Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Oligarchy, Rent, and Elite Consensus

Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Oligarchy, Rent, and Elite Consensus | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Oligarchy, Rent, and Elite Consensus Aris Sarjito This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This article introduces the concept of policy cartelization to explain the dynamics of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia. While existing frameworks such as cartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, and policy capture illuminate aspects of elite politics, they do not fully account for how policymaking itself becomes a site of collusion. Based on qualitative analysis of secondary sources, including policy documents, oversight reports, and scholarly literature, the study identifies four dimensions of policy cartelization: elite consensus over competition, policy as rent distribution, bureaucratic cartelization, and the weakening of accountability. Empirical illustrations from infrastructure development, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic reform demonstrate how elites negotiate and share rents while insulating policy outcomes from public scrutiny. The findings suggest that Indonesia’s democracy is stable procedurally but hollow substantively: elections and institutions remain, yet policymaking is cartelized to serve elite interests. The article argues that policy cartelization offers a novel analytical lens for understanding elite consensus politics in Indonesia and potentially other democracies with entrenched oligarchies. It concludes that addressing this condition requires reforms to strengthen opposition, depoliticize bureaucracy, and safeguard oversight institutions. Indonesia Oligarchy Policy Cartelization Post-Reformasi Democracy Rent-Seeking Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 1. Introduction More than two decades after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia has been widely praised as one of the world’s largest democracies. Regular elections, a multi-party system, and leadership turnover are often portrayed as hallmarks of democratic success. Yet, recent scholarship increasingly points to the paradox of Indonesia’s democracy: it remains procedurally resilient, but substantively hollow. Instead of advancing popular participation, democratic institutions have been captured and reshaped by political and economic elites who collaborate to preserve access to state resources (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019 ; Winters, 2021 ). This paradox reveals a system where democracy endures in form but erodes in substance. One of the most striking manifestations of this erosion is the emergence of cartelization in politics . Katz & Mair ( 2009 ) developed the concept of the cartel party , describing how political parties in Europe ceased to compete substantively and instead colluded to exploit state resources. This idea was later extended to other regions, including Southeast Asia, where scholars observed that Indonesia’s democratic system was marked by cartel democracy , a system in which major political parties coalesced into oversized coalitions and weakened the role of opposition (Lestari et al., 2025 ; Slater, 2018 ). However, contemporary dynamics in Indonesia suggest that cartelization goes beyond party politics. It increasingly permeates the policy-making process itself. This article introduces the concept of Policy Cartelization. Unlike policy capture , which emphasizes the dominance of a single actor or interest group over regulation (Kaufmann, 2024 ; OECD, 2017), policy cartelization highlights collusion among multiple elites who “carve up” policies and state projects as if they were market shares in a cartel. Public policy, under such conditions, is no longer an instrument for delivering collective welfare but rather a mechanism for distributing rents and maintaining elite consensus. 1.1. Significance of the Study The notion of policy cartelization is especially relevant in post-2014 Indonesia. President Joko Widodo’s administrations have been characterized by an unprecedentedly broad coalition, which included nearly all major parties in parliament. While this arrangement was justified in the name of political stability, it also blurred the boundaries between government and opposition. As a result, key policies, from mega-infrastructure projects and the relocation of the capital to natural resource regulations, were widely perceived as products of elite bargains rather than participatory deliberation (Asrinaldi et al., 2021; Warburton, 2016 ). This study matters for two reasons. First, it expands scholarly debates on democratic decline by moving beyond oligarchic governance (Indrawan et al., 2025 ; Winters, 2021 ). While oligarchy emphasizes the dominance of powerful families and business interests, policy cartelization explains the consensual and collaborative dimension of elite politics. Second, it builds on but also diverges from the literature on policy capture . Whereas capture implies unilateral domination, cartelization implies negotiated rent-sharing among multiple actors. This nuance allows us to better understand how fragmented elites can still maintain stability by cartelizing the policy process. 1.2. Research Questions Against this backdrop, the study seeks to answer three guiding questions: How does policy cartelization operate in the context of post-Reformasi Indonesian democracy? What are the defining features that distinguish policy cartelization from related concepts such as state capture and policy capture ? What are the implications of policy cartelization for democratic quality, public accountability, and bureaucratic reform in Indonesia? 1.3. Research Objectives In line with these questions, the study pursues the following objectives: To formulate a conceptual definition of policy cartelization and identify its key analytical indicators. To demonstrate how policy cartelization materializes in Indonesia through case studies in infrastructure development, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic appointments. To analyse the implications of policy cartelization for the trajectory of democracy and governance reform in Indonesia. 1.4. Novelty Statement The originality of this study lies in its conceptual innovation. First, policy cartelization differs from policy capture by focusing on collective collusion among elites rather than unilateral domination. Second, it extends the idea of cartel democracy (Slater, 2018 ) by showing that cartelization now penetrates policymaking itself , not merely electoral coalitions. Third, it contributes to the broader debate on democratic backsliding by providing a framework to analyse how elites neutralize accountability mechanisms while preserving the façade of electoral democracy. Thus, policy cartelization is proposed as both a descriptive and analytical tool: it describes elite practices in Indonesia and potentially offers a comparative framework for other developing democracies where oligarchic interests dominate policymaking. 1.5. Structure of the Article The article is organized into five sections. The first is the introduction, which sets out the background, research questions, objectives, and novelty of the study. The second presents a literature review, covering theories of the cartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance. The third outlines the research methodology, which relies on qualitative analysis of secondary data. The fourth elaborates the findings on the characteristics and indicators of policy cartelization in Indonesia, illustrated by sectoral case studies. The fifth provides a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications. The article concludes by summarizing the main contributions and offering recommendations for democratic reform. 2. Literature Review 2.1. Cartel Party Theory: From Competition to Collusion The idea of cartelization first emerged in the study of political parties. In their seminal work, Katz & Mair (2009) argued that party systems in Western Europe were shifting from competitive to collusive arrangements. Rather than fighting for votes with distinct ideological platforms, major parties increasingly relied on state subsidies and blurred their ideological differences. The result was what they called the cartel party , a formation where parties behave less like competitors and more like business cartels, sharing access to state resources while limiting the room for challengers. This theory was groundbreaking because it challenged the conventional view of democracy as a marketplace of competing ideas. Katz and Mair showed that when parties collude, elections may still happen regularly, but the choices available to citizens become superficial. Democracy remains “procedural” but loses much of its substantive vitality. For Indonesia, this framework resonates strongly. Since the Reformasi era, political parties have often been described as pragmatic rather than ideological, with coalitions shaped by transactional negotiations rather than programmatic visions (Slater, 2018). However, while cartel party theory explains the collusive behaviour of parties, it does not fully capture how similar dynamics extend into policy-making processes. 2.2. Cartel Democracy in Indonesia: Consensus Without Opposition Building on Katz and Mair, Southeast Asia specialists adapted the concept to Indonesia. Scholars such as Lestari et al. (2025) and (Slater, 2018) used the term cartel democracy to describe how post-Suharto political elites managed democratic competition by deliberately weakening opposition. Rather than allowing a vibrant contest of ideas, large parties tended to coalesce into oversized coalitions, effectively cartelizing the political system. In practice, this meant that nearly all major parties joined the governing coalition, leaving little space for meaningful checks and balances. As Aspinall & Mietzner (2019) put it, Indonesian democracy was paradoxical: stable on the surface but hollow in terms of accountability. The strength of the cartel democracy concept lies in its ability to explain why Indonesia’s democratic system looks competitive procedurally, yet in reality functions as a “grand coalition” of elites. However, the limitation is equally clear: the focus is primarily on electoral politics and coalition-building, rather than on policy substance . In other words, it explains who is in power but less about what they do with that power when formulating policies. 2.3. State Capture: The Domination of Public Institutions To understand how power is exercised over policymaking, scholars often turn to the concept of state capture . Popularized by Kaufmann (2024), state capture refers to situations where powerful firms, individuals, or groups exert undue influence over the formation of laws, rules, and policies. In captured states, decisions that should serve the public interest are instead tailored to serve private interests. State capture has been extensively documented in transition economies, especially in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states, where oligarchs shaped entire regulatory frameworks to entrench their wealth and political influence. In such cases, state capture often involves a one-way dynamic: powerful actors dictate policy to a compliant government. Indonesia also exhibits elements of state capture. For instance, natural resource sectors such as mining and palm oil are notorious for their deep entanglements with oligarchic interests (Indrawan et al., 2025). Yet, describing Indonesia solely in terms of state capture risks oversimplification. What we observe is not merely unilateral domination but rather negotiated consensus among multiple elites . Policies are often the outcome of bargains, compromises, and rent-sharing agreements rather than the dictate of a single dominant actor. 2.4. Policy Capture: A Narrow Lens A related but narrower concept is policy capture, often used in governance studies to highlight how specific policy domains are hijacked by vested interests. The OECD (2017) defines policy capture as the undue influence of interest groups on public decision-making, resulting in policies that favour private gain over public good. Policy capture is useful for analysing sectoral issues, for example, when mining regulations are skewed in favour of a handful of companies, or when healthcare reforms are shaped by pharmaceutical lobbies. However, the lens of policy capture typically isolates one policy area at a time. It does not fully account for the broader systemic pattern in which multiple policies across sectors are cartelized simultaneously through elite consensus. This is precisely where the proposed concept of policy cartelization extends the literature: it moves beyond the sectoral and case-specific focus of policy capture to analyse the structural tendency of elites to collude across domains of governance. 2.5. Oligarchic Governance: The Indonesian Context Indonesia’s political economy is best understood through the lens of oligarchic governance. Indrawan et al. (2025) describe how the post-Suharto era has seen the reorganization of power among political and economic elites, who dominate not only political parties but also key economic sectors. Winters (2013) reinforces this point, arguing that Indonesia remains an oligarchy in which wealth and power are concentrated among a narrow elite. The oligarchy framework explains why reform efforts often stall: because the same networks that dominated under authoritarianism have reconstituted themselves within democratic institutions. Yet, the oligarchy perspective, while powerful, can sometimes overemphasize structural continuity and understate the dynamic strategies elites use to maintain dominance in a democratic setting. This is where policy cartelization adds value. It conceptualizes how oligarchic elites manage competition among themselves, not only through domination or capture but through cartel-style negotiation and rent distribution embedded within policymaking. 2.6. Towards the Concept of Policy Cartelization This section proposes policy cartelization as a conceptual innovation that synthesizes and extends existing literature on political cartels, elite governance, and policy capture. While earlier frameworks have explained party collusion, electoral consensus, or sector-specific domination, they often fail to account for how elites negotiate and distribute control over the policymaking process itself. Policy cartelization refers to a systemic configuration in which policies, across multiple sectors, are governed not through open contestation, but through elite collusion, institutionalized rent-sharing, and bureaucratic entrenchment. It draws on the logic of cartel behaviour from economic theory and adapts it to analyse political economy dynamics in democratic yet oligarchic regimes such as post-Reformasi Indonesia. Bringing these strands together, we can see both the overlaps and the gaps. · Cartel Party Theory explains collusion among parties but neglects policy substance. · Cartel Democracy adapts the concept to Indonesia but focuses mainly on electoral politics. · State Capture highlights undue influence but often assumes unilateral domination. · Policy Capture is useful for sectoral studies but limited in scope. · Oligarchic Governance explains elite dominance but needs more nuance on how elites negotiate among themselves. Policy Cartelization synthesizes these insights while filling a crucial gap. It refers to the process by which public policies are carved up among elites in cartel-like arrangements, producing governance that is collusive rather than competitive, consensual among elites rather than participatory for citizens. The concept has four defining features: · Elite Consensus over Competition. Political elites prefer inclusion and compromise rather than genuine opposition. · Policy as Rent Distribution . Policies function as vehicles for distributing rents through projects, contracts, or regulatory privileges. · Cartelization of Bureaucracy . Bureaucratic positions are politicized and folded into the cartel’s rent-sharing logic. · Weakening of Accountability. Oversight institutions are co-opted or sidelined to protect the cartel arrangement. By foregrounding these features, policy cartelization captures both the systemic and negotiated nature of elite politics in Indonesia. To further clarify how policy cartelization operates in the Indonesian context, Figure 1 presents a typological model that distinguishes between three ideal types of elite-policy arrangements: competitive pluralism, state capture, and policy cartelization. This typology helps to situate the proposed concept within broader comparative frameworks, showing how cartelized policymaking is distinct from both open democratic deliberation and unilateral elite domination. As illustrated in the figure, policy cartelization differs from state capture in that it is based on negotiated elite consensus rather than one-sided domination. It also diverges from competitive pluralism by suppressing meaningful opposition and public deliberation. The vertical axis measures the degree of elite collusion, while the horizontal axis reflects the scope of policy domains affected. This model captures the structural transformation of Indonesia’s post-Reformasi governance, where policymaking has increasingly become a site of rent-sharing arrangements among oligarchic networks. Unlike isolated cases of corruption or sectoral capture, cartelization represents a systemic pattern that spans across institutions and policy sectors. 2.7. Implications for Research Adopting policy cartelization as a framework has several implications. First, it invites scholars to examine policymaking not as a technocratic or neutral process, but as a political marketplace where rents are bargained and distributed. Second, it emphasizes the role of elite consensus in stabilizing democracies that might otherwise fragment, explaining why Indonesia’s democracy is stable yet shallow. Third, it enables comparative research, as other developing democracies (such as the Philippines, Brazil, or South Africa) may also exhibit elements of policy cartelization. Most importantly, it reminds us that the crisis of democracy is not always visible in authoritarian takeovers or military coups. Sometimes, the erosion is subtler: democracy hollowed out from within , as elites cartelize policies while leaving democratic institutions formally intact. The concept of policy cartelization builds on, but also extends, existing theories of elite politics. As shown in Figure 2, five major theoretical strands, Cartel Party Theory, Cartel Democracy, State Capture, Policy Capture, and Oligarchic Governance, provide the foundation for understanding collusive governance. Each contributes important insights but leaves analytical gaps when applied to post-Reformasi Indonesia. By synthesizing these strands, the new concept of policy cartelization captures how elites not only dominate but also negotiate and distribute rents collectively through policymaking. As illustrated in the diagram, policy cartelization is characterized by four defining features: (1) elite consensus over competition, (2) policy as rent distribution, (3) cartelization of bureaucracy, and (4) weakening of accountability. Together, these features explain why Indonesian democracy is procedurally stable yet substantively hollow. The framework highlights how policymaking itself has been transformed into a cartelized process, where governance outcomes reflect elite bargains rather than democratic deliberation. This conceptual model also lays the groundwork for comparative studies, as similar dynamics may be observed in other democracies facing entrenched oligarchic power. As illustrated in Figure 1, the concept of policy cartelization emerges from the synthesis of five major theoretical strands, cartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance . Each provides important insights into Indonesian politics, yet none fully captures the systemic and negotiated nature of elite collusion in policymaking. To clarify both the overlaps and the gaps in the literature, Table 1 compares the strengths and limitations of existing frameworks, cartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance , with the proposed concept of policy cartelization . While these theories provide valuable insights into Indonesian politics, each leaves analytical gaps when applied to the dynamics of policymaking. The proposed framework highlights its novelty by moving beyond electoral coalitions, sectoral capture, or structural oligarchy, and instead conceptualizing policymaking itself as a cartelized arena. Table 1. Comparative Framework: Existing Theories vs Policy Cartelization Comparison of existing frameworks with the proposed concept of policy cartelization, highlighting its novelty in treating policymaking as a cartelized arena. Concept Key Focus Strengths Limitations in Indonesian Context What Policy Cartelization Adds Cartel Party Theory (Katz & Mair, 2009) Party collusion in elections, reliance on state resources Explains why parties cooperate rather than compete Neglects substance of policymaking beyond elections Extends cartel logic into the policy-making process Cartel Democracy (Lestari et al., 2025; Slater, 2018) Oversized coalitions, consensus politics Explains stability, weak opposition Focuses on institutional politics, less on policy outcomes Links coalition logic with distribution of rents in policies State Capture (Kaufmann, 2024) Domination of state by powerful business/oligarchic actors Shows how elites influence laws & regulations Assumes one-way domination, underplays negotiated consensus Emphasizes collective collusion among elites instead of unilateral capture Policy Capture (OECD, 2017) Vested interests in specific policy sectors Useful for sectoral analysis (e.g., mining, healthcare) Fragmented view; lacks systemic explanation across sectors Provides a systemic lens: multiple sectors cartelized simultaneously Oligarchic Governance (Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021) Enduring elite dominance over politics & economy Explains persistence of oligarchic networks Often static, less attention to dynamic elite negotiations Shows how oligarchs maintain stability via rent-sharing and cartelized bargains Policy Cartelization (New Concept) Collusion in policymaking; rents shared among elites Integrates insights from previous theories Novelty: highlights policy as a cartelized arena Explains Indonesia’s “stable but hollow” democracy Source: Author’s synthesis based on Katz & Mair (2009); Lestari et al. (2025); (Slater, 2018); (Kaufmann, 2024); OECD (2017); Indrawan et al. (2025); Winters (2021). As Table 1 shows, policy cartelization synthesizes the explanatory power of existing theories while addressing their limitations. It goes beyond electoral politics, sectoral capture, or structural oligarchy by focusing on how policies themselves are carved up among elites through cartel-style arrangements. This framework thus provides a stronger basis for analysing Indonesia’s post-Reformasi governance and for drawing comparative lessons in other developing democracies. 2.8. Theoretical Contribution of Policy Cartelization The concept of policy cartelization offers an explicit theoretical contribution to the study of political economy and democratic governance. First, it extends the cartel party thesis (Katz & Mair, 2009) by shifting the analytical focus from electoral competition to policymaking, demonstrating how collusive logics operate not only in party systems but also in the distribution of rents through public policies. Second, it moves beyond the state capture framework (Kaufmann, 2024) by emphasizing negotiated elite consensus rather than unilateral domination, highlighting the institutionalization of rent-sharing among multiple oligarchic actors. Third, it refines the notion of policy capture (OECD, 2017) by providing a systemic, rather than sectoral, lens that explains how multiple policy arenas become cartelized simultaneously. Finally, it deepens the framework of oligarchic governance (Winters, 2021) by showing the dynamic strategies elites employ to stabilize democracy through cartelized policymaking. By synthesizing these insights, policy cartelization contributes a novel conceptual lens to comparative politics. It highlights how democracies can remain procedurally intact yet substantively hollow, as elites transform policymaking into a cartelized arena insulated from meaningful public deliberation. This theoretical innovation provides a more comprehensive understanding of post-Reformasi Indonesia and creates new opportunities for cross-national comparison with other democracies experiencing oligarchic consolidation. 3. Methodology 3.1. Research Design This study adopts a qualitative descriptive research design. The objective is not to test causal hypotheses in a positivist sense, but to explore, interpret, and theorize the dynamics of policy cartelization in Indonesia’s post-Reformasi democracy. Given that the phenomenon is relatively under-theorized, qualitative research allows for a deeper engagement with historical trajectories, discursive narratives, and institutional practices. The descriptive dimension is equally important. By mapping observable indicators of cartelization across different policy arenas, such as infrastructure, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic reform, the study seeks to illustrate how cartelization manifests itself in practice. In this way, the methodology provides both conceptual grounding and empirical texture. 3.2. Data Sources The study relies primarily on secondary data sources , reflecting the sensitive and opaque nature of elite negotiations. These sources include: · Official policy documents , government white papers, strategic plans (e.g., Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional ), and parliamentary records that reveal formal policy directions. · Audit and oversight reports , documents from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and international watchdogs. · Academic literature , peer-reviewed articles, books, and dissertations that provide analytical depth on Indonesian democracy and oligarchy. · Think tank and NGO reports, publications from institutions such as CSIS Indonesia, Transparency International, and Global Witness, which often highlight governance concerns overlooked in official narratives. · Media investigations , long-form journalism and investigative reporting that uncover details about elite bargains, rent-seeking practices, and conflicts of interest. By triangulating these diverse sources, the study ensures breadth and depth of evidence, while acknowledging that no single dataset can fully capture the clandestine dynamics of cartelization. 3.3. Method and Source Justification This article employs a qualitative, interpretive approach rooted in critical policy studies and political economy analysis. Rather than using primary data or fieldwork, it synthesizes and analyses a broad range of secondary sources, including academic literature, policy reports, public documents, news archives, and expert commentaries published between 1999 and 2024. These sources were selected through purposive sampling, using three explicit criteria: (1) direct relevance to post-Reformasi Indonesian political developments, (2) credibility and authority of the publisher (e.g., Scopus- or JSTOR-indexed works, or reports from OECD and World Bank), and (3) capacity to provide insight into elite dynamics, party systems, or policy formation. The selection process was documented systematically, ensuring that another researcher could replicate the dataset construction by following the same inclusion criteria. The analytical procedure involved two steps. First, the sources were coded using conceptual categories derived from existing theories—cartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance—while remaining open to emergent themes. Second, the coded material was compared across cases and policy domains to trace patterns of elite consensus, rent-sharing, bureaucratic politicization, and weakened accountability. This process created a transparent audit trail that allows for replication, critique, and refinement in future studies. Although relying on secondary data carries the risk of bias or incompleteness, these limitations were mitigated through triangulation across diverse types of sources (academic, governmental, NGO, and media). By making the selection criteria and analytical steps explicit, the study enhances its methodological transparency and opens itself to scholarly scrutiny and debate. 3.4. Analytical Framework The analysis is structured around the four indicators of policy cartelization proposed in the conceptual section: · Elite Consensus Over Competition , measured by the breadth of governing coalitions, the absence of robust opposition, and elite negotiations that occur outside formal parliamentary debate. · Policy as Rent Distribution , traced through the allocation of infrastructure projects, natural resource concessions, and state-owned enterprise contracts. · Cartelization of Bureaucracy , observed in the politicization of bureaucratic appointments, the use of patronage in civil service promotions, and the weakening of meritocratic reform. · Weakening of Accountability , evaluated through the erosion of institutional independence in oversight bodies and the prevalence of legal exemptions or special regulations benefiting elites. Each indicator is operationalized not as a rigid variable, but as a guiding lens for interpreting textual and documentary evidence. For instance, when audit reports highlight irregularities in infrastructure contracts that involve multiple parties from both government and business sectors, these findings are interpreted through the lens of rent distribution and cartel-style negotiation. 3.5. Data Analysis The study employs content analysis combined with process tracing : · Content Analysis: Relevant documents are systematically coded for recurring themes such as “elite consensus,” “rent-sharing,” or “bureaucratic politicization.” The coding process is both deductive (based on theoretical indicators of cartelization) and inductive (allowing new patterns to emerge from the data). · Process Tracing : Where possible, the study reconstructs sequences of events to understand how policy decisions were reached. For example, tracing how a natural resource regulation evolved from parliamentary debate to final enactment reveals the layers of negotiation and compromise involved. This dual approach ensures that findings are both theory-driven and empirically grounded. 3.6. Limitations and Reflexivity Several methodological limitations must be acknowledged. First, relying on secondary data means the analysis is constrained by the availability and reliability of existing sources. Elite bargains are often hidden from public view, and what is documented may reflect partial truths or political bias. Second, the absence of primary interviews with policymakers or business elites may limit the granularity of insider perspectives. However, these limitations are mitigated by the triangulation of diverse sources and the use of established analytical frameworks. Moreover, focusing on secondary data offers one methodological advantage: it minimizes the risk of elite manipulation, as interviews with powerful actors can sometimes produce carefully curated narratives rather than candid revelations. The researcher also acknowledges their positionality. Analysing “cartelization” carries normative weight, as it implies collusion and corruption. To address this, the study strives to maintain analytical rigor, distinguishing between descriptive observation and normative judgment. 3.7. Ethical Considerations While no human subjects were interviewed directly, ethical considerations remain important. Sensitive findings are presented in a way that protects individuals while critiquing systemic patterns. The goal is not to single out personal misconduct but to highlight structural tendencies that undermine democratic accountability. In short, the methodology combines a qualitative descriptive design, secondary data analysis, and a concept-driven analytical framework . It seeks to illuminate how policy cartelization operates in Indonesia, while being transparent about its limitations. By grounding abstract theory in empirical evidence, the study contributes to both conceptual clarity and practical understanding of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia. 4. Findings The empirical analysis of post-Reformasi Indonesia suggests that the dynamics of governance cannot be fully explained by conventional theories of state capture or oligarchic dominance. Instead, what emerges is a pattern of negotiated collusion in which elites across party lines and business sectors agree to share the spoils of policymaking. This pattern is best described as policy cartelization . The following subsections present four interrelated dimensions of this phenomenon: 1. Elite consensus over competition 2. Policy as rent distribution 3. Cartelization of bureaucracy 4. Weakening of accountability 4.1. Elite Consensus Over Competition One of the clearest signs of policy cartelization in Indonesia is the consistent tendency of political elites to form oversized coalitions. After Reformasi, coalition governments were initially seen as pragmatic tools to stabilize fragile democracy (Hargens, 2021; Lestari et al., 2025). Over time, however, coalition-building became less about governance and more about eliminating opposition (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Slater, 2018). Under President Joko Widodo, this trend reached its peak. By his second term (2019–2024), the governing coalition included virtually all major parties, leaving only the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in opposition. Even these parties, while formally outside government, often aligned with the ruling coalition on critical votes (Asrinaldi et al., 2021; Mietzner, 2023). This arrangement created what Slater (2018) termed a cartel democracy , a system in which elites avoid open confrontation and instead negotiate behind closed doors. Public debates and parliamentary sessions often became performative, as the real bargains took place in informal settings (Johnson, 2020; Warburton, 2016). The impact on policymaking is profound. Major policies, such as the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (2020) , were pushed through parliament with minimal debate, despite massive public protests (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Mudhoffir & Hadiz, 2021). The law’s swift passage reflected not only executive dominance but also elite consensus across party lines. Dissent was marginalized, not because opposition was absent, but because it was structurally neutralized by the cartel logic. This consensus is not without conflict. Elites still compete over access to resources. Yet the competition occurs within the cartel, not outside it. Disagreements are resolved through negotiation and rent-sharing, not through adversarial politics (Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021). Thus, democracy functions without meaningful opposition, a hallmark of policy cartelization. 4.2. Policy as Rent Distribution Perhaps the most visible dimension of policy cartelization is the use of public policy as a mechanism for rent distribution. Policies are designed not only to govern but also to allocate economic opportunities among elites (Indrawan et al., 2025; Tomsa, 2022). 4.2.1. Infrastructure as Rent Arena Indonesia’s massive infrastructure drive under Jokowi, often described as “new developmentalism” (Warburton, 2016), provides a telling case. While infrastructure projects were justified in terms of economic growth and connectivity, they also became vehicles for distributing rents (Asrinaldi et al., 2021). Large-scale projects such as toll roads, airports, and the planned relocation of the capital city (IKN Nusantara) involved complex webs of contracts awarded to companies linked to political elites (Anguelov, 2024; Winters, 2021). Investigations by Transparency International and independent media revealed patterns of crony contracting. Companies with close ties to ruling parties or cabinet ministers often won bids, while state-owned enterprises served as intermediaries to funnel projects to politically connected firms (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Tomsa, 2022). Rather than open competition, infrastructure became a cartelized marketplace, where projects were divided among coalition partners (Johnson, 2020). 4.2.2. Natural Resource Governance The natural resource sector further illustrates this dynamic. The nickel industry, now central to Indonesia’s industrial policy, has been heavily influenced by elite bargains. The decision to ban raw nickel exports in 2020 was framed as a nationalist strategy to boost domestic processing. Yet studies show that concessions and smelter projects were disproportionately allocated to companies linked to politically connected oligarchs (Purnomo et al., 2020). Similarly, the palm oil sector demonstrates how policy serves as a rent-sharing mechanism. Subsidy programs, export permits, and land concessions are often distributed among elites across party lines (Hardiwinata et al., 2020; Purnomo et al., 2020). This creates a win-win arrangement for the cartel: no single group dominates entirely, but all members secure access to lucrative rents (Mudhoffir & Hadiz, 2021; Winters, 2021). 4.3. Cartelization of Bureaucracy While much attention is paid to parties and business elites, the bureaucracy is equally important in sustaining policy cartelization. In theory, civil service reform since Reformasi aimed to professionalize and depoliticize the state apparatus. In practice, however, bureaucratic appointments have often been politicized and folded into the cartel’s rent-sharing system (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Buehler et al., 2024). 4.3.1. Patronage in Appointments Senior bureaucratic posts, including director-general positions in ministries and leadership roles in state-owned enterprises, are frequently allocated based on loyalty to coalition partners rather than merit (Anguelov, 2024; Mietzner, 2023). For instance, state-owned enterprises like Pertamina and PLN have repeatedly appointed directors with strong political ties, reflecting the intertwining of bureaucratic governance with cartel logic (Warburton, 2016; Winters, 2021). This patronage system extends downward. Civil servants often report that promotions depend not only on performance but also on informal payments ( upeti ) or alignment with ruling elites (Berenschot, 2018; Latief, 2025). As a result, bureaucracy functions less as a neutral administrator and more as a cartelized network of patronage. 4.3.2. Stalled Reform Efforts to reform the civil service, such as the introduction of merit-based systems and e-government tools, have yielded mixed results (Iqbal et al., 2021; Kuipers, 2022). On paper, reforms promise transparency and professionalism. In practice, reforms are often symbolic, while the underlying structures of rent-seeking remain intact (Buehler et al., 2024). The cartel ensures that reforms do not disrupt the flow of patronage, absorbing reformist initiatives into the wider logic of negotiated rent-sharing (Indrawan et al., 2025). 4.4. Weakening of Accountability The final dimension of policy cartelization is the deliberate weakening of accountability mechanisms. 4.4.1. Oversight Institutions Institutions designed to check government power, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), and parliament, have been gradually undermined. The most striking example is the 2019 revision of the KPK Law , which curtailed the commission’s independence. Scholars widely argued that the revision was orchestrated by elites across the political spectrum to protect cartel interests (Butt, 2017; Mudhoffir & Hadiz, 2021; Tomsa, 2022). Parliament itself, rather than acting as a check on the executive, often functions as part of the cartel. Oversight hearings are frequently toothless, and investigative committees rarely challenge major government initiatives (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Johnson, 2020). Instead of adversarial accountability, the DPR’s role is often reduced to legitimizing elite bargains. 4.4.2. Public Participation Public accountability is further eroded by the narrowing of participatory channels. Civil society protests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (2020) and environmental deregulation were met with repression, while formal consultations were minimal (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Caraway & Ford, 2020). This reflects a dual strategy: elites maintain the procedural appearance of democracy while ensuring that policy outcomes remain insulated from popular demands (Mudhoffir & Hadiz, 2021; Warburton, 2016). Interconnections: A Systemic Cartel These four dimensions, elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic cartelization, and weakened accountability, are not isolated. They reinforce one another, producing a self-sustaining system: · Elite consensus ensures conflicts remain internal and manageable. · Rent distribution provides incentives for elites to remain in the cartel. · Bureaucratic cartelization embeds the system within state machinery. · Weakening accountability shields the cartel from external disruption. Together, these dynamics constitute a form of governance that is stable but shallow: stable because elite bargains prevent open conflict, but shallow because democracy’s substantive qualities, competition, accountability, and representation, are hollowed out (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Winters, 2021). Case Illustration: The Omnibus Law (2020) The Omnibus Law on Job Creation serves as a concrete case that brings all dimensions together. · Elite Consensus: Passed with overwhelming support across coalition parties, sidelining dissent (Tomsa, 2022). · Rent Distribution: Provisions benefited a range of business groups, from large conglomerates to natural resource firms, reflecting negotiated rent-sharing. · Bureaucratic Cartelization: Implementation relied on agencies staffed with politically connected officials (Iqbal et al., 2021). · Weakening Accountability: Public protests were met with repression, while judicial review processes faced political pressure (Caraway & Ford, 2020; Mudhoffir & Hadiz, 2021). The Omnibus Law thus epitomizes policy cartelization: a policy that embodies elite collusion while eroding democratic accountability. To better illustrate how the concept of policy cartelization manifests in practice, Table 2 summarizes its four key indicators. Each indicator is linked to empirical illustrations drawn from Indonesia’s recent political and economic governance, alongside references to the relevant scholarly literature. This synthesis highlights how cartelization is not confined to a single policy sector but operates systematically across arenas of policymaking, administration, and accountability. Table 2. Indicators of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia Indicators of policy cartelization in post-Reformasi Indonesia, linking each dimension to empirical illustrations and key scholarly references. Indicator Empirical Illustration Elite Consensus over Competition Oversized coalitions under Jokowi (2014–2024) involving nearly all major parties; marginalization of opposition; passage of the Omnibus Law despite protests. Policy as Rent Distribution Infrastructure projects (toll roads, IKN Nusantara) allocated to politically connected firms; nickel export ban benefiting oligarchs; palm oil concessions shared across elites. Cartelization of Bureaucracy Appointments in SOEs (Pertamina, PLN) based on political loyalty; promotions requiring upeti ; merit-based reforms undermined by patronage networks. Weakening of Accountability 2019 KPK Law revision reducing independence; DPR oversight weakened; repression of protests against the Omnibus Law further curtailed avenues for public accountability. Source: Author’s synthesis based on Lestari et al. (2025); Katz & Mair (2009); Slater (2018); Asrinaldi et al. (2021); Aspinall & Mietzner (2019); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Anguelov (2024); Purnomo et al. (2020); Winters (2021); Buehler et al. (2024); Aspinall & Berenschot (2019); Berenschot (2018); Latief (2025); (Iqbal et al., 2021); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir & Hadiz (2021); Caraway & Ford (2020). As the table shows, the four indicators reinforce one another in shaping Indonesia’s post-Reformasi governance. Elite consensus ensures that opposition remains marginal, while rent distribution incentivizes cartel members to remain within the system. Bureaucratic cartelization embeds these dynamics into the state apparatus, and the weakening of accountability protects the arrangement from external disruption. Together, these interlocking dimensions explain why Indonesian democracy has remained stable in procedure but hollow in substance. The table thus provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of the mechanisms through which policy cartelization operates, offering a foundation for both empirical analysis and comparative research. To further clarify the conceptual logic of policy cartelization , Figure 3 visualizes the relationship between its four main indicators and their empirical manifestations. This flowchart illustrates how cartelization permeates different dimensions of governance in Indonesia, from coalition politics to rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and the erosion of accountability. By connecting these elements, the model highlights the systemic character of cartelization in policymaking. As Figure 3 shows, each indicator of policy cartelization contributes to the consolidation of a “stable but hollow democracy”. Elite consensus reduces meaningful opposition, rent distribution ensures elite cooperation, bureaucratic cartelization embeds patronage within the state apparatus, and weakened accountability shields the system from disruption. Together, these dynamics explain how Indonesian democracy has endured institutionally while simultaneously eroding substantively. The framework not only strengthens the conceptual clarity of policy cartelization but also provides a tool for analysing similar patterns in other developing democracies facing entrenched oligarchic power. The case of the Omnibus Law demonstrates how all four dimensions of policy cartelization converge in a single policy process, yet this is not an isolated example. Similar dynamics can be observed across other major policy arenas in post-Reformasi Indonesia, from infrastructure development and natural resource governance to institutional reforms. To capture these broader patterns, Table 3 summarizes selected empirical cases that illustrate how policy cartelization materializes in practice, showing how elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability manifest in concrete policy processes. Table 3. Empirical Cases of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia Empirical cases of policy cartelization in post-Reformasi Indonesia across four key dimensions. Policy Case Dimension of Cartelization Empirical Evidence Impact on Democracy Omnibus Law on Job Creation (2020) Elite Consensus; Weakening of Accountability Passed with broad coalition support; minimal parliamentary debate; mass protests suppressed Reduced public participation; procedural democracy preserved, substantive accountability eroded Relocation of Capital (IKN Nusantara) Policy as Rent Distribution Contracts for infrastructure allocated to politically connected firms; SOEs as intermediaries Elite rent-sharing prioritized over transparent planning Nickel Export Ban (2020) Policy as Rent Distribution Concessions and smelter projects granted to firms linked to political elites Industrial policy captured by oligarchic interests; inequality in benefits Palm Oil Concessions Policy as Rent Distribution; Elite Consensus Land permits and subsidies distributed across coalition-linked companies Sustains elite consensus; undermines environmental governance Revision of KPK Law (2019) Weakening of Accountability; Elite Consensus Independence curtailed; supported by cross-party coalition Anti-corruption oversight weakened; cartel interests shielded from scrutiny Sourc e: Adapted from Aspinall & Mietzner (2019); Aspinall & Berenschot (2019); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir & Hadiz (2021); Tomsa (2022); Winters (2021). As shown in Table 3, different policies consistently display the same logic: elite consensus ensures broad support, rents are distributed through projects and concessions, bureaucratic networks sustain patronage, and accountability is systematically weakened. Taken together, these cases confirm that policy cartelization is not sector-specific but a systemic mode of governance. Building on these findings, the following section discusses how the concept contributes to the broader theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance. While Table 3 summarizes empirical cases of policy cartelization in a structured form, it is also important to visualize how these cases connect to the four dimensions of cartelization. Figure 4 presents a flowchart that maps each case, ranging from the Omnibus Law and capital relocation to the nickel export ban, palm oil governance, and the KPK Law revision, onto the dimensions of elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability. As shown in Figure 4, these diverse cases consistently reinforce the systemic nature of policy cartelization . Despite differences in policy domains, they all converge on the same democratic outcome: a system that is procedurally stable yet substantively hollow. This provides the foundation for the next section, which discusses how the concept of policy cartelization advances theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance in comparative perspective. 5. Discussion The empirical evidence presented in Table 3 and visualized in Figure 4 demonstrates that policy cartelization is not confined to isolated cases but constitutes a systemic mode of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Across different sectors, ranging from labour and infrastructure to natural resources and institutional reforms, policy processes consistently reflect the same underlying logic: elite consensus, negotiated rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability. These recurring patterns highlight that what appears as fragmented policy decisions are in fact interlinked manifestations of a deeper structural phenomenon. Building on these findings, this section situates policy cartelization within broader theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance. It explores how the concept extends existing frameworks such as cartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance, while also addressing their limitations. By doing so, the discussion clarifies the conceptual contribution of policy cartelization and its implications for understanding the paradox of Indonesia’s democracy, stable in procedure but hollow in substance. 5.1. Situating Policy Cartelization Among Existing Theories The findings demonstrate that Indonesia’s democratic governance after Reformasi cannot be adequately captured by existing concepts such as cartel party , state capture , policy capture , or oligarchic governance . Each theory provides valuable insights yet also has limitations when applied to the Indonesian case. · Cartel Party Theory (Katz & Mair, 2009) : This theory helps us understand why political parties in Indonesia collude rather than compete. However, it is primarily concerned with party behaviour in electoral politics, not the policymaking process. · Cartel Democracy (Lestari et al., 2025; Slater, 2018): This concept explains why oversized coalitions dominate post-Reformasi Indonesia. Yet, again, its focus is institutional politics, not how policies are crafted and distributed. · State Capture (Kaufmann, 2024): This concept is useful for highlighting the influence of business oligarchs. However, it implies a one-way relationship: powerful actors capture a weak state. Indonesia’s reality is more negotiated and consensual, involving multiple elites who bargain rather than a single dominant captor. · Policy Capture (OECD, 2017): This framework is valuable for examining sectoral distortions—say, when one industry lobbies for favourable regulations. But it lacks the systemic dimension. In Indonesia, cartelization occurs across multiple policy domains simultaneously. · Oligarchic Governance (Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021): This perspective explains elite dominance well, but it can appear static, portraying oligarchy as an unchanging structural condition. Policy cartelization adds nuance by showing how oligarchs maintain stability through ongoing negotiations, compromises, and rent-sharing. In short, policy cartelization synthesizes and extends these frameworks. It reveals that policymaking in Indonesia is less about unilateral domination and more about collusive governance, where elites deliberately construct a cartel to stabilize their collective power. 5.2. Theoretical Contribution The introduction of policy cartelization offers at least three contributions to political science and governance studies: · A New Lens on Elite Politics: It highlights the negotiated and consensual dimension of elite domination. Rather than viewing elites as always competing or capturing the state, we see how they manage competition by cartelizing policies. · Bridging Electoral and Policy Arenas: It extends the concept of cartel democracy beyond electoral politics. It shows that the same collusive logic that brings parties together in oversized coalitions also shapes the way policies are formulated and implemented. · Systemic Rather Than Sectoral: Unlike policy capture, which often looks at single industries or regulations, policy cartelization provides a systemic framework. It can explain why different sectors (infrastructure, natural resources, bureaucracy) display similar patterns of rent distribution. This theoretical move is important because it recognizes democracy’s erosion not only in electoral manipulation or authoritarian reversals but also in the hollowing out of policymaking. 5.3. Implications for Indonesian Democracy The implications for Indonesia are sobering. · Stable but Hollow Democracy: Policy cartelization helps explain why Indonesian democracy is stable in procedural terms but hollow in substantive quality. Elections are held regularly, and institutions remain intact, yet policies reflect elite bargains rather than public deliberation. · Weak Opposition and Civil Society: With nearly all major parties inside the governing cartel, opposition loses significance. Civil society protests are marginalized, and the policy arena becomes insulated from democratic pressures. · Stalled Reform: Efforts to reform bureaucracy, reduce corruption, or promote transparency are continuously diluted because they threaten the rent-sharing arrangements that sustain the cartel. Thus, policy cartelization not only explains current governance patterns but also points to the structural barriers facing reformers. 5.4. Comparative Implications While the focus here is Indonesia, the concept has broader relevance. Many developing democracies with entrenched oligarchies face similar dynamics. · In the Philippines, political clans often form cartels to distribute rents through infrastructure and natural resource policies. · In Brazil, the so-called coalition presidentialism has been criticized for encouraging rent-sharing among parties, which resonates with cartelization. · In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has been accused of cartelizing state contracts, especially in mining and energy sectors. By applying the lens of policy cartelization , scholars can compare how elites in different contexts stabilize their dominance by cartelizing policymaking, rather than relying solely on capture or domination. To further clarify the broader democratic implications of policy cartelization , Table 4 links each of its four dimensions with their consequences for opposition, civil society, bureaucratic reform, and accountability. This synthesis shows how cartelization not only shapes elite interactions but also undermines the substantive quality of democracy. Table 4. Democratic Implications of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia Implications of policy cartelization for opposition, civil society, bureaucratic reform, and accountability in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Dimension of Cartelization Implications for Opposition Implications for Civil Society Implications for Bureaucratic Reform Implications for Accountability Elite Consensus over Competition Opposition marginalized; coalitions co-opt nearly all parties Protest demands sidelined in formal politics Reform agendas diluted by elite bargaining Weak parliamentary oversight: checks and balances hollowed out Policy as Rent Distribution Opposition excluded from rent access, incentivizing co-optation Civil society concerns over inequality often ignored Development programs captured for elite benefit Policy outcomes prioritize rent-sharing over public good Cartelization of Bureaucracy Opposition parties rewarded with bureaucratic posts if co-opted Civil society faces closed access to neutral administrators Merit-based reform blocked by patronage networks Bureaucratic neutrality undermined; oversight agencies politicized Weakening of Accountability Opposition loses institutional allies (e.g., weakened KPK) Civil society protests repressed, narrowing participation Reform institutions (e.g., LAN, BKN) weakened structurally Oversight institutions curtailed; corruption oversight diluted Source: Adapted from Aspinall & Mietzner (2019); Aspinall & Berenschot (2019); Warburton (2016); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir & Hadiz (2021); Tomsa (2022); Winters (2021). As Table 4 demonstrates, the democratic implications of policy cartelization are systemic and multidimensional. Opposition is co-opted rather than contested, civil society is constrained, bureaucratic reform is neutralized, and accountability institutions are deliberately weakened. Together, these dynamics explain why Indonesia’s democracy has remained resilient in form but shallow in substance, offering important lessons for the study of democratic resilience under conditions of entrenched elite collusion. 5.5. Normative Reflections From a normative standpoint, policy cartelization represents a profound challenge to democratic ideals. Unlike overt authoritarianism, cartelization is subtle. Institutions remain, elections occur, and civil liberties are not entirely suspended. Yet the spirit of democracy, competition, accountability, representation, is hollowed out. Citizens participate, but their voices matter little in shaping substantive policy outcomes. This raises uncomfortable questions: Can democracy be considered functional if policymaking is cartelized? Does the mere survival of elections suffice, or must we demand substantive responsiveness to public needs? By naming and theorizing policy cartelization , this study seeks to expose the quiet erosion of democracy that operates behind the façade of stability. In sum, the discussion highlights how policy cartelization provides a more comprehensive framework for explaining Indonesia’s governance trajectory after Reformasi. By moving beyond frameworks that emphasize either electoral collusion, unilateral capture, or structural oligarchy, this concept reveals the negotiated and systemic nature of elite domination. The empirical cases show that cartelization operates not only in party politics but also in policymaking, rent distribution, bureaucratic management, and accountability structures. This reinforces the argument that Indonesian democracy is best understood as a “stable but hollow” system—one that endures institutionally yet erodes substantively. These insights lay the groundwork for the conclusion, which reflects on the theoretical contributions of policy cartelization and its broader implications for democratic governance in comparable contexts. 6. Conclusion This study has introduced and elaborated the concept of policy cartelization as a new framework for understanding Indonesia’s post-Reformasi governance. Moving beyond established theories of cartel party , cartel democracy , state capture , and policy capture , the findings suggest that policymaking in Indonesia is shaped by elite collusion rather than competition. Policies are not captured by a single dominant actor but are carved up through negotiated bargains , ensuring rent distribution across political and economic elites. Four key dimensions characterize this process: Elite Consensus Over Competition , oversized coalitions that neutralize opposition. Policy as Rent Distribution , public policies serving as vehicles for sharing economic spoils. Cartelization of Bureaucracy , bureaucratic positions and promotions folded into patronage networks. Weakening of Accountability , oversight institutions and civil society marginalized to protect cartel interests. The theoretical contribution of this study lies in offering policy cartelization as both an analytical and comparative concept. It highlights the consensual, negotiated side of elite politics that is often overlooked by frameworks emphasizing domination or unilateral capture. By extending the logic of cartelization from parties to policymaking, the concept provides a systemic lens that can be applied not only to Indonesia but also to other democracies facing oligarchic entrenchment. Normatively, the findings underscore the paradox of Indonesia’s democracy: stable in procedure yet hollow in substance. While elections and institutions remain intact, policymaking has been cartelized, eroding accountability and responsiveness to citizens. Breaking this cycle requires structural reforms: strengthening opposition, depoliticizing bureaucracy, and insulating oversight institutions from elite bargains. Without such reforms, Indonesia risks remaining trapped in a cartelized democracy , a system where governance is stable, but democracy is stripped of its true meaning. Declarations Funding: The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work. Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interests. Author Contributions: The study was conceptualized, written, and revised by Aris Sarjito. All sections reflect his original work. Data Availability Statement: This article is based on publicly available secondary sources. No new data were created or analysed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article. Use of AI Tools Statement Artificial intelligence tools (e.g., ChatGPT, OpenAI) were used during the manuscript preparation phase to assist with language editing and improving the clarity of expression. No AI tools were used for data analysis, interpretation of findings, or generating substantive research content. The author(s) retain full responsibility for the integrity and originality of the work. References Anguelov, D. (2024). State-owned enterprises and the politics of financializing infrastructure development in Indonesia: De‐risking at the limit? Development and Change , 55 (3), 493–529. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12828 Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, W. (2019). Democracy for sale: Elections, clientelism, and the state in Indonesia . Cornell University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvdtphhq.1 Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019). 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Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211822-4/indonesia-dirk-tomsa Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the new developmentalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies , 52 (3), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262 Winters, J. (2021). Oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia , 96 , 11–33. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.96.0099 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7567465","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":512129998,"identity":"efa54530-1480-4a37-b912-a1d9610c2156","order_by":0,"name":"Aris Sarjito","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Indonesia Defense University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Aris","middleName":"","lastName":"Sarjito","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-09-08 20:53:08","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":91022172,"identity":"617b1053-cb58-4a4b-b7a4-b38977c01c09","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-10 18:55:23","extension":"jpeg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":33368,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTypology of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Author’s elaboration based on Katz \u0026amp; Mair (2009), Slater (2018), Lestari et al. (2025), Kaufmann (2024), OECD (2017), Winters (2021).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7567465/v1/eebc00b282be43b3cb832ed5.jpeg"},{"id":91022569,"identity":"d8a7329b-ee2c-4e1d-96e1-33b940e0be33","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-10 19:03:23","extension":"jpeg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":35491,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptual Framework of Policy Cartelization\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConceptualization of \u003cem\u003ePolicy Cartelization\u003c/em\u003e as a synthesis of cartel theory, state capture, and governance, highlighting its impact on bureaucracy and accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author’s synthesis based on Katz \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Mair (2009); Lestari et al. (2025); Slater (2018); Kaufmann (2024); OECD (2017); Indrawan et al. (2025); Winters (2021).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7567465/v1/782bd86f531329ae4fabb47f.jpeg"},{"id":91022173,"identity":"4f70d692-21ec-45ae-aca8-eab43366900b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-10 18:55:23","extension":"jpeg","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":47825,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFlowchart of Policy Cartelization Indicators in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndicators of policy cartelization in post-Reformasi Indonesia, illustrating how elite-driven practices shape a stable yet hollow democratic system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author’s synthesis based on (Lestari et al., 2025); Slater (2018); Aspinall \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Mietzner (2019); Asrinaldi et al. (2021); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Anguelov (2024); Purnomo et al. (2020); Winters (2021); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Hadiz (2021); Caraway \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Ford (2020).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7567465/v1/136f2dd7107fbd17dd588b07.jpeg"},{"id":91022170,"identity":"eb627181-36f8-466b-9e59-27bf0e6f8bac","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-10 18:55:23","extension":"jpeg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":47060,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFlowchart of Empirical Cases of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis flowchart illustrates how selected policy cases in Indonesia, such as the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, capital relocation (IKN Nusantara), the nickel export ban, palm oil concessions, and the revision of the KPK Law, map onto the four dimensions of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e. Each case demonstrates elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability, all converging to produce a form of democracy that is stable but substantively hollow.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Adapted from Aspinall \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Berenschot (2019); Aspinall \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Mietzner (2019); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir \u0026nbsp;\u0026amp; Hadiz (2021); Tomsa (2022); Winters (2021).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage4.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7567465/v1/1ce7dc46427526b68df09c01.jpeg"},{"id":91249946,"identity":"40ee6923-ea30-4c59-af46-530b30a8f91d","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-13 15:46:44","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1578374,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7567465/v1/8a7093c1-9579-46be-9fed-d66b13cd04f7.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Oligarchy, Rent, and Elite Consensus","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eMore than two decades after the fall of Suharto\u0026rsquo;s authoritarian regime, Indonesia has been widely praised as one of the world\u0026rsquo;s largest democracies. Regular elections, a multi-party system, and leadership turnover are often portrayed as hallmarks of democratic success. Yet, recent scholarship increasingly points to the paradox of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy: it remains procedurally resilient, but substantively hollow. Instead of advancing popular participation, democratic institutions have been captured and reshaped by political and economic elites who collaborate to preserve access to state resources (Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Winters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This paradox reveals a system where democracy endures in form but erodes in substance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne of the most striking manifestations of this erosion is the emergence of \u003cem\u003ecartelization in politics\u003c/em\u003e. Katz \u0026amp; Mair (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) developed the concept of the \u003cem\u003ecartel party\u003c/em\u003e, describing how political parties in Europe ceased to compete substantively and instead colluded to exploit state resources. This idea was later extended to other regions, including Southeast Asia, where scholars observed that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democratic system was marked by \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e, a system in which major political parties coalesced into oversized coalitions and weakened the role of opposition (Lestari et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Slater, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, contemporary dynamics in Indonesia suggest that cartelization goes beyond party politics. It increasingly permeates the \u003cem\u003epolicy-making process itself.\u003c/em\u003e This article introduces the concept of \u003cem\u003ePolicy Cartelization.\u003c/em\u003e Unlike \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e, which emphasizes the dominance of a single actor or interest group over regulation (Kaufmann, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; OECD, 2017), \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e highlights collusion among multiple elites who \u0026ldquo;carve up\u0026rdquo; policies and state projects as if they were market shares in a cartel. Public policy, under such conditions, is no longer an instrument for delivering collective welfare but rather a mechanism for distributing rents and maintaining elite consensus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec2\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e1.1. Significance of the Study\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe notion of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e is especially relevant in post-2014 Indonesia. President Joko Widodo\u0026rsquo;s administrations have been characterized by an unprecedentedly broad coalition, which included nearly all major parties in parliament. While this arrangement was justified in the name of political stability, it also blurred the boundaries between government and opposition. As a result, key policies, from mega-infrastructure projects and the relocation of the capital to natural resource regulations, were widely perceived as products of elite bargains rather than participatory deliberation (Asrinaldi et al., 2021; Warburton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study matters for two reasons. First, it expands scholarly debates on democratic decline by moving beyond \u003cem\u003eoligarchic governance\u003c/em\u003e (Indrawan et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Winters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). While oligarchy emphasizes the dominance of powerful families and business interests, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e explains the consensual and collaborative dimension of elite politics. Second, it builds on but also diverges from the literature on \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e. Whereas \u003cem\u003ecapture\u003c/em\u003e implies unilateral domination, \u003cem\u003ecartelization\u003c/em\u003e implies negotiated rent-sharing among multiple actors. This nuance allows us to better understand how fragmented elites can still maintain stability by cartelizing the policy process.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e1.2. Research Questions\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgainst this backdrop, the study seeks to answer three guiding questions:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eHow does \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e operate in the context of post-Reformasi Indonesian democracy?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat are the defining features that distinguish \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e from related concepts such as \u003cem\u003estate capture\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat are the implications of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e for democratic quality, public accountability, and bureaucratic reform in Indonesia?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e1.3. Research Objectives\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn line with these questions, the study pursues the following objectives:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo formulate a conceptual definition of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e and identify its key analytical indicators.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo demonstrate how policy cartelization materializes in Indonesia through case studies in infrastructure development, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic appointments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo analyse the implications of policy cartelization for the trajectory of democracy and governance reform in Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e1.4. Novelty Statement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe originality of this study lies in its conceptual innovation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirst, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e differs from \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e by focusing on \u003cem\u003ecollective collusion\u003c/em\u003e among elites rather than unilateral domination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, it extends the idea of \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e (Slater, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) by showing that cartelization now penetrates \u003cem\u003epolicymaking itself\u003c/em\u003e, not merely electoral coalitions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, it contributes to the broader debate on democratic backsliding by providing a framework to analyse how elites neutralize accountability mechanisms while preserving the fa\u0026ccedil;ade of electoral democracy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThus, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e is proposed as both a descriptive and analytical tool: it describes elite practices in Indonesia and potentially offers a comparative framework for other developing democracies where oligarchic interests dominate policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e1.5. Structure of the Article\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe article is organized into five sections. The first is the introduction, which sets out the background, research questions, objectives, and novelty of the study. The second presents a literature review, covering theories of the cartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance. The third outlines the research methodology, which relies on qualitative analysis of secondary data. The fourth elaborates the findings on the characteristics and indicators of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e in Indonesia, illustrated by sectoral case studies. The fifth provides a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications. The article concludes by summarizing the main contributions and offering recommendations for democratic reform.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature Review","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Cartel Party Theory: From Competition to Collusion\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea of cartelization first emerged in the study of political parties. In their seminal work, Katz \u0026amp; Mair (2009) argued that party systems in Western Europe were shifting from competitive to collusive arrangements. Rather than fighting for votes with distinct ideological platforms, major parties increasingly relied on state subsidies and blurred their ideological differences. The result was what they called the \u003cem\u003ecartel party\u003c/em\u003e, a formation where parties behave less like competitors and more like business cartels, sharing access to state resources while limiting the room for challengers.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis theory was groundbreaking because it challenged the conventional view of democracy as a marketplace of competing ideas. Katz and Mair showed that when parties collude, elections may still happen regularly, but the choices available to citizens become superficial. Democracy remains \u0026ldquo;procedural\u0026rdquo; but loses much of its substantive vitality.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor Indonesia, this framework resonates strongly. Since the Reformasi era, political parties have often been described as pragmatic rather than ideological, with coalitions shaped by transactional negotiations rather than programmatic visions (Slater, 2018). However, while \u003cem\u003ecartel party theory\u003c/em\u003e explains the collusive behaviour of parties, it does not fully capture how similar dynamics extend into \u003cem\u003epolicy-making processes.\u003c/em\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Cartel Democracy in Indonesia: Consensus Without Opposition\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBuilding on Katz and Mair, Southeast Asia specialists adapted the concept to Indonesia. Scholars such as Lestari et al. (2025) and (Slater, 2018) used the term \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e to describe how post-Suharto political elites managed democratic competition by deliberately weakening opposition. Rather than allowing a vibrant contest of ideas, large parties tended to coalesce into oversized coalitions, effectively cartelizing the political system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn practice, this meant that nearly all major parties joined the governing coalition, leaving little space for meaningful checks and balances. As Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner (2019) put it, Indonesian democracy was paradoxical: stable on the surface but hollow in terms of accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe strength of the \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e concept lies in its ability to explain why Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democratic system looks competitive procedurally, yet in reality functions as a \u0026ldquo;grand coalition\u0026rdquo; of elites. However, the limitation is equally clear: the focus is primarily on electoral politics and coalition-building, rather than on \u003cem\u003epolicy substance\u003c/em\u003e. In other words, it explains \u003cem\u003ewho\u003c/em\u003e is in power but less about \u003cem\u003ewhat they do with that power\u003c/em\u003e when formulating policies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.3. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; State Capture: The Domination of Public Institutions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo understand how power is exercised over policymaking, scholars often turn to the concept of \u003cem\u003estate capture\u003c/em\u003e. Popularized by Kaufmann (2024), state capture refers to situations where powerful firms, individuals, or groups exert undue influence over the formation of laws, rules, and policies. In captured states, decisions that should serve the public interest are instead tailored to serve private interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eState capture has been extensively documented in transition economies, especially in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states, where oligarchs shaped entire regulatory frameworks to entrench their wealth and political influence. In such cases, state capture often involves a one-way dynamic: powerful actors dictate policy to a compliant government.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndonesia also exhibits elements of state capture. For instance, natural resource sectors such as mining and palm oil are notorious for their deep entanglements with oligarchic interests (Indrawan et al., 2025). Yet, describing Indonesia solely in terms of state capture risks oversimplification. What we observe is not merely unilateral domination but rather \u003cem\u003enegotiated consensus among multiple elites\u003c/em\u003e. Policies are often the outcome of bargains, compromises, and rent-sharing agreements rather than the dictate of a single dominant actor.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.4. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Policy Capture: A Narrow Lens\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA related but narrower concept is \u003cem\u003epolicy capture,\u003c/em\u003e often used in governance studies to highlight how specific policy domains are hijacked by vested interests. The OECD (2017) defines policy capture as the undue influence of interest groups on public decision-making, resulting in policies that favour private gain over public good.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePolicy capture is useful for analysing sectoral issues, for example, when mining regulations are skewed in favour of a handful of companies, or when healthcare reforms are shaped by pharmaceutical lobbies. However, the lens of policy capture typically isolates \u003cem\u003eone policy area\u003c/em\u003e at a time. It does not fully account for the broader \u003cem\u003esystemic pattern\u003c/em\u003e in which multiple policies across sectors are cartelized simultaneously through elite consensus.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis is precisely where the proposed concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e extends the literature: it moves beyond the sectoral and case-specific focus of policy capture to analyse the \u003cem\u003estructural tendency\u003c/em\u003e of elites to collude across domains of governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.5. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Oligarchic Governance: The Indonesian Context\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s political economy is best understood through the lens of \u003cem\u003eoligarchic governance.\u003c/em\u003e Indrawan et al. (2025) describe how the post-Suharto era has seen the reorganization of power among political and economic elites, who dominate not only political parties but also key economic sectors. Winters (2013) reinforces this point, arguing that Indonesia remains an oligarchy in which wealth and power are concentrated among a narrow elite.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe oligarchy framework explains why reform efforts often stall: because the same networks that dominated under authoritarianism have reconstituted themselves within democratic institutions. Yet, the oligarchy perspective, while powerful, can sometimes overemphasize structural continuity and understate the \u003cem\u003edynamic strategies\u003c/em\u003e elites use to maintain dominance in a democratic setting.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis is where \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e adds value. It conceptualizes how oligarchic elites manage competition among themselves, not only through domination or capture but through \u003cem\u003ecartel-style negotiation and rent distribution\u003c/em\u003e embedded within policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.6. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Towards the Concept of Policy Cartelization\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis section proposes \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e as a conceptual innovation that synthesizes and extends existing literature on political cartels, elite governance, and policy capture. While earlier frameworks have explained party collusion, electoral consensus, or sector-specific domination, they often fail to account for how elites negotiate and distribute control over the policymaking process itself. Policy cartelization refers to a systemic configuration in which policies, across multiple sectors, are governed not through open contestation, but through elite collusion, institutionalized rent-sharing, and bureaucratic entrenchment. It draws on the logic of cartel behaviour from economic theory and adapts it to analyse political economy dynamics in democratic yet oligarchic regimes such as post-Reformasi Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBringing these strands together, we can see both the overlaps and the gaps.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eCartel Party Theory\u003c/em\u003e explains collusion among parties but neglects policy substance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eCartel Democracy\u003c/em\u003e adapts the concept to Indonesia but focuses mainly on electoral politics.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eState Capture\u003c/em\u003e highlights undue influence but often assumes unilateral domination.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003ePolicy Capture\u003c/em\u003e is useful for sectoral studies but limited in scope.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eOligarchic Governance\u003c/em\u003e explains elite dominance but needs more nuance on how elites negotiate among themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePolicy Cartelization\u003c/em\u003e synthesizes these insights while filling a crucial gap. It refers to the process by which \u003cem\u003epublic policies are carved up among elites in cartel-like arrangements,\u003c/em\u003e producing governance that is collusive rather than competitive, consensual among elites rather than participatory for citizens.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe concept has four defining features:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eElite Consensus over Competition.\u003c/em\u003e Political elites prefer inclusion and compromise rather than genuine opposition.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/em\u003e. Policies function as vehicles for distributing rents through projects, contracts, or regulatory privileges.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eCartelization of Bureaucracy\u003c/em\u003e. Bureaucratic positions are politicized and folded into the cartel\u0026rsquo;s rent-sharing logic.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eWeakening of Accountability.\u003c/em\u003e Oversight institutions are co-opted or sidelined to protect the cartel arrangement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy foregrounding these features, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e captures both the systemic and negotiated nature of elite politics in Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo further clarify how policy cartelization operates in the Indonesian context, Figure 1 presents a typological model that distinguishes between three ideal types of elite-policy arrangements: competitive pluralism, state capture, and policy cartelization. This typology helps to situate the proposed concept within broader comparative frameworks, showing how cartelized policymaking is distinct from both open democratic deliberation and unilateral elite domination.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs illustrated in the figure, policy cartelization differs from state capture in that it is based on negotiated elite consensus rather than one-sided domination. It also diverges from competitive pluralism by suppressing meaningful opposition and public deliberation. The vertical axis measures the degree of elite collusion, while the horizontal axis reflects the scope of policy domains affected. This model captures the structural transformation of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi governance, where policymaking has increasingly become a site of rent-sharing arrangements among oligarchic networks. Unlike isolated cases of corruption or sectoral capture, cartelization represents a systemic pattern that spans across institutions and policy sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.7. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Implications for Research\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdopting \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e as a framework has several implications.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, it invites scholars to examine policymaking not as a technocratic or neutral process, but as a political marketplace where rents are bargained and distributed. Second, it emphasizes the role of \u003cem\u003eelite consensus\u003c/em\u003e in stabilizing democracies that might otherwise fragment, explaining why Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy is stable yet shallow. Third, it enables comparative research, as other developing democracies (such as the Philippines, Brazil, or South Africa) may also exhibit elements of policy cartelization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMost importantly, it reminds us that the crisis of democracy is not always visible in authoritarian takeovers or military coups. Sometimes, the erosion is subtler: \u003cem\u003edemocracy hollowed out from within\u003c/em\u003e, as elites cartelize policies while leaving democratic institutions formally intact.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e builds on, but also extends, existing theories of elite politics. As shown in Figure 2, five major theoretical strands, Cartel Party Theory, Cartel Democracy, State Capture, Policy Capture, and Oligarchic Governance, provide the foundation for understanding collusive governance. Each contributes important insights but leaves analytical gaps when applied to post-Reformasi Indonesia. By synthesizing these strands, the new concept of policy cartelization captures how elites not only dominate but also \u003cem\u003enegotiate and distribute rents collectively through policymaking.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs illustrated in the diagram, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e is characterized by four defining features: (1) elite consensus over competition, (2) policy as rent distribution, (3) cartelization of bureaucracy, and (4) weakening of accountability. Together, these features explain why Indonesian democracy is procedurally stable yet substantively hollow. The framework highlights how policymaking itself has been transformed into a cartelized process, where governance outcomes reflect elite bargains rather than democratic deliberation. This conceptual model also lays the groundwork for comparative studies, as similar dynamics may be observed in other democracies facing entrenched oligarchic power.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs illustrated in Figure 1, the concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e emerges from the synthesis of five major theoretical strands, \u003cem\u003ecartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture,\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eoligarchic governance\u003c/em\u003e. Each provides important insights into Indonesian politics, yet none fully captures the systemic and negotiated nature of elite collusion in policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo clarify both the overlaps and the gaps in the literature, Table 1 compares the strengths and limitations of existing frameworks, \u003cem\u003ecartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture,\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eoligarchic governance\u003c/em\u003e, with the proposed concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e. While these theories provide valuable insights into Indonesian politics, each leaves analytical gaps when applied to the dynamics of policymaking. The proposed framework highlights its novelty by moving beyond electoral coalitions, sectoral capture, or structural oligarchy, and instead conceptualizing policymaking itself as a cartelized arena.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1. Comparative Framework: Existing Theories vs Policy Cartelization\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eComparison of existing frameworks with the proposed concept of policy cartelization, highlighting its novelty in treating policymaking as a cartelized arena.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eConcept\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eKey Focus\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eStrengths\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLimitations in Indonesian Context\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhat Policy Cartelization Adds\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCartel Party Theory \u003cstrong\u003e(Katz \u0026amp; Mair, 2009)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eParty collusion in elections, reliance on state resources\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExplains why parties cooperate rather than compete\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeglects substance of policymaking beyond elections\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExtends cartel logic into the \u003cem\u003epolicy-making process\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCartel Democracy \u003cstrong\u003e(Lestari et al., 2025; Slater, 2018)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOversized coalitions, consensus politics\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExplains stability, weak opposition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFocuses on institutional politics, less on policy outcomes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLinks coalition logic with distribution of rents in policies\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eState Capture \u003cstrong\u003e(Kaufmann, 2024)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDomination of state by powerful business/oligarchic actors\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eShows how elites influence laws \u0026amp; regulations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAssumes one-way domination, underplays negotiated consensus\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmphasizes collective collusion among elites instead of unilateral capture\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy Capture \u003cstrong\u003e(OECD, 2017)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVested interests in specific policy sectors\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eUseful for sectoral analysis (e.g., mining, healthcare)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFragmented view; lacks systemic explanation across sectors\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProvides a systemic lens: multiple sectors cartelized simultaneously\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOligarchic Governance \u003cstrong\u003e(Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEnduring elite dominance over politics \u0026amp; economy\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExplains persistence of oligarchic networks\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOften static, less attention to dynamic elite negotiations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eShows how oligarchs maintain stability via rent-sharing and cartelized bargains\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy Cartelization (New Concept)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCollusion in policymaking; rents shared among elites\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIntegrates insights from previous theories\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNovelty: highlights policy as a cartelized arena\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExplains Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;stable but hollow\u0026rdquo; democracy\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author\u0026rsquo;s synthesis based on Katz \u0026amp; Mair (2009); Lestari et al. (2025); (Slater, 2018); (Kaufmann, 2024); OECD (2017); Indrawan et al. (2025); Winters (2021).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Table 1 shows, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e synthesizes the explanatory power of existing theories while addressing their limitations. It goes beyond electoral politics, sectoral capture, or structural oligarchy by focusing on \u003cem\u003ehow policies themselves are carved up among elites through cartel-style arrangements.\u003c/em\u003e This framework thus provides a stronger basis for analysing Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi governance and for drawing comparative lessons in other developing democracies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.8. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Theoretical Contribution of Policy Cartelization\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe concept of policy cartelization offers an explicit theoretical contribution to the study of political economy and democratic governance. First, it extends the cartel party thesis (Katz \u0026amp; Mair, 2009) by shifting the analytical focus from electoral competition to policymaking, demonstrating how collusive logics operate not only in party systems but also in the distribution of rents through public policies. Second, it moves beyond the state capture framework (Kaufmann, 2024) by emphasizing negotiated elite consensus rather than unilateral domination, highlighting the institutionalization of rent-sharing among multiple oligarchic actors. Third, it refines the notion of policy capture (OECD, 2017) by providing a systemic, rather than sectoral, lens that explains how multiple policy arenas become cartelized simultaneously. Finally, it deepens the framework of oligarchic governance (Winters, 2021) by showing the dynamic strategies elites employ to stabilize democracy through cartelized policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy synthesizing these insights, policy cartelization contributes a novel conceptual lens to comparative politics. It highlights how democracies can remain procedurally intact yet substantively hollow, as elites transform policymaking into a cartelized arena insulated from meaningful public deliberation. This theoretical innovation provides a more comprehensive understanding of post-Reformasi Indonesia and creates new opportunities for cross-national comparison with other democracies experiencing oligarchic consolidation.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Research Design\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study adopts a \u003cem\u003equalitative descriptive research design.\u003c/em\u003e The objective is not to test causal hypotheses in a positivist sense, but to \u003cem\u003eexplore, interpret, and theorize\u003c/em\u003e the dynamics of policy cartelization in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi democracy. Given that the phenomenon is relatively under-theorized, qualitative research allows for a deeper engagement with historical trajectories, discursive narratives, and institutional practices.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe descriptive dimension is equally important. By mapping observable indicators of cartelization across different policy arenas, such as infrastructure, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic reform, the study seeks to illustrate how cartelization manifests itself in practice. In this way, the methodology provides both conceptual grounding and empirical texture.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Data Sources\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study relies primarily on \u003cem\u003esecondary data sources\u003c/em\u003e, reflecting the sensitive and opaque nature of elite negotiations. These sources include:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eOfficial policy documents\u003c/em\u003e, government white papers, strategic plans (e.g., \u003cem\u003eRencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional\u003c/em\u003e), and parliamentary records that reveal formal policy directions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eAudit and oversight reports\u003c/em\u003e, documents from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and international watchdogs.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eAcademic literature\u003c/em\u003e, peer-reviewed articles, books, and dissertations that provide analytical depth on Indonesian democracy and oligarchy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eThink tank and NGO reports,\u003c/em\u003e publications from institutions such as CSIS Indonesia, Transparency International, and Global Witness, which often highlight governance concerns overlooked in official narratives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eMedia investigations\u003c/em\u003e, long-form journalism and investigative reporting that uncover details about elite bargains, rent-seeking practices, and conflicts of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy triangulating these diverse sources, the study ensures \u003cem\u003ebreadth and depth\u003c/em\u003e of evidence, while acknowledging that no single dataset can fully capture the clandestine dynamics of cartelization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.3. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Method and Source Justification\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis article employs a qualitative, interpretive approach rooted in critical policy studies and political economy analysis. Rather than using primary data or fieldwork, it synthesizes and analyses a broad range of secondary sources, including academic literature, policy reports, public documents, news archives, and expert commentaries published between 1999 and 2024. These sources were selected through purposive sampling, using three explicit criteria: (1) direct relevance to post-Reformasi Indonesian political developments, (2) credibility and authority of the publisher (e.g., Scopus- or JSTOR-indexed works, or reports from OECD and World Bank), and (3) capacity to provide insight into elite dynamics, party systems, or policy formation. The selection process was documented systematically, ensuring that another researcher could replicate the dataset construction by following the same inclusion criteria.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe analytical procedure involved two steps. First, the sources were coded using conceptual categories derived from existing theories\u0026mdash;cartel party, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance\u0026mdash;while remaining open to emergent themes. Second, the coded material was compared across cases and policy domains to trace patterns of elite consensus, rent-sharing, bureaucratic politicization, and weakened accountability. This process created a transparent audit trail that allows for replication, critique, and refinement in future studies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough relying on secondary data carries the risk of bias or incompleteness, these limitations were mitigated through triangulation across diverse types of sources (academic, governmental, NGO, and media). By making the selection criteria and analytical steps explicit, the study enhances its methodological transparency and opens itself to scholarly scrutiny and debate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.4. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Analytical Framework\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe analysis is structured around the four \u003cem\u003eindicators of policy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e proposed in the conceptual section:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eElite Consensus Over Competition\u003c/em\u003e, measured by the breadth of governing coalitions, the absence of robust opposition, and elite negotiations that occur outside formal parliamentary debate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/em\u003e, traced through the allocation of infrastructure projects, natural resource concessions, and state-owned enterprise contracts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eCartelization of Bureaucracy\u003c/em\u003e, observed in the politicization of bureaucratic appointments, the use of patronage in civil service promotions, and the weakening of meritocratic reform.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eWeakening of Accountability\u003c/em\u003e, evaluated through the erosion of institutional independence in oversight bodies and the prevalence of legal exemptions or special regulations benefiting elites.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach indicator is operationalized not as a rigid variable, but as a \u003cem\u003eguiding lens\u003c/em\u003e for interpreting textual and documentary evidence. For instance, when audit reports highlight irregularities in infrastructure contracts that involve multiple parties from both government and business sectors, these findings are interpreted through the lens of rent distribution and cartel-style negotiation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.5. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Data Analysis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study employs \u003cem\u003econtent analysis\u003c/em\u003e combined with \u003cem\u003eprocess tracing\u003c/em\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eContent Analysis:\u003c/em\u003e Relevant documents are systematically coded for recurring themes such as \u0026ldquo;elite consensus,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;rent-sharing,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;bureaucratic politicization.\u0026rdquo; The coding process is both \u003cem\u003edeductive\u003c/em\u003e (based on theoretical indicators of cartelization) and \u003cem\u003einductive\u003c/em\u003e (allowing new patterns to emerge from the data).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eProcess Tracing\u003c/em\u003e: Where possible, the study reconstructs sequences of events to understand how policy decisions were reached. For example, tracing how a natural resource regulation evolved from parliamentary debate to final enactment reveals the layers of negotiation and compromise involved.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis dual approach ensures that findings are both \u003cem\u003etheory-driven\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eempirically grounded.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.6. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Limitations and Reflexivity\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSeveral methodological limitations must be acknowledged.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, relying on secondary data means the analysis is constrained by the availability and reliability of existing sources. Elite bargains are often hidden from public view, and what is documented may reflect partial truths or political bias. Second, the absence of primary interviews with policymakers or business elites may limit the granularity of insider perspectives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, these limitations are mitigated by the \u003cem\u003etriangulation of diverse sources\u003c/em\u003e and the use of established analytical frameworks. Moreover, focusing on secondary data offers one methodological advantage: it minimizes the risk of elite manipulation, as interviews with powerful actors can sometimes produce carefully curated narratives rather than candid revelations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe researcher also acknowledges their positionality. Analysing \u0026ldquo;cartelization\u0026rdquo; carries normative weight, as it implies collusion and corruption. To address this, the study strives to maintain analytical rigor, distinguishing between descriptive observation and normative judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3.7. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Ethical Considerations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile no human subjects were interviewed directly, ethical considerations remain important. Sensitive findings are presented in a way that protects individuals while critiquing systemic patterns. The goal is not to single out personal misconduct but to \u003cem\u003ehighlight structural tendencies\u003c/em\u003e that undermine democratic accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the methodology combines a \u003cem\u003equalitative descriptive design, secondary data analysis,\u003c/em\u003e and a \u003cem\u003econcept-driven analytical framework\u003c/em\u003e. It seeks to illuminate how policy cartelization operates in Indonesia, while being transparent about its limitations. By grounding abstract theory in empirical evidence, the study contributes to both conceptual clarity and practical understanding of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4. Findings","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe empirical analysis of post-Reformasi Indonesia suggests that the dynamics of governance cannot be fully explained by conventional theories of state capture or oligarchic dominance. Instead, what emerges is a \u003cem\u003epattern of negotiated collusion\u003c/em\u003e in which elites across party lines and business sectors agree to share the spoils of policymaking. This pattern is best described as \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe following subsections present four interrelated dimensions of this phenomenon:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Elite consensus over competition\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Policy as rent distribution\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Cartelization of bureaucracy\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Weakening of accountability\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Elite Consensus Over Competition\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the clearest signs of policy cartelization in Indonesia is the consistent tendency of political elites to form oversized coalitions. After Reformasi, coalition governments were initially seen as pragmatic tools to stabilize fragile democracy (Hargens, 2021; Lestari et al., 2025). Over time, however, coalition-building became less about governance and more about eliminating opposition (Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner, 2019; Slater, 2018).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnder President Joko Widodo, this trend reached its peak. By his second term (2019\u0026ndash;2024), the governing coalition included virtually all major parties, leaving only the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in opposition. Even these parties, while formally outside government, often aligned with the ruling coalition on critical votes (Asrinaldi et al., 2021; Mietzner, 2023).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis arrangement created what Slater (2018) termed a \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e, a system in which elites avoid open confrontation and instead negotiate behind closed doors. Public debates and parliamentary sessions often became performative, as the real bargains took place in informal settings (Johnson, 2020; Warburton, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe impact on policymaking is profound. Major policies, such as the \u003cem\u003eOmnibus Law on Job Creation (2020)\u003c/em\u003e, were pushed through parliament with minimal debate, despite massive public protests (Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot, 2019; Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz, 2021). The law\u0026rsquo;s swift passage reflected not only executive dominance but also elite consensus across party lines. Dissent was marginalized, not because opposition was absent, but because it was structurally neutralized by the cartel logic.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis consensus is not without conflict. Elites still compete over access to resources. Yet the competition occurs \u003cem\u003ewithin the cartel, not outside it.\u003c/em\u003e Disagreements are resolved through negotiation and rent-sharing, not through adversarial politics (Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021). Thus, democracy functions without meaningful opposition, a hallmark of policy cartelization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Policy as Rent Distribution\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps the most visible dimension of policy cartelization is the use of public policy as a mechanism for rent distribution. Policies are designed not only to govern but also to allocate economic opportunities among elites (Indrawan et al., 2025; Tomsa, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.2.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Infrastructure as Rent Arena\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s massive infrastructure drive under Jokowi, often described as \u0026ldquo;new developmentalism\u0026rdquo; (Warburton, 2016), provides a telling case. While infrastructure projects were justified in terms of economic growth and connectivity, they also became vehicles for distributing rents (Asrinaldi et al., 2021). Large-scale projects such as toll roads, airports, and the planned relocation of the capital city (IKN Nusantara) involved complex webs of contracts awarded to companies linked to political elites (Anguelov, 2024; Winters, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInvestigations by Transparency International and independent media revealed patterns of \u003cem\u003ecrony contracting.\u003c/em\u003e Companies with close ties to ruling parties or cabinet ministers often won bids, while state-owned enterprises served as intermediaries to funnel projects to politically connected firms (Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot, 2019; Tomsa, 2022). Rather than open competition, infrastructure became a cartelized marketplace, where projects were divided among coalition partners (Johnson, 2020).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.2.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Natural Resource Governance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe natural resource sector further illustrates this dynamic. The nickel industry, now central to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s industrial policy, has been heavily influenced by elite bargains. The decision to ban raw nickel exports in 2020 was framed as a nationalist strategy to boost domestic processing. Yet studies show that concessions and smelter projects were disproportionately allocated to companies linked to politically connected oligarchs (Purnomo et al., 2020).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, the palm oil sector demonstrates how policy serves as a rent-sharing mechanism. Subsidy programs, export permits, and land concessions are often distributed among elites across party lines (Hardiwinata et al., 2020; Purnomo et al., 2020). This creates \u003cem\u003ea win-win arrangement for the cartel:\u003c/em\u003e no single group dominates entirely, but all members secure access to lucrative rents (Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz, 2021; Winters, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.3. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Cartelization of Bureaucracy\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile much attention is paid to parties and business elites, the bureaucracy is equally important in sustaining policy cartelization. In theory, civil service reform since Reformasi aimed to professionalize and depoliticize the state apparatus. In practice, however, bureaucratic appointments have often been politicized and folded into the cartel\u0026rsquo;s rent-sharing system (Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot, 2019; Buehler et al., 2024).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.3.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Patronage in Appointments\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSenior bureaucratic posts, including director-general positions in ministries and leadership roles in state-owned enterprises, are frequently allocated based on loyalty to coalition partners rather than merit (Anguelov, 2024; Mietzner, 2023). For instance, state-owned enterprises like Pertamina and PLN have repeatedly appointed directors with strong political ties, reflecting the intertwining of bureaucratic governance with cartel logic (Warburton, 2016; Winters, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis patronage system extends downward. Civil servants often report that promotions depend not only on performance but also on informal payments (\u003cem\u003eupeti\u003c/em\u003e) or alignment with ruling elites (Berenschot, 2018; Latief, 2025). As a result, bureaucracy functions less as a neutral administrator and more as a cartelized network of patronage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.3.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Stalled Reform\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEfforts to reform the civil service, such as the introduction of merit-based systems and e-government tools, have yielded mixed results (Iqbal et al., 2021; Kuipers, 2022). On paper, reforms promise transparency and professionalism. In practice, reforms are often symbolic, while the underlying structures of rent-seeking remain intact (Buehler et al., 2024). The cartel ensures that reforms do not disrupt the flow of patronage, absorbing reformist initiatives into the wider logic of negotiated rent-sharing (Indrawan et al., 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.4. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Weakening of Accountability\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe final dimension of policy cartelization is the deliberate weakening of accountability mechanisms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.4.1. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Oversight Institutions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInstitutions designed to check government power, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), and parliament, have been gradually undermined. The most striking example is the \u003cem\u003e2019 revision of the KPK Law\u003c/em\u003e, which curtailed the commission\u0026rsquo;s independence. Scholars widely argued that the revision was orchestrated by elites across the political spectrum to protect cartel interests (Butt, 2017; Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz, 2021; Tomsa, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eParliament itself, rather than acting as a check on the executive, often functions as part of the cartel. Oversight hearings are frequently toothless, and investigative committees rarely challenge major government initiatives (Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner, 2019; Johnson, 2020). Instead of adversarial accountability, the DPR\u0026rsquo;s role is often reduced to legitimizing elite bargains.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4.4.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Public Participation\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePublic accountability is further eroded by the narrowing of participatory channels. Civil society protests against the \u003cem\u003eOmnibus Law on Job Creation (2020)\u003c/em\u003e and environmental deregulation were met with repression, while formal consultations were minimal (Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot, 2019; Caraway \u0026amp; Ford, 2020). This reflects a dual strategy: elites maintain the procedural appearance of democracy while ensuring that policy outcomes remain insulated from popular demands (Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz, 2021; Warburton, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eInterconnections: A Systemic Cartel\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese four dimensions, elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic cartelization, and weakened accountability, are not isolated. They reinforce one another, producing a self-sustaining system:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eElite consensus\u003c/em\u003e ensures conflicts remain internal and manageable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eRent distribution\u003c/em\u003e provides incentives for elites to remain in the cartel.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eBureaucratic cartelization\u003c/em\u003e embeds the system within state machinery.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eWeakening accountability\u003c/em\u003e shields the cartel from external disruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTogether, these dynamics constitute a form of governance that is stable but shallow: stable because elite bargains prevent open conflict, but shallow because democracy\u0026rsquo;s substantive qualities, competition, accountability, and representation, are hollowed out (Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner, 2019; Winters, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eCase Illustration: The Omnibus Law (2020)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eOmnibus Law on Job Creation\u003c/em\u003e serves as a concrete case that brings all dimensions together.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eElite Consensus:\u003c/em\u003e Passed with overwhelming support across coalition parties, sidelining dissent (Tomsa, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eRent Distribution:\u003c/em\u003e Provisions benefited a range of business groups, from large conglomerates to natural resource firms, reflecting negotiated rent-sharing.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eBureaucratic Cartelization:\u003c/em\u003e Implementation relied on agencies staffed with politically connected officials (Iqbal et al., 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; \u003cem\u003eWeakening Accountability:\u003c/em\u003e Public protests were met with repression, while judicial review processes faced political pressure (Caraway \u0026amp; Ford, 2020; Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Omnibus Law thus epitomizes \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization:\u003c/em\u003e a policy that embodies elite collusion while eroding democratic accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo better illustrate how the concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e manifests in practice, Table 2 summarizes its four key indicators. Each indicator is linked to empirical illustrations drawn from Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s recent political and economic governance, alongside references to the relevant scholarly literature. This synthesis highlights how cartelization is not confined to a single policy sector but operates systematically across arenas of policymaking, administration, and accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2. Indicators of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndicators of policy cartelization in post-Reformasi Indonesia, linking each dimension to empirical illustrations and key scholarly references.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIndicator\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmpirical Illustration\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eElite Consensus over Competition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOversized coalitions under Jokowi (2014\u0026ndash;2024) involving nearly all major parties; marginalization of opposition; passage of the Omnibus Law despite protests.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eInfrastructure projects (toll roads, IKN Nusantara) allocated to politically connected firms; nickel export ban benefiting oligarchs; palm oil concessions shared across elites.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCartelization of Bureaucracy\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAppointments in SOEs (Pertamina, PLN) based on political loyalty; promotions requiring \u003cem\u003eupeti\u003c/em\u003e; merit-based reforms undermined by patronage networks.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeakening of Accountability\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2019 KPK Law revision reducing independence; DPR oversight weakened; repression of protests against the Omnibus Law further curtailed avenues for public accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author\u0026rsquo;s synthesis based on Lestari et al. (2025); Katz \u0026amp; Mair (2009); Slater (2018); Asrinaldi et al. (2021); Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner (2019); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Anguelov (2024); Purnomo et al. (2020); Winters (2021); Buehler et al. (2024); Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot (2019); Berenschot (2018); Latief (2025); (Iqbal et al., 2021); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz (2021); Caraway \u0026amp; Ford (2020).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs the table shows, the four indicators reinforce one another in shaping Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi governance. \u003cem\u003eElite consensus\u003c/em\u003e ensures that opposition remains marginal, while \u003cem\u003erent distribution\u003c/em\u003e incentivizes cartel members to remain within the system. \u003cem\u003eBureaucratic cartelization\u003c/em\u003e embeds these dynamics into the state apparatus, and the \u003cem\u003eweakening of accountability\u003c/em\u003e protects the arrangement from external disruption. Together, these interlocking dimensions explain why Indonesian democracy has remained stable in procedure but hollow in substance. The table thus provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of the mechanisms through which \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e operates, offering a foundation for both empirical analysis and comparative research.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo further clarify the conceptual logic of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e, Figure 3 visualizes the relationship between its four main indicators and their empirical manifestations. This flowchart illustrates how cartelization permeates different dimensions of governance in Indonesia, from coalition politics to rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and the erosion of accountability. By connecting these elements, the model highlights the systemic character of cartelization in policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Figure 3 shows, each indicator of policy cartelization contributes to the consolidation of a \u0026ldquo;stable but hollow democracy\u0026rdquo;. Elite consensus reduces meaningful opposition, rent distribution ensures elite cooperation, bureaucratic cartelization embeds patronage within the state apparatus, and weakened accountability shields the system from disruption. Together, these dynamics explain how Indonesian democracy has endured institutionally while simultaneously eroding substantively. The framework not only strengthens the conceptual clarity of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e but also provides a tool for analysing similar patterns in other developing democracies facing entrenched oligarchic power.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe case of the Omnibus Law demonstrates how all four dimensions of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e converge in a single policy process, yet this is not an isolated example. Similar dynamics can be observed across other major policy arenas in post-Reformasi Indonesia, from infrastructure development and natural resource governance to institutional reforms. To capture these broader patterns, Table 3 summarizes selected empirical cases that illustrate how \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e materializes in practice, showing how elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability manifest in concrete policy processes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 3. Empirical Cases of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpirical cases of policy cartelization in post-Reformasi Indonesia across four key dimensions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy Case\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDimension of Cartelization\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEmpirical Evidence\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImpact on Democracy\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOmnibus Law on Job Creation (2020)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eElite Consensus; Weakening of Accountability\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePassed with broad coalition support; minimal parliamentary debate; mass protests suppressed\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eReduced public participation; procedural democracy preserved, substantive accountability eroded\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRelocation of Capital (IKN Nusantara)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eContracts for infrastructure allocated to politically connected firms; SOEs as intermediaries\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eElite rent-sharing prioritized over transparent planning\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNickel Export Ban (2020)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eConcessions and smelter projects granted to firms linked to political elites\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIndustrial policy captured by oligarchic interests; inequality in benefits\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePalm Oil Concessions\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution; Elite Consensus\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLand permits and subsidies distributed across coalition-linked companies\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSustains elite consensus; undermines environmental governance\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRevision of KPK Law (2019)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeakening of Accountability; Elite Consensus\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIndependence curtailed; supported by cross-party coalition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAnti-corruption oversight weakened; cartel interests shielded from scrutiny\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSourc\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003ee: Adapted from\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner (2019); Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot (2019); Warburton (2016); Indrawan et al. (2025); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz (2021); Tomsa (2022); Winters (2021).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs shown in Table 3, different policies consistently display the same logic: elite consensus ensures broad support, rents are distributed through projects and concessions, bureaucratic networks sustain patronage, and accountability is systematically weakened. Taken together, these cases confirm that \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e is not sector-specific but a systemic mode of governance. Building on these findings, the following section discusses how the concept contributes to the broader theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile Table 3 summarizes empirical cases of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e in a structured form, it is also important to visualize how these cases connect to the four dimensions of cartelization. Figure 4 presents a flowchart that maps each case, ranging from the Omnibus Law and capital relocation to the nickel export ban, palm oil governance, and the KPK Law revision, onto the dimensions of elite consensus, rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs shown in Figure 4, these diverse cases consistently reinforce the systemic nature of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e. Despite differences in policy domains, they all converge on the same democratic outcome: a system that is procedurally stable yet substantively hollow. This provides the foundation for the next section, which discusses how the concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e advances theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance in comparative perspective.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"5. Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe empirical evidence presented in Table 3 and visualized in Figure 4 demonstrates that \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e is not confined to isolated cases but constitutes a systemic mode of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Across different sectors, ranging from labour and infrastructure to natural resources and institutional reforms, policy processes consistently reflect the same underlying logic: elite consensus, negotiated rent distribution, bureaucratic patronage, and weakened accountability. These recurring patterns highlight that what appears as fragmented policy decisions are in fact interlinked manifestations of a deeper structural phenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBuilding on these findings, this section situates \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e within broader theoretical debates on democracy, oligarchy, and governance. It explores how the concept extends existing frameworks such as cartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, policy capture, and oligarchic governance, while also addressing their limitations. By doing so, the discussion clarifies the conceptual contribution of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e and its implications for understanding the paradox of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy, stable in procedure but hollow in substance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5.1.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Situating Policy Cartelization Among Existing Theories\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe findings demonstrate that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democratic governance after Reformasi cannot be adequately captured by existing concepts such as \u003cem\u003ecartel party\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003estate capture\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e, or \u003cem\u003eoligarchic governance\u003c/em\u003e. Each theory provides valuable insights yet also has limitations when applied to the Indonesian case.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Cartel Party Theory\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e(Katz \u0026amp; Mair, 2009)\u003cstrong\u003e:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;This theory helps us understand why political parties in Indonesia collude rather than compete. However, it is primarily concerned with party behaviour in electoral politics, not the policymaking process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Cartel Democracy (Lestari et al., 2025; Slater, 2018):\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;This concept explains why oversized coalitions dominate post-Reformasi Indonesia. Yet, again, its focus is institutional politics, not how policies are crafted and distributed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; State Capture\u0026nbsp;(Kaufmann, 2024):\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;This concept is useful for highlighting the influence of business oligarchs. However, it implies a one-way relationship: powerful actors capture a weak state. Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s reality is more negotiated and consensual, involving multiple elites who bargain rather than a single dominant captor.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Policy Capture\u0026nbsp;(OECD, 2017):\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;This framework is valuable for examining sectoral distortions\u0026mdash;say, when one industry lobbies for favourable regulations. But it lacks the systemic dimension. In Indonesia, cartelization occurs across multiple policy domains simultaneously.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Oligarchic Governance\u0026nbsp;(Indrawan et al., 2025; Winters, 2021):\u003cbr\u003eThis perspective explains elite dominance well, but it can appear static, portraying oligarchy as an unchanging structural condition. \u003cem\u003ePolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e adds nuance by showing how oligarchs maintain stability through ongoing negotiations, compromises, and rent-sharing.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e synthesizes and extends these frameworks. It reveals that policymaking in Indonesia is less about unilateral domination and more about \u003cem\u003ecollusive governance,\u003c/em\u003e where elites deliberately construct a cartel to stabilize their collective power.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5.2.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Theoretical Contribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe introduction of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e offers at least three contributions to political science and governance studies:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; A New Lens on Elite Politics:\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;It highlights the negotiated and consensual dimension of elite domination. Rather than viewing elites as always competing or capturing the state, we see how they manage competition by cartelizing policies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Bridging Electoral and Policy Arenas:\u003cbr\u003eIt extends the concept of \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e beyond electoral politics. It shows that the same collusive logic that brings parties together in oversized coalitions also shapes the way policies are formulated and implemented.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Systemic Rather Than Sectoral:\u003cbr\u003eUnlike policy capture, which often looks at single industries or regulations, \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e provides a systemic framework. It can explain why different sectors (infrastructure, natural resources, bureaucracy) display similar patterns of rent distribution.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis theoretical move is important because it recognizes democracy\u0026rsquo;s erosion not only in electoral manipulation or authoritarian reversals but also in the hollowing out of policymaking.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5.3.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Implications for Indonesian Democracy\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe implications for Indonesia are sobering.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Stable but Hollow Democracy:\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;Policy cartelization helps explain why Indonesian democracy is stable in procedural terms but hollow in substantive quality. Elections are held regularly, and institutions remain intact, yet policies reflect elite bargains rather than public deliberation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Weak Opposition and Civil Society:\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;With nearly all major parties inside the governing cartel, opposition loses significance. Civil society protests are marginalized, and the policy arena becomes insulated from democratic pressures.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; Stalled Reform:\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;Efforts to reform bureaucracy, reduce corruption, or promote transparency are continuously diluted because they threaten the rent-sharing arrangements that sustain the cartel.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThus, policy cartelization not only explains current governance patterns but also points to the structural barriers facing reformers.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5.4.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Comparative Implications\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the focus here is Indonesia, the concept has broader relevance. Many developing democracies with entrenched oligarchies face similar dynamics.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; In the Philippines, political clans often form cartels to distribute rents through infrastructure and natural resource policies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; In Brazil, the so-called \u003cem\u003ecoalition presidentialism\u003c/em\u003e has been criticized for encouraging rent-sharing among parties, which resonates with cartelization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026middot; In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has been accused of cartelizing state contracts, especially in mining and energy sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy applying the lens of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e, scholars can compare how elites in different contexts stabilize their dominance by cartelizing policymaking, rather than relying solely on capture or domination.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo further clarify the broader democratic implications of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e, Table 4 links each of its four dimensions with their consequences for opposition, civil society, bureaucratic reform, and accountability. This synthesis shows how cartelization not only shapes elite interactions but also undermines the substantive quality of democracy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 4. Democratic Implications of Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eImplications of policy cartelization for opposition, civil society, bureaucratic reform, and accountability in post-Reformasi Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDimension of Cartelization\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImplications for Opposition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImplications for Civil Society\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImplications for Bureaucratic Reform\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImplications for Accountability\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eElite Consensus over Competition\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOpposition marginalized; coalitions co-opt nearly all parties\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProtest demands sidelined in formal politics\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eReform agendas diluted by elite bargaining\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeak parliamentary oversight: checks and balances hollowed out\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOpposition excluded from rent access, incentivizing co-optation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCivil society concerns over inequality often ignored\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDevelopment programs captured for elite benefit\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePolicy outcomes prioritize rent-sharing over public good\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCartelization of Bureaucracy\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOpposition parties rewarded with bureaucratic posts if co-opted\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCivil society faces closed access to neutral administrators\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMerit-based reform blocked by patronage networks\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBureaucratic neutrality undermined; oversight agencies politicized\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeakening of Accountability\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOpposition loses institutional allies (e.g., weakened KPK)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCivil society protests repressed, narrowing participation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eReform institutions (e.g., LAN, BKN) weakened structurally\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOversight institutions curtailed; corruption oversight diluted\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Adapted from Aspinall \u0026amp; Mietzner (2019); Aspinall \u0026amp; Berenschot (2019); Warburton (2016); Butt (2017); Mudhoffir \u0026amp; Hadiz (2021); Tomsa (2022); Winters (2021).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Table 4 demonstrates, the democratic implications of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e are systemic and multidimensional. Opposition is co-opted rather than contested, civil society is constrained, bureaucratic reform is neutralized, and accountability institutions are deliberately weakened. Together, these dynamics explain why Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy has remained resilient in form but shallow in substance, offering important lessons for the study of democratic resilience under conditions of entrenched elite collusion.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e5.5.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Normative Reflections\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom a normative standpoint, policy cartelization represents a profound challenge to democratic ideals. Unlike overt authoritarianism, cartelization is subtle. Institutions remain, elections occur, and civil liberties are not entirely suspended. Yet the spirit of democracy, competition, accountability, representation, is hollowed out. Citizens participate, but their voices matter little in shaping substantive policy outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis raises uncomfortable questions: Can democracy be considered functional if policymaking is cartelized? Does the mere survival of elections suffice, or must we demand substantive responsiveness to public needs? By naming and theorizing \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e, this study seeks to expose the quiet erosion of democracy that operates behind the fa\u0026ccedil;ade of stability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn sum, the discussion highlights how \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e provides a more comprehensive framework for explaining Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s governance trajectory after Reformasi. By moving beyond frameworks that emphasize either electoral collusion, unilateral capture, or structural oligarchy, this concept reveals the negotiated and systemic nature of elite domination. The empirical cases show that cartelization operates not only in party politics but also in policymaking, rent distribution, bureaucratic management, and accountability structures. This reinforces the argument that Indonesian democracy is best understood as a \u0026ldquo;stable but hollow\u0026rdquo; system\u0026mdash;one that endures institutionally yet erodes substantively. These insights lay the groundwork for the conclusion, which reflects on the theoretical contributions of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e and its broader implications for democratic governance in comparable contexts.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"6. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study has introduced and elaborated the concept of \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e as a new framework for understanding Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi governance. Moving beyond established theories of \u003cem\u003ecartel party\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003ecartel democracy\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003estate capture\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003epolicy capture\u003c/em\u003e, the findings suggest that policymaking in Indonesia is shaped by elite collusion rather than competition. Policies are not captured by a single dominant actor but \u003cem\u003eare carved up through negotiated bargains\u003c/em\u003e, ensuring rent distribution across political and economic elites.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFour key dimensions characterize this process:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eElite Consensus Over Competition\u003c/em\u003e, oversized coalitions that neutralize opposition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePolicy as Rent Distribution\u003c/em\u003e, public policies serving as vehicles for sharing economic spoils.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eCartelization of Bureaucracy\u003c/em\u003e, bureaucratic positions and promotions folded into patronage networks.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eWeakening of Accountability\u003c/em\u003e, oversight institutions and civil society marginalized to protect cartel interests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe theoretical contribution of this study lies in offering \u003cem\u003epolicy cartelization\u003c/em\u003e as both an analytical and comparative concept. It highlights the consensual, negotiated side of elite politics that is often overlooked by frameworks emphasizing domination or unilateral capture. By extending the logic of cartelization from parties to policymaking, the concept provides a systemic lens that can be applied not only to Indonesia but also to other democracies facing oligarchic entrenchment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNormatively, the findings underscore the paradox of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy: stable in procedure yet hollow in substance. While elections and institutions remain intact, policymaking has been cartelized, eroding accountability and responsiveness to citizens.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBreaking this cycle requires structural reforms: strengthening opposition, depoliticizing bureaucracy, and insulating oversight institutions from elite bargains. Without such reforms, Indonesia risks remaining trapped in a \u003cem\u003ecartelized democracy\u003c/em\u003e, a system where governance is stable, but democracy is stripped of its true meaning.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting Interests:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor Contributions:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study was conceptualized, written, and revised by Aris Sarjito. All sections reflect his original work.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis article is based on publicly available secondary sources. No new data were created or analysed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUse of AI Tools Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eArtificial intelligence tools (e.g., ChatGPT, OpenAI) were used during the manuscript preparation phase to assist with language editing and improving the clarity of expression. No AI tools were used for data analysis, interpretation of findings, or generating substantive research content. The author(s) retain full responsibility for the integrity and originality of the work.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnguelov, D. (2024). 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Oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia. \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e96\u003c/em\u003e, 11\u0026ndash;33. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.96.0099\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.5728/indonesia.96.0099\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Indonesia, Oligarchy, Policy Cartelization, Post-Reformasi Democracy, Rent-Seeking","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis article introduces the concept of policy cartelization to explain the dynamics of governance in post-Reformasi Indonesia. While existing frameworks such as cartel party theory, cartel democracy, state capture, and policy capture illuminate aspects of elite politics, they do not fully account for how policymaking itself becomes a site of collusion. Based on qualitative analysis of secondary sources, including policy documents, oversight reports, and scholarly literature, the study identifies four dimensions of policy cartelization: elite consensus over competition, policy as rent distribution, bureaucratic cartelization, and the weakening of accountability. Empirical illustrations from infrastructure development, natural resource governance, and bureaucratic reform demonstrate how elites negotiate and share rents while insulating policy outcomes from public scrutiny. The findings suggest that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s democracy is stable procedurally but hollow substantively: elections and institutions remain, yet policymaking is cartelized to serve elite interests. The article argues that policy cartelization offers a novel analytical lens for understanding elite consensus politics in Indonesia and potentially other democracies with entrenched oligarchies. It concludes that addressing this condition requires reforms to strengthen opposition, depoliticize bureaucracy, and safeguard oversight institutions.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Policy Cartelization in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Oligarchy, Rent, and Elite Consensus","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-09-10 18:55:19","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7567465/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"8a91dc48-892d-4731-a851-93e48c1afa30","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 10th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-09-13T15:38:37+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-09-10 18:55:19","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7567465","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7567465","identity":"rs-7567465","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}