Border Disruptions and Food Security in Fragile Economies: Evidence from Afghanistan’s Trade Dependence on Iran and Pakistan

Border Disruptions and Food Security in Fragile Economies: Evidence from Afghanistan’s Trade Dependence on Iran and Pakistan | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Border Disruptions and Food Security in Fragile Economies: Evidence from Afghanistan’s Trade Dependence on Iran and Pakistan Abdul Ahmad Pooya This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The challenge of food systems in Afghanistan is driven by its extreme reliance on trade across borders, making this region very sensitive to geopolitical conflicts and health-related emergencies. This paper will analyze the impact of the closure of borders with Iran and Pakistan on domestic food prices and composition of imports, its consequences on food security and economic sustainability in fragile states. There are two events examined: border closure in Pakistan due to COVID-19 in 2021 and the disruption of trade with Iran in 2025 caused by the Iran-Israel conflict. Based on the weekly market prices data, the results indicate that the 2025 disruption had steeper and more urgent costs of inflationary pressure (an increase in the costs of staple commodities in flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel of more than 14 per cent), especially in the urban wells such as Kabul. It is also confirmed statistically (paired-sample t-tests, 95 percent significance) that the breakdown of trade has a measurable relationship with price volatility. These findings demonstrate that there is increased strategic dependence among Afghanistan and Iranian trade routes on the part of direct imports as well as regional transit. By framing these economic shocks in the bigger picture of sustainable development, the paper will address the literature on the subject of trade vulnerability and resilience building by providing a policy recommendation to enhance supply chain stability, improve food security, and minimize dependency risks in weak economies. JEL codes : E31, F14, Q18 food Security Trade Disruption Border Closure Import Dependence Economic Resilience Afghanistan Iran–Pakistan Trade Sustainable Development Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 1. Introduction The topography of Afghanistan as a landlocked state, which has to rely on the transit trade bound to its neighbors Iran and Pakistan, hugely contributes to its economic weakness. This reliance predisposes the nation to huge risks since even the minute border shutdowns may compromise trade patterns, lower food sufficiency, and destabilize prices (Rahim, 2018 ). As most of the essential imported foodstuffs to Afghanistan-wheat flour and rice-are supplied almost exclusively by Pakistan and Iran, the country is susceptible to the continuous flow of the cross-border transport routes. Chronic trade deficits also indicate the presence of structural vulnerability to such domestic capacity to produce that puts Afghan households at significant risk of external shocks that threaten livelihoods and nutrition alike (Mahmood et al., 2021 ; Amin et al., 2021). These border shocks can be dramatic and occur mainly under the influence of political or security factors that have a devastating economic impact on traders and disrupt essential supply chains, and the instantaneous rise in prices, especially in food (Rahim, 2018 ). Despite the fact that the increase in the valuation of the Afghan afghani and positive harvests in the short run have alleviated the inflationary pressures, this balance is tenuous. Ironically, closure of borders will not only increase the cost of necessary imports but can lower national agricultural product prices because of the limitation of exportation, which increases poverty. The fact that Afghanistan currently depends heavily on imports, and its trade deficit is steadily growing, heightens the economic vulnerability of this state and contributes to the food insecurity of its population, with millions of people relying on the delivery of humanitarian aid (Rahim, 2018 ; Rahmany, 2021 ). This volatility is evidently depicted by empirical data. In the World Bank's February 2025 report, the domestic prices were recorded to have increased slightly by 0.1 percent in January 2025 relative to December 2024, and this was attributed mainly to the increase in food prices by 1.1 percent. This marginal stability was attributed to the appreciation of the Afghan currency when compared to the U.S. dollar, a better availability of imports, and a declining global commodity market (World Bank, 2025 ). Conversely, the KhabarFarsi ( 2025 ) showed an increase of 3.0 percent in food prices in February 2025, a 5.0 percent increase in prices in clothing, and a 3.4 percent increase in prices in household goods, respectively. In the meantime, NSIA of Afghanistan registered a decrease in food prices by 1.4 percent in April 2025 (Swar 1404), which was mainly caused by a tremendous decline in the prices of vegetables (16.7 percent), spices (7.3 percent), and milk (3.7 percent) (Zahra Rashidi, 2025). Among the interconnected aspects that propagate oscillation of food prices in Afghanistan are exchange rates (instability in the value of the afghani to the U.S), discontinuation in international donations, as well as food dependency, (flour, wheat, oil, rice) climatical shocks, floods, and droughts, and road blocks at strategic border points such as Torkham and Islam Qala. Collectively, such pressures make the prices high and worsen food security in the country (Shoaib & Yunxian, 2025 ; KhabarFarsi, 2025 ; Ufuq News, 2025). Although the stability of the borders is paramount to the economically weak, landlocked countries such as Afghanistan, there is a considerable gap in the empirical work that examines the impact of border closures and their implications for the structure of imports and internal food prices. This research has attempted to bridge the gap by looking at two large-scale cases of border shutdown: the COVID-19-induced lockdown in Pakistan in 2021 and the 2025 border closure in Iran as part of the Iran-Israel conflict. There are three critical scientific contributions of this article. On the one hand, it contributes to the literature by focusing on the in-depth nature of the disruption of the distribution of trade to illustrate the effect of geopolitical strains on the inflow composition. Second, by combining the exchange rate movements and high-resolution food prices, it measures the direct impact of border closures on national price volatility of foodstuffs. Third, it contextualizes the experience of Afghanistan against the background of the world debate on trade vulnerability and food security in fragile states. All in all, these findings are a good guiding light to policymakers interested in responding with greater resilience in both economic and human aid relief in future trouble spots of this kind. The rest of this article consists of the following way of organization: Section 2 contains review of related literature and theoretical framework; Section 3 contains research methodology; Section 4 includes the discussion of structural vulnerabilities and dependence of Afghanistan in regional trade; Section 5 consists of the presentation of the empirical findings, and the analysis; Section 6 contains the conclusion and implications of policy and recommendations. 2. Literature and theoretical analysis 2.1 Literature Review Closure of the borders with Afghanistan has shown, numerous times, the grave insecurity of the country to any disturbances in the flow of trade. It has been detrimental to food prices and security situations. This can be seen in the example of the global food price crisis of 2007/2008: wheat flour prices increased twofold in Afghanistan alone within several months due to not only a severe domestic drought but also regional export restrictions and overall increase in global food prices (D'Souza et al., 2016). This shock was especially harmful since the Afghan households consume almost 60 percent of their income in food, and wheat alone contributes more than half of their calories (D'Souza et al., 2016). Border closure affects the economy not just in the short term, but also raises prices. To take one example, when the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, traders incurred high rates of additional charges, those related to demurrage and detention costs, averaging at USD 150 per container per day, with the highest being USD 15,000 (Rasul, 2021 ). Such increased trading expenses heightened inflationary demands in the food markets in Afghanistan. This makes fragile states such as Afghanistan susceptible to trade shocks, which is one of the areas of systemic weaknesses that can be built into an ever more complex global food system. Even the international trade networks have grown in dimension and interconnectedness and present many pathways through which food trade can occur, and likewise heavily multiply the potential that cascading effects will take place when external jolts are encountered (Burkholz et al., 2019). Such systems of Coldwater are more susceptible to African and Asian countries, and can swiftly travel through global supply chains. The prominent feature of this vulnerability lies in the concentrated export profile of the staple cereals. Food security of more than 200 million individuals around the globe is at risk because disruptions caused by global grain exporters affect 90 percent of those persons, and most of them are based in sub-Saharan Africa (Seekell et al., 2018 ; Laio et al., 2016 ). Food stocks in most of the vulnerable regions are low and unstable, which further restrains their shock-absorbing capacity, resulting in higher insecurity (Seekell et al., 2018 ). The government's response to a crisis through trade policies tends to increase global food insecurity. Such export restrictions, which are popularized during COVID-2019 and food crises in the past, entail the adverse spillover effects through increased international prices and a decrease in food availability in countries experiencing import dependency (Swinnen et al., 2021; Laborde et al., 2020 ). These restrictions have a more substantial effect on the economies that are heavily dependent on imports and those that have few alternative suppliers (Koppenberg et al., 2020 ). These weaknesses have been contributed to by geopolitical crises that have also occurred recently. The Russian invasion of Ukraine interrupted the functioning of the global agricultural market, which led to a reduction in the availability of wheat and increased world food prices (Hellegers, 2022 ). This combination of binary hits the reduction of the importation of grains and the rise of the cost of the demands of inputs and fertilizers, furthered food insecurity in already vulnerable areas mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, given that they have been and remain significant importers of grain imports (Rahimi et al., 2023 ; Wellington et al., 2023 ). It is mainly based on the variety of trade links and volume of trade links that a country is able to withstand any trade interruptions. The main risk of countries that are dependent on only one or a few supplies is that they are more vulnerable as long as their suppliers are exposed to shocks (Marchand et al., 2016 ). The most susceptible areas, such as the Middle East, Central America, and West Africa, rely on several staple crops (wheat, maize, and rice). Still, as a result, they become more susceptible to remotely caused supply chain shocks (Bren d'Amour et al., 2016). Besides direct cost factors, the closing of borders and disruption of commerce have long-term effects on locally-based agriculture. The economic and trade activity was devastated in West Africa because of the Ebola outbreak due to the closure of the borders, which led to a loss of 20–50 percent of the major crops, such as rice, coffee, cocoa, and maize (Jacoby et al., 2019 ). The repetition of such issues might take place in weak states, which experience long-term disturbances. The topic of open trade and food security in fragile states is rather multifaceted and contradictory. Although the international food trade facilitates the global food supply, one out of every six people in the world is very dependent on trade (Sun et al., 2021; Chikhuri, 2013 )-the excessiveness of dependency means that the impact is severe during periods of discontinuity. Research indicates that economic instability, coupled with volatility in trade openness, may negatively impact food security in developing nations, particularly in cases where developing nations deal in a small number of staple foodstuffs and their markets are closed. Effects of the trade disturbances extend to other countries via price transmission channels that are not precisely targeted by the disturbances. It can be analyzed and observed that global transmission of prices is interfered with due to disruptions, as was seen in the wheat and flour markets of Afghanistan and other places like this (Mann et al., 2021). Notably, the effects of these prices can have a long-term impact on the resumption of trade and, hence, continued problems with food security. These shortcomings were further illustrated during the COVID-19 pandemic due to border closures, transportation problems, and labor shortages, which upset all agricultural production in the world and food supply chains (Mahmood et al., 2024 ). These restrictions on exports with the aim of protecting national supplies entailed major shocks in the world food markets and resulted in price surges within most countries (Schoeneman et al., 2024 ; Carreno et al., 2020; Evenett et al., 2020). All of this demonstrates the necessity to reach a compromise between making trade efficient and making the food system resilient. Although the process of trade integration is positive to both exporters and importers as it links surplus and deficit economies, import-dependent economies, especially fragile ones, are susceptible to shocks in the international trading environment (Zhang et al., 2023 ; Puma et al., 2015 ). The main issue would be how to better combine the advantages of trade specialization with the endeavors to build up the domestic production and diversify the sources of imports, and become more resilient. Specifically, to Afghanistan, which has its own geopolitical location and a relatively frequent disruption of its borders, this study is aimed at filling the significant gap concerning the direct consequences of closing the borders on the food prices and import flows. The learnings of this research can enhance academic knowledge and give practical directions to all policymakers and humanitarian non-governmental organizations that aim at strengthening economic resilience and food security in fragile, landlocked nations. 2.2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses The paper is a very valuable addition to the trade disruptions and economic vulnerability literature, as it brings a specific empirical contribution to this field of expertise, demonstrating how border closures impact the import composition and food security of the country concerned, particularly in an import-dependent, geopolitically weak country, in this case, Afghanistan. Although several studies have recorded different dimensions of trade vulnerability in developing economies, there are few studies examining the concomitant impact of multiple shocks, which include border closure, price volatility, and currency depreciation, among other shocks, in developing countries where resilience is low. The paper contributes to the academic debate because it incorporates a variety of types of vulnerability into one empirical study and tests the implications of these factors in three theoretically based hypotheses. Interdependent structural conditions cause vulnerability of the import-dependent economies faced by the trade shock. An important aspect is the degree of dependence on imports that inherently augments the exposure of the country to outside shocks. Although a drop in international prices can help countries weather the economic storm in the short term, as demonstrated by Kavallari et al. ( 2014 ), highly dependent countries on imported agricultural goods are exposed to market disturbances to a considerable degree. This weakness is acute, particularly for a country that relies on imported necessities such as staple goods, fuel, or mid-range goods to make products. Import concentration or over-dependence on a few supplier nations is another significant part. The studies show that this kind of concentration heightens systemic risks, especially in those areas that have a low level of substitution. To illustrate, Sharma et al. ( 2017 ) discovered that the lack of diversification in exporters of biomedical products might cause considerable risks to people. In the COVID-19 pandemic, Boschemeier et al. (2023) noted that contractions in imports were sharper in highly market-concentrated nations. Nonetheless, turning to alternative trade partners allowed them to reduce losses in supply by almost a third due to lockdowns, thus pointing to the opportunity, but rather constrained possibilities of diversification. The risks are particularly high in an agricultural trade. Through the increases in international food trade experienced in the past few decades, the food security of nations has come to be associated with the sustainability of world food systems. The analysis of Seekell et al. ( 2018 ) and Marchand et al. ( 2016 ) show that the declining ratio of domestic food production to demand propels the country of import to increase its vulnerability to exogenous shocks, i.e., in the case of Egypt, the relative decrease in the output of food products within the country led to the country becoming more susceptible to external shocks. Veninga et al. (2018) show that Egypt faces the threat of instability in wheat imports, and this instability gravely affects domestic food security. Other import-dependent states experience the same dynamics, hence researchers formulated self-sufficiency ratios and vulnerability indexes to have a better grasp of exposure (Gutierrez-Moya et al., 2020). H1 Closure of borders with significant trading partners will have pronounced impacts of increasing the prices of food at the domestic level and triggering structural changes, such as changes in imports in countries that are import-dependent, such as Afghanistan. Vulnerability is also determined by the dynamics of trade networks around the world. Increased integration of such international supply chains will make local disturbances become global emergencies. The studies conducted by Puma, Steinbrech et al. (2015), Burkholz et al. (2019), and Li et al. ( 2024 ) demonstrate the level of cascading effects that can quickly appear in food systems in the case of a high level of network instability. To give an example, Li et al. ( 2024 ) mention Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Belgium among countries that are on a high-risk level since their domestic production capability falls short, and they use foreign food supplies quite intensively, which Afghanistan also does in terms of trade. In addition, when export controls are applied during crises, it aggravates the vulnerability of the importing countries. It has been proven that the exporting countries tend to limit exports in favor of the government of supply, and this increases the deficiency in the markets where they are dependent (Headey et al., 2008; Bren d'Amour & Anderson, 2020 ). Another point stressed by Koppenberg et al. ( 2020 ) is that such restrictions will have a greater adverse effect in those countries that have high import dependency and low substitutability, which is true of Afghanistan, with most of its major commodities. The world commodity market is also another cause of economic vulnerability due to the fluctuation of prices. To give an example, price shocks have a powerful impact on African countries due to the low quality of institutions and the intense exposure of these states to external trade (Katusiime, 2018 ). As revealed by Bibi et al. ( 2021 ), the rise in oil prices may adversely affect the current account balances of oil-importing countries, whereas Josue et al. (2024) witnessed that the oil price shocks lead to appreciation in currency in the exporting countries and inflation in the importing countries. H2a In highly dependent economies like Afghanistan, trade disruptions—such as export bans and swings in international prices—affect food security and internal market stability. Financial market volatility plays an important role, too. The volatility in the exchange rate selectively affects the companies within the import-dependent economies by increasing the prices of foreign-denominated materials. Jinjarak ( 2014 ) points out that the most susceptible firms are those that have no hedging mechanisms in place and that disturbances in global supply chains may lead to a liquidity crunch and an increase in the cost of financing, as well as a lack of credit accessibility, particularly to small or informal sector importers. Lastly, the inequality in resilience between high-income countries and low-income countries is the reason why price shocks are more likely to produce devastating effects in fragile economies. According to Bajaj et al. ( 2025 ), although some countries benefited due to an increased price of exportation amid the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, others were experiencing severe food insecurity. Such observations reveal the strong necessity to believe in diversification and increase domestic production capacities of the import-dependent economies. Even in the absence of such reforms, intermediate-term shocks would in some instances produce long-lasting economic friction and a humanitarian crisis (Bajaj et al., 2025 ). H2b Currency volatility, together with trade disruptions, raises input costs, curtails credit access, and escalates price shocks, and these effects augment economic fragility in import-dependent nations, particularly in low-resilience settings, such as Afghanistan. These mechanisms used by them are complex; this highlights the view that economic vulnerability should not be perceived as a fixed state but rather a dynamic process as the product of interacting structural, financial, and policy elements. Civin et al. (2020) conceptualize the term economic vulnerability on two levels: the sensitivity of the country to exogenous shocks in trade and the ability to adapt. As the results obtained by them, as well as by Schmitt-Grohé et al. (2018), indicate, the fraction of the BOP-based variation in macroeconomic performance that can be attributed to terms-of-trade shocks is up to 30 percent, thus confirming the necessity of close empirical evaluation in the context of fragile states, such as Afghanistan. 3. Methodology The effect of the international border shutdown (Pakistan and Iran) on the domestic Afghanistan energy and food prices will be examined using a comparative structured case study methodology in this research. The two exogenous shocks were sampled strategically: the mid-2021 Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the partial closure of trading activities with Iran in June 2025, due to the Iran-Israel conflict. The two were selected partly because of the key position of Pakistan and Iran in terms of both being the major trading partners of Afghanistan, but also because they represent two different kinds of shocks, i.e., public health and geopolitical shocks. The design then enables comparative studies of the market reactions in the space and time dimension within the context of the domestic production limitations and import mix. The dependent variable, on the other hand, is the weekly change of retail fundamental commodities price in U.S dollars. The affected commodities due to the 2021 disruption in Pakistan include wheat flour, cooking oil, pulses (including beans), and liquefied gas, staples that are mostly imported from Pakistan by land. The corresponding commodities in terms of the planned 2025 disruption case involving Iran are wheat flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel, which also reflect the growing dependency of Afghanistan on Iran in terms of trade paths concerning foodstuffs and oil products. The major (independent variables are a) the incidence of the border closure (dummy-coded as an intervention), b) the origin of perturbance (Pakistan/Iran), and c) the type of shock (health/conflict). The study design juxtaposes the descriptive statistics, the distance between price in percentages and absolute price changes, and the paired-sample t-tests of the statistical and economic accuracy of the realized price changes. The mixed-method design enhances the explanatory nature of the study, and it identifies the structural weaknesses of the market system of Afghanistan in response to different geopolitical pressures. 3.1 Case Selection and Data Sources The empirical part is based on the secondary price data obtained from reliable sources. The 2021 episode included regional prices that were recorded in the field assessments by Save the Children that entailed Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul; essential items considered included wheat flour, cooking oil, legumes, and liquefied gas. Regarding the case of the year 2025, TOLOnews economic reports provided the weekly retail prices of wheat flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel in Kabul. The price was also converted into USD at an average exchange rate of the particular time to make them temporarily comparable. The choice of these cases allows the study to observe inter-provincial differences as well as the inflationary pressure of particular commodities based on the fact that Afghanistan is widely dependent on its neighbors in terms of food and energy sources. 3.2 Analytical Approach The analysis model is based on the combination of the descriptive and inferential approaches. First, both absolute and percent change in price before and after the occurrence of each border disruption are compared, enabling an opportunity to visualize the magnitude of market shocks clearly. The selection of place is examined through province-level comparisons between provinces, depending on disturbance paths. The lens used to explain the translation of dependence on particular trading partners into price vulnerability is based on the commodity level. In those cases where the data permitted it, paired-sample t-tests were conducted to determine whether the changes in prices observed were statistically significant. The tests completed on the 2021 case (in Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul) were not at standard levels of significance, probably because of small or unbalanced sample sizes, but the economic consequences were substantial, including price growth of various goods of more than 60 percent in Kunduz. However, the 2025 Kabul analysis, in comparison, produced statistically insignificant but still significant economic consequences of geopolitical instability in the prices of core consumer markets. In order to complement this inferential analysis, statistical analysis on the significance level of the observed changes in prices before and after each disruption was performed using a paired-sample t-test. The test is according to the following formula: $$\:t=\frac{\stackrel{-}{d}}{s\stackrel{-}{d}/\:\surd\:n}\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:\:$$ 1 where: \(\:\stackrel{-}{d\:}\) is the mean difference in prices, \(\:s\stackrel{-}{d}\) is the standard deviation of the differences, and n is the number of paired observations. 4. Afghanistan's Structural Vulnerability and Strategic Dependency on Regional Trade Routes Afghanistan's position as a landlocked, aid-dependent, and fragile economy renders it acutely vulnerable to external shocks, particularly those emanating from geopolitical instability in its surrounding region. Despite years of international engagement, the country remains entrenched in a long-term cycle of underdevelopment, characterized by a GDP of only $ 17.2 billion in 2023 and a per capita income of just $ 363.7 in 2021. The scale of socioeconomic distress is staggering: 97% of the population lives in poverty, and over 22.9 million people require humanitarian assistance, underscoring the severity of the crisis (World Bank, 2025 ; Sirat, 2025). Agriculture continues to dominate the economy in terms of employment, with 60–80% of the population engaged in low-productivity farming. However, the sector contributes less than one-third of GDP, revealing deep-seated structural inefficiencies, chronic underinvestment, and widespread lack of access to modern technology and capital (World Bank, 2025 ). These internal constraints are compounded by heavy reliance on imports, especially of essential commodities such as food, fuel, and manufactured goods, making domestic price systems highly susceptible to global supply disruptions and exchange rate volatility. In 2023 alone, Afghanistan imported $ 826 million in wheat flour, $ 340 million in palm oil, and $ 213 million in rice, all of which are central to the country's Consumer Price Index (Jingjing et al., 2025 ). This high dependence on external markets ties domestic price stability directly to international developments. Simultaneously, the country's trade deficit ballooned to $ 6.8 billion in 2023 and is projected to widen further to $ 8.9 billion in 2024, representing nearly 44% of GDP, among the highest ratios globally (Gul, 2025). While Afghanistan has sought to diversify trade beyond its traditional partners—Pakistan and India—by engaging with Iran, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, these efforts have not corrected structural imbalances or created meaningful buffers against external price volatility. In 2024, Iran came out as the largest import partner of Afghanistan, which contributed to about 30 percent of the country's total imports. The bilateral trade between the two nations was recorded at the amount of 3.14 billion dollars, showing an 83 percent leap as compared to the figure in the previous year (WFP, 2025 ). Although the direct contribution by Iran to food supply is low, ranking third in the production of rice, and fifth and sixth in edible oil and flour, respectively, its strategic position is elsewhere. First, Iran is one of the leading suppliers of non-food commodities; refined fuel, steel, cement, and construction materials are some of them. Second, and even more importantly, Iran is a key point of transit through which Afghanistan accesses imported goods supplied through Central Asia, Malaysia, etc. As a result, any unrest in Iranian territory by war, sanctions, or any other political upheavals is two-sided: not only will it curtail the direct access to Iranian goods by Afghanistan, but it will also prevent access to the larger international markets channels through Iran. The weaknesses of such dependency were also discovered after the onset of the Iran-Israel conflict. In mid-2025, there was an unplanned closure of border trade at the western and southern treaties in Afghanistan, and this harsh process caused an intense bottleneck in the progress of cargo, which caused a further challenge to the already stressed logistics system. Among the most direct and obvious implications was a sudden skyrocket in the prices of fuel. As of June 2025, the cost of diesel had gone up to 67.1 AFN ( $ 0.95) per liter, up by 14.7 percent weekly (WFP, 2025 ). The increase in the costs of transportation created a knock-on effect that caused the prices of food and other necessities to increase, and this led to a further decline in the purchasing power of these already poor households. This is happening amid a bad macroeconomic environment. Despite the fact that GDP growth amounted to 2.5 percent as of 2024, it is projected to come down to 2.2 percent as of 2025, which amounts to less than the population growth and is an indicator of a further reduction of the per capita income. Although headline inflation was contained at 0.3%, the economic situation is still not sound. Early in 2025, the central bank interventions gave some temporary satisfaction to the Afghan afghani (AFN), but the currency is not stable yet. The AFN suffered a loss of over 10% share at the end of 2024 and shows a close relationship with inflationary activities since the correlation coefficient of 73.79 accounts for the fact that even slight depreciation not only significantly works to increase importation costs but also leads to domestic price fluctuations (Sirat, 2025). To sum up, Afghanistan's strategic reliance on trade routes in the region, primarily through Iran and Pakistan, the structural underdevelopment, and the macroeconomic vulnerability make the country highly vulnerable in the system. Health or conflict-related trade disturbances reveal glaring weaknesses in the supply chain, fiscal system, and social welfare system, and are more than enough reasons to plan strategically, diversify the economy, and collaborate with regions to minimize exposure and become more resilient. 5. Results and Discussion 5.1 Descriptive Summary Considering the descriptive research model that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) applies typically when conducting its research on trade shocks and by way of commodity price volatility, this section will analyze the provincial-scale market reaction to the border closure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. IMF reports emphasize the effects of the restrictive trade and supply chain on basic commodity prices, particularly in the import-dependent economy, and how it can convey inflation and regional differences within a short frame of time. Based on this line of analysis, we use a descriptive, event-based analysis that analyzes the impact of the disrupted trade flow between provinces in Afghanistan in a short-term way (IMF, 2025 ). The Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure in the central provinces across the country (August 2021), such as Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul, triggered a drastic rise in the prices of key commodities such as flour, cooking oil, beans, and gas. The converted figures based on an average exchange rate of 85 AFN per USD reflect dramatic increases both in absolute figures and percentages during the two months. These are price spikes as a result of imminent disruption of the supply chain due to delays in imports, logistical backups, and restricted overland access. The results highlight the weak structural susceptibility to exogenous shocks in trade in Afghanistan, particularly since there are limited options in differentiating supply outlets and the emergency supply of commodities. It is also worth noting that regional variances in price impacts also help to disclose an imbalanced capacity of provincial markets; peripheral or war-torn regions, like Kunduz and Faryab, witnessed a greater rise in inflation as compared to cities, like Kabul. Commodity-specific trends have been given in the following section, where the inflation pattern of each item is discussed. Table 1 Provincial Price Changes of Essential Commodities Following Pakistan Border Closure, July–August 2021, in USD Commodity Province Price in July 2021 (USD) Price in August 2021 (USD) Absolute Change (USD) Percentage Change (%) Flour (50kg) Kunduz 18.82 26.47 7.65 40.6 Oil (5ltr) Kunduz 8.82 10.59 1.77 20.1 Beans (1kg) Kunduz 1.18 1.53 0.35 29.7 Gas (1ltr) Kunduz 0.61 1.0 0.39 63.9 Flour (50kg) Faryab 19.06 21.18 2.12 11.1 Oil (5ltr) Faryab 7.29 8.24 0.95 13.0 Beans (1kg) Faryab 1.12 1.29 0.17 15.2 Gas (1ltr) Faryab 0.76 1.0 0.24 31.6 Flour (50kg) Kabul 21.65 22.94 1.29 6.0 Oil (5Ltr) Kabul 8.0 8.47 0.47 5.9 Beans (1kg) Kabul 1.41 1.41 0.0 0.0 Gas (1ltr) Kabul 0.65 0.76 0.11 16.9 Source: ( Save the Children, 2021 ) Table 1 illustrates the strong cases of immediate and asymmetric impacts of the July-August 2021 cross-border closure with Pakistan on domestic prices of food and fuel in central Afghan provinces. Price increases were particularly acute in Kunduz and Faryab, which are two northern provinces that strongly relied on Pakistani overland trade routes. The cost of flour, gas, and cooking oil rose by 40.6 percent, 63.9 percent, and 20.1 percent, respectively, highlighting the extreme volatility of prices under the supply chain disruption in the region. Even partially buffered by the access to alternative routes that lie through Iran and Turkmenistan, Faryab was characterized by significant inflation, especially in liquefied gas (+ 31.6%) and cooking oil (+ 13.0%), which underscores the lower substitutability of essential commodities in times of acute shocks. In comparison, Kabul experienced relatively stable prices with prices of flour and oil rising only by 6.0 percent and 5.9 percent, respectively, and the cost of beans remained the same. That indicates the greater resilience of the capital, presumably because of having centralized storage, sourcing diversification, and emergency intervention. The observed provincial differences confirm that being closer to the choice points of trade, combined with the localization of the supply, adds to the vulnerability of a location in the case of a crisis. As shown in Fig. 1 , the graphically presented data represents the percentage rise in prices of basic commodities at Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul after the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was closed in the middle of the year 2021. The visual analysis supports the conclusions of Table 1 , where, despite the observable regional differences in the inflationary influence, the view seems relatively straightforward. The highest intensity of price shocks was registered in Kunduz since this region relies heavily on the exchange of goods with Pakistan, especially liquefied gas and flour. Even though it is partially exposed to other routes of supply via Iran and Turkmenistan, Faryab registered relatively high but significant growth, particularly in gas and oil prices. In comparison with Kabul, minimal inflation was seen, which proves the centralized logistics, sourcing diversification, and buffers of institutions to be a stabilizing factor. Table 2 shows the sudden week-on-week increase in the price of basic commodities in Kabul, after the June 2025 Iran-Israel war, which also caused a break in border incidents with Iran. Even primary commodities in the household like flour, rice, oil, and diesel registered steep increases within only a period of seven days, demonstrating Afghanistan's acute exposure to external shocks. Such a fast rush creates not only an immediate crisis in supply but also a more fundamental structural vulnerability to Iranian trade channels. The statistics illustrate the rapidity with which geopolitical instability may lead to nationwide inflation, especially with weak, import-based economies that do not have shock-absorbing devices. Table 2 Price Changes of Essential Commodities in Kabul After Iran Border Disruption During Iran–Israel Conflict (June 2025) Item Current Price in Afghanistan (USD) Last Week's Price in Afghanistan (USD) Weekly Change in Price (USD) Weekly Change (%) 1 Bag of Flour 21.78 18.97 + 2.81 14.81% 1 Bag of Rice 35.14 30.95 + 4.19 13.53% 10 liters of cooking oil 15.46 13.35 + 2.11 15.81% 1 liter of Diesel 0.95 0.83 + 0.12 14.69% Source: ( TOLOnews, 2025 ) Table 2 identifies the inflationary impact of the Iran-Israel war in June 2025 on weekly prices of commodities in Kabul and how easily external geopolitical shocks destabilize highly import-dependent economies with weak externalities, such as that of Afghanistan. Prices of the essential staples increased by 14.81, 13.53, 15.81, and 14.69 percent, respectively, when it comes to flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel in only one week. Such sharp rises not only signify short-term scarcity of supply, but also reinforce the structural dependence of Afghanistan on Iranian trade routes and its topical absence of buffers in terms of production. Increase in the cost of transport fuel like diesel, which increased the operational costs, especially for the rural agriculture and food supply chain logistics, further contributed to the reduction of purchasing power of the households, particularly low-income households and urban families whose operations were off the official markets. As opposed to mere short-run movements in the market, these numbers are a harbinger of an impending structural susceptibility. They show us how the external dependence, the poor institutional capacity, and the speculative behavior interact to multiply the regional destabilizing effect on the domestic level. Unless there are tactical responses in policies, including but not limited to internalizing dealing partners in imports, undertaking the preparation of emergency reserves, and stabilizing domestic supply chains, these shocks can spiral into a full-scale socioeconomic and humanitarian crisis. Figure 2 shows graphically the increase in the price of four of the basic supplies in Kabul as of June 19, 2025, in the short-term reaction of the market to the Israeli-Iranian confrontation that occurred in the previous days of these events. The diagram shows an eye-catching surge of inflation: in only seven days, flour prices soared by 14.81 percent, rice by 13.53 percent, cooking oil by 15.81 percent, and diesel by 14.69 percent. Such coordinated and sharp increases in prices are supportive of the systemic vulnerabilities of the Afghan economy to external geopolitical shocks, and especially strategic reliance on trade routes through Iran. This number graphically proves the rates at which breaks in the supply chains, inflation in fuel costs, and market speculation are converted to instability in domestic prices. In addition to a short-term reaction to the market, the mutual positive growth in all types indicates the structural weakness, namely, a low storage level, the lack of price regulation mechanisms, and the absence of diversification in imports. This presents the markets of Afghanistan as highly vulnerable to tensions in the region, which increases the need to implement policy to ensure the resilience of supply chains and absorb the shock within its economy. 5.2 Statistical Testing: Paired Sample t-Test for Price Changes Following the established tradition of applied development economics, the question of whether a change in observed prices both before and after the occurrence of key border disturbances is significantly different will be addressed through the application of the paired-sample t-test. This strategy has been shared fully among the global organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to assess the effect of shocks on the economy, such as trade, food security, and price volatility, particularly in fragile or data-deficient environments. These statistical procedures are continuously employed by the research sector of the World Bank when performing empirical research regarding price tendencies and regulation impacts (The World Bank Research, 2019 ). Such practices are internationally accepted, and hence the study enhances the validity and comparability of its findings as part of the overall policy debate on food price volatility and trade vulnerability. For the July–August 2021 period, three provinces were analyzed: Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul. Province t-statistic p-value Interpretation Kunduz -1.464 0.239 Not statistically significant Faryab -1.923 0.150 Not statistically significant Kabul -1.601 0.208 Not statistically significant To analyze the closure of Pakistan's borders, the statistical data regarding Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul belonging to the province are used during the July-August timeline of 2021. Even though paired-sample t-tests have been employed, the exact time during which they collected the data and the number of observations (n) are not stated in the source reports. Statistical outcomes on all three provinces resulted in p-values that were larger than standard significance values (p > 0.15), that is, no significant differences were found. Nevertheless, the descriptive outcomes depict a high cost rise of flour (plus 40.6 per cent), gas (plus 63.9 per cent), and oil (plus 20.1 per cent) in Kunduz, representing acute inflationary hitches. These results indicate that the insignificance could be attributed to small or unbalanced sample sizes, not the implication of the nonexistence of economic effect, particularly with the apparent regional variations seen here. For the June 2025 Iran–Israel conflict-driven disruption, paired t-tests were applied to weekly Retail prices in Kabul. Province t-statistic p-value Interpretation Kabul (2025) -2.722 0.072 Marginally significant (p < 0.1) After the Iran-Israel conflict in June 2025, a paired-sample t-test was conducted to test the variation in the weekly retail prices of essential commodities in Kabul, before and after the partial closure of the Kabul and Iran borders. The t-statistic is -2.722, with a p-value of 0.072, indicating that the outcome was marginally significant at the 10% level. This suggests that none of the price increases that are observed in flour (+ 14.81%), rice (+ 13.53%), cooking oil (+ 15.81%), and diesel (+ 14.69%) are random developments, but instead can be predicted to take place and lead to an increase in the price level. The value of the result is not up to the level of 5 percent significance, but it will still point to a perceivable effect on the economic field because the timeframe was not extensive, and Kabul was highly exposed to the Iranian trade routes. The above results support the hypothesis that domestic price instability within import-heavy regions can develop rapidly in response to geopolitical shocks, as observed in the case of Afghanistan, which is structurally fragile with a narrow buffer range in the supply chain and an excessive reliance on a single trade route. 5.3 Socioeconomic Consequences of Border Closures: Beyond Geographies, Toward Systemic Vulnerabilities 5.3.1 Collapsing Purchasing Power and Expanding Food Insecurity The effects of border closure, irrespective of the geographical basis of border closure, on long-distance socioeconomic effects extend to weak, import-reliant economies. Even a temporary suspension of the transit corridors paralyzes the supply of vital goods, limits the market supply, and increases the inflationary pressures. Such shocks directly impact purchasing power and lead to increased food insecurity, particularly in cases where households are already existing on the fringes of poverty. Afghanistan is one such country where almost one-half of its population is below the poverty line, and foodstuff imports constitute the main sustenance of the national consumption; price spurts in basic foodstuff items, even in the short run, can be catastrophic. These shocks cannot be absorbed by stagnant wages, particularly those in the informal economy, and the family will have to respond to them by reducing the call floor or liquidating productive assets and/or dropping children out of school. All these are not individual means of coping but the evidence of a growing humanitarian crisis. Any disruption in the trade channels, whether through war, pandemic, or political friction, is not only making food and fuel prices hit the roof but also restricting the means to healthcare, education, and work, further plunging the already poor communities into the prospect of perpetual impoverishment. Due to the collapse of cross-border supply chains, internal logistics also collapses under the pressure, which exacerbates the inequality between urban and rural citizens. 5.3.2 Macroeconomic Instability and the Retreat from Development Border closures at the macro-level limit fiscal policy space, renew government spending on emergency responses, and weaken long-term development planning. With the increase in donor fatigue and the reduction of foreign assistance, the already small capacity of fragile states to recover after suffering concurrent shocks, including food crisis, decreased value of currency, and disrupted trade, in turn further dilutes the legitimacy of the state and the goal of economic stabilization. Trade-related inflationary shocks consume massive amounts of government cash, and the result of this leads to a redirection of funds that are meant to be used on infrastructure, health, and education sectors in favor of temporary relief measures, as well as stabilization of prices. Such a trade-off prevents structural transformation by trapping the economies in low-productivity traps. Moreover, fragility is compounded by financial exclusion, currency volatility, and an overly strict policy that limits effort in the labor force (and this is more of a problem for women). The failure to enter the regional value chains and lack of access to international banking services imply that even the geopolitical tensions that are not directly affecting the country, like its borders, can cause drastic disturbances in the internal status quo of the market. 5.3.3 Border Closures as Catalysts for Systemic Fragility The Afghanistan example is one that we can apply to other landlocked, conflict-ridden, and import-dependent countries: closed borders not only cause a material disruption in the flow of goods, but they are also triggers to reveal and aggravate existing economic and social deficiencies. The scale of their effects is because they affect all connected systems: trade, transport, finance, employment, and public services. One of the significant findings of this research is that the exposure to border closure is structural more than it is circumstantial. It is a product of dependency in imports, low diversification levels, insufficient infrastructure, poor state capacity, and geographic isolation. The implications do not only limit their effects to the short-term market manipulations but goes as far as to the long-term retarded growth. 6. Conclusion and Recommendation This paper highlights how uneven and localized the impacts of the border closures with Iran and Pakistan have been on the food markets in Afghanistan. Although both of the above disruptions harm supply chains and consumer prices, there are more direct and specific inflationary effects from the shorter shutdown of the Iran-Afghanistan border in 2025. These inflationary impacts are more noticeable in Kabul, reflecting Afghanistan's increasing dependence on Iranian products, including fuel and staple supplies, as well as the use of Iranian corridors. Conversely, the closure in Pakistan in 2021 brought evenly distributed price rises, mostly in northern provinces, including Kunduz and Faryab. The paired-sample t-test has shown a marginally significant value in the case of Kabul in 2025, and it can give some statistical backing to the noted rise in prices. All in all, these results indicate an increase in structural weakness due to poor diversification of trade, excessive concentration on a single source of imports, and poor domestic cushions. In order to avoid future impediments to trade, Afghanistan would benefit by undertaking a multi-pronged approach to food system and logistics network resilience. The country should strengthen its trade relations with its neighbors in Central Asia and invest in other transit corridors in order to alleviate the overdependence issue on Iran and Pakistan. It is therefore essential to build strategic national reserves of some basic commodities like food and fuel so that short-term shocks can be absorbed, and this keeps speculative tendencies at bay in very volatile markets. There should be parallel tracks to enhance domestic agricultural production through investments in rural infrastructure, irrigation systems, and modern farming technologies. Potential mitigation measures that could be put in place to curb cases where a price adjustment leads to inflationary cycles are institutional price stabilization during a crisis and better coordination between food security actors, including humanitarians and governments. Lastly, an alert system and real-time data surveillance platform should be deployed to ensure that measures are taken in advance before the manifestation of geopolitical or logistical risk. A combination of these efforts can restore Afghanistan to a stronger economic standing and provide food security should any future external shock occur in the country. Declarations Funding declaration: This research did not receive any specific grants from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Clinical trial number: Not applicable. Ethics approval, consent to participate, and consent for publication : Not applicable. Conflict of Interest Statement The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. Author Contribution A.A.P. (Abdul Ahmad Pooya) conducted the entire research process, including the conception and design of the study, data collection and analysis, preparation of figures and tables, and manuscript writing. The author reviewed and approved the final version of the paper for submission. Data Availability The data used in this study were obtained from publicly available sources, including [e.g., TOLO News, Save the Children]. 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(2025). ? ????? ? ????????? ? ?????? . https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8096333ca1992e8a986bf0b5c159b672-0310012025/related/Afghanistan-Economic-Monitor-February-2025-Dari.pdf World Bank. (2025). Afghanistan Economic Monitor. The World Bank Group. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8096333ca1992e8a986bf0b5c159b672-0310012025/original/Afghanistan-Economic-Monitor-February-2025.pdf World Bank Research. (2019). W.B. Research. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/research Zahra Rashidi. (2025, May 29). Food prices drop 1.4 percent in April. ???????? ???? ??? - ?????. https://www.khaama.com/persian/archives/155854 Zhang, Y., Waldhoff, S., Wise, M., Edmonds, J., & Patel, P. (2023). Agriculture, bioenergy, and water implications of constrained cereal trade and climate change impacts. PLoS ONE, 18(9), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0291577 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7331484","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":506430624,"identity":"dbc5edfe-ec0e-4171-a182-599941c5d658","order_by":0,"name":"Abdul Ahmad Pooya","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Hunan University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Abdul","middleName":"Ahmad","lastName":"Pooya","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-08-09 05:38:14","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":90349424,"identity":"bdd6ac49-77ab-4170-a580-ca9186fd4e06","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-01 17:20:17","extension":"jpeg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":157936,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eDisproportionate Price Shocks across Afghan Provinces Following Pakistan Border Closure: Evidence from July–August 2021\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: author’s calculations based on primary data\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7331484/v1/0d65ec0646ad2653acadb1c6.jpeg"},{"id":90349423,"identity":"9b9d4f6d-6241-42a6-b992-370b38b2e1a0","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-01 17:20:17","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":107138,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWeekly Price Surge of Essential Goods in Kabul Following the Iran–Israel Conflict (June 2025)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: author's calculations based on primary data\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7331484/v1/71d9cd97070c37f2d1a4a13d.png"},{"id":93687712,"identity":"55cd2693-9f1a-4b29-a868-179ee826741e","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-16 13:31:52","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1296089,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7331484/v1/8cb5d225-1c3e-4b11-94e9-e910ba5f5881.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Border Disruptions and Food Security in Fragile Economies: Evidence from Afghanistan’s Trade Dependence on Iran and Pakistan","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe topography of Afghanistan as a landlocked state, which has to rely on the transit trade bound to its neighbors Iran and Pakistan, hugely contributes to its economic weakness. This reliance predisposes the nation to huge risks since even the minute border shutdowns may compromise trade patterns, lower food sufficiency, and destabilize prices (Rahim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). As most of the essential imported foodstuffs to Afghanistan-wheat flour and rice-are supplied almost exclusively by Pakistan and Iran, the country is susceptible to the continuous flow of the cross-border transport routes. Chronic trade deficits also indicate the presence of structural vulnerability to such domestic capacity to produce that puts Afghan households at significant risk of external shocks that threaten livelihoods and nutrition alike (Mahmood et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Amin et al., 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese border shocks can be dramatic and occur mainly under the influence of political or security factors that have a devastating economic impact on traders and disrupt essential supply chains, and the instantaneous rise in prices, especially in food (Rahim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Despite the fact that the increase in the valuation of the Afghan afghani and positive harvests in the short run have alleviated the inflationary pressures, this balance is tenuous. Ironically, closure of borders will not only increase the cost of necessary imports but can lower national agricultural product prices because of the limitation of exportation, which increases poverty. The fact that Afghanistan currently depends heavily on imports, and its trade deficit is steadily growing, heightens the economic vulnerability of this state and contributes to the food insecurity of its population, with millions of people relying on the delivery of humanitarian aid (Rahim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Rahmany, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis volatility is evidently depicted by empirical data. In the World Bank's February 2025 report, the domestic prices were recorded to have increased slightly by 0.1 percent in January 2025 relative to December 2024, and this was attributed mainly to the increase in food prices by 1.1 percent. This marginal stability was attributed to the appreciation of the Afghan currency when compared to the U.S. dollar, a better availability of imports, and a declining global commodity market (World Bank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, the KhabarFarsi (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) showed an increase of 3.0 percent in food prices in February 2025, a 5.0 percent increase in prices in clothing, and a 3.4 percent increase in prices in household goods, respectively. In the meantime, NSIA of Afghanistan registered a decrease in food prices by 1.4 percent in April 2025 (Swar 1404), which was mainly caused by a tremendous decline in the prices of vegetables (16.7 percent), spices (7.3 percent), and milk (3.7 percent) (Zahra Rashidi, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAmong the interconnected aspects that propagate oscillation of food prices in Afghanistan are exchange rates (instability in the value of the afghani to the U.S), discontinuation in international donations, as well as food dependency, (flour, wheat, oil, rice) climatical shocks, floods, and droughts, and road blocks at strategic border points such as Torkham and Islam Qala. Collectively, such pressures make the prices high and worsen food security in the country (Shoaib \u0026amp; Yunxian, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; KhabarFarsi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Ufuq News, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough the stability of the borders is paramount to the economically weak, landlocked countries such as Afghanistan, there is a considerable gap in the empirical work that examines the impact of border closures and their implications for the structure of imports and internal food prices. This research has attempted to bridge the gap by looking at two large-scale cases of border shutdown: the COVID-19-induced lockdown in Pakistan in 2021 and the 2025 border closure in Iran as part of the Iran-Israel conflict.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere are three critical scientific contributions of this article. On the one hand, it contributes to the literature by focusing on the in-depth nature of the disruption of the distribution of trade to illustrate the effect of geopolitical strains on the inflow composition. Second, by combining the exchange rate movements and high-resolution food prices, it measures the direct impact of border closures on national price volatility of foodstuffs. Third, it contextualizes the experience of Afghanistan against the background of the world debate on trade vulnerability and food security in fragile states. All in all, these findings are a good guiding light to policymakers interested in responding with greater resilience in both economic and human aid relief in future trouble spots of this kind.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe rest of this article consists of the following way of organization: Section 2 contains review of related literature and theoretical framework; Section 3 contains research methodology; Section 4 includes the discussion of structural vulnerabilities and dependence of Afghanistan in regional trade; Section 5 consists of the presentation of the empirical findings, and the analysis; Section 6 contains the conclusion and implications of policy and recommendations.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature and theoretical analysis","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1 Literature Review\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eClosure of the borders with Afghanistan has shown, numerous times, the grave insecurity of the country to any disturbances in the flow of trade. It has been detrimental to food prices and security situations. This can be seen in the example of the global food price crisis of 2007/2008: wheat flour prices increased twofold in Afghanistan alone within several months due to not only a severe domestic drought but also regional export restrictions and overall increase in global food prices (D'Souza et al., 2016). This shock was especially harmful since the Afghan households consume almost 60 percent of their income in food, and wheat alone contributes more than half of their calories (D'Souza et al., 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBorder closure affects the economy not just in the short term, but also raises prices. To take one example, when the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, traders incurred high rates of additional charges, those related to demurrage and detention costs, averaging at USD 150 per container per day, with the highest being USD 15,000 (Rasul, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Such increased trading expenses heightened inflationary demands in the food markets in Afghanistan.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis makes fragile states such as Afghanistan susceptible to trade shocks, which is one of the areas of systemic weaknesses that can be built into an ever more complex global food system. Even the international trade networks have grown in dimension and interconnectedness and present many pathways through which food trade can occur, and likewise heavily multiply the potential that cascading effects will take place when external jolts are encountered (Burkholz et al., 2019). Such systems of Coldwater are more susceptible to African and Asian countries, and can swiftly travel through global supply chains.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe prominent feature of this vulnerability lies in the concentrated export profile of the staple cereals. Food security of more than 200\u0026nbsp;million individuals around the globe is at risk because disruptions caused by global grain exporters affect 90 percent of those persons, and most of them are based in sub-Saharan Africa (Seekell et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Laio et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Food stocks in most of the vulnerable regions are low and unstable, which further restrains their shock-absorbing capacity, resulting in higher insecurity (Seekell et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe government's response to a crisis through trade policies tends to increase global food insecurity. Such export restrictions, which are popularized during COVID-2019 and food crises in the past, entail the adverse spillover effects through increased international prices and a decrease in food availability in countries experiencing import dependency (Swinnen et al., 2021; Laborde et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). These restrictions have a more substantial effect on the economies that are heavily dependent on imports and those that have few alternative suppliers (Koppenberg et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese weaknesses have been contributed to by geopolitical crises that have also occurred recently. The Russian invasion of Ukraine interrupted the functioning of the global agricultural market, which led to a reduction in the availability of wheat and increased world food prices (Hellegers, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). This combination of binary hits the reduction of the importation of grains and the rise of the cost of the demands of inputs and fertilizers, furthered food insecurity in already vulnerable areas mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, given that they have been and remain significant importers of grain imports (Rahimi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Wellington et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is mainly based on the variety of trade links and volume of trade links that a country is able to withstand any trade interruptions. The main risk of countries that are dependent on only one or a few supplies is that they are more vulnerable as long as their suppliers are exposed to shocks (Marchand et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). The most susceptible areas, such as the Middle East, Central America, and West Africa, rely on several staple crops (wheat, maize, and rice). Still, as a result, they become more susceptible to remotely caused supply chain shocks (Bren d'Amour et al., 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBesides direct cost factors, the closing of borders and disruption of commerce have long-term effects on locally-based agriculture. The economic and trade activity was devastated in West Africa because of the Ebola outbreak due to the closure of the borders, which led to a loss of 20\u0026ndash;50 percent of the major crops, such as rice, coffee, cocoa, and maize (Jacoby et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). The repetition of such issues might take place in weak states, which experience long-term disturbances.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe topic of open trade and food security in fragile states is rather multifaceted and contradictory. Although the international food trade facilitates the global food supply, one out of every six people in the world is very dependent on trade (Sun et al., 2021; Chikhuri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e)-the excessiveness of dependency means that the impact is severe during periods of discontinuity. Research indicates that economic instability, coupled with volatility in trade openness, may negatively impact food security in developing nations, particularly in cases where developing nations deal in a small number of staple foodstuffs and their markets are closed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEffects of the trade disturbances extend to other countries via price transmission channels that are not precisely targeted by the disturbances. It can be analyzed and observed that global transmission of prices is interfered with due to disruptions, as was seen in the wheat and flour markets of Afghanistan and other places like this (Mann et al., 2021). Notably, the effects of these prices can have a long-term impact on the resumption of trade and, hence, continued problems with food security.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese shortcomings were further illustrated during the COVID-19 pandemic due to border closures, transportation problems, and labor shortages, which upset all agricultural production in the world and food supply chains (Mahmood et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). These restrictions on exports with the aim of protecting national supplies entailed major shocks in the world food markets and resulted in price surges within most countries (Schoeneman et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Carreno et al., 2020; Evenett et al., 2020).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAll of this demonstrates the necessity to reach a compromise between making trade efficient and making the food system resilient. Although the process of trade integration is positive to both exporters and importers as it links surplus and deficit economies, import-dependent economies, especially fragile ones, are susceptible to shocks in the international trading environment (Zhang et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Puma et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The main issue would be how to better combine the advantages of trade specialization with the endeavors to build up the domestic production and diversify the sources of imports, and become more resilient.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSpecifically, to Afghanistan, which has its own geopolitical location and a relatively frequent disruption of its borders, this study is aimed at filling the significant gap concerning the direct consequences of closing the borders on the food prices and import flows. The learnings of this research can enhance academic knowledge and give practical directions to all policymakers and humanitarian non-governmental organizations that aim at strengthening economic resilience and food security in fragile, landlocked nations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe paper is a very valuable addition to the trade disruptions and economic vulnerability literature, as it brings a specific empirical contribution to this field of expertise, demonstrating how border closures impact the import composition and food security of the country concerned, particularly in an import-dependent, geopolitically weak country, in this case, Afghanistan. Although several studies have recorded different dimensions of trade vulnerability in developing economies, there are few studies examining the concomitant impact of multiple shocks, which include border closure, price volatility, and currency depreciation, among other shocks, in developing countries where resilience is low. The paper contributes to the academic debate because it incorporates a variety of types of vulnerability into one empirical study and tests the implications of these factors in three theoretically based hypotheses.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterdependent structural conditions cause vulnerability of the import-dependent economies faced by the trade shock. An important aspect is the degree of dependence on imports that inherently augments the exposure of the country to outside shocks. Although a drop in international prices can help countries weather the economic storm in the short term, as demonstrated by Kavallari et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e), highly dependent countries on imported agricultural goods are exposed to market disturbances to a considerable degree. This weakness is acute, particularly for a country that relies on imported necessities such as staple goods, fuel, or mid-range goods to make products.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eImport concentration or over-dependence on a few supplier nations is another significant part. The studies show that this kind of concentration heightens systemic risks, especially in those areas that have a low level of substitution. To illustrate, Sharma et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) discovered that the lack of diversification in exporters of biomedical products might cause considerable risks to people. In the COVID-19 pandemic, Boschemeier et al. (2023) noted that contractions in imports were sharper in highly market-concentrated nations. Nonetheless, turning to alternative trade partners allowed them to reduce losses in supply by almost a third due to lockdowns, thus pointing to the opportunity, but rather constrained possibilities of diversification.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe risks are particularly high in an agricultural trade. Through the increases in international food trade experienced in the past few decades, the food security of nations has come to be associated with the sustainability of world food systems. The analysis of Seekell et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and Marchand et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) show that the declining ratio of domestic food production to demand propels the country of import to increase its vulnerability to exogenous shocks, i.e., in the case of Egypt, the relative decrease in the output of food products within the country led to the country becoming more susceptible to external shocks. Veninga et al. (2018) show that Egypt faces the threat of instability in wheat imports, and this instability gravely affects domestic food security. Other import-dependent states experience the same dynamics, hence researchers formulated self-sufficiency ratios and vulnerability indexes to have a better grasp of exposure (Gutierrez-Moya et al., 2020).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH1\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eClosure of borders with significant trading partners will have pronounced impacts of increasing the prices of food at the domestic level and triggering structural changes, such as changes in imports in countries that are import-dependent, such as Afghanistan.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eVulnerability is also determined by the dynamics of trade networks around the world. Increased integration of such international supply chains will make local disturbances become global emergencies. The studies conducted by Puma, Steinbrech et al. (2015), Burkholz et al. (2019), and Li et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrate the level of cascading effects that can quickly appear in food systems in the case of a high level of network instability. To give an example, Li et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) mention Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Belgium among countries that are on a high-risk level since their domestic production capability falls short, and they use foreign food supplies quite intensively, which Afghanistan also does in terms of trade.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, when export controls are applied during crises, it aggravates the vulnerability of the importing countries. It has been proven that the exporting countries tend to limit exports in favor of the government of supply, and this increases the deficiency in the markets where they are dependent (Headey et al., 2008; Bren d'Amour \u0026amp; Anderson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Another point stressed by Koppenberg et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) is that such restrictions will have a greater adverse effect in those countries that have high import dependency and low substitutability, which is true of Afghanistan, with most of its major commodities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe world commodity market is also another cause of economic vulnerability due to the fluctuation of prices. To give an example, price shocks have a powerful impact on African countries due to the low quality of institutions and the intense exposure of these states to external trade (Katusiime, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). As revealed by Bibi et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), the rise in oil prices may adversely affect the current account balances of oil-importing countries, whereas Josue et al. (2024) witnessed that the oil price shocks lead to appreciation in currency in the exporting countries and inflation in the importing countries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH2a\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIn highly dependent economies like Afghanistan, trade disruptions\u0026mdash;such as export bans and swings in international prices\u0026mdash;affect food security and internal market stability.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinancial market volatility plays an important role, too. The volatility in the exchange rate selectively affects the companies within the import-dependent economies by increasing the prices of foreign-denominated materials. Jinjarak (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) points out that the most susceptible firms are those that have no hedging mechanisms in place and that disturbances in global supply chains may lead to a liquidity crunch and an increase in the cost of financing, as well as a lack of credit accessibility, particularly to small or informal sector importers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLastly, the inequality in resilience between high-income countries and low-income countries is the reason why price shocks are more likely to produce devastating effects in fragile economies. According to Bajaj et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), although some countries benefited due to an increased price of exportation amid the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, others were experiencing severe food insecurity. Such observations reveal the strong necessity to believe in diversification and increase domestic production capacities of the import-dependent economies. Even in the absence of such reforms, intermediate-term shocks would in some instances produce long-lasting economic friction and a humanitarian crisis (Bajaj et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH2b\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eCurrency volatility, together with trade disruptions, raises input costs, curtails credit access, and escalates price shocks, and these effects augment economic fragility in import-dependent nations, particularly in low-resilience settings, such as Afghanistan.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese mechanisms used by them are complex; this highlights the view that economic vulnerability should not be perceived as a fixed state but rather a dynamic process as the product of interacting structural, financial, and policy elements. Civin et al. (2020) conceptualize the term economic vulnerability on two levels: the sensitivity of the country to exogenous shocks in trade and the ability to adapt. As the results obtained by them, as well as by Schmitt-Groh\u0026eacute; et al. (2018), indicate, the fraction of the BOP-based variation in macroeconomic performance that can be attributed to terms-of-trade shocks is up to 30 percent, thus confirming the necessity of close empirical evaluation in the context of fragile states, such as Afghanistan.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe effect of the international border shutdown (Pakistan and Iran) on the domestic Afghanistan energy and food prices will be examined using a comparative structured case study methodology in this research. The two exogenous shocks were sampled strategically: the mid-2021 Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the partial closure of trading activities with Iran in June 2025, due to the Iran-Israel conflict. The two were selected partly because of the key position of Pakistan and Iran in terms of both being the major trading partners of Afghanistan, but also because they represent two different kinds of shocks, i.e., public health and geopolitical shocks. The design then enables comparative studies of the market reactions in the space and time dimension within the context of the domestic production limitations and import mix. The dependent variable, on the other hand, is the weekly change of retail fundamental commodities price in U.S dollars.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe affected commodities due to the 2021 disruption in Pakistan include wheat flour, cooking oil, pulses (including beans), and liquefied gas, staples that are mostly imported from Pakistan by land. The corresponding commodities in terms of the planned 2025 disruption case involving Iran are wheat flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel, which also reflect the growing dependency of Afghanistan on Iran in terms of trade paths concerning foodstuffs and oil products. The major (independent variables are a) the incidence of the border closure (dummy-coded as an intervention), b) the origin of perturbance (Pakistan/Iran), and c) the type of shock (health/conflict). The study design juxtaposes the descriptive statistics, the distance between price in percentages and absolute price changes, and the paired-sample t-tests of the statistical and economic accuracy of the realized price changes. The mixed-method design enhances the explanatory nature of the study, and it identifies the structural weaknesses of the market system of Afghanistan in response to different geopolitical pressures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.1 Case Selection and Data Sources\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe empirical part is based on the secondary price data obtained from reliable sources. The 2021 episode included regional prices that were recorded in the field assessments by Save the Children that entailed Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul; essential items considered included wheat flour, cooking oil, legumes, and liquefied gas. Regarding the case of the year 2025, TOLOnews economic reports provided the weekly retail prices of wheat flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel in Kabul. The price was also converted into USD at an average exchange rate of the particular time to make them temporarily comparable. The choice of these cases allows the study to observe inter-provincial differences as well as the inflationary pressure of particular commodities based on the fact that Afghanistan is widely dependent on its neighbors in terms of food and energy sources.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.2 Analytical Approach\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe analysis model is based on the combination of the descriptive and inferential approaches. First, both absolute and percent change in price before and after the occurrence of each border disruption are compared, enabling an opportunity to visualize the magnitude of market shocks clearly. The selection of place is examined through province-level comparisons between provinces, depending on disturbance paths. The lens used to explain the translation of dependence on particular trading partners into price vulnerability is based on the commodity level. In those cases where the data permitted it, paired-sample t-tests were conducted to determine whether the changes in prices observed were statistically significant. The tests completed on the 2021 case (in Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul) were not at standard levels of significance, probably because of small or unbalanced sample sizes, but the economic consequences were substantial, including price growth of various goods of more than 60 percent in Kunduz. However, the 2025 Kabul analysis, in comparison, produced statistically insignificant but still significant economic consequences of geopolitical instability in the prices of core consumer markets.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn order to complement this inferential analysis, statistical analysis on the significance level of the observed changes in prices before and after each disruption was performed using a paired-sample t-test. The test is according to the following formula:\u003cdiv id=\"Equ1\" class=\"Equation\"\u003e\u003cdiv format=\"TEX\" class=\"mathdisplay\" id=\"FileID_Equ1\" name=\"EquationSource\"\u003e\n$$\\:t=\\frac{\\stackrel{-}{d}}{s\\stackrel{-}{d}/\\:\\surd\\:n}\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:\\:$$\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"EquationNumber\"\u003e1\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ewhere:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(\\:\\stackrel{-}{d\\:}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003eis the mean difference in prices,\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(\\:s\\stackrel{-}{d}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the standard deviation of the differences, and\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003en is the number of paired observations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Afghanistan's Structural Vulnerability and Strategic Dependency on Regional Trade Routes","content":"\u003cp\u003eAfghanistan's position as a landlocked, aid-dependent, and fragile economy renders it acutely vulnerable to external shocks, particularly those emanating from geopolitical instability in its surrounding region. Despite years of international engagement, the country remains entrenched in a long-term cycle of underdevelopment, characterized by a GDP of only \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e17.2\u0026nbsp;billion in 2023 and a per capita income of just \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e363.7 in 2021. The scale of socioeconomic distress is staggering: 97% of the population lives in poverty, and over 22.9\u0026nbsp;million people require humanitarian assistance, underscoring the severity of the crisis (World Bank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Sirat, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgriculture continues to dominate the economy in terms of employment, with 60\u0026ndash;80% of the population engaged in low-productivity farming. However, the sector contributes less than one-third of GDP, revealing deep-seated structural inefficiencies, chronic underinvestment, and widespread lack of access to modern technology and capital (World Bank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). These internal constraints are compounded by heavy reliance on imports, especially of essential commodities such as food, fuel, and manufactured goods, making domestic price systems highly susceptible to global supply disruptions and exchange rate volatility.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 2023 alone, Afghanistan imported \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e826\u0026nbsp;million in wheat flour, \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e340\u0026nbsp;million in palm oil, and \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e213\u0026nbsp;million in rice, all of which are central to the country's Consumer Price Index (Jingjing et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This high dependence on external markets ties domestic price stability directly to international developments. Simultaneously, the country's trade deficit ballooned to \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e6.8\u0026nbsp;billion in 2023 and is projected to widen further to \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e8.9\u0026nbsp;billion in 2024, representing nearly 44% of GDP, among the highest ratios globally (Gul, 2025). While Afghanistan has sought to diversify trade beyond its traditional partners\u0026mdash;Pakistan and India\u0026mdash;by engaging with Iran, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, these efforts have not corrected structural imbalances or created meaningful buffers against external price volatility.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 2024, Iran came out as the largest import partner of Afghanistan, which contributed to about 30 percent of the country's total imports. The bilateral trade between the two nations was recorded at the amount of 3.14\u0026nbsp;billion dollars, showing an 83 percent leap as compared to the figure in the previous year (WFP, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Although the direct contribution by Iran to food supply is low, ranking third in the production of rice, and fifth and sixth in edible oil and flour, respectively, its strategic position is elsewhere. First, Iran is one of the leading suppliers of non-food commodities; refined fuel, steel, cement, and construction materials are some of them. Second, and even more importantly, Iran is a key point of transit through which Afghanistan accesses imported goods supplied through Central Asia, Malaysia, etc. As a result, any unrest in Iranian territory by war, sanctions, or any other political upheavals is two-sided: not only will it curtail the direct access to Iranian goods by Afghanistan, but it will also prevent access to the larger international markets channels through Iran.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe weaknesses of such dependency were also discovered after the onset of the Iran-Israel conflict. In mid-2025, there was an unplanned closure of border trade at the western and southern treaties in Afghanistan, and this harsh process caused an intense bottleneck in the progress of cargo, which caused a further challenge to the already stressed logistics system. Among the most direct and obvious implications was a sudden skyrocket in the prices of fuel. As of June 2025, the cost of diesel had gone up to 67.1 AFN (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e 0.95) per liter, up by 14.7 percent weekly (WFP, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The increase in the costs of transportation created a knock-on effect that caused the prices of food and other necessities to increase, and this led to a further decline in the purchasing power of these already poor households.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis is happening amid a bad macroeconomic environment. Despite the fact that GDP growth amounted to 2.5 percent as of 2024, it is projected to come down to 2.2 percent as of 2025, which amounts to less than the population growth and is an indicator of a further reduction of the per capita income. Although headline inflation was contained at 0.3%, the economic situation is still not sound. Early in 2025, the central bank interventions gave some temporary satisfaction to the Afghan afghani (AFN), but the currency is not stable yet. The AFN suffered a loss of over 10% share at the end of 2024 and shows a close relationship with inflationary activities since the correlation coefficient of 73.79 accounts for the fact that even slight depreciation not only significantly works to increase importation costs but also leads to domestic price fluctuations (Sirat, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, Afghanistan's strategic reliance on trade routes in the region, primarily through Iran and Pakistan, the structural underdevelopment, and the macroeconomic vulnerability make the country highly vulnerable in the system. Health or conflict-related trade disturbances reveal glaring weaknesses in the supply chain, fiscal system, and social welfare system, and are more than enough reasons to plan strategically, diversify the economy, and collaborate with regions to minimize exposure and become more resilient.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"5. Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.1 Descriptive Summary\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eConsidering the descriptive research model that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) applies typically when conducting its research on trade shocks and by way of commodity price volatility, this section will analyze the provincial-scale market reaction to the border closure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. IMF reports emphasize the effects of the restrictive trade and supply chain on basic commodity prices, particularly in the import-dependent economy, and how it can convey inflation and regional differences within a short frame of time. Based on this line of analysis, we use a descriptive, event-based analysis that analyzes the impact of the disrupted trade flow between provinces in Afghanistan in a short-term way (IMF, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure in the central provinces across the country (August 2021), such as Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul, triggered a drastic rise in the prices of key commodities such as flour, cooking oil, beans, and gas. The converted figures based on an average exchange rate of 85 AFN per USD reflect dramatic increases both in absolute figures and percentages during the two months. These are price spikes as a result of imminent disruption of the supply chain due to delays in imports, logistical backups, and restricted overland access. The results highlight the weak structural susceptibility to exogenous shocks in trade in Afghanistan, particularly since there are limited options in differentiating supply outlets and the emergency supply of commodities. It is also worth noting that regional variances in price impacts also help to disclose an imbalanced capacity of provincial markets; peripheral or war-torn regions, like Kunduz and Faryab, witnessed a greater rise in inflation as compared to cities, like Kabul. Commodity-specific trends have been given in the following section, where the inflation pattern of each item is discussed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvincial Price Changes of Essential Commodities Following Pakistan Border Closure, July\u0026ndash;August 2021, in USD\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCommodity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrice in July 2021 (USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrice in August 2021 (USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAbsolute Change (USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePercentage Change (%)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFlour (50kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKunduz\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e18.82\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e26.47\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e40.6\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOil (5ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKunduz\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.82\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10.59\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeans (1kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKunduz\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.18\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.53\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.35\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e29.7\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGas (1ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKunduz\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.61\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.39\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e63.9\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFlour (50kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFaryab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e19.06\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.18\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.12\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e11.1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOil (5ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFaryab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.29\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.24\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.95\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeans (1kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFaryab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.12\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.29\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.17\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGas (1ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFaryab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.76\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.24\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31.6\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFlour (50kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e22.94\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.29\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e6.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOil (5Ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.47\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.47\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.9\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeans (1kg)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.41\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.41\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGas (1ltr)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.76\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.11\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e16.9\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: (\u003c/em\u003eSave the Children, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e illustrates the strong cases of immediate and asymmetric impacts of the July-August 2021 cross-border closure with Pakistan on domestic prices of food and fuel in central Afghan provinces. Price increases were particularly acute in Kunduz and Faryab, which are two northern provinces that strongly relied on Pakistani overland trade routes. The cost of flour, gas, and cooking oil rose by 40.6 percent, 63.9 percent, and 20.1 percent, respectively, highlighting the extreme volatility of prices under the supply chain disruption in the region.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEven partially buffered by the access to alternative routes that lie through Iran and Turkmenistan, Faryab was characterized by significant inflation, especially in liquefied gas (+\u0026thinsp;31.6%) and cooking oil (+\u0026thinsp;13.0%), which underscores the lower substitutability of essential commodities in times of acute shocks.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn comparison, Kabul experienced relatively stable prices with prices of flour and oil rising only by 6.0 percent and 5.9 percent, respectively, and the cost of beans remained the same. That indicates the greater resilience of the capital, presumably because of having centralized storage, sourcing diversification, and emergency intervention. The observed provincial differences confirm that being closer to the choice points of trade, combined with the localization of the supply, adds to the vulnerability of a location in the case of a crisis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, the graphically presented data represents the percentage rise in prices of basic commodities at Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul after the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was closed in the middle of the year 2021. The visual analysis supports the conclusions of Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, where, despite the observable regional differences in the inflationary influence, the view seems relatively straightforward.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe highest intensity of price shocks was registered in Kunduz since this region relies heavily on the exchange of goods with Pakistan, especially liquefied gas and flour. Even though it is partially exposed to other routes of supply via Iran and Turkmenistan, Faryab registered relatively high but significant growth, particularly in gas and oil prices. In comparison with Kabul, minimal inflation was seen, which proves the centralized logistics, sourcing diversification, and buffers of institutions to be a stabilizing factor.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e shows the sudden week-on-week increase in the price of basic commodities in Kabul, after the June 2025 Iran-Israel war, which also caused a break in border incidents with Iran. Even primary commodities in the household like flour, rice, oil, and diesel registered steep increases within only a period of seven days, demonstrating Afghanistan's acute exposure to external shocks. Such a fast rush creates not only an immediate crisis in supply but also a more fundamental structural vulnerability to Iranian trade channels. The statistics illustrate the rapidity with which geopolitical instability may lead to nationwide inflation, especially with weak, import-based economies that do not have shock-absorbing devices.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrice Changes of Essential Commodities in Kabul After Iran Border Disruption During Iran\u0026ndash;Israel Conflict (June 2025)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eItem\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCurrent Price in Afghanistan (USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLast Week's Price in Afghanistan (USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWeekly Change in Price\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(USD)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWeekly Change\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(%)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1 Bag of Flour\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.78\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e18.97\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.81\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e14.81%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1 Bag of Rice\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e35.14\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e30.95\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.19\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.53%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10 liters of\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecooking oil\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.46\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.35\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.11\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.81%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1 liter of Diesel\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.95\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.83\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;0.12\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e14.69%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: (\u003c/em\u003eTOLOnews, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e identifies the inflationary impact of the Iran-Israel war in June 2025 on weekly prices of commodities in Kabul and how easily external geopolitical shocks destabilize highly import-dependent economies with weak externalities, such as that of Afghanistan. Prices of the essential staples increased by 14.81, 13.53, 15.81, and 14.69 percent, respectively, when it comes to flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel in only one week. Such sharp rises not only signify short-term scarcity of supply, but also reinforce the structural dependence of Afghanistan on Iranian trade routes and its topical absence of buffers in terms of production. Increase in the cost of transport fuel like diesel, which increased the operational costs, especially for the rural agriculture and food supply chain logistics, further contributed to the reduction of purchasing power of the households, particularly low-income households and urban families whose operations were off the official markets. As opposed to mere short-run movements in the market, these numbers are a harbinger of an impending structural susceptibility. They show us how the external dependence, the poor institutional capacity, and the speculative behavior interact to multiply the regional destabilizing effect on the domestic level. Unless there are tactical responses in policies, including but not limited to internalizing dealing partners in imports, undertaking the preparation of emergency reserves, and stabilizing domestic supply chains, these shocks can spiral into a full-scale socioeconomic and humanitarian crisis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFigure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e shows graphically the increase in the price of four of the basic supplies in Kabul as of June 19, 2025, in the short-term reaction of the market to the Israeli-Iranian confrontation that occurred in the previous days of these events. The diagram shows an eye-catching surge of inflation: in only seven days, flour prices soared by 14.81 percent, rice by 13.53 percent, cooking oil by 15.81 percent, and diesel by 14.69 percent. Such coordinated and sharp increases in prices are supportive of the systemic vulnerabilities of the Afghan economy to external geopolitical shocks, and especially strategic reliance on trade routes through Iran. This number graphically proves the rates at which breaks in the supply chains, inflation in fuel costs, and market speculation are converted to instability in domestic prices.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition to a short-term reaction to the market, the mutual positive growth in all types indicates the structural weakness, namely, a low storage level, the lack of price regulation mechanisms, and the absence of diversification in imports. This presents the markets of Afghanistan as highly vulnerable to tensions in the region, which increases the need to implement policy to ensure the resilience of supply chains and absorb the shock within its economy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.2 Statistical Testing: Paired Sample t-Test for Price Changes\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFollowing the established tradition of applied development economics, the question of whether a change in observed prices both before and after the occurrence of key border disturbances is significantly different will be addressed through the application of the paired-sample t-test. This strategy has been shared fully among the global organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to assess the effect of shocks on the economy, such as trade, food security, and price volatility, particularly in fragile or data-deficient environments. These statistical procedures are continuously employed by the research sector of the World Bank when performing empirical research regarding price tendencies and regulation impacts (The World Bank Research, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Such practices are internationally accepted, and hence the study enhances the validity and comparability of its findings as part of the overall policy debate on food price volatility and trade vulnerability.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor the July\u0026ndash;August 2021 period, three provinces were analyzed: Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003et-statistic\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterpretation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKunduz\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.464\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.239\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot statistically significant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFaryab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.923\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.150\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot statistically significant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.601\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.208\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot statistically significant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo analyze the closure of Pakistan's borders, the statistical data regarding Kunduz, Faryab, and Kabul belonging to the province are used during the July-August timeline of 2021. Even though paired-sample t-tests have been employed, the exact time during which they collected the data and the number of observations (n) are not stated in the source reports. Statistical outcomes on all three provinces resulted in p-values that were larger than standard significance values (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.15), that is, no significant differences were found. Nevertheless, the descriptive outcomes depict a high cost rise of flour (plus 40.6 per cent), gas (plus 63.9 per cent), and oil (plus 20.1 per cent) in Kunduz, representing acute inflationary hitches. These results indicate that the insignificance could be attributed to small or unbalanced sample sizes, not the implication of the nonexistence of economic effect, particularly with the apparent regional variations seen here.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor the June 2025 Iran\u0026ndash;Israel conflict-driven disruption, paired t-tests were applied to weekly Retail prices in Kabul.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Tabb\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003et-statistic\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterpretation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eKabul (2025)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-2.722\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.072\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMarginally significant (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter the Iran-Israel conflict in June 2025, a paired-sample t-test was conducted to test the variation in the weekly retail prices of essential commodities in Kabul, before and after the partial closure of the Kabul and Iran borders. The t-statistic is -2.722, with a p-value of 0.072, indicating that the outcome was marginally significant at the 10% level. This suggests that none of the price increases that are observed in flour (+\u0026thinsp;14.81%), rice (+\u0026thinsp;13.53%), cooking oil (+\u0026thinsp;15.81%), and diesel (+\u0026thinsp;14.69%) are random developments, but instead can be predicted to take place and lead to an increase in the price level. The value of the result is not up to the level of 5 percent significance, but it will still point to a perceivable effect on the economic field because the timeframe was not extensive, and Kabul was highly exposed to the Iranian trade routes. The above results support the hypothesis that domestic price instability within import-heavy regions can develop rapidly in response to geopolitical shocks, as observed in the case of Afghanistan, which is structurally fragile with a narrow buffer range in the supply chain and an excessive reliance on a single trade route.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3 Socioeconomic Consequences of Border Closures: Beyond Geographies, Toward Systemic Vulnerabilities\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3.1 Collapsing Purchasing Power and Expanding Food Insecurity\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe effects of border closure, irrespective of the geographical basis of border closure, on long-distance socioeconomic effects extend to weak, import-reliant economies. Even a temporary suspension of the transit corridors paralyzes the supply of vital goods, limits the market supply, and increases the inflationary pressures. Such shocks directly impact purchasing power and lead to increased food insecurity, particularly in cases where households are already existing on the fringes of poverty.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfghanistan is one such country where almost one-half of its population is below the poverty line, and foodstuff imports constitute the main sustenance of the national consumption; price spurts in basic foodstuff items, even in the short run, can be catastrophic. These shocks cannot be absorbed by stagnant wages, particularly those in the informal economy, and the family will have to respond to them by reducing the call floor or liquidating productive assets and/or dropping children out of school. All these are not individual means of coping but the evidence of a growing humanitarian crisis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAny disruption in the trade channels, whether through war, pandemic, or political friction, is not only making food and fuel prices hit the roof but also restricting the means to healthcare, education, and work, further plunging the already poor communities into the prospect of perpetual impoverishment. Due to the collapse of cross-border supply chains, internal logistics also collapses under the pressure, which exacerbates the inequality between urban and rural citizens.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3.2 Macroeconomic Instability and the Retreat from Development\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBorder closures at the macro-level limit fiscal policy space, renew government spending on emergency responses, and weaken long-term development planning. With the increase in donor fatigue and the reduction of foreign assistance, the already small capacity of fragile states to recover after suffering concurrent shocks, including food crisis, decreased value of currency, and disrupted trade, in turn further dilutes the legitimacy of the state and the goal of economic stabilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTrade-related inflationary shocks consume massive amounts of government cash, and the result of this leads to a redirection of funds that are meant to be used on infrastructure, health, and education sectors in favor of temporary relief measures, as well as stabilization of prices. Such a trade-off prevents structural transformation by trapping the economies in low-productivity traps.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, fragility is compounded by financial exclusion, currency volatility, and an overly strict policy that limits effort in the labor force (and this is more of a problem for women). The failure to enter the regional value chains and lack of access to international banking services imply that even the geopolitical tensions that are not directly affecting the country, like its borders, can cause drastic disturbances in the internal status quo of the market.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3.3 Border Closures as Catalysts for Systemic Fragility\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Afghanistan example is one that we can apply to other landlocked, conflict-ridden, and import-dependent countries: closed borders not only cause a material disruption in the flow of goods, but they are also triggers to reveal and aggravate existing economic and social deficiencies. The scale of their effects is because they affect all connected systems: trade, transport, finance, employment, and public services.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne of the significant findings of this research is that the exposure to border closure is structural more than it is circumstantial. It is a product of dependency in imports, low diversification levels, insufficient infrastructure, poor state capacity, and geographic isolation. The implications do not only limit their effects to the short-term market manipulations but goes as far as to the long-term retarded growth.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Conclusion and Recommendation","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper highlights how uneven and localized the impacts of the border closures with Iran and Pakistan have been on the food markets in Afghanistan. Although both of the above disruptions harm supply chains and consumer prices, there are more direct and specific inflationary effects from the shorter shutdown of the Iran-Afghanistan border in 2025. These inflationary impacts are more noticeable in Kabul, reflecting Afghanistan's increasing dependence on Iranian products, including fuel and staple supplies, as well as the use of Iranian corridors. Conversely, the closure in Pakistan in 2021 brought evenly distributed price rises, mostly in northern provinces, including Kunduz and Faryab. The paired-sample t-test has shown a marginally significant value in the case of Kabul in 2025, and it can give some statistical backing to the noted rise in prices. All in all, these results indicate an increase in structural weakness due to poor diversification of trade, excessive concentration on a single source of imports, and poor domestic cushions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn order to avoid future impediments to trade, Afghanistan would benefit by undertaking a multi-pronged approach to food system and logistics network resilience. The country should strengthen its trade relations with its neighbors in Central Asia and invest in other transit corridors in order to alleviate the overdependence issue on Iran and Pakistan. It is therefore essential to build strategic national reserves of some basic commodities like food and fuel so that short-term shocks can be absorbed, and this keeps speculative tendencies at bay in very volatile markets. There should be parallel tracks to enhance domestic agricultural production through investments in rural infrastructure, irrigation systems, and modern farming technologies. Potential mitigation measures that could be put in place to curb cases where a price adjustment leads to inflationary cycles are institutional price stabilization during a crisis and better coordination between food security actors, including humanitarians and governments. Lastly, an alert system and real-time data surveillance platform should be deployed to ensure that measures are taken in advance before the manifestation of geopolitical or logistical risk. A combination of these efforts can restore Afghanistan to a stronger economic standing and provide food security should any future external shock occur in the country.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding declaration:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eThis research did not receive any specific grants from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eClinical trial number:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics approval, consent to participate, and consent for publication\u003c/strong\u003e: Not applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConflict of Interest Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA.A.P. (Abdul Ahmad Pooya) conducted the entire research process, including the conception and design of the study, data collection and analysis, preparation of figures and tables, and manuscript writing. The author reviewed and approved the final version of the paper for submission.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data used in this study were obtained from publicly available sources, including [e.g., TOLO News, Save the Children].\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAmin, R. U., Dr. Ghulam Muhammad Awan, \u0026amp; Dr. Faryal Raheem. (2021). Critical Analyses of Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement: Pakistan\u0026apos;s Perspective. Research Journal of Social Sciences and Economics Review (RJSSER), 1(4), 418\u0026ndash;426. https://doi.org/10.36902/rjsser-vol1-iss4-2020(418-426)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAnderson, K., \u0026amp; Martin, W. J. (2011, July). 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Food prices drop 1.4 percent in April. ???????? ???? ??? - ?????. https://www.khaama.com/persian/archives/155854\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eZhang, Y., Waldhoff, S., Wise, M., Edmonds, J., \u0026amp; Patel, P. (2023). Agriculture, bioenergy, and water implications of constrained cereal trade and climate change impacts. PLoS ONE, 18(9), 1\u0026ndash;18. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0291577\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"food Security, Trade Disruption, Border Closure, Import Dependence, Economic Resilience, Afghanistan, Iran–Pakistan Trade, Sustainable Development","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe challenge of food systems in Afghanistan is driven by its extreme reliance on trade across borders, making this region very sensitive to geopolitical conflicts and health-related emergencies. This paper will analyze the impact of the closure of borders with Iran and Pakistan on domestic food prices and composition of imports, its consequences on food security and economic sustainability in fragile states. There are two events examined: border closure in Pakistan due to COVID-19 in 2021 and the disruption of trade with Iran in 2025 caused by the Iran-Israel conflict. Based on the weekly market prices data, the results indicate that the 2025 disruption had steeper and more urgent costs of inflationary pressure (an increase in the costs of staple commodities in flour, rice, cooking oil, and diesel of more than 14 per cent), especially in the urban wells such as Kabul. It is also confirmed statistically (paired-sample t-tests, 95 percent significance) that the breakdown of trade has a measurable relationship with price volatility. These findings demonstrate that there is increased strategic dependence among Afghanistan and Iranian trade routes on the part of direct imports as well as regional transit. By framing these economic shocks in the bigger picture of sustainable development, the paper will address the literature on the subject of trade vulnerability and resilience building by providing a policy recommendation to enhance supply chain stability, improve food security, and minimize dependency risks in weak economies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eJEL codes\u003c/strong\u003e: E31, F14, Q18\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Border Disruptions and Food Security in Fragile Economies: Evidence from Afghanistan’s Trade Dependence on Iran and Pakistan","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-09-01 17:20:12","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7331484/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"c1434e55-0e84-47b8-874b-1ed08156775d","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 1st, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-10-16T13:23:42+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-09-01 17:20:12","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7331484","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7331484","identity":"rs-7331484","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}