Empirical Evidence for the Inefficiency of ModeratePolitical Coercion

Empirical Evidence for the Inefficiency of ModeratePolitical Coercion | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Empirical Evidence for the Inefficiency of ModeratePolitical Coercion Øivind Schøyen, Espen Sirnes, Chris Rune Andersen This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7512429/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Does the efficacy of political coercion in building state legitimacy vary by intensity?Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity-5 indices as proxies for coercion, combinedwith data on legitimacy and regime survival, we identify a mid-level coercion range withnegative efficacy. Significantly fewer regimes operate in this range, and those that do ex-hibit lower legitimacy and survival rates. Time-series analysis reveals authoritarian regimesoften reduce coercion into this range, only to increase it abruptly. This suggests applyingcoercion is costly and regimes’ delayed feedback on its impact on legitimacy results in adynamic overshoot. We present historical evidence supporting the view that the data aredriven by an intrinsic negative response to coercion, namely coercion resentment. We ex-amine policy implications for how democracies can reduce the risk of slipping into softauthoritarianism. JEL Classification: D74, P16, P47 Political Coercion State Legitimacy Regime Survival Coercion Resentment Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7512429","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":516656525,"identity":"4fd3c5da-4b20-4ca1-a2f6-4af277b2d320","order_by":0,"name":"Øivind Schøyen","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"UiT The Arctic University of Norway","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Øivind","middleName":"","lastName":"Schøyen","suffix":""},{"id":516656526,"identity":"2b2c2136-52fd-4603-852e-fda4a42630b5","order_by":1,"name":"Espen Sirnes","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"UiT The Arctic University of Norway","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Espen","middleName":"","lastName":"Sirnes","suffix":""},{"id":516656528,"identity":"fcd877eb-75d1-4e51-b94c-7775af8c9f7b","order_by":2,"name":"Chris Rune Andersen","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"UiT The Arctic University of Norway","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Chris","middleName":"Rune","lastName":"Andersen","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-09-02 02:23:08","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7512429/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7512429/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":91557314,"identity":"f21c4f3d-704e-4163-9238-6111b7d38714","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-17 17:48:26","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":618025,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Measuringtheefficacyofcoercion65.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7512429/v1_covered_4f446ed1-a6af-46f2-aeec-8b6a62c9ed9f.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Empirical Evidence for the Inefficiency of ModeratePolitical Coercion","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Political Coercion, State Legitimacy, Regime Survival, Coercion Resentment","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7512429/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7512429/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eDoes the efficacy of political coercion in building state legitimacy vary by intensity?Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity-5 indices as proxies for coercion, combinedwith data on legitimacy and regime survival, we identify a mid-level coercion range withnegative efficacy. 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