Teacher Incentive Strategy in Secondary Schools: The Missing Link between Policy and Practices

Teacher Incentive Strategy in Secondary Schools: The Missing Link between Policy and Practices | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Teacher Incentive Strategy in Secondary Schools: The Missing Link between Policy and Practices Shimelis Mesfin This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Purpose: The purpose of this study was to assess the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy from the perspectives of Expectancy Motivation theory. Methods: Descriptive survey design was employed. The size of the population was 346. Of these, 173 teachers were selected using simple random sampling technique. Questionnaire and interview were used to collect the data. Results: The result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean scores of teachers about the awareness of the incentive strategy (4.21) and attractiveness of the incentives (4.69 ) were significantly higher than the expected mean value (3) at (t = 43.27) and (t = 150.739) respectively at df = 172, p< 0.05. Conversely, the mean scores of teachers’ expectancy in exerting effort in achieving the provided duties (2.00) and instrumentality of getting the incentives when they perform the required tasks (1.98) were lower than the expected mean value (3) at (t = -59.0) and (t = -37.1) respectively at p < 0.05, df =172. Conclusion: Based on expectancy motivation theory, it is concluded that the incentive strategy was not effective in motivating teachers due to the absence of certain personal and institutional factors. Therefore, incentives need to be provided for teachers who perform the required tasks with clear criteria. Educational Psychology Expectancy Incentive strategy Instrumentality Valence Perception 1. Introduction The issue of employee motivation has got the attention of many researchers because it plays an important role in increasing the productivity of organizations (Gautam, Mandal & Dalal, 2006). The worth of motivated employees become more indispensable and significantly contributes for the growth and development of the organization. However, with the advent of globalization one of the leading challenges of leaders is managing human resources to increase the performance of the organization. The outcomes of motivated work force includes; employee retention, loyalty and harmony which enhance the performance of the organization. Thus, enhancing employees’ motivation has become one of the most demanding activities for human resource management in any organization including schools. This shows that employees with high motivation exhibit high energy, pleasurable engagement and enthusiasm while employees with low motivation show distress, unpleasant engagement and nervousness (Heller, Judge, & Watson, 2002). The performance of schools depends on the commitment of teachers and principals who are working for the development of students. Though school principals and teachers are important, they need to have motivation to play a vital role in improving the quality of educational institutions and building the personality of their students. McShane and Vonglinow (2000) argued that motivation is one of the key ingredients in employees’ performance and productivity. That is, attempts to improve performance in schools will never succeed if teachers’ motivation is ignored. Employees can render efficient services to the employers and customers in an organization if they are motivated (Mbua, 2003). This implies that motivated teachers are more likely to affect students’ learning positively while the reverse situation may not bring the same result. Therefore, it is better to pay special attention to teacher motivation to improve their performance. As far as the issue of motivation is concerned, incentive is any thing that makes an employee desire to do better, try harder and expend more energy (Yavuz, 2004). In this study, incentive refers to anything that makes an employee want to do better, try harder and exert their maximum effort to achieve certain goals. Incentives have the potential to enhance employees’ performance, motivation and morale if it is implemented effectively. While there are some counters arguments that incentives may in fact harm intrinsic motivation, teachers are motivated by the opportunity to earn more money particularly for educators whose income falls to meet the basic needs (Hoy & Miskel, 1996). In addition, if the incentive is paid in return for behavior that contributes to the organizations' goals, it will enhance organizational effectiveness and productivity in the long run and hence generates a positive outcome for both employers and employees (Torrington, Hall, Tayler, & Atkinson, 2009), cited in Mikander (2010). Moreover, Katz (1964), as cited in Lai (2009) stated that organizations provide rewards to employees who perform the desired behavior in the form of financial incentives, benefits, and social affiliation to encourage the achievement of those organizational goals. Employee incentive strategies have been found to be the most commonly adopted techniques in all organizations including schools. The purpose of the program is to reward productive performance, reinforce positive behavior, stir interest in employees and most importantly motivate them (Lai, 2009). Motivation guides people‘s actions and behaviors towards the achievement of some goals (Analoui, 2000). Motivation affect can affect the behavior, performance, and well-being of teachers in the workplace (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Therefore, it is understood that motivated and satisfied workers will be much more productive and be retained within the organization for a longer period as compared to displeased workers who will be less useful and will have a higher tendency to quit the job (Crossman & Abou-Zaki, 2003). More importantly, motivated workers not only lead to better performances but it also provides a higher service to customers. Large body of empirical research indicated that incentive pay increases workers’ effort and outputs, thus, too important for teachers and principals. This is supported by Condly, Clark, and Stolovitch (2003) and Goodman and Turner (2010) who stated that properly structured incentive schemes align the interest of workers and employers, provide information about the most valued aspects of an employee’s job, and motivate workers to provide costly effort. Additionally, they added in the long-run, a performance-based element of teacher pay may combat wage compression in the profession and increase the ability of individuals choosing to enter in to the teaching profession. Concerning teacher incentive strategies, Kermmerer (1990), as cited by the World Bank (2000), further stated that direct monetary benefits are packages of teacher salary, allowance and fringe benefits: indirect monetary incentives are all the other offered to teachers which are financed by the governments and communities. These might include ( 1 ) professional support such as initial and ongoing training programs, teacher guides, text books, instructional supervision and ( 2 ) personal support such as free or subsidized housing, food or transportation. Non-monetary benefits include professional status in the community, location or teaching position, recognition and approval of significant people. Kemmerer (1990) as cited in Sarda (2005) highlighted that incentives have been used across many countries in attempts to encourage better teacher performance through remuneration, instructional support, career and working condition. Teacher incentive programs have enjoyed growing popularity. In the United States, a number of teacher incentive programs have been introduced in the past few decades, generally offering annual merit pay on the order of 10–40% of an average teacher's monthly salary (American Federation of Teacher, 2000), as cited by Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2004). Moreover, a study conducted by the Incentive Research Foundation (IRF) (2007) in the U.S concluded that incentive programs were capable of improving performance from 20–25% to 40–44%, as cited by Coats (2009). Israel has also provided incentives to teachers based on students’ scores (Cavy, 2002), and a World Bank fund program in Mexico has been providing performance incentives to primary school teachers as cited in Glewwe et al. (2004). However, in many developing countries incentives for teachers are weaker than in developed countries. Given that most teaching in many developing countries at risk which reduce the efforts of teachers due to lack of incentives. The prospect of identifying low cost incentives to motivate teacher has a powerful appeal to countries caught in the squeeze of simultaneous declines in education quality and resources (Chapman, Snder, & Burchfield, 1983). In this regard, Goodman and Turner (2010) considered incentives as the most effective strategies that employers have good measures of worker output or observable effort is closely tied to firm productivity. It is costly to monitor teachers and difficult to quantify individual contributions to a student’s education since production depends not only on a student’s current teacher but also upon the effort provided by past teachers. Although incentives have the capacity to motivate employees and increase their performance, it is difficult to implement it. As a result, incentive strategies must be implemented in ways that address all issues related to performance and human motivation (IRF, 2007) as cited in Coats (2009). Currently, there appears to be a widespread dissatisfaction in the teaching profession (Agnihotri, 2013). A range of research findings derived from quantitative and qualitative studies indicated that there was low level of teachers’ motivation which leads to the inefficient implementation of teaching and learning process. For example, some of the behavioral manifestations of teachers due to lack of job satisfaction: stress and burn-out, frequent absenteeism, regular leave-taking from school, underperformance of tasks given, conflict with supervisors, disobedient behavior towards their colleagues and learners, lack of cooperation and initiative to render services for task accomplishment (Maniram, 2007). A survey conducted in 12 Asia and Sub-Saharan African countries investigated about the result of low teacher satisfaction in teaching which led to absenteeism, lateness and lack of commitment to their work (Bennell & Akyeampong, 2007). This indicates that low level of motivation make teachers demoralized, discouraged and dissatisfied with their job. Previous studies indicated that there was relatively low level of teacher motivation among teachers which leads to the inefficient implementation of teaching-learning process. De Jesus and Conboy (2000) reported that many teachers were not motivated in Portugal. More specifically, it is estimated that fewer than 50% of teachers want to continue in their profession but the majority would prefer to change their profession. This finding is similar with Mertler (2002) who reported that a significant number of teachers in USA had low level of motivation and satisfaction and 34% of teachers in their prior study of the opinion that if an opportunity given to choose career again, they would not choose to enter in the teaching profession. Moreover, low teacher motivation is offered by Boyer and Gillespie (2001) indicated that 6% of teachers in USA leave the field of teaching each year. Although many studies have been done on teachers’ motivation and thousands of articles have been published (Zembylas & Papanastasiou, 2006 ) , most studies have been done in the context of developed countries such as USA and UK, but a few studies have been undertaken in developing countries including Ethiopia. Teaching profession has been criticized due to lack of performance incentives in Ethiopia for the past many years ago. For example, teachers’ motivation and commitment in Ethiopia are low due to insufficient compensation system and poor working condition (Getachew, 1999; Manna & Tesfay, 2000). Moreover, the finding of Fenot (2005) revealed that 65% of teachers want to leave their profession due to poor fringe benefits, management style of the principals and poor relationships in the workplace. This shows that teacher motivation has been one of the serious issues which affect the quality of education. Following this, the Ethiopian government has designed the incentive strategy in 2007 to motivate teachers. Despite the government of Ethiopia has designed an incentive strategy in 2007 to motivate teachers, research has not been conducted in Assosa zone secondary schools to determine the effectiveness of the strategy. Thus, it was important to look at expectancy motivation theory to forecast if the incentive strategy is more likely to be effective to attain the intended goal. Expectancy motivation theory is one of the most widely accepted theories developed by victor vroom in 1964 with the direct application to work settings, which was later refined by Porter and Lawler in 1968 (Pinder, 1987). According to Vroom (1964), motivation depends on the three variables i.e. expectancy, instrumentality and valence which are related to one another. Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence The multiplier effect of the equation is significant. According to the theory, motivation will exist only when employees perceive a positive correlation that effort leads to job performance and job performance leads to rewards (Griffin, 2008, cited in Lai, 2009). It means that higher levels of motivation will result when expectancy, instrumentality and valence are high. However, the multiplier assumption of the theory implies that if the strength of either expectancy or instrumentality or valence is zero or in significant, there will be no motivation. Therefore, this study was conducted to assess the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy in Assosa zone secondary schools using expectancy motivation theory as a framework. Therefore, the researcher formulated the following research questions to address the above issue: To what extent do teachers aware the existence of incentive strategy? To what extent do teachers expect the probability that exerting effort will result in a given level of performance? To what extent do teachers perceive that their performance will lead to the given outcome? To what extent do teachers and principal perceive the attractiveness of the incentive strategy? Are there significant differences between teachers and school principals on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence? How far the incentive strategy is implemented in line with its formulation? 2. Research Methodology 2.1 Research Design Since this study involved large number of participants to assess the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy, descriptive survey research design was found suitable. This design helps to explain the respondents’ opinions, attitudes and feelings towards the implementation of the strategy. As a result, the researcher followed this design as a guide to the research using quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness of teachers’ incentive strategy in Assosa zone secondary schools. To support this, mixed approach is capable of providing profound insights into participants’ interpretation than using either approach alone (Marshal, & Rossman, 2006). 2.2 Population, Sample size and Sampling Techniques There were 7 districts and one city administration in Assosa zone. Of these, the researcher selected 4 districts and one city administration using simple random sampling technique mainly lottery method. Then, the researcher included all 12 secondary schools which were found in the selected districts and city administration using comprehensive sampling technique. In these 12 secondary schools, there were 346 teachers. For manageability reason, 50% (173) of teachers were selected using a combination of proportional sample allocation method and simple random sampling techniques because the number of teachers across 12 schools was significantly varied. Finally, 5 teachers and 3 school principals were purposively selected for interview to collect data about their awareness, expectancy in exerting efforts to perform certain duties, expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties and the attractiveness of the incentive strategy. 2.3 Data Collection Instruments Questionnaire and semi structured interview were used to gather the data about the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy. The questionnaires had four parts containing 47 close ended questions. The first and second parts had questions concerning respondents’ level of awareness and expectancy about the incentive strategy respectively. The third and fourth parts of the questionnaire consisted of items related to instrumentality and valence of the incentive strategy respectively. Finally, respondents rated items using five-point Likert-type items ranging from 1 (very low/strongly disagree/not important at all) to 5 (very high/strongly agree/very important at all) to measure about the implementation of the incentive strategy. With regard to interview, the researcher developed three questions to collect the qualitative data about the implementation of the incentive strategy using 5 teachers and 3 principals. Relevant documents were also reviewed about the implementation of the incentive strategy. 2.4 Pilot Study Pilot test was conducted on 40 teachers found outside the main sample of the study. The distribution of samples for pilot test followed the same procedures as the main study. Cronbach Alpha was used to test the internal consistency of items. The reliability coefficients of the instrument with Cronbach Alpha (α) were (0.82, 0.85, 0.92 and 0.84) for items concerning awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence respectively. These results indicated that the items used to measure the implementation of the incentive strategy were found highly reliable. Thus, items with the value of Cronbach Alpha (α) = 0.75 is considered the instrument as reliable (Orodho, 2009). 2.5 Data Analysis Techniques Both quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques were used to analyze the data. The quantitative data were analyzed with the help of inferential statistical techniques. Specifically, one sample t-test was used to analyze the degree of teachers’ awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the implementation of the incentive strategy (RQ # 1, 2, 3 & 4). Independent sample t- test was used to determine whether there are significant differences between teachers and school principals on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence (RQ #5). Finally, narration was used to analyze the qualitative data gathered through interview. 2.6 Ethical Considerations Initially, the permission letter was granted by the University of Gondar to collect the data. Then, the researcher provided information for the participants about the purpose of the study before they involved in the study. The respondents were also informed that their involvement in the study was totally voluntary, so that they would withdraw from the research at any time. The study had no potential risks and benefits on the participants due to participation in the study and received approval from the College Review and Ethics Committee (CREC) of the College of Education at University of Gondar, with the ethics committee approval reference CoE_CREC_010/2024. 3. Results and Discussion This section analyzed the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy so that results were organized according to the themes of the research questions. Specifically, it began with teachers’ awareness, expectancies, instrumentalities and valences perceptions towards the incentive strategy respectively. It also presented factors that influence the implementation of the incentive strategy. Finally, the results and discussions of findings are presented concurrently. 3.1 Teachers’ awareness about the Incentive strategy Table 1 a one sample t- test of teachers’ awareness about the Incentive strategy Variable N Mean SD Std. Error Mean t-value df Sig(2-tailed) Awareness 173 4.212 .3684 .0280 43.274 172 .000 Scale: 3 = High As indicated in Table 1 , the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers' awareness about the incentive strategy (4.21) was significantly higher than the expected mean value ( 3 ) at (t = 43.27, df = 172, p < 0.05). This result showed that teachers had high level of awareness about the incentive types and the duties embedded in the strategy. It is possible to understand that the awareness of teachers about the incentive strategy is not a guarantee for its implementation unless they have positive perception towards it. If teachers aware the existence of incentive strategy, they can develop expectations for the incentives and evaluate the instrumentality and valence of them. The result of this study is consistent with the previous research findings of Chalott-Mecklenburg, Kentucky and Maryland conducted by Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001), who found school based award programs in Chalott-Mecklenburg, Kentucky were reasonably successful in getting teachers to understand and be committed to achieve the goals. In addition, the result of this study is also similar with the findings of Robbins and De Cenzo (2008), as cited by Nikander (2011) stated that employees aware of the organizational goals expected of them. This tells that individuals should be aware of what is expected of them for each task to be able to evaluate their possibilities to excel. The employees should also be aware of what sort of performance level is considered normal, how they can be better than others and show the true valence. But, the current research finding is contradicted with teachers’ responses in Maryland who had no information about the incentive strategy. 3.2 Teachers’ expectancy in exerting effort to perform certain duties Table 2 Teachers’ expectancy in exerting efforts to perform certain duties Variable N Mean SD Std. Error Mean t-value df Sig(2-tailed) Expectancy(Effort-performance relationship) 173 2.0010 .22266 .01693 -59.0 172 .000 Scale: 3 = Agree Expectancy is the probability perceived by the individual that exerting a given amount of effort will lead to a specified performance level (Hoy & Miskel, 1991; Robbins, Judge & Cambell, 2010). As shown in Table 2 , the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers’ expectancy (2.00) was lower than the expected mean value ( 3 ) at (t= -59.0, df = 172, p < 0.05). This result showed that teachers were not sure whether exerting efforts would result in achieving the provided duties to be exemplary professionals. The respondents on the average did not expect even 50 percent probability of exerting efforts for improving students’ performance. The result of this study is consistent with the finding of kuserka (n. d) who stated that effort does not necessarily lead to good performance if individual has insufficient knowledge and skills. A research conducted by Kelly, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) also found that teachers on the average did not expect even 50 percent probability that if as an individual they tried, their school would achieve a level of student performance necessary to achieve reward status. Moreover, the skill levels may be deficient; the organization’s performance appraisal system may be designed to assess non-performance factors such as loyalty or initiative (Robbins, Judge, & Cambell, 2010). 3.3 Teachers’ expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties Table 3 Teachers’ expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties effectively Variable N Mean SD Std. Error Mean t-value df Sig(2-tailed) Instrumentality(performance-outcome relationship) 173 1.977 .3618 .0275 -37.1 172 .000 Scale: 3 = It does likely happen Instrumentality is an individual’s estimate of the probability that a given level of performance will lead to various work outcomes. As depicted in Table 3 , the result of one sample t-test revealed that the mean score of teachers’ instrumentality of getting the incentives as far as they perform the required tasks (1.98) was lower than the expected mean value ( 3 ) at (t = -37.1, df = 172, p < 0.05) though it was found statistically significant. This result showed that teachers believed that performing the given tasks cannot lead them to receive the incentives. The findings of this study indicated that there was lack of trust on the part of teachers to get incentives which set out in the strategy even after accomplishing the required tasks. This result is consistent with Robbins, Judge and Cambell (2010) who claimed that many employees believed that the performance-reward relationship in their job was weak. They justify that the organizations reward a lot of things besides just performance. For example, when reward is given to employees based on factors such as seniority cooperativeness, or flattering the boss, employees are likely to find the relationship as being weak and demotivating. The determinant factor of instrumentality is the nature of the outcomes (Lawler, 1999), as cited by Hayibor (2005). Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) also found that relatively low perceived probability of receiving a bonus even if school goals had been met. Thus, if people do not see a connection between their performance level and a possible outcome, they are less likely to be motivated (Redmond, 2010). 3.4 The attractiveness of the Incentive strategy Table 4 The attractiveness of the incentive strategy from teachers’ perspectives Variable N Mean SD Std. Error Mean t-value df Sig(2-tailed) Valence(incentive attractiveness) 173 4.6919 .14763 .01122 150.739 172 .000 Scale: 3 = Important Valence is the strength of an employee’s preference for a particular reward. Table 4 indicated that the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers’ perceptions about the valence (attractiveness) of the incentives (4.69) was significantly higher than the expected mean value ( 3 ) at (t = 150.739, df = 172, p < 0.05). This suggests that incentives set out in the strategy were considered more essential for teachers to have strong desire to do their job. The result of this study is consistent with United Nation Development Program (UNDP) (2008) who have reported that teachers in Ethiopia have strong desire to towards the incentives which set out in the strategy such as compatible financial rewards, prior chance for social services, retirement with full salary, land for house construction, prior chance for education, naming schools after one’s name, free touring, top up chance who work voluntarily in remote areas and acceleration in carrier structure. Similarly, Christensen (2002) also reported that employees had an interest to get health insurance, retirement savings plan pension plan, long term care insurance, life insurance, and stock options. The most preferred benefit was health insurance, followed by retirement savings plans, pension plans and the remainder services. Moreover, Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) found that bonuses for school wide improvement in student performance was appropriate, there were a variety of other important outcomes such as public recognition and opportunities for professional development that motivated them to achieve program goals. 3.5. Variations between teachers’ and principals’ perception on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the incentive strategy Table 5 The mean differences between teachers’ and principals’ perception on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the incentive strategy Variables Groups N Mean SD T- test for equality means Mean difference t- value df Sig(2-tailed Awareness Teachers Principals 161 12 4.219 4.111 .3784 .1641 .1084 .983 171 .327 Expectancy Teachers Principals 161 12 2.00 2.01 .2262 .1742 − .01389 − .208 171 .836 Instrumentality Teachers Principals 161 12 1.964 2.156 .3449 .5279 − .1925 -1.790 171 .075 Valence Teachers Principals 161 12 4.685 4.873 .1479 .1114 − .09824 -2.250 171 .026 Significance level: P < .05 As shown in Table 5 , the result of independent sample t-test revealed that statistically significant mean differences were not observed between teachers and school principals on awareness (t = .983, df = 171, p > 0.05), expectancy (t = − .208, df = 171, p > 0.05) and instrumentality (t = -1.790, df = 171, p > 0.05). However, significance mean difference was found between teachers and school principals on valence at (t = -2.250, df = 171, p < 0.05). This states teachers and principals had similar perception towards the awareness, expectancy and instrumentality of the incentive strategy but they were differed in perceiving the attractiveness of the incentives in the strategy. 3.6 The Implementation of the Incentive Strategy The results of different research suggest that incentive programs are most effective when they implemented as part of holistic retention strategy rather than as standalone initiatives. Compensation is not the only concern teachers consider in their decisions about where to work (Hanover, 2014). This shows that designing any incentive strategy by itself is not sufficient to motivate teachers unless it implemented in line with the formulation of the strategy. In this regard, respondents were asked to describe the status of the implementation of teacher incentive strategy in their schools. The majority of interviewees reported about the poor implementation of the incentive strategy in their school due to different factors. Specifically, one of the respondents explained that with the exception of education opportunities which is often given, other types of incentives included in the strategy were not yet provided. Similarly, three of my interviewees also believed that getting the chance to be rewarded was very narrow. According to their expression, the incentive strategy has no clear criteria to reward teachers and school principals who showed an excellent performance in their schools. This showed that despite an attempt was made to motivate teachers; still the effect of the incentive strategy has become minimal in improving the learning outcomes of students. Hence, the result of this study is similar with Hanover (2014) in that the very existence of the specificity of the relationships between incentive and performance in the public sector is only due to the difficulties of measuring performance. In the same way, the other four respondents expressed that the concerned body was not ready to give them the reward even if they performed the required duties stipulated in the strategy. This indicates that the incentive strategy does not seem effective in motivating teachers. Johnson and John (2009) supported the finding of this study in that despite the prevalence of teacher-compensation reforms, their effect on teacher motivation and performance is weak. However, several recent district-specific studies have provided carefully identified evidence the extent to which the productivity of existing teachers increases when they are provided with financial incentives as a result, some of the empirical evidence suggests that incentive programs must be implemented in ways that address all issues related to performance and human motivation (Coats, 2009). Moreover, they also reported that the strategy had no clear procedures, measurements, and implementation plan as well as the necessary resources to provide the incentives for those who performed the required tasks. This shows that the respondents had similar perception about the poor implementation of the incentive strategy in their schools. That means that the incentive strategy has not been implemented in line with its formulation to reach at its objectives. 4. Conclusion The quantitative results indicated that teachers had high level of awareness and valence about the incentive strategy while their expectancy and instrumentality perception were low. This means that though teachers were highly doubtful in favor of receiving incentives, they ensured that the incentives were really desirable. Based on the Expectancy Motivation Theory constructs, therefore, it is concluded that the incentive strategy was not effective in motivating teachers due to the absence of certain personal and institutional factors. Similar result was also found through semi-structured interview about the poor implementation of the strategy. Declarations Funding: The author did not get any funds to conduct this research. The author declares that he has no potential conflict of interest on this study. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Abebe Teshome and Bekele Melaku for coordinating the data collection process at the research sites. 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Academic, San Diego, pp 14–54 Sarda CST (2005) Increasing teacher attendance: Peruvian incentive project in rural schools UNDP (2008) Study in teacher utilization in the region of Ethiopia Vroom VH (1964) Work and motivation. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA World Bank (2000) Effective schooling in rural Africa report4: Frequently asked questions about effective schooling in rural communities Yavuz N (2004) The use of non-monetary incentives as a motivational tool: A survey study in a public organization in Turkey Zembylas M, Papanastasiou E (2006) Sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction in Cyprus. British. Association for International and Comparative Education , 36 (4) Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-5744827","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":396346922,"identity":"6fdedd0d-18de-4745-a144-d88d311ad752","order_by":0,"name":"Shimelis Mesfin","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6199-828X","institution":"University of Gondar","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shimelis","middleName":"","lastName":"Mesfin","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-01-01 06:31:42","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":false,"vertebrateSubjects":false,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":false,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false,"humanSubjectConsent":false,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":72866974,"identity":"47567190-c65f-4200-b00a-29be33125361","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-01-03 06:14:05","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":578865,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-5744827/v1/63ea85e0-2fc8-466a-bcc9-130426649031.pdf"},{"id":72866416,"identity":"a7af0f81-e729-4f66-b17f-db0ee9a9673b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-01-03 05:58:05","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":25012,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eQuestionnaire and Interview Schedule\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"DataCollectionTools.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-5744827/v1/69a7976c122c49cdb741f460.docx"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare no competing interests.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTeacher Incentive Strategy in Secondary Schools: The Missing Link between Policy and Practices\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe issue of employee motivation has got the attention of many researchers because it plays an important role in increasing the productivity of organizations (Gautam, Mandal \u0026amp; Dalal, 2006). The worth of motivated employees become more indispensable and significantly contributes for the growth and development of the organization. However, with the advent of globalization one of the leading challenges of leaders is managing human resources to increase the performance of the organization. The outcomes of motivated work force includes; employee retention, loyalty and harmony which enhance the performance of the organization. Thus, enhancing employees\u0026rsquo; motivation has become one of the most demanding activities for human resource management in any organization including schools. This shows that employees with high motivation exhibit high energy, pleasurable engagement and enthusiasm while employees with low motivation show distress, unpleasant engagement and nervousness (Heller, Judge, \u0026amp; Watson, 2002).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe performance of schools depends on the commitment of teachers and principals who are working for the development of students. Though school principals and teachers are important, they need to have motivation to play a vital role in improving the quality of educational institutions and building the personality of their students. McShane and Vonglinow (2000) argued that motivation is one of the key ingredients in employees\u0026rsquo; performance and productivity. That is, attempts to improve performance in schools will never succeed if teachers\u0026rsquo; motivation is ignored. Employees can render efficient services to the employers and customers in an organization if they are motivated (Mbua, 2003). This implies that motivated teachers are more likely to affect students\u0026rsquo; learning positively while the reverse situation may not bring the same result. Therefore, it is better to pay special attention to teacher motivation to improve their performance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs far as the issue of motivation is concerned, incentive is any thing that makes an employee desire to do better, try harder and expend more energy (Yavuz, 2004). In this study, incentive refers to anything that makes an employee want to do better, try harder and exert their maximum effort to achieve certain goals. Incentives have the potential to enhance employees\u0026rsquo; performance, motivation and morale if it is implemented effectively. While there are some counters arguments that incentives may in fact harm intrinsic motivation, teachers are motivated by the opportunity to earn more money particularly for educators whose income falls to meet the basic needs (Hoy \u0026amp; Miskel, 1996). In addition, if the incentive is paid in return for behavior that contributes to the organizations' goals, it will enhance organizational effectiveness and productivity in the long run and hence generates a positive outcome for both employers and employees (Torrington, Hall, Tayler, \u0026amp; Atkinson, 2009), cited in Mikander (2010). Moreover, Katz (1964), as cited in Lai (2009) stated that organizations provide rewards to employees who perform the desired behavior in the form of financial incentives, benefits, and social affiliation to encourage the achievement of those organizational goals.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmployee incentive strategies have been found to be the most commonly adopted techniques in all organizations including schools. The purpose of the program is to reward productive performance, reinforce positive behavior, stir interest in employees and most importantly motivate them (Lai, 2009). Motivation guides people\u0026lsquo;s actions and behaviors towards the achievement of some goals (Analoui, 2000). Motivation affect can affect the behavior, performance, and well-being of teachers in the workplace (Ryan \u0026amp; Deci, 2000). Therefore, it is understood that motivated and satisfied workers will be much more productive and be retained within the organization for a longer period as compared to displeased workers who will be less useful and will have a higher tendency to quit the job (Crossman \u0026amp; Abou-Zaki, 2003). More importantly, motivated workers not only lead to better performances but it also provides a higher service to customers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLarge body of empirical research indicated that incentive pay increases workers\u0026rsquo; effort and outputs, thus, too important for teachers and principals. This is supported by Condly, Clark, and Stolovitch (2003) and Goodman and Turner (2010) who stated that properly structured incentive schemes align the interest of workers and employers, provide information about the most valued aspects of an employee\u0026rsquo;s job, and motivate workers to provide costly effort. Additionally, they added in the long-run, a performance-based element of teacher pay may combat wage compression in the profession and increase the ability of individuals choosing to enter in to the teaching profession. Concerning teacher incentive strategies, Kermmerer (1990), as cited by the World Bank (2000), further stated that direct monetary benefits are packages of teacher salary, allowance and fringe benefits: indirect monetary incentives are all the other offered to teachers which are financed by the governments and communities. These might include (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e) professional support such as initial and ongoing training programs, teacher guides, text books, instructional supervision and (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e) personal support such as free or subsidized housing, food or transportation. Non-monetary benefits include professional status in the community, location or teaching position, recognition and approval of significant people.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKemmerer (1990) as cited in Sarda (2005) highlighted that incentives have been used across many countries in attempts to encourage better teacher performance through remuneration, instructional support, career and working condition. Teacher incentive programs have enjoyed growing popularity. In the United States, a number of teacher incentive programs have been introduced in the past few decades, generally offering annual merit pay on the order of 10\u0026ndash;40% of an average teacher's monthly salary (American Federation of Teacher, 2000), as cited by Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2004). Moreover, a study conducted by the Incentive Research Foundation (IRF) (2007) in the U.S concluded that incentive programs were capable of improving performance from 20\u0026ndash;25% to 40\u0026ndash;44%, as cited by Coats (2009). Israel has also provided incentives to teachers based on students\u0026rsquo; scores (Cavy, 2002), and a World Bank fund program in Mexico has been providing performance incentives to primary school teachers as cited in Glewwe \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e (2004). However, in many developing countries incentives for teachers are weaker than in developed countries. Given that most teaching in many developing countries at risk which reduce the efforts of teachers due to lack of incentives.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe prospect of identifying low cost incentives to motivate teacher has a powerful appeal to countries caught in the squeeze of simultaneous declines in education quality and resources (Chapman, Snder, \u0026amp; Burchfield, 1983). In this regard, Goodman and Turner (2010) considered incentives as the most effective strategies that employers have good measures of worker output or observable effort is closely tied to firm productivity. It is costly to monitor teachers and difficult to quantify individual contributions to a student\u0026rsquo;s education since production depends not only on a student\u0026rsquo;s current teacher but also upon the effort provided by past teachers. Although incentives have the capacity to motivate employees and increase their performance, it is difficult to implement it. As a result, incentive strategies must be implemented in ways that address all issues related to performance and human motivation (IRF, 2007) as cited in Coats (2009).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCurrently, there appears to be a widespread dissatisfaction in the teaching profession (Agnihotri, 2013). A range of research findings derived from quantitative and qualitative studies indicated that there was low level of teachers\u0026rsquo; motivation which leads to the inefficient implementation of teaching and learning process. For example, some of the behavioral manifestations of teachers due to lack of job satisfaction: stress and burn-out, frequent absenteeism, regular leave-taking from school, underperformance of tasks given, conflict with supervisors, disobedient behavior towards their colleagues and learners, lack of cooperation and initiative to render services for task accomplishment (Maniram, 2007). A survey conducted in 12 Asia and Sub-Saharan African countries investigated about the result of low teacher satisfaction in teaching which led to absenteeism, lateness and lack of commitment to their work (Bennell \u0026amp; Akyeampong, 2007). This indicates that low level of motivation make teachers demoralized, discouraged and dissatisfied with their job.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrevious studies indicated that there was relatively low level of teacher motivation among teachers which leads to the inefficient implementation of teaching-learning process. De Jesus and Conboy (2000) reported that many teachers were not motivated in Portugal. More specifically, it is estimated that fewer than 50% of teachers want to continue in their profession but the majority would prefer to change their profession. This finding is similar with Mertler (2002) who reported that a significant number of teachers in USA had low level of motivation and satisfaction and 34% of teachers in their prior study of the opinion that if an opportunity given to choose career again, they would not choose to enter in the teaching profession. Moreover, low teacher motivation is offered by Boyer and Gillespie (2001) indicated that 6% of teachers in USA leave the field of teaching each year.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlthough many studies have been done on teachers\u0026rsquo; motivation and thousands of articles have been published (Zembylas \u0026amp; Papanastasiou, 2006\u003cb\u003e)\u003c/b\u003e, most studies have been done in the context of developed countries such as USA and UK, but a few studies have been undertaken in developing countries including Ethiopia. Teaching profession has been criticized due to lack of performance incentives in Ethiopia for the past many years ago. For example, teachers\u0026rsquo; motivation and commitment in Ethiopia are low due to insufficient compensation system and poor working condition (Getachew, 1999; Manna \u0026amp; Tesfay, 2000). Moreover, the finding of Fenot (2005) revealed that 65% of teachers want to leave their profession due to poor fringe benefits, management style of the principals and poor relationships in the workplace. This shows that teacher motivation has been one of the serious issues which affect the quality of education.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFollowing this, the Ethiopian government has designed the incentive strategy in 2007 to motivate teachers. Despite the government of Ethiopia has designed an incentive strategy in 2007 to motivate teachers, research has not been conducted in Assosa zone secondary schools to determine the effectiveness of the strategy. Thus, it was important to look at expectancy motivation theory to forecast if the incentive strategy is more likely to be effective to attain the intended goal.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpectancy motivation theory is one of the most widely accepted theories developed by victor vroom in 1964 with the direct application to work settings, which was later refined by Porter and Lawler in 1968 (Pinder, 1987). According to Vroom (1964), motivation depends on the three variables i.e. expectancy, instrumentality and valence which are related to one another.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMotivation\u0026thinsp;\u003cb\u003e=\u003c/b\u003e\u0026thinsp;Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe multiplier effect of the equation is significant. According to the theory, motivation will exist only when employees perceive a positive correlation that effort leads to job performance and job performance leads to rewards (Griffin, 2008, cited in Lai, 2009). It means that higher levels of motivation will result when expectancy, instrumentality and valence are high. However, the multiplier assumption of the theory implies that if the strength of either expectancy or instrumentality or valence is zero or in significant, there will be no motivation. Therefore, this study was conducted to assess the implementation of teachers\u0026rsquo; incentive strategy in Assosa zone secondary schools using expectancy motivation theory as a framework.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTherefore, the researcher formulated the following research questions to address the above issue:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do teachers aware the existence of incentive strategy?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do teachers expect the probability that exerting effort will result in a given level of performance?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do teachers perceive that their performance will lead to the given outcome?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do teachers and principal perceive the attractiveness of the incentive strategy?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre there significant differences between teachers and school principals on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow far the incentive strategy is implemented in line with its formulation?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2.\tResearch Methodology","content":" \u003cdiv id=\"Sec2\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Research Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSince this study involved large number of participants to assess the implementation of teachers\u0026rsquo; incentive strategy, descriptive survey research design was found suitable. This design helps to explain the respondents\u0026rsquo; opinions, attitudes and feelings towards the implementation of the strategy. As a result, the researcher followed this design as a guide to the research using quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness of teachers\u0026rsquo; incentive strategy in Assosa zone secondary schools. To support this, mixed approach is capable of providing profound insights into participants\u0026rsquo; interpretation than using either approach alone (Marshal, \u0026amp; Rossman, 2006).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Population, Sample size and Sampling Techniques\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere were 7 districts and one city administration in Assosa zone. Of these, the researcher selected 4 districts and one city administration using simple random sampling technique mainly lottery method. Then, the researcher included all 12 secondary schools which were found in the selected districts and city administration using comprehensive sampling technique. In these 12 secondary schools, there were 346 teachers. For manageability reason, 50% (173) of teachers were selected using a combination of proportional sample allocation method and simple random sampling techniques because the number of teachers across 12 schools was significantly varied.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, 5 teachers and 3 school principals were purposively selected for interview to collect data about their awareness, expectancy in exerting efforts to perform certain duties, expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties and the attractiveness of the incentive strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 Data Collection Instruments\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuestionnaire and semi structured interview were used to gather the data about the implementation of teachers\u0026rsquo; incentive strategy. The questionnaires had four parts containing 47 close ended questions. The first and second parts had questions concerning respondents\u0026rsquo; level of awareness and expectancy about the incentive strategy respectively. The third and fourth parts of the questionnaire consisted of items related to instrumentality and valence of the incentive strategy respectively.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, respondents rated items using five-point Likert-type items ranging from \u003cem\u003e1 (very low/strongly disagree/not important at all) to 5 (very high/strongly agree/very important at all)\u003c/em\u003e to measure about the implementation of the incentive strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWith regard to interview, the researcher developed three questions to collect the qualitative data about the implementation of the incentive strategy using 5 teachers and 3 principals. Relevant documents were also reviewed about the implementation of the incentive strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4 Pilot Study\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003ePilot test was conducted on 40 teachers found outside the main sample of the study. The distribution of samples for pilot test followed the same procedures as the main study. Cronbach Alpha was used to test the internal consistency of items. The reliability coefficients of the instrument with Cronbach Alpha (α) were (0.82, 0.85, 0.92 and 0.84) for items concerning awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence respectively. These results indicated that the items used to measure the implementation of the incentive strategy were found highly reliable. Thus, items with the value of Cronbach Alpha (α)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.75 is considered the instrument as reliable (Orodho, 2009).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.5 Data Analysis Techniques\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoth quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques were used to analyze the data. The quantitative data were analyzed with the help of inferential statistical techniques. Specifically, one sample t-test was used to analyze the degree of teachers\u0026rsquo; awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the implementation of the incentive strategy (RQ # 1, 2, 3 \u0026amp; 4). Independent sample t- test was used to determine whether there are significant differences between teachers and school principals on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence (RQ #5). Finally, narration was used to analyze the qualitative data gathered through interview.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.6 Ethical Considerations\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eInitially, the permission letter was granted by the University of Gondar to collect the data. Then, the researcher provided information for the participants about the purpose of the study before they involved in the study. The respondents were also informed that their involvement in the study was totally voluntary, so that they would withdraw from the research at any time. The study had no potential risks and benefits on the participants due to participation in the study and received approval from the College Review and Ethics Committee (CREC) of the College of Education at University of Gondar, with the ethics committee approval reference CoE_CREC_010/2024.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis section analyzed the implementation of teachers\u0026rsquo; incentive strategy so that results were organized according to the themes of the research questions. Specifically, it began with teachers\u0026rsquo; awareness, expectancies, instrumentalities and valences perceptions towards the incentive strategy respectively. It also presented factors that influence the implementation of the incentive strategy. Finally, the results and discussions of findings are presented concurrently.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Teachers\u0026rsquo; awareness about the Incentive strategy\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ea one sample t- test of teachers\u0026rsquo; awareness about the Incentive strategy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStd. Error\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003et-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003edf\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSig(2-tailed)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAwareness\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e173\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.212\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.3684\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.0280\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e43.274\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e172\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"8\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eScale: \u0026lt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Low, 3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Moderate, \u0026amp;\u0026gt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;High\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs indicated in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers' awareness about the incentive strategy (4.21) was significantly higher than the expected mean value (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e) at (t\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;43.27, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;172, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This result showed that teachers had high level of awareness about the incentive types and the duties embedded in the strategy. It is possible to understand that the awareness of teachers about the incentive strategy is not a guarantee for its implementation unless they have positive perception towards it.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIf teachers aware the existence of incentive strategy, they can develop expectations for the incentives and evaluate the instrumentality and valence of them. The result of this study is consistent with the previous research findings of Chalott-Mecklenburg, Kentucky and Maryland conducted by Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001), who found school based award programs in Chalott-Mecklenburg, Kentucky were reasonably successful in getting teachers to understand and be committed to achieve the goals. In addition, the result of this study is also similar with the findings of Robbins and De Cenzo (2008), as cited by Nikander (2011) stated that employees aware of the organizational goals expected of them. This tells that individuals should be aware of what is expected of them for each task to be able to evaluate their possibilities to excel. The employees should also be aware of what sort of performance level is considered normal, how they can be better than others and show the true valence. But, the current research finding is contradicted with teachers\u0026rsquo; responses in Maryland who had no information about the incentive strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Teachers\u0026rsquo; expectancy in exerting effort to perform certain duties\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u0026rsquo; expectancy in exerting efforts to perform certain duties\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStd. Error Mean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003et-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003edf\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSig(2-tailed)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpectancy(Effort-performance relationship)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e173\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.0010\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.22266\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.01693\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-59.0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e172\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"8\"\u003eScale: \u003cb\u003e\u0026lt;\u003c/b\u003e3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Disagree, 3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;somewhat agree, \u0026amp; \u0026gt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Agree\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpectancy is the probability perceived by the individual that exerting a given amount of effort will lead to a specified performance level (Hoy \u0026amp; Miskel, 1991; Robbins, Judge \u0026amp; Cambell, 2010). As shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers\u0026rsquo; expectancy (2.00) was lower than the expected mean value (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e) at (t= -59.0, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;172, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This result showed that teachers were not sure whether exerting efforts would result in achieving the provided duties to be exemplary professionals. The respondents on the average did not expect even 50 percent probability of exerting efforts for improving students\u0026rsquo; performance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe result of this study is consistent with the finding of kuserka (n. d) who stated that effort does not necessarily lead to good performance if individual has insufficient knowledge and skills. A research conducted by Kelly, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) also found that teachers on the average did not expect even 50 percent probability that if as an individual they tried, their school would achieve a level of student performance necessary to achieve reward status. Moreover, the skill levels may be deficient; the organization\u0026rsquo;s performance appraisal system may be designed to assess non-performance factors such as loyalty or initiative (Robbins, Judge, \u0026amp; Cambell, 2010).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Teachers\u0026rsquo; expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u0026rsquo; expectancy in getting reward after performing certain duties effectively\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStd. Error Mean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003et-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003edf\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSig(2-tailed)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstrumentality(performance-outcome relationship)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e173\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.977\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.3618\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.0275\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-37.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e172\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"8\"\u003eScale: \u0026lt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;It does not likely happen, 3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;It does slightly happen, \u0026amp;\u0026gt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;It does likely happen\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstrumentality is an individual\u0026rsquo;s estimate of the probability that a given level of performance will lead to various work outcomes. As depicted in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, the result of one sample t-test revealed that the mean score of teachers\u0026rsquo; instrumentality of getting the incentives as far as they perform the required tasks (1.98) was lower than the expected mean value (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e) at (t = -37.1, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;172, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) though it was found statistically significant. This result showed that teachers believed that performing the given tasks cannot lead them to receive the incentives.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings of this study indicated that there was lack of trust on the part of teachers to get incentives which set out in the strategy even after accomplishing the required tasks. This result is consistent with Robbins, Judge and Cambell (2010) who claimed that many employees believed that the performance-reward relationship in their job was weak. They justify that the organizations reward a lot of things besides just performance. For example, when reward is given to employees based on factors such as seniority cooperativeness, or flattering the boss, employees are likely to find the relationship as being weak and demotivating. The determinant factor of instrumentality is the nature of the outcomes (Lawler, 1999), as cited by Hayibor (2005). Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) also found that relatively low perceived probability of receiving a bonus even if school goals had been met. Thus, if people do not see a connection between their performance level and a possible outcome, they are less likely to be motivated (Redmond, 2010).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4 The attractiveness of the Incentive strategy\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe attractiveness of the incentive strategy from teachers\u0026rsquo; perspectives\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStd. Error Mean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003et-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003edf\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSig(2-tailed)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eValence(incentive attractiveness)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e173\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6919\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.14763\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.01122\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e150.739\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e172\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"8\"\u003eScale: \u0026lt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Not important, 3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;somehow important, \u0026amp;\u0026gt;3\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Important\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValence is the strength of an employee\u0026rsquo;s preference for a particular reward. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e indicated that the result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean score of teachers\u0026rsquo; perceptions about the valence (attractiveness) of the incentives (4.69) was significantly higher than the expected mean value (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e) at (t\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;150.739, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;172, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This suggests that incentives set out in the strategy were considered more essential for teachers to have strong desire to do their job.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe result of this study is consistent with United Nation Development Program (UNDP) (2008) who have reported that teachers in Ethiopia have strong desire to towards the incentives which set out in the strategy such as compatible financial rewards, prior chance for social services, retirement with full salary, land for house construction, prior chance for education, naming schools after one\u0026rsquo;s name, free touring, top up chance who work voluntarily in remote areas and acceleration in carrier structure. Similarly, Christensen (2002) also reported that employees had an interest to get health insurance, retirement savings plan pension plan, long term care insurance, life insurance, and stock options. The most preferred benefit was health insurance, followed by retirement savings plans, pension plans and the remainder services. Moreover, Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2001) found that bonuses for school wide improvement in student performance was appropriate, there were a variety of other important outcomes such as public recognition and opportunities for professional development that motivated them to achieve program goals.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e3.5. Variations between teachers\u0026rsquo; and principals\u0026rsquo; perception on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the incentive strategy\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe mean differences between teachers\u0026rsquo; and principals\u0026rsquo; perception on awareness, expectancy, instrumentality and valence about the incentive strategy\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"9\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c9\" colnum=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGroups\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eT- test for equality means\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMean difference\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003et- value\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003edf\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSig(2-tailed\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAwareness\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincipals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e161\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.219\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.111\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.3784\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e.1641\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.1084\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.983\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e171\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.327\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpectancy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincipals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e161\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.00\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.01\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.2262\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e.1742\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.01389\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e171\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.836\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstrumentality\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincipals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e161\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.964\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.156\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.3449\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e.5279\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.1925\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-1.790\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e171\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.075\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eValence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeachers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincipals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e161\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.685\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.873\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.1479\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e.1114\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.09824\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-2.250\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e171\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.026\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"9\"\u003eSignificance level: P\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.05\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, the result of independent sample t-test revealed that statistically significant mean differences were not observed between teachers and school principals on awareness (t\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.983, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;171, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05), expectancy (t\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.208, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;171, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) and instrumentality (t = -1.790, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;171, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). However, significance mean difference was found between teachers and school principals on valence at (t = -2.250, df\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;171, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This states teachers and principals had similar perception towards the awareness, expectancy and instrumentality of the incentive strategy but they were differed in perceiving the attractiveness of the incentives in the strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6 The Implementation of the Incentive Strategy\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of different research suggest that incentive programs are most effective when they implemented as part of holistic retention strategy rather than as standalone initiatives. Compensation is not the only concern teachers consider in their decisions about where to work (Hanover, 2014). This shows that designing any incentive strategy by itself is not sufficient to motivate teachers unless it implemented in line with the formulation of the strategy. In this regard, respondents were asked to describe the status of the implementation of teacher incentive strategy in their schools.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe majority of interviewees reported about the poor implementation of the incentive strategy in their school due to different factors. Specifically, one of the respondents explained that with the exception of education opportunities which is often given, other types of incentives included in the strategy were not yet provided. Similarly, three of my interviewees also believed that getting the chance to be rewarded was very narrow. According to their expression, the incentive strategy has no clear criteria to reward teachers and school principals who showed an excellent performance in their schools. This showed that despite an attempt was made to motivate teachers; still the effect of the incentive strategy has become minimal in improving the learning outcomes of students. Hence, the result of this study is similar with Hanover (2014) in that the very existence of the specificity of the relationships between incentive and performance in the public sector is only due to the difficulties of measuring performance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the same way, the other four respondents expressed that the concerned body was not ready to give them the reward even if they performed the required duties stipulated in the strategy. This indicates that the incentive strategy does not seem effective in motivating teachers. Johnson and John (2009) supported the finding of this study in that despite the prevalence of teacher-compensation reforms, their effect on teacher motivation and performance is weak. However, several recent district-specific studies have provided carefully identified evidence the extent to which the productivity of existing teachers increases when they are provided with financial incentives as a result, some of the empirical evidence suggests that incentive programs must be implemented in ways that address all issues related to performance and human motivation (Coats, 2009). Moreover, they also reported that the strategy had no clear procedures, measurements, and implementation plan as well as the necessary resources to provide the incentives for those who performed the required tasks. This shows that the respondents had similar perception about the poor implementation of the incentive strategy in their schools. That means that the incentive strategy has not been implemented in line with its formulation to reach at its objectives.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe quantitative results indicated that teachers had high level of awareness and valence about the incentive strategy while their expectancy and instrumentality perception were low. This means that though teachers were highly doubtful in favor of receiving incentives, they ensured that the incentives were really desirable. Based on the Expectancy Motivation Theory constructs, therefore, it is concluded that the incentive strategy was not effective in motivating teachers due to the absence of certain personal and institutional factors. Similar result was also found through semi-structured interview about the poor implementation of the strategy.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eThe author did not get any funds to conduct this research.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe author declares that he has no potential conflict of interest on this study. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgments\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eI would like to thank Abebe Teshome and Bekele Melaku for coordinating the data collection process at the research sites. I am also grateful to Assosa zone secondary school teachers who participated in filling out the questionnaire for this study. My special thanks also go to school principals and woreda education experts for taking part in the interview and providing their views on the issue that has been studied.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAgnihotri AK (2013) Job satisfaction among school teachers\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnaloui F (2000) What motivates senior managers? The case of Romania. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Managerial Psychology, 15\u003c/em\u003e(4), 324\u0026ndash;340. University of Bradford, Bradford, UK\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBennell P, Akyeampong K (2007) Teacher Motivation in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. DFID Department of international Development, p 71\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBoyer L, Gillespi P (2000) Keeping the committed. The importance of introduction and support program for the new special educators. 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British. \u003cem\u003eAssociation for International and Comparative Education\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e36\u003c/em\u003e (4)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"University Of Gondar","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Expectancy, Incentive strategy, Instrumentality, Valence, Perception","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePurpose:\u003c/strong\u003e The purpose of this study was to assess the implementation of teachers’ incentive strategy from the perspectives of Expectancy Motivation theory.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMethods:\u003c/strong\u003e Descriptive survey design was employed. The size of the population was 346. Of these, 173 teachers were selected using simple random sampling technique. Questionnaire and interview were used to collect the data.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResults:\u003c/strong\u003e The result of one sample t-test indicated that the mean scores of teachers about the awareness of the incentive strategy (4.21) and attractiveness of the incentives (4.69\u003cstrong\u003e)\u003c/strong\u003e were significantly higher than the expected mean value (3) at (t = 43.27) and (t = 150.739) respectively at df = 172, p\u0026lt; 0.05. Conversely, the mean scores of teachers’ expectancy in exerting effort in achieving the provided duties (2.00) and instrumentality of getting the incentives when they perform the required tasks (1.98) were lower than the expected mean value (3) at (t = -59.0) and (t = -37.1) respectively at p \u0026lt; 0.05, df =172.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConclusion:\u003c/strong\u003e Based on expectancy motivation theory, it is concluded that the incentive strategy was not effective in motivating teachers due to the absence of certain personal and institutional factors. Therefore, incentives need to be provided for teachers who perform the required tasks with clear criteria.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Teacher Incentive Strategy in Secondary Schools: The Missing Link between Policy and Practices","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-01-03 05:58:01","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5744827/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"3fa3f47e-af8c-45f9-b449-c0dd057416ae","owner":[],"postedDate":"January 3rd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":42225152,"name":"Educational Psychology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-01-03T05:58:01+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-01-03 05:58:01","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-5744827","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-5744827","identity":"rs-5744827","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}