Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking: commentary on Phillips et al, 2020, BBS
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This commentary proposes distinguishing knowledge from beliefs at the cognitive mechanism level, detailing three mechanisms: tagging shared representations, metarepresenting knowledge, and attributing information-providing dispositions.
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Abstract
We welcome Phillips et al.’s proposal to separate the understanding of ‘knowledge’ from that of ‘beliefs’. We argue that this distinction is best specified at the level of the cognitive mechanisms. Three distinct mechanisms are discussed: tagging one’s own representations with those who share the same reality; representing others’ representations (metarepresenting knowledge); and attributing dispositions to provide useful information
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License: CC-BY-4.0