Community standards of deception: Deception is perceived to be ethical when it prevents unnecessary harm

We frequently claim that lying is wrong, despite modeling that it is often right. The present research sheds light on this tension by unearthing systematic cases in which people believe lying is ethical in everyday communication and by proposing and testing a theory to explain these cases. Using both inductive and experimental approaches, I find that deception is perceived to be ethical, and individuals want to be deceived, when deception is perceived to prevent unnecessary harm. I identify eight implicit rules – pertaining to the targets of deception and the topic and timing of a conversation – that clarify systematic circumstances in which deception is perceived to prevent unnecessary harm, and I document the causal effect of each implicit rule on the endorsement of deception. I also explore how perceptions of unnecessary harm influence communicators’ use of deception in everyday life, above and beyond other moral concerns. This research provides insight into when and why people value honesty and paves the way for future research on when and why people embrace deception.