that state general and social anxiety had an impact on theory of mind measured through a false belief task, when compared to a neutral mood group. There were also no significant correlations between trait general and social anxiety and theory of mind ability in the false belief task. There was a correlation between trait general and trait social anxiety, suggesting that people who experience trait general anxiety are more likely to also experience trait social anxiety and vice versa. The Impact of State Anxiety on Theory of Mind The current study’s findings are inconsistent with previous studies on anxiety and theory of mind by Todd et al. (2015) [ 5 ] and Todd and Simpson (2016) [ 25 ]. The findings from Todd et al. (2015) [ 5 ] suggest that egocentrism is increased by emotions that are characterised by uncertainty. In the current study participants in each condition reported being significantly more anxious in the anxiety conditions, yet the outcomes do not demonstrate a motivation to reduce uncertainty, or this motivation may have been overridden. Todd and Simpson (2016) [ 25 ] suggest that the impact of anxiety on theory of mind may be particularly noticeable for social aspects of cognition, however, the current study found no differences between social and non-social anxiety on a theory of mind task. Dyer et al. (2022) [ 26 ], on the other hand, found no effects of state anxiety on emotion recognition, and although they did not distinguish between general and social anxiety, these findings are more consistent with the current study. The discrepancy between the findings from this study and previous studies poses queries about whether anxious participants experienced increased egocentrism, and if they did, how this may not lead to a reduced theory of mind ability. This resonates with Todd and Tamir's (2024) [ 13 ] argument that the capability to override an egocentric pull depends on the strength with which egocentric information is activated, as well as individual characteristics that influence someone’s motivation or ability to override this pull. In the current study, the strength of the activation of self-information may rely on the intensity of experienced anxiety or the failure of the false belief task to create a curse of knowledge adequately, which is suggested from the absence of a significant main effect of knowledge state. Overall, the outcomes of this study indicate that even when people are anxious, they can still utilise their knowledge about others’ knowledge to make accurate, unbiased inferences in a false belief task. The Impact of Trait Anxiety on Theory of Mind Baez et al.’s (2023) [ 28 ] meta-analysis looking at the impact of trait anxiety on theory of mind concludes that SAD produces a reduced theory of mind ability compared to healthy controls, despite some of the variability between studies. In the current study, trait social anxiety did not lead to a reduced theory of mind, which is more consistent with the findings from the study by Lenton-Brym et al. (2018) [ 33 ] that found no differences between high and low socially anxious participants based on their scores from the SPIN. Considering that increased trait social anxiety was positively correlated with trait general anxiety in the current study, it may be worth considering if there are differences in the impact on theory of mind when these are present in isolation and in combination (i.e., trait social anxiety with no trait general anxiety, trait general anxiety with no trait social anxiety, and both trait social and general anxiety together). While the non-significant findings of trait general and social anxiety in the current study echo the findings from Dyer et al. (2022) [ 26 ], the latter study used an emotion recognition task. Emotion recognition is often associated with theory of mind [ 27 ] but Quesque and Rossetti (2020) [ 35 ] argue that emotion recognition tasks do not measure theory of mind. Despite this disjuncture, given the close association between these two concepts, these similarities in findings may suggest that the cognitive processes linking theory of mind and emotion recognition remain unaffected by trait general and social anxiety. Strengths and Limitations Previous studies that have looked at the influence of anxiety on theory of mind and its related concepts have failed to measure state and trait and general and social anxiety as distinct concepts. This study was the first to differentiate between both state and trait, and general and social anxiety, while using a well-established measure of theory of mind. While the mood manipulation procedure was shown to adequately induce a mood state of sufficient intensity, i.e., participants in the anxiety conditions reported being significantly more anxious than the neutral group, it is not clear if the duration of this manipulated mood state was sufficient to affect the cognitive processes underlying theory of mind. There may also be a question around whether the curse of knowledge in the false belief task was sufficient to detect theory of mind deficits in this cohort of participants, as there was no effect of knowledge condition. However, Converse et al. (2008) [ 14 ] used similar mood manipulation procedures with moderate effect sizes and discovered significant differences in mood groups on Vicki’s Violin theory of mind task in a similar cohort of university students. The findings from this study are limited by the potentially mismatched impact of mood manipulation tasks within a laboratory environment when compared to real-world experiences in terms of a) intensity and b) differences between generalised and social anxiety. Bhanot et al. (2020) [ 45 ] comment on the ecological validity of autobiographical mood induction tasks relative to other laboratory methods, noting that these can often encounter a demand effect due to the wording used and may be limited in external validity. Still, laboratory results have been evidenced to reliably replicate field results when there are large effect sizes [ 46 , 47 ]. Given that Converse et al. (2008) [ 14 ] found a significant impact of mood on theory of mind with moderate effect sizes for manipulation check items, and the current study’s manipulation check demonstrated medium to large effect sizes, the non-significant effect in this study may indeed offer a reliable outcome of anxiety on theory of mind. Differences in general and social anxiety on the manipulation check items could help to ensure distinctions between the two conditions. That is, it could be argued that a participant’s anticipation of a larger audience for the social anxiety condition prospective follow-up task (having been told they would have to present their writing) could increase these distinctions. However, studies investigating the impact of audience size on level of social anxiety have found no significant effects [ 48 , 49 ]. The current study showed good internal validity, given that there were no differences found between conditions in terms of participants’ age, gender, and ethnicity, suggesting that the non-significant findings are not a result of these factors. However, an overall majority of study participants identified as female. This imbalance potentially limits the generalisability of the findings to male samples, particularly as female participants have been shown to demonstrate a greater self-other distinction whilst under stress whereas male participants respond with increased egocentrism [ 50 ]. If women demonstrate an enhanced theory of mind ability under negatively valanced emotions, the majority female sample in the current study may have contributed to the absence of a significant main effect of anxiety on theory of mind. Future Directions The current study suggests several additional avenues for future research. First, future research should continue to determine which concepts are being measured (theory of mind, mentalizing, etc) and when measuring theory of mind should use specific and well-established theory of mind tasks, such as the one used in this study. They should also continue to distinguish systematically between state and trait, and general and social anxiety as distinct phenomena. Replicating the current study's protocol could verify the findings. Second, further analyses could explore the relationship between trait anxiety and susceptibility to state mood manipulation. Third, while the current study did not incorporate integral emotions, similar distinctions between different emotional phenomena and reliable measures should be used when investigating how these may affect theory of mind. Finally, future studies should aim to recruit more balanced samples of gender and ethnicity so that outcomes can be generalised to broader populations and subgroup differences can be explored. Clinical Implications The significant, bi-directional correlation between trait general and trait social anxiety supports the conclusions from Goldenberg et al. (1996) [ 51 ] that GAD and SAD are more commonly experienced as comorbidities than not. Despite this known association, quality standards for the treatment provided by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for GAD and SAD differ; a stepped care approach is recommended for GAD and specifically developed Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) interventions are recommended for SAD [ 52 ]. Given the treatment distinctions, individuals presenting at mental health services with GAD or SAD should be screened for the presence of the other condition, and interventions should be offered for both conditions when necessary. Conclusions The current study showed that state general and social anxiety did not impact the curse of knowledge people experience when reasoning about false beliefs. Equivalent null results were found for trait general and social anxiety. These findings prompt further questions about what factors may exist that provide someone with the ability to override an egocentric motivation to reduce uncertainty. The study builds upon previous research and begins to provide a systematic approach to discriminating between the varying impacts of these different phenomena on reliably measured theory of mind. Declarations Author contributions Conceptualisation (CF and AS), Methodology (CF, AS), Data Collection (CF & VK), Analysis (CF), Investigation (CF), Writing - Original Draft (CF), Writing - Review & Editing (CF, AS), Visualization (CF, AS), Supervision (AS), Project administration (CF). Data availability statement SPSS data file that supports the findings of this study has been uploaded to Open Science Framework (OSF) project osf.io/zc3pf Registration DOI https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/4KA9Y Ethical considerations Ethical approval for this research was sought through the University of Birmingham Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) ethics committee. Consent to participate Participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the study. Competing interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding statement This study was supported by a Health Education England training grant to CF. References Remes, O., Brayne, C., van der Linde, R. & Lafortune, L. A systematic review of reviews on the prevalence of anxiety disorders in adult populations. Brain Behav. 6 (7), e00497. https://doi.org/10.1002/brb3.497 (2016). Crosier, B. S., Webster, G. 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Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task. Cognition 156 , 88–94 (2016). Dyer, M. L., Attwood, A. S., Penton-Voak, I. S. & Munafò, M. R. The role of state and trait anxiety in the processing of facial expressions of emotion. R Soc. Open. Sci. 9 , 210056 (2021). Mier, D. et al. The involvement of emotion recognition in affective theory of mind. Psychophysiology 47 (6), 1028–1039. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01031 (2010). Baez, S., Tangarife, M. A., Davila-Mejia, G., Trujillo-Güiza, M. & Forero, D. A. Performance in emotion recognition and theory of mind tasks in social anxiety and generalized anxiety disorders: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Front Psychiatry 14 , (2023). Hezel, D. M. & McNally, R. J. Theory of mind impairments in social anxiety disorder. Behav. Ther. 45 , 530–540 (2014). Washburn, D., Wilson, G., Roes, M., Rnic, K. & Harkness, K. L. Theory of mind in social anxiety disorder, depression, and comorbid conditions. J. Anxiety Disord . 37 , 71–77 (2016). Ballespí, S., Vives, J., Sharp, C. & Tobar, A. Barrantes-Vidal, N. Hypermentalizing in social anxiety: Evidence for a context-dependent relationship. Front. Psychol. 10 , 1501 (2019). Alvi, T., Kouros, C. D., Lee, J., Fulford, D. & Tabak, B. A. Social anxiety is negatively associated with theory of mind and empathic accuracy. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 129 , 108–113 (2020). Lenton-Brym, A. P., Moscovitch, D. A., Vidovic, V., Nilsen, E. & Friedman, O. Theory of mind ability in high socially anxious individuals. Anxiety Stress Coping . 31 , 487–499 (2018). Zainal, N. H. & Newman, M. G. Worry amplifies theory-of-mind reasoning for negatively valenced social stimuli in generalized anxiety disorder. J. Affect. Disord . 227 , 824–833 (2018). Quesque, F. & Rossetti, Y. What do theory-of-mind tasks actually measure? Theory and practice. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 15 , 384–396 (2020). Birch, S. A. J. & Bloom, P. The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs. Psychol. Sci. 18 , 382–386 (2007). Spitzer, R. L., Kroenke, K., Williams, J. B. W. & Löwe, B. A brief measure for assessing generalized anxiety disorder: The GAD-7. Arch. Intern. Med. 166 , 1092–1097 (2006). Connor, K. M. et al. Psychometric properties of the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN): New self-rating scale. Br. J. Psychiatry . 176 , 379–386 (2000). Ballance, B. C. et al. Imagining emotional events benefits future-oriented decisions. Q J. Exp. Psychol 17470218221086637 , (2022). Endler, N. S. & Kocovski, N. L. State and trait anxiety revisited. J. Anxiety Disord . 15 , 231–245 (2001). Grupe, D. W. & Nitschke, J. B. Uncertainty and anticipation in anxiety. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 14 , 488–501 (2013). Miloyan, B., Pachana, N. A. & Suddendorf, T. Future-oriented thought patterns associated with anxiety and depression in later life: The intriguing prospects of prospection. Gerontologist 57 , 619–625 (2017). Damasio, A. R. et al. Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions. Nat. Neurosci. 3 , 1049–1056 (2000). Ghasemi, A. & Zahediasl, S. Normality tests for statistical analysis: A guide for non-statisticians. Int. J. Endocrinol. Metab. 10 , 486–489 (2012). Bhanot, S. P., Chang, D., Cunningham, J. L. & Ranson, M. Emotions and decisions in the real world: What can we learn from quasi-field experiments? PLOS ONE . 15 , e0243044 (2020). Anderson, C. A., Lindsay, J. J. & Bushman, B. J. Research in the psychological laboratory: Truth or triviality? Curr Dir. Psychol. Sci 8 , (1999). Mitchell, G. Revisiting truth or triviality: The external validity of research in the psychological laboratory. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 7 , 109–117 (2012). Mostajeran, F., Balci, M. B., Steinicke, F., Kühn, S. & Gallinat, J. The effects of virtual audience size on social anxiety during public speaking. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6855230","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":471802493,"identity":"6380e6cf-9fdd-4980-bbad-b4f23dbf3c38","order_by":0,"name":"Charlotte Foulds","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Birmingham","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Charlotte","middleName":"","lastName":"Foulds","suffix":""},{"id":471802494,"identity":"304ed244-f208-4c46-9b74-eb06decacd9d","order_by":1,"name":"Valeria Khudiakova","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Birmingham","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Valeria","middleName":"","lastName":"Khudiakova","suffix":""},{"id":471802495,"identity":"cbb09cd4-2953-472b-86c5-d40362a1be61","order_by":2,"name":"Surtees Andrew","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Birmingham","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Surtees","middleName":"","lastName":"Andrew","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-09 14:08:15","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[{"content":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-36718-5","type":"published","date":"2026-03-05T15:59:19+00:00"}],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":84919634,"identity":"7416bfd5-3e36-4bab-bfa1-1a736429f671","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-18 19:35:01","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":28822,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVicki’s Violin Task\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6855230/v1/c194e5a0c484f53b27966892.png"},{"id":84919640,"identity":"195aff2a-ef58-4b80-8520-ccb49aef0a25","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-18 19:35:01","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":70957,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eViolin Plot of Participants’ Predictions that Vicki Will Look in the Red Box by Mood and Knowledge Condition\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6855230/v1/6497dcd87c9a2ec15e4efdf0.png"},{"id":104250839,"identity":"6efd6c96-48fe-49cc-a2bb-e110977476ea","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-09 16:09:42","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1222561,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6855230/v1/ebc96242-bac4-404f-80be-dbb8c01515a5.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Do State and Trait General and Social Anxiety Affect Theory of Mind?","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn a fundamentally social world, developing social relationships and understanding others is an important skill. Thinking about another person\u0026rsquo;s mental state, referred to as theory of mind, is a process through which this skill is possible. Many factors can affect this ability, including emotions such as anxiety, which exists in a variety of categories (general, social), and can be experienced intermittently (state) and more persistently (trait). Some emotions may improve our theory of mind ability and others may reduce it. It is currently not clear whether state, trait, general, or social anxiety differ in their impact on theory of mind. Given the prevalence of anxiety disorders [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e], and the need for an improved understanding and treatment of conditions that negatively impact social interactions, it is important to understand how theory of mind processes, such as belief reasoning, vary in relation to different sorts of experiences of anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTheory of Mind\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSocial interactions are a ubiquitous aspect of human life [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. Our world is inherently social; to survive and thrive as individuals, as well as increase social capital, effectiveness at socialising with others is crucial [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e]. Understanding our own behaviours, intentions, and mental states as well as those of others is necessary for the effective management of social encounters. Various definitions have been used for these processes, most often \u0026ldquo;mentalizing\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;theory of mind\u0026rdquo; [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e]. Quesque et al. (2024) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that mentalizing refers to the ability to attribute mental states, while theory of mind encompasses mentalizing in addition to the theory that the process of attributing mental states is affected by other concepts (e.g., behaviour).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTraditional ways of thinking about theory of mind emerged from literature in children and non-human animals [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e] and have tended to focus on broad group differences, neglecting that while different people vary in theory of mind ability, this can also vary within an individual from moment to moment. Individual differences in theory of mind ability have been well researched in terms of age [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e], culture [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e], language ability [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e], autism, visual impairments, and auditory impairments [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. Todd \u0026amp; Tamir (2024) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e] include some of the more transitory factors in their review of factors that that can lead to an over-reliance on self-information when making inferences about another\u0026rsquo;s mental state, including incidental emotions (emotions brought about by something unrelated to the main task). Converse et al. (2008) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e] found that incidental emotions that are positive in valence increase egocentrism (an over-reliance on self-information when making inferences about another\u0026rsquo;s mental state), yet Yip \u0026amp; Schweitzer (2019) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e] found a negatively valanced emotion, anger, to also reduce theory of mind accuracy. Other studies have found that emotions high in uncertainty, such as anxiety, are also more likely to increase egocentrism [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eAnxiety and Theory of Mind\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnxiety is a future-oriented [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e], pervasive and valuable emotion that indicates potential threat and is designed to promote action to reduce susceptibility [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e], such as seeking and using advice [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e]. It has been described as negative in valence and high in physiological arousal [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e]. State and trait anxiety differ; the former is a common and momentary emotion, and the latter reflects a chronic predisposition. Similarly, social and general anxiety differ; Khdour et al., (2016) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e] note the differences between social anxiety disorder (SAD) and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) symptomology, including in cognitive domains. While SAD has been found to produce impairments in attentive, executive, and visuo-spatial functions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e], no correlation between cognitive deficits and GAD have been reported, although there has been limited investigation into cognitive function in GAD in particular [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurtees et al., (2024) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e] propose that anxiety increases egocentrism, as it creates a motivation to reduce uncertainty, which results in an over-reliance on our own thoughts and beliefs to predict those of others. However, there is limited and inconsistent literature regarding the impact of state anxiety, both general and social, on theory of mind. Some of these inconsistencies may have arisen from varied methodological approaches to measuring theory of mind, and some may be a result of researchers not distinguishing between general and social anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUsing spatial and conceptual perspective-taking tasks to measure theory of mind, along with an autobiographical writing task to induce state anxiety that did not distinguish between general and social anxiety, Todd et al. (2015) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e] found increased egocentrism in anxious participants compared to anger, disgust, and neutral mood conditions. Similarly, Todd and Simpson (2016) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e] used a visual perspective-taking task and an autobiographical writing task and again did not distinguish between general and social anxiety. They found that anxiety, relative to anger and neutral feelings, impaired ability to use theory of mind with other people but notably not non-human objects, highlighting a link between social aspects of cognition and a reduced theory of mind ability. Dyer et al. (2021) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e], on the other hand, distinguish between both state and trait, and general and social anxiety. In their study, state anxiety was induced through inhalations of 7.5% carbon dioxide enriched air, which they compare to the physiological and physical symptoms experienced in GAD and note that anxiety induction methods that incorporate a social element may produce different outcomes. The effects of this on emotion recognition task performance (emotion recognition is often closely related to theory of mind [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e]) found high state anxiety to reduce emotion recognition accuracy. They also found that trait anxiety did not have an impact or moderate the impact of state anxiety on emotion recognition despite previous findings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings from Dyer et al. (2021) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e] highlight that there is also a lack of clarity at the trait level. A meta-analysis by Baez et al. (2023) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e] found that individuals with SAD performed worse than healthy controls on theory of mind tests but were unable to draw any conclusions on GAD as only two studies met inclusion criteria. The outcomes of the included SAD studies varied in their findings. Some studies reported that social anxiety disorder can lead to excessive theory of mind use [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e]. Although this may be context dependent [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e], other studies have suggested that SAD is negatively associated with theory of mind ability [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, Lenton-Brym et al. (2018) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e] found no significant differences on a social cognition task when they grouped participants based on their scores on the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) into sub-clinical high socially anxious and low socially anxious. For GAD, Zainal and Newman (2018) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e] found that individuals with GAD performed better than controls at cognitive reasoning theory of mind tasks when induced with worry compared to when given a relaxation exercise, but also performed better when worried and presented with negative social stimuli compared to controls.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBaez et al. (2023) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e] note that the substantial heterogeneity in outcomes across the included SAD studies may be due to the diversity of tests used to assess theory of mind; of the 18 SAD studies included in this meta-analysis, 13 different theory of mind tasks were used. They conclude that further studies with large homogeneous samples were needed to better understand the factors that influence social cognition outcomes in both SAD and GAD. Quesque and Rossetti (2020) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e] identify two criteria that a task must meet to measure theory of mind: 1) the task must involve attributing mental states to others (mentalizing), and 2) participants must maintain a distinction between their own and others\u0026rsquo; mental states, which they label the \u0026ldquo;non-merging\u0026rdquo; criterion. While they note that many tasks do not meet these criteria, they determine that false belief tasks are an adequate method of measuring theory of mind. False belief tasks require participants to infer another person\u0026rsquo;s false belief about a particular scenario where they may or may not have privileged information about the scenario. Birch and Bloom (2007) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that a curse of knowledge bias in false belief reasoning can detect deficits in adult participants, i.e., if specific knowledge about an outcome increases egocentrism, and the study by Converse et al. (2008) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e] has shown that mood manipulation can affect participants\u0026rsquo; responses on this task.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCurrent Study\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe current study attempted to address the lack of clarity on distinguishing how state and trait, and general and social anxiety impact theory of mind. General and social state anxiety were manipulated, and general and social trait anxiety were measured. It also attempted to address the inconsistencies and oversights in measuring theory of mind by using a typical measure of theory of mind that has been well established in the literature. A widely used false belief task [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e] measured theory of mind in participants that were randomised to either a general anxiety, social anxiety, or neutral condition. It was predicted that the anxiety conditions would demonstrate a reduced theory of mind ability when compared to the neutral condition, and that the social anxiety condition would perform worse than the general anxiety condition.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eMethods were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://osf.io/zc3pf/\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e). Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University of Birmingham Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics Ethics Committee. All methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study followed a 3x2 between-subjects experimental design. Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of three mood conditions (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) and one of two knowledge conditions (no knowledge, privileged knowledge).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eParticipants\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA G*power analysis based on Converse et al., (2008) [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e], to give 80% power to detect a medium effect size (\u0026eta;p\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.06) at \u0026alpha;\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.05, returned a suggested sample size of 155. One hundred and sixty-eight participants were recruited, exceeding the minimum sample size required to detect a medium effect size. Participants were split evenly (56 in each group) across the general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral mood conditions. Half of each group received privileged knowledge and half received no knowledge for Vicki\u0026rsquo;s violin task (see below). Most of the participants were female and white. Mean age of participants was 19.06 (SD 1.38), with a range of 18\u0026ndash;32. Demographic information across conditions can be found in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e. Participants received research credits for taking part. Participants were ineligible to take part if they were under 18, had a diagnosed psychiatric condition and/or neurodevelopmental disorder, their English language proficiency was below that required to perform the experiment, or if they were already participating in a trial using the same or similar protocol.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ctable id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDemographic Information by Condition\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003ccolgroup cols=\"15\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"12\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCondition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTotal\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGeneral anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSocial anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n 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\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e%\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e%\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e%\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e%\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e%\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGender\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e85.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e85.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e85.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e85.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e23\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e82.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e89.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e144\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e85.71\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e17.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13.10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNon-binary\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEthnicity\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhite\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e46.4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e53.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e67.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e42.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e87\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e51.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBlack\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21.4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.31\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAsian\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21.4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e39.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e35.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e32.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e46\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27.38\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMixed\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOther\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.38\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e total\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e168\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003ctfoot\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"15\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eNote\u003c/em\u003e. Aggregated scores were used for ethnicity.\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tfoot\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eProcedure\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOn arrival at the lab, a QR code was scanned by participants to access and complete the information sheet and consent form via Qualtrix, along with the GAD-7 and the SPIN to measure trait general and social anxiety. Participants were then pseudo-randomly allocated to one of the general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral conditions, and given the relevant written instructions (detailed below) for the respective mood manipulation task. This was followed by a mood manipulation check, Vicki\u0026rsquo;s violin task (described below), and the debrief form.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTrait Anxiety Measures\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe GAD-7 is a brief, validated tool for measuring generalised anxiety and its severity, and has shown excellent internal consistency (\u0026alpha;\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.92), good test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.83) and good criterion, construct, factorial, and procedural validity [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e]. Participants are asked to consider the extent to which they have experienced seven items over the past 2 weeks. Responses range from \u0026lsquo;Not at all\u0026rsquo; to \u0026lsquo;Nearly every day\u0026rsquo;. A score between 5\u0026ndash;9 indicates mild general anxiety, 10\u0026ndash;14 moderate general anxiety, and 15\u0026ndash;21 severe general anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe SPIN is a 17-item, validated self-rating scale assessing fear, avoidance, and physiological symptoms of social anxiety. It has shown good test-retest reliability (\u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.78-.89), excellent internal consistency for the full scale (\u0026alpha;\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.94), and good convergent validity [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e]. Participants are asked to rate the extent to which each statement applied to them over the past week. Responses range from \u0026lsquo;Not at all\u0026rsquo; to \u0026lsquo;Extremely\u0026rsquo;. A score of 21\u0026ndash;30 indicates mild social anxiety, 31\u0026ndash;40 moderate, 41\u0026ndash;50 severe, and above 50 very severe social anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMood Manipulation\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach of the mood manipulation tasks consisted of a relevant a writing task as well the prospect of a future follow-up task, as anxiety is a future-oriented emotion [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e]. This procedure has been shown to induce anxiety in healthy participants [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e]. For consistency, the neutral condition also received a prospective future follow-up task.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants in the social anxiety condition were asked to complete an autobiographical writing task of a time at which they were worried before or during a social event: \u0026ldquo;Think about a time you felt anxious about having to speak in public. This might be a presentation or speech. When you have decided on a memory, write about it for 5 minutes. You are encouraged to think about thoughts that crossed your mind, how other people looking at you made you feel, and any physical sensations you experienced\u0026rdquo;. Participants were also told that they will have to present what they have written: \u0026ldquo;At the end of these tasks, you will be asked to present on what you wrote for a further 5 minutes\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants in the general anxiety condition were asked to complete a writing task, in which they describe a time when they felt worried about an exam: \u0026ldquo;Think about a time you had to take an important or difficult test/exam. The memory you think of should be of a time you were feeling anxious about taking the test/exam. When you have thought of the memory, spend 5 minutes recounting this experience. You are encouraged to think about how you felt, worries you had, and any physical sensations you experienced\u0026rdquo;. They were also informed that following the writing task, they will be given a test that will be marked: \u0026ldquo;At some point throughout these tasks, you will be given a test that will be marked and your result fed back to you\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants in the neutral condition were asked to write about the last items they purchased from the grocery store, as used by Todd et al., 2015 [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e]: \u0026ldquo;Think about what you bought the last time you went shopping. You will have 5 minutes to write about the items you bought. You are encouraged to think about the items in detail; how much they cost, if you had bought them before, etc\u0026rdquo;. Participants were informed that after completing the writing task, they will be asked to engage in a prospective neutral task: \u0026ldquo;Following this you will be asked to look at pictures of items from a shopping list\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eManipulation Check\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFollowing the writing tasks, all participants were asked to complete a self-report questionnaire on their mood. This consisted of a 7-item Likert scale ranging from \u0026ldquo;Not at all\u0026rdquo; to \u0026ldquo;Very much so\u0026rdquo; on how strongly they felt anxious, nervous, tense, calm, indifferent, neutral, unemotional, alert, aroused, energetic, and excited (adapted from Todd et al., 2015 [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e]).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eFalse Belief Task\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFollowing the writing task and manipulation check, participants from each condition then completed \u0026lsquo;Vicki\u0026rsquo;s violin\u0026rsquo; task as shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;1 (adapted from [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e]). Participants were randomly allocated either to a privileged knowledge condition or to receive the same knowledge that Vicki had. Both conditions receive the following text and visual: \u0026ldquo;This is Vicki. She finishes playing her violin and puts it in the blue container. Then she goes outside to play\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe privileged knowledge group read: \u0026ldquo;While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, moves the violin to the red container\u0026rdquo;. The no knowledge condition received the same knowledge as Vicki, which read: \u0026ldquo;While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, comes into the room\u0026rdquo;. Both conditions receive the following text and image: \u0026ldquo;Then, Denise rearranges the containers in the room until the room looks like the picture below. When Vicki returns, she wants to play her violin. What are the chances Vicki will first look for her violin in each of the below containers? Write your answers in percentages in the space below each box\u0026rdquo;. The key dependent variable is the estimated likelihood, as a percentage, that the participant attributes to the red box. In the privileged knowledge condition, if participants estimate a higher likelihood of Vicki looking in the red box compared to the no knowledge condition, this demonstrates egocentrism. The no knowledge condition acts as a control, in that the percentage estimates reflect how often participants identify the red box on the basis of it being moved alone. Responses on the false belief task that were more than 3 SDs from the overall mean were removed from the analysis, as described in Converse et al. (2008) [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOnce participants had completed the mood manipulation and false-belief tasks, they were presented with a debrief form that requested they do not share any details with their peers, as well as information regarding services that can be accessed for support with any prolonged anxiety that might be experienced.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eStatistical Analyses\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSPSS 29.0 was used to conduct statistical analyses. The dependent variable was recorded as a scaled percentage of what participants recorded as the likelihood of Vicki looking in the red box. For most participants, this reflected the percentage score they reported. Due to some participants providing a total percentage (for all boxes) that did not equal 100%, a scaled percentage value for the dependent variable was calculated by dividing 100 by the total percentage participants gave (for all boxes) and then multiplying this by the original red percentage value. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests were carried out to assess for any differences between mood conditions and knowledge conditions in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. ANOVA were also carried out to assess for any differences between group scores on the GAD-7 and SPIN, as well as on the manipulation check variables, with Scheffe post hoc tests. A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to find any main or interaction effects between the two independent variables of mood condition (general anxiety, social anxiety, and neutral) and knowledge condition (no knowledge and privileged knowledge) and their impact on the dependent variable. Where relevant, effect sizes are reported as partial eta squared (\u0026eta;\u0026sup2;). Spearman\u0026rsquo;s r correlations were performed for exploring the effects of trait anxiety on false belief task response.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eAlthough data were not normally distributed, an ANOVA was still conducted as these are typically considered robust to variations from non-normal distributions, particularly when group sizes are balanced (Blanca et al., 2017) and with sample sizes exceeding 30 [\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e]. The current study meets both criteria.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eDescriptive Statistics\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThere was no significant main effect of mood condition, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 166)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.83, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.54., or knowledge condition \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 166)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.59, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.44, and no significant interaction between the two, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 166)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.90, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.41, in terms of age. There was no significant difference between the gender of participants across the three mood conditions (\u0026chi;2(4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.26, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.37). Within each of the mood conditions, there was also no difference between the gender of participants across knowledge conditions (General, \u0026chi;2(2)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.67, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.26; Social, \u0026chi;2(2)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; Neutral, \u0026chi;2(2)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.58, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.45). There was no significant difference between the ethnicity of participants across the three mood conditions (\u0026chi;2(34)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;29.93, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.67). Within each of the mood conditions, there was also no difference between the gender of participants across knowledge conditions (General, \u0026chi;2(12)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;12.15, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.43; Social, \u0026chi;2(13)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;11.49, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.57; Neutral, \u0026chi;2(12)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;14.38, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.28). There were also no significant differences between the combined conditions and scores on the GAD-7 or SPIN, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(5, 166)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;1.53, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.22. Means and SDs for each group are shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, demonstrating that the groups were equally matched for trait anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ctable id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMeans and Standard Deviations of Scores on the GAD-7 and SPIN by Study Condition\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003ccolgroup cols=\"15\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"12\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCondition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGeneral anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSocial anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePrivileged knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTotal\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGAD\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.29\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.00\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.80\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.11\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.97\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.86\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.86\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.32\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.93\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.87\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSPIN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19.04\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.59\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.54\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12.46\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21.14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.93\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.07\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12.63\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19.86\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19.32\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.96\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21.33\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOn the GAD-7, 66 participants scores fell within the minimal range, 75 within the mild range, 21 within the moderate range, and 6 within the severe range. On the SPIN, 86 participants scored within the minimal range, 42 within the mild rage, 32 within the moderate range, 6 within the severe range, and 2 within the very severe range.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eManipulation Check\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAn ANOVA looking at differences between each of the manipulation check items and the three mood conditions found there were significant differences between condition (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) and the extent to which participants reported feeling anxious \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 165)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;15.41, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .16, General\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Social\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Neutral, nervous \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 165)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;9.77, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .11, General\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Social\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Neutral, tense \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 165)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;13.35 \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .14, General\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Social\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Neutral, calm \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 165)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;6.71, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .06, General\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Social\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;Neutral, and neutral \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 165)\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;7.27, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .08, General\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Social\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;Neutral. This suggests that the manipulation induction was successful, in that the anxious groups reported increased anxiety with similar intensity for both social and non-social situations. No other mood manipulation items were significantly different between mood conditions. Results for each mood manipulation check item can be found in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ctable id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMeans, Standard Deviations, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results of Manipulation Check Items\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003ccolgroup cols=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"6\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCondition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eANOVA\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eScheffe post-hoc\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGeneral anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSocial anxiety\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGeneral v social\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGeneral v neutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSocial v neutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAnxious\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.96\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.35\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.95\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.82\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15.41\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNervous\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.73\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.35\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.77\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.77\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTense\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.53\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.04\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.43\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.06\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13.35\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.62\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCalm\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.30\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.72\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.37\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.59\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e17.60\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.002\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.72\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.003\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.03\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIndifferent\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.95\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.59\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.02\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.69\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.66\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.81\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.00\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.05\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.98\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.09\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeutral\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.23\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.75\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.61\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.89\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.71\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.54\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.04\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmotional\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.95\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.78\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.78\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.85\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.74\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.46\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAlert\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.43\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.59\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.87\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.53\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.29\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.33\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.96\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAroused\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.07\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.45\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.29\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.34\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.98\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.45\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEnergetic\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.29\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.41\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.61\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.17\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.92\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.40\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.71\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.87\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.71\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExcited\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.39\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.37\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.46\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.41\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.30\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.67\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.63\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eThe Impact of State Anxiety on False Belief Reasoning\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThirty-six participants\u0026rsquo; percentages on the false belief task did not add up to 100%, varying from 90\u0026ndash;330%, and therefore data was scaled for all participants\u0026rsquo; responses as described in the method. One outlier was greater than 3 SDs from the mean and was therefore removed from analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eA 3 (general anxiety, social anxiety, neutral) x 2 (privileged knowledge, no knowledge) between-subjects ANOVA yielded no main effect of mood condition, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(2, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.88, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.42, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .01, or knowledge condition, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.08, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.15, \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; = .01 on participants\u0026rsquo; prediction of how likely Vicki was to look in the red box. The interaction effect was also non-significant, \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(5, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.92), \u0026eta;\u0026sup2; \u0026lt; .01, see Fig. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003eCorrelation Between Trait Anxiety and False Belief Reasoning\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSpearman\u0026rsquo;s correlations revealed a significant correlation between trait general and social anxiety in the no knowledge condition, \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.45, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, but no significant correlations between trait general anxiety and scaled red box response \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.03, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.82, or trait social anxiety and scaled red box response, \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.21, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.06. Similarly, for the privileged knowledge condition, there was a significant correlation between trait general and social anxiety, \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.39, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, but no significant correlations between trait general anxiety and scaled red box response \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.18, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.11, or trait social anxiety and scaled red box response, \u003cem\u003er\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.05, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.64.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn this study, participants\u0026rsquo; state general and social anxiety was effectively manipulated after completing an autobiographical writing task, with a prospective future follow-up task. There was, however, no evidence that state general and social anxiety had an impact on theory of mind measured through a false belief task, when compared to a neutral mood group. There were also no significant correlations between trait general and social anxiety and theory of mind ability in the false belief task. There was a correlation between trait general and trait social anxiety, suggesting that people who experience trait general anxiety are more likely to also experience trait social anxiety and vice versa.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eThe Impact of State Anxiety on Theory of Mind\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current study\u0026rsquo;s findings are inconsistent with previous studies on anxiety and theory of mind by Todd et al. (2015) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e] and Todd and Simpson (2016) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e]. The findings from Todd et al. (2015) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that egocentrism is increased by emotions that are characterised by uncertainty. In the current study participants in each condition reported being significantly more anxious in the anxiety conditions, yet the outcomes do not demonstrate a motivation to reduce uncertainty, or this motivation may have been overridden. Todd and Simpson (2016) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that the impact of anxiety on theory of mind may be particularly noticeable for social aspects of cognition, however, the current study found no differences between social and non-social anxiety on a theory of mind task. Dyer et al. (2022) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e], on the other hand, found no effects of state anxiety on emotion recognition, and although they did not distinguish between general and social anxiety, these findings are more consistent with the current study.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe discrepancy between the findings from this study and previous studies poses queries about whether anxious participants experienced increased egocentrism, and if they did, how this may not lead to a reduced theory of mind ability. This resonates with Todd and Tamir's (2024) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e] argument that the capability to override an egocentric pull depends on the strength with which egocentric information is activated, as well as individual characteristics that influence someone\u0026rsquo;s motivation or ability to override this pull. In the current study, the strength of the activation of self-information may rely on the intensity of experienced anxiety or the failure of the false belief task to create a curse of knowledge adequately, which is suggested from the absence of a significant main effect of knowledge state. Overall, the outcomes of this study indicate that even when people are anxious, they can still utilise their knowledge about others\u0026rsquo; knowledge to make accurate, unbiased inferences in a false belief task.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eThe Impact of Trait Anxiety on Theory of Mind\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBaez et al.\u0026rsquo;s (2023) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e] meta-analysis looking at the impact of trait anxiety on theory of mind concludes that SAD produces a reduced theory of mind ability compared to healthy controls, despite some of the variability between studies. In the current study, trait social anxiety did not lead to a reduced theory of mind, which is more consistent with the findings from the study by Lenton-Brym et al. (2018) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e] that found no differences between high and low socially anxious participants based on their scores from the SPIN. Considering that increased trait social anxiety was positively correlated with trait general anxiety in the current study, it may be worth considering if there are differences in the impact on theory of mind when these are present in isolation and in combination (i.e., trait social anxiety with no trait general anxiety, trait general anxiety with no trait social anxiety, and both trait social and general anxiety together).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile the non-significant findings of trait general and social anxiety in the current study echo the findings from Dyer et al. (2022) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e], the latter study used an emotion recognition task. Emotion recognition is often associated with theory of mind [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e] but Quesque and Rossetti (2020) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e] argue that emotion recognition tasks do not measure theory of mind. Despite this disjuncture, given the close association between these two concepts, these similarities in findings may suggest that the cognitive processes linking theory of mind and emotion recognition remain unaffected by trait general and social anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eStrengths and Limitations\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrevious studies that have looked at the influence of anxiety on theory of mind and its related concepts have failed to measure state and trait and general and social anxiety as distinct concepts. This study was the first to differentiate between both state and trait, and general and social anxiety, while using a well-established measure of theory of mind.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e While the mood manipulation procedure was shown to adequately induce a mood state of sufficient intensity, i.e., participants in the anxiety conditions reported being significantly more anxious than the neutral group, it is not clear if the duration of this manipulated mood state was sufficient to affect the cognitive processes underlying theory of mind. There may also be a question around whether the curse of knowledge in the false belief task was sufficient to detect theory of mind deficits in this cohort of participants, as there was no effect of knowledge condition. However, Converse et al. (2008) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e] used similar mood manipulation procedures with moderate effect sizes and discovered significant differences in mood groups on Vicki\u0026rsquo;s Violin theory of mind task in a similar cohort of university students.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings from this study are limited by the potentially mismatched impact of mood manipulation tasks within a laboratory environment when compared to real-world experiences in terms of a) intensity and b) differences between generalised and social anxiety. Bhanot et al. (2020) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e] comment on the ecological validity of autobiographical mood induction tasks relative to other laboratory methods, noting that these can often encounter a demand effect due to the wording used and may be limited in external validity. Still, laboratory results have been evidenced to reliably replicate field results when there are large effect sizes [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e]. Given that Converse et al. (2008) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e] found a significant impact of mood on theory of mind with moderate effect sizes for manipulation check items, and the current study\u0026rsquo;s manipulation check demonstrated medium to large effect sizes, the non-significant effect in this study may indeed offer a reliable outcome of anxiety on theory of mind.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferences in general and social anxiety on the manipulation check items could help to ensure distinctions between the two conditions. That is, it could be argued that a participant\u0026rsquo;s anticipation of a larger audience for the social anxiety condition prospective follow-up task (having been told they would have to present their writing) could increase these distinctions. However, studies investigating the impact of audience size on level of social anxiety have found no significant effects [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current study showed good internal validity, given that there were no differences found between conditions in terms of participants\u0026rsquo; age, gender, and ethnicity, suggesting that the non-significant findings are not a result of these factors. However, an overall majority of study participants identified as female. This imbalance potentially limits the generalisability of the findings to male samples, particularly as female participants have been shown to demonstrate a greater self-other distinction whilst under stress whereas male participants respond with increased egocentrism [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e]. If women demonstrate an enhanced theory of mind ability under negatively valanced emotions, the majority female sample in the current study may have contributed to the absence of a significant main effect of anxiety on theory of mind.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eFuture Directions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current study suggests several additional avenues for future research. First, future research should continue to determine which concepts are being measured (theory of mind, mentalizing, etc) and when measuring theory of mind should use specific and well-established theory of mind tasks, such as the one used in this study. They should also continue to distinguish systematically between state and trait, and general and social anxiety as distinct phenomena. Replicating the current study's protocol could verify the findings. Second, further analyses could explore the relationship between trait anxiety and susceptibility to state mood manipulation. Third, while the current study did not incorporate integral emotions, similar distinctions between different emotional phenomena and reliable measures should be used when investigating how these may affect theory of mind. Finally, future studies should aim to recruit more balanced samples of gender and ethnicity so that outcomes can be generalised to broader populations and subgroup differences can be explored.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eClinical Implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe significant, bi-directional correlation between trait general and trait social anxiety supports the conclusions from Goldenberg et al. (1996) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e] that GAD and SAD are more commonly experienced as comorbidities than not. Despite this known association, quality standards for the treatment provided by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for GAD and SAD differ; a stepped care approach is recommended for GAD and specifically developed Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) interventions are recommended for SAD [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e]. Given the treatment distinctions, individuals presenting at mental health services with GAD or SAD should be screened for the presence of the other condition, and interventions should be offered for both conditions when necessary.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe current study showed that state general and social anxiety did not impact the curse of knowledge people experience when reasoning about false beliefs. Equivalent null results were found for trait general and social anxiety. These findings prompt further questions about what factors may exist that provide someone with the ability to override an egocentric motivation to reduce uncertainty. The study builds upon previous research and begins to provide a systematic approach to discriminating between the varying impacts of these different phenomena on reliably measured theory of mind.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor contributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConceptualisation (CF and AS), Methodology (CF, AS), Data Collection (CF \u0026amp; VK), Analysis (CF), Investigation (CF), Writing - Original Draft (CF), Writing - Review \u0026amp; Editing (CF, AS), Visualization (CF, AS), Supervision (AS), Project administration (CF).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSPSS data file that supports the findings of this study has been uploaded to Open Science Framework (OSF) project osf.io/zc3pf \u0026nbsp; Registration DOI https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/4KA9Y\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical considerations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthical approval for this research was sought through the University of Birmingham Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) ethics committee.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to participate\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParticipants provided informed consent prior to participating in the study.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was supported by a Health Education England training grant to CF.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRemes, O., Brayne, C., van der Linde, R. \u0026amp; Lafortune, L. A systematic review of reviews on the prevalence of anxiety disorders in adult populations. \u003cem\u003eBrain Behav.\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003e6\u003c/b\u003e (7), e00497. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1002/brb3.497\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1002/brb3.497\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (2016).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCrosier, B. S., Webster, G. D. \u0026amp; Dillon, H. M. Wired to connect: Evolutionary psychology and social networks. \u003cem\u003eRev. Gen. Psychol.\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003e16\u003c/b\u003e, 230\u0026ndash;239 (2012).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLi, J. Humans as social beings\u0026mdash;From \u0026lsquo;people first\u0026rsquo; to people-centered. \u003cem\u003eSci Soc. 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(2014).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"theory of mind, anxiety, general anxiety, social anxiety, state anxiety, trait anxiety","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIntroduction\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTheory of mind is an important skill to function in society. There is evidence that anxiety can impair the ability to use this skill effectively, however, current research is inconclusive, heterogeneously measures of theory of mind, and lacks distinction between anxiety types despite these being known to present differently in clinical populations. False belief tasks are standard practice for assessing theory of mind in children and autistic participants and have also been found to adequately detect theory of mind differences in neurotypical adults. Yet these are not systematically used throughout the current literature.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMethod\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOne hundred and sixty-eight participants completed the Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) and the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) prior to being randomly allocated to a general anxiety, social anxiety, or neutral mood condition. Following mood manipulation, participants completed a false belief task with either privileged knowledge or no knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResults\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA 3x2 ANOVA found no significant main or interaction effects of general or social anxiety and false belief knowledge on performance, despite a reported increase of anxiety in the anxiety groups. There were also no significant correlations between trait general or social anxiety on theory of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDiscussion\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe findings from this study do not support the previous evidence that anxiety increases egocentrism. Future studies should continue to distinguish systematically between state, trait, general, and social anxiety, and use reliable theory of mind measures.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Do State and Trait General and Social Anxiety Affect Theory of Mind?","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-06-18 19:34:56","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6855230/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-08-05T11:17:05+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-07-15T19:05:55+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"196221104319392591341040024336662241007","date":"2025-07-10T14:01:03+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"32674656706518839807387268142397290449","date":"2025-07-08T15:12:55+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-06-13T15:41:06+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-06-13T00:34:52+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-06-12T22:28:34+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-06-11T10:36:30+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Scientific Reports","date":"2025-06-09T13:54:47+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"aebc5a0f-6fa4-411a-a5e4-d5ff4b631467","owner":[],"postedDate":"June 18th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[{"id":50098645,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology"},{"id":50098646,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology/Human behaviour"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-09T16:06:22+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-6855230","link":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-36718-5","journal":{"identity":"scientific-reports","isVorOnly":false,"title":"Scientific Reports"},"publishedOn":"2026-03-05 15:59:19","publishedOnDateReadable":"March 5th, 2026"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-06-18 19:34:56","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1038/s41598-026-36718-5","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-36718-5","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6855230","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6855230","identity":"rs-6855230","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}