The effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain response to emotional scenarios: An fMRI study

The effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain response to emotional scenarios: An fMRI study | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain response to emotional scenarios: An fMRI study Ruben E Nechifor, Răzvan Predatu, Adriana Rusu, Antonio Maffei, and 1 more This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7875472/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Introduction: This study aimed to investigate the neural correlates of adopting rational versus irrational beliefs in response to emotionally stressful scenarios, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Grounded in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), we explored how endorsing rational or irrational beliefs modulates brain activity while evaluating hypothetical stressful situations. Methods: Seventy-five participants (48 females, aged 19–35) were randomly assigned to a rational or irrational belief group. Participants underwent fMRI while imagining emotionally stressful scenarios and endorsing corresponding beliefs. Results: We found that a rational way of approaching a given emotionally stressful scenario was associated with significantly higher activity in the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula compared to the irrational thinking group. Discussions: The current result suggests that participants adopting a rational approach toward the unpleasant scenarios were able to generate better mental representations of the scenes, likely because rational thinking allows for improved regulation of the unpleasant arousal that these emotionally stressful scenarios could trigger. Interventions targeting irrational beliefs and promoting rational thinking, such as REBT, promise to improve emotional functioning and facilitate a more adaptive approach to negative scenarios. REBT rational beliefs irrational beliefs fMRI emotional functioning Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Introduction Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) stands as a „gold standard” in evidence-based psychotherapy, demonstrating efficacy and effectiveness across diverse populations and psychopathologies (Dobson & Dobson, 2016; Van Dis et al., 2020). Developed by pioneers like Albert Ellis and Aaron T. Beck during the 1960s, CBT has been extensively researched (i.e., it is nowadays the most investigated form of psychotherapy), with numerous outcome studies affirming its efficacy/effectiveness in treating many psychiatric disorders and psychological conditions (Beck, 2020 ). Rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT), a form of CBT introduced by Albert Ellis in 1957, focuses on identifying and challenging irrational beliefs that contribute to emotional distress (Ellis, 1957 ). While sharing structural similarities with other CBT approaches, REBT specifically targets evaluative beliefs or appraisals (David et al., 2018 ). A recent meta-analysis has highlighted the efficacy of REBT interventions across various conditions, sample ages, and delivery formats, highlighting its versatility and effectiveness (David et al., 2018 ). Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) conceptual framework differentiates between two fundamental thinking patterns: irrational beliefs and rational beliefs (Ellis, 1994 ). Irrational beliefs lack logical, empirical, and/or functional/pragmatic support, while rational beliefs are grounded in logic, empirical evidence, and/or functionality/pragmatism. These irrational beliefs can impede individuals' progress in achieving their goals and are central to poor emotional functioning and psychopathology (Ellis, 1994 ). In contrast, central to mental health and optimal emotional functioning are flexible, non-dogmatic articulations of personal desires and objectives, termed rational beliefs. These acknowledge personal desires while recognizing the limitations of insisting on their absolute fulfillment (e.g., 'I prefer to succeed in all I do, and I do what is humanly possible to succeed, but I accept that sometimes I might fail) (Szentagotai-Tătar et al., 2019 ). According to REBT, when individuals encounter various triggering events (e.g., failing an exam), endorsing irrational beliefs leads to adverse outcomes across behavioral, emotional, and cognitive domains, while rational beliefs lead to constructive/functional emotions and adaptive behaviors (David, DiGiuseppe, et al., 2019 ; David, Matu, et al., 2019 ; David, Sucală, et al., 2019 ). As emphasized by REBT (David, Matu, et al., 2019 ; David, Sucală, et al., 2019 ), there are several types of irrational beliefs, encompassing demandingness (characterized by inflexible or rigid thinking; e.g., 'I must be respected by others'), catastrophizing or awfulizing (e.g., 'It is awful if I am disrespected'), low frustration tolerance (e.g., 'I can't stand being disrespected'), and global evaluation of self, others, and/or life (e.g., 'If I'm disrespected, it means that I am worthless, others are worthless, and/or life is totally bad'). Conversely, the alternative processes of rational beliefs in REBT include preferences (demonstrating flexible or accepting thinking, e.g., 'I prefer to be respected by others and I do what is humanly possible for this to happen, but I accept that it might not happen'), non-awfulizing (e.g., 'It is very bad if others disrespect me, but it is not awful'), high frustration tolerance (e.g., 'I can stand being disrespected'), and unconditional acceptance of self, others, and/or life circumstances (e.g., 'Although others might disrespect me, this does not mean that I am worthless, others are worthless, and/or life is totally bad'). Extensive research shows robust correlations between irrational beliefs and various adverse affective outcomes or dysfunctional behaviors (David, 2015 ; David, Sucală, et al., 2019 ), summarized in complex meta-analyses (Vîslă et al., 2016 ), while rational beliefs are associated with multiple healthy outcomes (Olteanu et al., 2017). Thus, in line with the REBT model, irrational beliefs are identified as the primary driver of psychological disturbances, while rational beliefs function as a mechanism for enhancing psychological well-being. Consequently, alterations in irrational beliefs are expected to lead to changes in individuals' emotional functioning and behaviors (David, Sucală, et al., 2019 ). To thoroughly investigate the mechanisms contributing to the development of emotional disturbances, it's essential to rigorously and accurately evaluate both irrational and rational beliefs at multiple levels, including both subjective and objective assessments. While previous studies have primarily focused on subjective assessments of irrational and rational beliefs and their effects using self-report measures, there needs to be more empirical research concerning the biological underpinnings of these cognitive processes and their effects. Ellis asserted that these cognitive patterns, encompassing both self-enhancing (i.e., rationality) and self-defeating (i.e., irrationality) tendencies, have biological underpinnings rather than solely arising from individuals' interactions with specific environments (Ellis, 1994 ; Szentagotai-Tătar et al., 2019 ). However, these biological underpinnings, specifically the brain mechanisms underlying these processes, are still poorly understood (but see Podină et al., 2015, for the genetic basis of irrational beliefs). To our knowledge, no study has previously investigated the changes in brain activity resulting from specifically adopting rational or irrational beliefs when dealing with emotionally stressful scenarios (except for the preliminary study of Cristea, 2015 ). However, a series of neuroimaging studies have documented the neural correlates of cognitive reappraisal (i.e., an emotion regulation strategy that resembles the adoption of rational beliefs), albeit with some significant limitations. Firstly, one of the first findings on cognitive reappraisal using fMRI was that the reappraisal of highly negative pictures in unemotional terms reduced distress in participants after exposure to these stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2002 ). During the training phase, subjects were instructed to generate interpretations of images in a more „positive” light (e.g., A woman crying outside of a church would be described as attending a wedding rather than a funeral). Related to brain correlates, the authors concluded that the results supported the hypothesis of the PFC being involved in constructing reappraisal strategies that can modulate activity in the emotion processing systems based on the finding that reappraisal was linked to increased activation of the lateral and medial prefrontal regions, as well as decreased activation in the amygdala and the medial orbito-frontal cortex. Subsequent studies have introduced methodological modifications. For example, Wu et al. ( 2019 ) employed creative reinterpretations generated externally for unpleasant International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images (e.g., “Although she just threw up, she has great joy in her heart because she will finally have a baby”). Behaviorally, creative reappraisal showed superior and longer-lasting effects in reducing negative affect and was associated with increased engagement of the amygdala, hippocampus, as well as regions in the ventral striatum. In another study, Sarkheil et al. ( 2019 ) tracked neural responses to cognitive reappraisal and attentional deployment while participants viewed sets of negative images. Results showed that cognitive reappraisal increased activity in medial, dorsolateral, and ventrolateral PFC stronger than attentional deployment. Furthermore, they also found that the activation in the amygdala showed an increasing pattern of activation during cognitive reappraisal, underscoring that the temporal dynamic of the amygdala response, as well as its functional connectivity, differentiates between the two emotional regulation strategies. In this study, participants were instructed to reinterpret images by adopting professional perspectives, focusing on technical aspects, or considering future improvements (Sarkheil et al., 2019 ). In a recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies, Monachesi and colleagues ( 2023 ) investigated task-related activity of reappraisal and acceptance (Monachesi et al., 2023 ). Regarding reappraisal, their findings confirmed those of previous meta-analytic studies (Buhle et al., 2014 ; Kohn et al., 2014 ; Picó-Pérez et al., 2019 ), mainly that cognitive reappraisal, as an explicit emotional regulation strategy, shapes brain responses toward increased activity in a distributed frontoparietal network involving prefrontal regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), as well as the insula. Moreover, in line with earlier literature (Buhle et al., 2014 ; Kohn et al., 2014 ), they concluded that reappraisal is linked with decreased neural activity in the basal ganglia, specifically in the putamen and globus pallidus. However, Cristea ( 2015 ) highlighted some key limitations in cognitive reappraisal literature. Primarily, Cristea pointed to significant heterogeneity in reappraisal tasks, identifying three main strategies: (1) positive reinterpretation (e.g., viewing a hospitalized person as recovering or having just given birth), (2) blunting negative valence (e.g., interpreting an image of a mutilated body as coming from a movie set), and (3) emotional distancing (e.g., viewing someone in pain as unrelated to oneself). Most contemporary studies have similarly employed one or combinations of these approaches (e.g., Che et al., 2015 ; Qu & Telzer, 2017 ; Fitzgerald et al., 2020 ; Goldin et al., 2019 ), maintaining this heterogeneity. These approaches often yield artificial definitions of reappraisal lacking ecological validity. Laboratory-generated or externally-produced reinterpretations, such as those by Wu et al. ( 2019 ), are not easily translatable to therapeutic or real-world scenarios, where therapists or individuals cannot realistically rely on external, highly creative reinterpretations. Although potentially beneficial in limited contexts, these methods have restricted applicability and generalizability. Thus, a significant limitation in empirical research is that most studies to date have only addressed a small portion of reappraisal's multifaceted nature, often with low ecological validity, thereby offering limited practical applicability, particularly in contexts such as psychotherapy. Given this background, we suggest that research should explore more ecologically valid and clinically informed approaches to reappraisal. Cristea ( 2015 ) conducted a preliminary study involving 25 participants, who were presented with 24 emotionally stressful scenarios and instructed to imagine themselves within each scenario vividly. These instructions were constructed in accordance with CBT/REBT theory in order to guarantee their resemblance to clinical practice. Preliminary results indicated that irrational thinking elicited stronger activations in regions associated with theory of mind (STS), visual processing, and cognitive control (bilateral DLPFC) during ambiguous-negative scenarios. Conversely, rational instructions correlated mainly with increased activity in the precuneus, linked to self-reflection, and additionally activated STS and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during unequivocally negative scenarios. Given the relatively small sample sizes and the limited procedures employed in the majority of studies to date and considering the aforementioned limitations, we further investigated the changes in brain activity as a result of adopting rational or irrational beliefs construed in accordance with REBT theory and practice when dealing with emotionally stressful scenarios. In the current study, we aimed to assess the brain activity of individuals employing rational versus irrational beliefs using task fMRI. Specifically, the BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) MRI technique was utilized to measure brain activity while participants adopted either rational or irrational beliefs in response to specific emotional scenarios. Thus, this study sought to examine how irrational and rational thinking modulates brain activity while evaluating hypothetical emotionally stressful situations. However, given the limited previous research and the preliminary nature of the existing findings, this study should be viewed as exploratory. Methods Participants The initial sample consisted of 85 participants recruited using an advertisement of this study on social media. Ten participants were excluded from the analysis due to image quality issues (generated by movement and/or poor acquisition). The final sample consists of 75 participants (48 females) with ages ranging between 19–35 years old (Mage = 25.92, SD = 4.58). All of them were right-handed and White Caucasians. Only participants with no psychological and/or medical/neurological diagnostic and with no risks generated by exposure to the magnetic field (metallic implants, tattoos, etc.) were included in the study. The study was approved by the Scientific Council of Babeș–Bolyai University (Protocol No. 11.671/02.07.2018) and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants were informed about the investigational nature of the study and the use of their personal data, and they were given informed consent before any study-related procedures. Experimental paradigm Before the MRI data acquisition, specific training was done with each participant to familiarize them with the requirements of the study. During the training, each participant was informed that different negative scenarios will be presented, in which they have to imagine themselves as vividly as possible and adopt a specific cognitive attitude related to the negative scenarios. Only after the participants confirmed that they understood their requirements they were scanned. The participants were randomly divided into two groups: one group was asked to apply the rational way of thinking related to those negative scenarios (i.e., „the Rational group”), and the other group was asked to apply the irrational way of thinking associated with the same scenarios (i.e., „the Irrational group”). The participants instructed to adopt the rational way of thinking were asked to approach the following thoughts in relation to the unpleasant, presented, and imagined scenarios (i.e., expressions of irrational core beliefs in irrational automatic thoughts/self-statements): “I prefer that this situation never happened, but I accept that sometimes I experience such unpleasant situations and I try my best to change them. This situation is unpleasant, and it is difficult to face it, but I can try. It is unpleasant that this thing happened, but this doesn’t mean that my life, in general, is bad and unfair, and/or something is wrong with me or the other people”. In contrast, the participants instructed to adopt the irrational way of thinking were asked to approach the following thoughts in relation to the unpleasant, presented, and imagined scenarios (i.e., expressions of rational core beliefs in rational automatic thoughts/self-statements): “This thing should never happen, and I cannot conceive of going through such a situation. This is the worst thing that could happen, and I cannot tolerate this situation. The fact that this thing happened shows that my life, in general, is bad and unfair and/or it is something bad with me or the other people”. The experimental paradigm started with the baseline session (B = 12 sec.), followed by the instruction session (I = 40 sec.) and the scenario session (S = 90 sec.), and concluded with the rating session (R = 10 sec.). All those four sessions (B, I, S, R) were repeated three times in one run, each time with different scenarios (Fig. 1 ). The study contains five runs, with 15 negative scenarios presented to the participants (as described in Supplementary Table 1) (adapted from the study conducted by Cristea, 2015 ). The baseline session was used to make the participants comfortable with the MRI environment. The instruction session was to help the participants remember the requirements for them, and the scenario session was when the negative scenarios were presented, and the participants had to adopt that specific cognitive attitude (rational/irrational way of thinking). The rating session was used to receive participants’ feedback on whether they succeeded in adopting the required attitude to that specific scenario. Thus, the participants were asked to report how intensely they felt a negative emotion. This feedback weighed the participant’s response and attitude related to the request implementation through the parametric modulation option included in the GLM model. MRI data acquisition The task-fMRI data were acquired as part of a more extensive MRI protocol, including structural MRI (T1-MPRAGE, T2, FLAIR) and diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) scans, needed for the clinical assessment. The T1 MPRAGE sequence was used for the neurological evaluation, and the BOLD sequence was used for the task-fMRI analysis. All the MRI data were acquired using the MAGNETOM 3T Skyra (SIEMENS, Germany). For structural, diffusion, and functional acquisition, the 20-channel head coil was used. Structural volumetric T1 MPRAGE images were acquired using an echo spacing of 6.4 ms, a bandwidth of 220 Hz/Px, 160 slices per slab, TR of 1.9 s, voxel size of 0.4 x 0.4 x 1 mm, and FOV read of 230 mm. The total acquisition time of the T1 sequence was 4 min and 22 s. The task-fMRI images were acquired in interleaved multi-slice mode using an echo spacing of 0.65 ms, a bandwidth of 1776 Hz/Px, 4 dummy scans, 180 volumes, applying motion correction, TR of 2 s, using fat saturation option of the EPI sequence. For each volume, 32 slices were acquired with a slice thickness of 3 mm, a matrix size of 4.4 x 4.4 x 3 mm, and an FOV read of 280 mm. The total acquisition time for one run of the task-fMRI sequence was 6 min and 6 s. The GRAPPA acceleration mode was used for faster structural and functional acquisitions with an acceleration factor PE of 2 and ref. lines PE of 24. Preprocessing Pre-processing was performed using the fMRIPrep pipeline for fMRI data analysis within the Docker container. The brain extraction procedure is applied for the BOLD images after discarding the first 10 volumes to allow for signal equilibrium. Then, the images were corrected for slice acquisition timing and susceptibility distortion and realigned to correct head movements. 6 affine motion parameter regressions were used for this purpose. The general trend was considered a covariate of no interest and thus removed using the polort 4 option of the fMRIPrep pipeline. Runs from all subjects with a movement threshold > 25% or more (based on maximum displacement in any direction) were excluded from the analysis. T1 images were co-registered to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template (Ashburner & Friston, 2005 ) using diffeomorphic anatomical registration through an exponentiated Lie Algebra (DAR-TEL) algorithm (Ashburner, 2007 ). Then, mean functional images were co-registered to the T1 images, and also the functional images were normalized to MNI space and smoothed with a 4 x 4 x 4 mm 3 FMWH Gaussian function. First-level analysis First–level analysis was performed through the 3dDeconvolve function in AFNI (Cox, 1996 ; Cox & Hyde, 1997 ); in all GLMs, a two-parameter SPM gamma variate basis function (the SPMG2 function) was used to approximate the hemodynamic response function (HRF), with temporal derivatives included allowing for deviations from the canonical HRF (Henson et al., 2002 ). The statistics at the subject level were performed for Baseline (B), Instruction (I), and Scenarios (S), and the contrast between Scenarios – Baseline (S-B) and Scenarios – Instruction (S-I) were estimated. In addition, in order to take into account the effect of how appropriate were imagined the scenarios and how well were applied the rational/irrational thinking procedure on those scenarios, the parametric modulation effect was included in the GLM where the subject feedback related to each scenario was considered as a covariate. Statistical analysis The statistical analysis (second-level analysis) was performed using the randomize command from FSL (Jenkinson et al., 2012 ; Smith et al., 2004 ; Woolrich et al., 2009 ). Thus, a two-sample t-test was performed to assess the between-group effect using a p-value threshold for significance of 0.05 and a Family wise error rate (FWER) correction with Threshold Free Cluster Enhancement (TFCE) with 10.000 iterations. Finally, a cluster size threshold of 30 voxels was set to allow the identification of clusters with significant differences between groups. Each cluster identified was marked with the MNI coordinates and t-values of the peak voxel. The anatomic location of significant clusters was performed using automated anatomical labeling (AAL) (9) and the Brodmann (10) atlases. Transparency and Openness We report all procedures for participant recruitment, data collection, and analysis in the Methods section, following JARS guidelines (Appelbaum et al., 2018 ). We determined our sample size, ensuring adequate statistical power based on prior fMRI studies and recommendations for neuroimaging research (Yeung, 2018 ; Geuter, 2018 and Ostwald, 2019;). All data exclusions (e.g., excessive motion, poor image quality), manipulations, and measures are detailed in the manuscript. This study was not preregistered. Data were analyzed using AFNI (Cox, 1996 ) and FSL (Smith et al., 2004 ). The task-fMRI preprocessing pipeline and statistical models are available upon reasonable request from the corresponding author. Results The rating differences between groups used as a covariate at the first level of analysis were tested using the covariate interaction. The irrational group had significantly higher scores on the rating question after they applied the rational/irrational way of thinking (“How intense do you feel a negative emotion?”) in comparison with the rational group (p-value of 0.05), as can be seen in Fig. 2 . This proves that the participants successfully fulfilled their requests: the irrational group adopted the irrational way of thinking, and thus, they felt more intense negative emotion in comparison with the rational group, while the rational group adopted the rational way of thinking and thus, they felt less intense the negative emotion in contrast with the irrational group. The rating covariate was used for SPMG2 for both amplitude and derivative components at subject-level analysis (through parametric/amplitude modulation procedure). A total of 85 subjects were scanned, of which 10 were excluded due to poor image acquisitions generated by subject movements. In addition, 24 additional runs were excluded based on a movement threshold > 25%. Thus, a total of 75 subjects (351 runs) were included in the analysis (64.0% females, median age 24.0 [23.0; 29.5] years). Of these, 39 (52.0%) were allocated to the irrational thinking group. There was no difference between the rational and the irrational thinking groups in terms of age (26.5 [23.0; 29.5] vs. 23.0 [22.5; 28.5] years, p = 0.109) and sex (female 63.9% vs. 64.1%, p = 0.985). In the GLM used for first-level analysis (at 3dDeconvolve level), the two-parameter SPM gamma variate basis function (SPMG2) was used to approximate the hemodynamic response function (HRF), with temporal derivatives included to allow for derivations from the canonical HRF (Henson et al., 2002 ). Also, participants’ feedback related to whether they were considered a covariate to control this critical request. Significant differences were reported in brain activity between those 2 groups (thinking rational/irrational) for the amplitude component. The statistical contrast between groups showed 4 significant clusters of increased activation in the group with rational thinking compared to the group with irrational thinking. Figure 3 shows the activation pattern identified in the two groups while performing the rational or the irrational way of thinking related to the presented negative scenarios. The right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, insula, and Rolandic operculum were more active in the rational thinking group than in the irrational thinking group. No clusters of decreased activation were identified in the rational group compared to the irrational thinking group, and no clusters were found in the opposite direction of the contrast (irrational > rational) (Table 1 ). Table 1 Brain areas with significant differences between the rational and irrational group Anatomical location Brodmann’s area Laterality Peak location (MNI) Peak T value Number of voxels x y z Rational > Irrational Cuneus Superior temporal Gyrus Insula - 48 48 48 Right Right Right Right 10 50 36 54 -74 -18 -14 -26 22 -2 8 22 4.10 4.01 3.41 3.29 169 92 42 35 Discussions This task-based fMRI study aimed to investigate cerebral activity changes associated with irrational vs rational thinking when exposed to hypothetical emotionally stressful situations. We found that a rational way of approaching a given emotionally stressful scenario was associated with significantly higher activity in the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula compared to the irrational thinking group. All these regions play a specific role in emotional processing, mainly when emotions are elicited with mental imagery paradigms like the one employed in this research. The cuneus, a region in the occipital lobe typically involved in visual processing, has been previously shown to be activated by tasks that require imaging oneself in a given scenario (Mcnorgan, 2012 ). Activity in this region is thought to act as an amplifier of previously encoded perceptual representations, a process needed to generate a more vivid experience during the imagery processing of a visual scene (Mcnorgan, 2012 ), irrespective of its emotional content. When the scene to be imagined has an emotional valence, especially a negative and unpleasant valence, activity in posterior cortices, including the cuneus, is further enhanced (Barrett, 2017 ). According to recent theoretical developments in affective neuroscience, a strong recruitment of these regions is needed to generate an emotional experience, which should be considered a high-order representation that our brain creates on top of more straightforward, often modality-specific representations (Barrett, 2017 ). The current result suggests that participants adopting a rational approach toward the unpleasant scenarios presented were able to generate better mental representations of the scenes. This is likely because rational thinking allows for improved regulation of the unpleasant arousal that these emotionally stressful scenarios could trigger, thus potentially reducing the avoidance of interaction with unpleasant scenarios. The observation of increased activity in the insula of participants in the rational group supports this interpretation. Since generating an emotional representation requires the brain to encode information about the rest of the body, the recruitment of the insula is critical. Insular cortices represent the most crucial cortical node where information about the state of the body is projected. The insula is typically active in tasks that require attention toward the body (e.g., interoceptive tasks) (Strigo & Craig, 2016 ). Its dysfunction has been suggested to play an important role in psychological conditions characterized by emotional bluntness, such as psychopathy (Sitaram et al., 2014 ; Yang & Raine, 2008 ) and alexithymia (Hogeveen et al., 2016 ). With its deep interconnections with subcortical nuclei, the insular cortex also has a vital role in controlling homeostatic regulation (Simmons et al., 2013 ; Strigo & Craig, 2016 ). Finding an enhanced insular activity in the rational thinking group clearly suggests that adopting a rational approach led participants to regulate bodily activation more efficiently, such as increased cardiovascular and electrodermal activity, typically arising during unpleasant imagery (Levine et al., 2016 ; Williams et al., 2017 ). Finally, we observed that adopting a rational thinking style, compared to adopting an irrational thinking style, also prompts increased activity in the superior temporal gyrus (STG). STG is involved in processing sensory-specific information, precisely auditory information. Imaging and electrophysiological studies have revealed that the role of STG is to support the extraction and processing of affective features of an incoming auditory stream, such as emotional prosody (Frühholz et al., 2012 ; Leitman et al., 2010 ) or the affective characteristics of music (Proverbio et al., 2020 ). As with the cuneus, STG is also typically activated in imagery tasks (Mcnorgan, 2012 ). Studies reporting STG activity during affective imagery suggest that STG is part of a broader network of regions, including the insula, which is involved in exerting cognitive control over the imagined scenario and reappraisal of a threatening situation (Buhle et al., 2014 ; Koenigsberg et al., 2010 ; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011 ). Furthermore, electrophysiological activity in superior temporal regions (Maffei, 2020 ), especially in the right hemisphere, has been previously linked with unpleasant negative emotions. According to this evidence, our result of an increased STG activity fits with the interpretation that participants in the rational thinking group were better able to immerse themselves in the proposed scenarios than the irrational thinking group. Taken together, these results highlight that rational thinking shapes brain activity toward increased recruitment of brain regions that allow for immersion in an imagined scenario, thus reducing the avoidance of interaction with negative/unpleasant scenarios. Given the negative nature of the scripts employed in this study, we might advance that rational thinking, allowing for improved regulation of the negative emotions arising from the task (as highlighted by participants’ self-reports), prompts a more efficient regulation of activity in these regions. Thus, participants instructed to adopt rational thinking were more able to reappraise the negative scenarios, leading to an improved ability to picture themselves in these scenes without experiencing stronger negative emotions. It is possible that AAC (anterior cerebral cortex), which was observed in Cristea ( 2015 ) to be activated in rational condition (vs. irrational condition), is responsible for some of these brain changes, although it was not itself clearly evident in this sample; therefore, future studies should further investigate this hypothesis. The current study also has several limitations. First, we used a non-clinical sample of individuals in our study, limiting the generalizability of the findings. Future research should aim to replicate these findings in clinical populations, such as individuals diagnosed with depression or anxiety, who typically endorse more irrational beliefs. Examining these effects in clinical populations could provide deeper insights into the neurobiological correlates of irrational beliefs vs. rational beliefs. Second, the current sample consisted of more female participants, and the age range was relatively young. This imbalance may affect the generalizability of the results. Future studies should aim for more balanced gender representation and include a broader age range to ensure the findings are applicable across diverse demographic groups. Third, the absence of a neutral condition in the experimental design limits the ability to compare the endorsement of irrational or rational beliefs with pure cognitive or attentional effort. Including such a condition would provide a clearer understanding of brain activation during the employment of rational and irrational beliefs and their specificity. Finally, while the study employed hypothetical emotionally stressful scenarios, future research could benefit from using more personally relevant or autobiographical emotionally stressful stimuli. This adjustment could enhance the ecological validity of the study and better capture the effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain activations. Despite these limitations, the study provides valuable insights into the effects of rational versus irrational beliefs on brain reactivity in response to emotionally stressful scenarios. Specifically, individuals adopting a rational approach exhibited higher activity in brain regions involved in emotional processing, such as the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula, compared to those endorsing irrational beliefs. The increased activity in these regions among participants adopting rational thinking suggests a more remarkable ability to generate detailed mental representations of the emotional scenarios presented. These results might imply that rational thinking facilitates better regulation of negative emotions triggered by emotionally stressful scenarios, leading to more efficient activity regulation in relevant brain regions. Thus, participants instructed to adopt rational thinking might be more able to reappraise the negative scenarios, which led to an improved ability to picture themselves in these scenes without experiencing stronger negative emotions. In conclusion, this study underscores the importance of rational versus irrational thinking in shaping brain activity in the context of emotionally stressful scenarios. Also, this study contributes to our understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of rational and irrational beliefs and their implications for emotional regulation. Thus, interventions targeting individuals' irrational beliefs and replacing them with rational beliefs (i.e., REBT) hold promise for enhancing emotional well-being and fostering a more adaptive approach to negative scenarios. Declarations Declarations of interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. Ethical Approval This study was approved by the Scientific Council of the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca (Protocol No. 11.671 / 02.07.2018). All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed Consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. Data The data supporting this study's findings are available from the corresponding author, [DD], upon reasonable request. *Acknowledgment: The first two authors have contributed equally to this work. This study was partially supported by: The Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, as Intermediary Body for the Operational Programme Competitiveness 2014-2020 project code SMIS 2014+ 127725, contract no. 352/390028/23.09.2021, acronym project INSPIRE; The Ministry of European Investment and Projects (MIPE) as Managing Authority for the Smart Growth, Digitalization and Financial Instruments Programme 2021 - 2027 and the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization (MCID) as Intermediary Research Body, project code SMIS 2021+ 324771 contract MIPE no. G-2024-71962/23.10.2024 and contract MCID no.390005/23.10.2024, project acronym INSPIRE-II. 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11:09:37","extension":"html","order_by":21,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":153165,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/0eea85d7bd79279bdc38e309.html"},{"id":97668614,"identity":"85d5c771-e873-4f18-92f6-41769371776f","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-08 09:25:51","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":45975,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThe timing diagram of the experimental design used in the current study.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/66a0fc5e42744da1cf48ca27.png"},{"id":97667841,"identity":"b788e2c9-1ade-40bc-8b6a-07b85fa5b02e","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-08 09:24:21","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":20055,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThe rating differences between groups were used to assess whether the instruction was applied correctly. As can be seen, the irrational group felt more intense negative emotions, which proves that the instructions were successfully applied.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/b661b87d3e988be5d8e8f189.png"},{"id":97436431,"identity":"5c085870-8a78-4db1-b513-14cdce3120c0","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-04 11:09:37","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":137089,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eBrain activation patterns increased in the rational thinking group related to negative scenarios. The statistical maps were thresholded at p \u0026lt; 0.05, family-wise error corrected.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/b674445b453928f8a5faa734.png"},{"id":102296335,"identity":"bfecf5bc-5bfc-4c56-8eaf-c06e9a0e6f11","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-10 10:18:46","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":800320,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/535f64e6-2896-43b1-b3ba-e00191281ec4.pdf"},{"id":97436430,"identity":"d279e19a-dcf5-428e-b6cd-14cf0ecb3204","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-04 11:09:37","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":16694,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryTable1.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7875472/v1/3cd8fa139515e76af92c16ed.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain response to emotional scenarios: An fMRI study","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eCognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) stands as a \u0026bdquo;gold standard\u0026rdquo; in evidence-based psychotherapy, demonstrating efficacy and effectiveness across diverse populations and psychopathologies (Dobson \u0026amp; Dobson, 2016; Van Dis et al., 2020). Developed by pioneers like Albert Ellis and Aaron T. Beck during the 1960s, CBT has been extensively researched (i.e., it is nowadays the most investigated form of psychotherapy), with numerous outcome studies affirming its efficacy/effectiveness in treating many psychiatric disorders and psychological conditions (Beck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRational emotive behavior therapy (REBT), a form of CBT introduced by Albert Ellis in 1957, focuses on identifying and challenging irrational beliefs that contribute to emotional distress (Ellis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1957\u003c/span\u003e). While sharing structural similarities with other CBT approaches, REBT specifically targets evaluative beliefs or appraisals (David et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). A recent meta-analysis has highlighted the efficacy of REBT interventions across various conditions, sample ages, and delivery formats, highlighting its versatility and effectiveness (David et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) conceptual framework differentiates between two fundamental thinking patterns: irrational beliefs and rational beliefs (Ellis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). Irrational beliefs lack logical, empirical, and/or functional/pragmatic support, while rational beliefs are grounded in logic, empirical evidence, and/or functionality/pragmatism. These irrational beliefs can impede individuals' progress in achieving their goals and are central to poor emotional functioning and psychopathology (Ellis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). In contrast, central to mental health and optimal emotional functioning are flexible, non-dogmatic articulations of personal desires and objectives, termed rational beliefs. These acknowledge personal desires while recognizing the limitations of insisting on their absolute fulfillment (e.g., 'I prefer to succeed in all I do, and I do what is humanly possible to succeed, but I accept that sometimes I might fail) (Szentagotai-Tătar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAccording to REBT, when individuals encounter various triggering events (e.g., failing an exam), endorsing irrational beliefs leads to adverse outcomes across behavioral, emotional, and cognitive domains, while rational beliefs lead to constructive/functional emotions and adaptive behaviors (David, DiGiuseppe, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; David, Matu, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; David, Sucală, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs emphasized by REBT (David, Matu, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; David, Sucală, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), there are several types of irrational beliefs, encompassing demandingness (characterized by inflexible or rigid thinking; e.g., 'I must be respected by others'), catastrophizing or awfulizing (e.g., 'It is awful if I am disrespected'), low frustration tolerance (e.g., 'I can't stand being disrespected'), and global evaluation of self, others, and/or life (e.g., 'If I'm disrespected, it means that I am worthless, others are worthless, and/or life is totally bad'). Conversely, the alternative processes of rational beliefs in REBT include preferences (demonstrating flexible or accepting thinking, e.g., 'I prefer to be respected by others and I do what is humanly possible for this to happen, but I accept that it might not happen'), non-awfulizing (e.g., 'It is very bad if others disrespect me, but it is not awful'), high frustration tolerance (e.g., 'I can stand being disrespected'), and unconditional acceptance of self, others, and/or life circumstances (e.g., 'Although others might disrespect me, this does not mean that I am worthless, others are worthless, and/or life is totally bad').\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExtensive research shows robust correlations between irrational beliefs and various adverse affective outcomes or dysfunctional behaviors (David, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; David, Sucală, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), summarized in complex meta-analyses (V\u0026icirc;slă et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e), while rational beliefs are associated with multiple healthy outcomes (Olteanu et al., 2017). Thus, in line with the REBT model, irrational beliefs are identified as the primary driver of psychological disturbances, while rational beliefs function as a mechanism for enhancing psychological well-being. Consequently, alterations in irrational beliefs are expected to lead to changes in individuals' emotional functioning and behaviors (David, Sucală, et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo thoroughly investigate the mechanisms contributing to the development of emotional disturbances, it's essential to rigorously and accurately evaluate both irrational and rational beliefs at multiple levels, including both subjective and objective assessments. While previous studies have primarily focused on subjective assessments of irrational and rational beliefs and their effects using self-report measures, there needs to be more empirical research concerning the biological underpinnings of these cognitive processes and their effects.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEllis asserted that these cognitive patterns, encompassing both self-enhancing (i.e., rationality) and self-defeating (i.e., irrationality) tendencies, have biological underpinnings rather than solely arising from individuals' interactions with specific environments (Ellis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e; Szentagotai-Tătar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). However, these biological underpinnings, specifically the brain mechanisms underlying these processes, are still poorly understood (but see Podină et al., 2015, for the genetic basis of irrational beliefs).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo our knowledge, no study has previously investigated the changes in brain activity resulting from specifically adopting rational or irrational beliefs when dealing with emotionally stressful scenarios (except for the preliminary study of Cristea, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). However, a series of neuroimaging studies have documented the neural correlates of cognitive reappraisal (i.e., an emotion regulation strategy that resembles the adoption of rational beliefs), albeit with some significant limitations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirstly, one of the first findings on cognitive reappraisal using fMRI was that the reappraisal of highly negative pictures in unemotional terms reduced distress in participants after exposure to these stimuli (Ochsner et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). During the training phase, subjects were instructed to generate interpretations of images in a more \u0026bdquo;positive\u0026rdquo; light (e.g., A woman crying outside of a church would be described as attending a wedding rather than a funeral). Related to brain correlates, the authors concluded that the results supported the hypothesis of the PFC being involved in constructing reappraisal strategies that can modulate activity in the emotion processing systems based on the finding that reappraisal was linked to increased activation of the lateral and medial prefrontal regions, as well as decreased activation in the amygdala and the medial orbito-frontal cortex.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSubsequent studies have introduced methodological modifications. For example, Wu et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) employed creative reinterpretations generated externally for unpleasant International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Although she just threw up, she has great joy in her heart because she will finally have a baby\u0026rdquo;). Behaviorally, creative reappraisal showed superior and longer-lasting effects in reducing negative affect and was associated with increased engagement of the amygdala, hippocampus, as well as regions in the ventral striatum.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn another study, Sarkheil et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) tracked neural responses to cognitive reappraisal and attentional deployment while participants viewed sets of negative images.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eResults showed that cognitive reappraisal increased activity in medial, dorsolateral, and ventrolateral PFC stronger than attentional deployment. Furthermore, they also found that the activation in the amygdala showed an increasing pattern of activation during cognitive reappraisal, underscoring that the temporal dynamic of the amygdala response, as well as its functional connectivity, differentiates between the two emotional regulation strategies. In this study, participants were instructed to reinterpret images by adopting professional perspectives, focusing on technical aspects, or considering future improvements (Sarkheil et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn a recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies, Monachesi and colleagues (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) investigated task-related activity of reappraisal and acceptance (Monachesi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Regarding reappraisal, their findings confirmed those of previous meta-analytic studies (Buhle et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Kohn et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Pic\u0026oacute;-P\u0026eacute;rez et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), mainly that cognitive reappraisal, as an explicit emotional regulation strategy, shapes brain responses toward increased activity in a distributed frontoparietal network involving prefrontal regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), as well as the insula. Moreover, in line with earlier literature (Buhle et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Kohn et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e), they concluded that reappraisal is linked with decreased neural activity in the basal ganglia, specifically in the putamen and globus pallidus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, Cristea (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) highlighted some key limitations in cognitive reappraisal literature. Primarily, Cristea pointed to significant heterogeneity in reappraisal tasks, identifying three main strategies: (1) positive reinterpretation (e.g., viewing a hospitalized person as recovering or having just given birth), (2) blunting negative valence (e.g., interpreting an image of a mutilated body as coming from a movie set), and (3) emotional distancing (e.g., viewing someone in pain as unrelated to oneself). Most contemporary studies have similarly employed one or combinations of these approaches (e.g., Che et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Qu \u0026amp; Telzer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Fitzgerald et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Goldin et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), maintaining this heterogeneity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese approaches often yield artificial definitions of reappraisal lacking ecological validity. Laboratory-generated or externally-produced reinterpretations, such as those by Wu et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), are not easily translatable to therapeutic or real-world scenarios, where therapists or individuals cannot realistically rely on external, highly creative reinterpretations. Although potentially beneficial in limited contexts, these methods have restricted applicability and generalizability. Thus, a significant limitation in empirical research is that most studies to date have only addressed a small portion of reappraisal's multifaceted nature, often with low ecological validity, thereby offering limited practical applicability, particularly in contexts such as psychotherapy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGiven this background, we suggest that research should explore more ecologically valid and clinically informed approaches to reappraisal. Cristea (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) conducted a preliminary study involving 25 participants, who were presented with 24 emotionally stressful scenarios and instructed to imagine themselves within each scenario vividly. These instructions were constructed in accordance with CBT/REBT theory in order to guarantee their resemblance to clinical practice. Preliminary results indicated that irrational thinking elicited stronger activations in regions associated with theory of mind (STS), visual processing, and cognitive control (bilateral DLPFC) during ambiguous-negative scenarios. Conversely, rational instructions correlated mainly with increased activity in the precuneus, linked to self-reflection, and additionally activated STS and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during unequivocally negative scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGiven the relatively small sample sizes and the limited procedures employed in the majority of studies to date and considering the aforementioned limitations, we further investigated the changes in brain activity as a result of adopting rational or irrational beliefs construed in accordance with REBT theory and practice when dealing with emotionally stressful scenarios. In the current study, we aimed to assess the brain activity of individuals employing rational versus irrational beliefs using task fMRI. Specifically, the BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) MRI technique was utilized to measure brain activity while participants adopted either rational or irrational beliefs in response to specific emotional scenarios. Thus, this study sought to examine how irrational and rational thinking modulates brain activity while evaluating hypothetical emotionally stressful situations. However, given the limited previous research and the preliminary nature of the existing findings, this study should be viewed as exploratory.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eParticipants\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe initial sample consisted of 85 participants recruited using an advertisement of this study on social media. Ten participants were excluded from the analysis due to image quality issues (generated by movement and/or poor acquisition). The final sample consists of 75 participants (48 females) with ages ranging between 19\u0026ndash;35 years old (Mage\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;25.92, SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.58). All of them were right-handed and White Caucasians. Only participants with no psychological and/or medical/neurological diagnostic and with no risks generated by exposure to the magnetic field (metallic implants, tattoos, etc.) were included in the study. The study was approved by the Scientific Council of Babeș\u0026ndash;Bolyai University (Protocol No. 11.671/02.07.2018) and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants were informed about the investigational nature of the study and the use of their personal data, and they were given informed consent before any study-related procedures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eExperimental paradigm\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBefore the MRI data acquisition, specific training was done with each participant to familiarize them with the requirements of the study. During the training, each participant was informed that different negative scenarios will be presented, in which they have to imagine themselves as vividly as possible and adopt a specific cognitive attitude related to the negative scenarios. Only after the participants confirmed that they understood their requirements they were scanned. The participants were randomly divided into two groups: one group was asked to apply the rational way of thinking related to those negative scenarios (i.e., \u0026bdquo;the Rational group\u0026rdquo;), and the other group was asked to apply the irrational way of thinking associated with the same scenarios (i.e., \u0026bdquo;the Irrational group\u0026rdquo;).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe participants instructed to adopt the rational way of thinking were asked to approach the following thoughts in relation to the unpleasant, presented, and imagined scenarios (i.e., expressions of irrational core beliefs in irrational automatic thoughts/self-statements): \u0026ldquo;I prefer that this situation never happened, but I accept that sometimes I experience such unpleasant situations and I try my best to change them. This situation is unpleasant, and it is difficult to face it, but I can try. It is unpleasant that this thing happened, but this doesn\u0026rsquo;t mean that my life, in general, is bad and unfair, and/or something is wrong with me or the other people\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn contrast, the participants instructed to adopt the irrational way of thinking were asked to approach the following thoughts in relation to the unpleasant, presented, and imagined scenarios (i.e., expressions of rational core beliefs in rational automatic thoughts/self-statements): \u0026ldquo;This thing should never happen, and I cannot conceive of going through such a situation. This is the worst thing that could happen, and I cannot tolerate this situation. The fact that this thing happened shows that my life, in general, is bad and unfair and/or it is something bad with me or the other people\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe experimental paradigm started with the baseline session (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;12 sec.), followed by the instruction session (I\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;40 sec.) and the scenario session (S\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;90 sec.), and concluded with the rating session (R\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;10 sec.). All those four sessions (B, I, S, R) were repeated three times in one run, each time with different scenarios (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). The study contains five runs, with 15 negative scenarios presented to the participants (as described in Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;1) (adapted from the study conducted by Cristea, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The baseline session was used to make the participants comfortable with the MRI environment. The instruction session was to help the participants remember the requirements for them, and the scenario session was when the negative scenarios were presented, and the participants had to adopt that specific cognitive attitude (rational/irrational way of thinking). The rating session was used to receive participants\u0026rsquo; feedback on whether they succeeded in adopting the required attitude to that specific scenario. Thus, the participants were asked to report how intensely they felt a negative emotion. This feedback weighed the participant\u0026rsquo;s response and attitude related to the request implementation through the parametric modulation option included in the GLM model.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMRI data acquisition\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe task-fMRI data were acquired as part of a more extensive MRI protocol, including structural MRI (T1-MPRAGE, T2, FLAIR) and diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) scans, needed for the clinical assessment. The T1 MPRAGE sequence was used for the neurological evaluation, and the BOLD sequence was used for the task-fMRI analysis. All the MRI data were acquired using the MAGNETOM 3T Skyra (SIEMENS, Germany). For structural, diffusion, and functional acquisition, the 20-channel head coil was used. Structural volumetric T1 MPRAGE images were acquired using an echo spacing of 6.4 ms, a bandwidth of 220 Hz/Px, 160 slices per slab, TR of 1.9 s, voxel size of 0.4 x 0.4 x 1 mm, and FOV read of 230 mm. The total acquisition time of the T1 sequence was 4 min and 22 s. The task-fMRI images were acquired in interleaved multi-slice mode using an echo spacing of 0.65 ms, a bandwidth of 1776 Hz/Px, 4 dummy scans, 180 volumes, applying motion correction, TR of 2 s, using fat saturation option of the EPI sequence. For each volume, 32 slices were acquired with a slice thickness of 3 mm, a matrix size of 4.4 x 4.4 x 3 mm, and an FOV read of 280 mm. The total acquisition time for one run of the task-fMRI sequence was 6 min and 6 s. The GRAPPA acceleration mode was used for faster structural and functional acquisitions with an acceleration factor PE of 2 and ref. lines PE of 24.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePreprocessing\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePre-processing was performed using the fMRIPrep pipeline for fMRI data analysis within the Docker container. The brain extraction procedure is applied for the BOLD images after discarding the first 10 volumes to allow for signal equilibrium. Then, the images were corrected for slice acquisition timing and susceptibility distortion and realigned to correct head movements. 6 affine motion parameter regressions were used for this purpose. The general trend was considered a covariate of no interest and thus removed using the polort 4 option of the fMRIPrep pipeline. Runs from all subjects with a movement threshold\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;25% or more (based on maximum displacement in any direction) were excluded from the analysis. T1 images were co-registered to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template (Ashburner \u0026amp; Friston, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e) using diffeomorphic anatomical registration through an exponentiated Lie Algebra (DAR-TEL) algorithm (Ashburner, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Then, mean functional images were co-registered to the T1 images, and also the functional images were normalized to MNI space and smoothed with a 4 x 4 x 4 mm\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e FMWH Gaussian function.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFirst-level analysis\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst\u0026ndash;level analysis was performed through the 3dDeconvolve function in AFNI (Cox, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e; Cox \u0026amp; Hyde, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e); in all GLMs, a two-parameter SPM gamma variate basis function (the SPMG2 function) was used to approximate the hemodynamic response function (HRF), with temporal derivatives included allowing for deviations from the canonical HRF (Henson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). The statistics at the subject level were performed for Baseline (B), Instruction (I), and Scenarios (S), and the contrast between Scenarios \u0026ndash; Baseline (S-B) and Scenarios \u0026ndash; Instruction (S-I) were estimated. In addition, in order to take into account the effect of how appropriate were imagined the scenarios and how well were applied the rational/irrational thinking procedure on those scenarios, the parametric modulation effect was included in the GLM where the subject feedback related to each scenario was considered as a covariate.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eStatistical analysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe statistical analysis (second-level analysis) was performed using the randomize command from FSL (Jenkinson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Smith et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Woolrich et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, a two-sample t-test was performed to assess the between-group effect using a p-value threshold for significance of 0.05 and a Family wise error rate (FWER) correction with Threshold Free Cluster Enhancement (TFCE) with 10.000 iterations. Finally, a cluster size threshold of 30 voxels was set to allow the identification of clusters with significant differences between groups. Each cluster identified was marked with the MNI coordinates and t-values of the peak voxel. The anatomic location of significant clusters was performed using automated anatomical labeling (AAL) (9) and the Brodmann (10) atlases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTransparency and Openness\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe report all procedures for participant recruitment, data collection, and analysis in the Methods section, following JARS guidelines (Appelbaum et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). We determined our sample size, ensuring adequate statistical power based on prior fMRI studies and recommendations for neuroimaging research (Yeung, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Geuter, 2018 and Ostwald, 2019;). All data exclusions (e.g., excessive motion, poor image quality), manipulations, and measures are detailed in the manuscript. This study was not preregistered. Data were analyzed using AFNI (Cox, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e) and FSL (Smith et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). The task-fMRI preprocessing pipeline and statistical models are available upon reasonable request from the corresponding author.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe rating differences between groups used as a covariate at the first level of analysis were tested using the covariate interaction. The irrational group had significantly higher scores on the rating question after they applied the rational/irrational way of thinking (\u0026ldquo;How intense do you feel a negative emotion?\u0026rdquo;) in comparison with the rational group (p-value of 0.05), as can be seen in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e. This proves that the participants successfully fulfilled their requests: the irrational group adopted the irrational way of thinking, and thus, they felt more intense negative emotion in comparison with the rational group, while the rational group adopted the rational way of thinking and thus, they felt less intense the negative emotion in contrast with the irrational group. The rating covariate was used for SPMG2 for both amplitude and derivative components at subject-level analysis (through parametric/amplitude modulation procedure).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA total of 85 subjects were scanned, of which 10 were excluded due to poor image acquisitions generated by subject movements. In addition, 24 additional runs were excluded based on a movement threshold\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;25%. Thus, a total of 75 subjects (351 runs) were included in the analysis (64.0% females, median age 24.0 [23.0; 29.5] years). Of these, 39 (52.0%) were allocated to the irrational thinking group. There was no difference between the rational and the irrational thinking groups in terms of age (26.5 [23.0; 29.5] vs. 23.0 [22.5; 28.5] years, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.109) and sex (female 63.9% vs. 64.1%, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.985).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the GLM used for first-level analysis (at 3dDeconvolve level), the two-parameter SPM gamma variate basis function (SPMG2) was used to approximate the hemodynamic response function (HRF), with temporal derivatives included to allow for derivations from the canonical HRF (Henson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). Also, participants\u0026rsquo; feedback related to whether they were considered a covariate to control this critical request.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSignificant differences were reported in brain activity between those 2 groups (thinking rational/irrational) for the amplitude component. The statistical contrast between groups showed 4 significant clusters of increased activation in the group with rational thinking compared to the group with irrational thinking. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e shows the activation pattern identified in the two groups while performing the rational or the irrational way of thinking related to the presented negative scenarios. The right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, insula, and Rolandic operculum were more active in the rational thinking group than in the irrational thinking group. No clusters of decreased activation were identified in the rational group compared to the irrational thinking group, and no clusters were found in the opposite direction of the contrast (irrational\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;rational) (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBrain areas with significant differences between the rational and irrational group\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAnatomical location\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBrodmann\u0026rsquo;s\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003earea\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLaterality\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePeak location (MNI)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePeak T value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNumber of voxels\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ex\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ey\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ez\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRational\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Irrational\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCuneus\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSuperior temporal Gyrus\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInsula\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e48\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e48\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e48\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRight\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRight\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRight\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRight\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e50\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e36\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e54\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-74\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e-18\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e-14\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e-26\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e-2\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4.10\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e4.01\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.41\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.29\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e169\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e92\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e42\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e35\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis task-based fMRI study aimed to investigate cerebral activity changes associated with irrational vs rational thinking when exposed to hypothetical emotionally stressful situations. We found that a rational way of approaching a given emotionally stressful scenario was associated with significantly higher activity in the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula compared to the irrational thinking group. All these regions play a specific role in emotional processing, mainly when emotions are elicited with mental imagery paradigms like the one employed in this research.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe cuneus, a region in the occipital lobe typically involved in visual processing, has been previously shown to be activated by tasks that require imaging oneself in a given scenario (Mcnorgan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Activity in this region is thought to act as an amplifier of previously encoded perceptual representations, a process needed to generate a more vivid experience during the imagery processing of a visual scene (Mcnorgan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e), irrespective of its emotional content. When the scene to be imagined has an emotional valence, especially a negative and unpleasant valence, activity in posterior cortices, including the cuneus, is further enhanced (Barrett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). According to recent theoretical developments in affective neuroscience, a strong recruitment of these regions is needed to generate an emotional experience, which should be considered a high-order representation that our brain creates on top of more straightforward, often modality-specific representations (Barrett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe current result suggests that participants adopting a rational approach toward the unpleasant scenarios presented were able to generate better mental representations of the scenes. This is likely because rational thinking allows for improved regulation of the unpleasant arousal that these emotionally stressful scenarios could trigger, thus potentially reducing the avoidance of interaction with unpleasant scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe observation of increased activity in the insula of participants in the rational group supports this interpretation. Since generating an emotional representation requires the brain to encode information about the rest of the body, the recruitment of the insula is critical. Insular cortices represent the most crucial cortical node where information about the state of the body is projected. The insula is typically active in tasks that require attention toward the body (e.g., interoceptive tasks) (Strigo \u0026amp; Craig, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Its dysfunction has been suggested to play an important role in psychological conditions characterized by emotional bluntness, such as psychopathy (Sitaram et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Yang \u0026amp; Raine, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) and alexithymia (Hogeveen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). With its deep interconnections with subcortical nuclei, the insular cortex also has a vital role in controlling homeostatic regulation (Simmons et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Strigo \u0026amp; Craig, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Finding an enhanced insular activity in the rational thinking group clearly suggests that adopting a rational approach led participants to regulate bodily activation more efficiently, such as increased cardiovascular and electrodermal activity, typically arising during unpleasant imagery (Levine et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Williams et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, we observed that adopting a rational thinking style, compared to adopting an irrational thinking style, also prompts increased activity in the superior temporal gyrus (STG). STG is involved in processing sensory-specific information, precisely auditory information. Imaging and electrophysiological studies have revealed that the role of STG is to support the extraction and processing of affective features of an incoming auditory stream, such as emotional prosody (Fr\u0026uuml;hholz et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Leitman et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) or the affective characteristics of music (Proverbio et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). As with the cuneus, STG is also typically activated in imagery tasks (Mcnorgan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Studies reporting STG activity during affective imagery suggest that STG is part of a broader network of regions, including the insula, which is involved in exerting cognitive control over the imagined scenario and reappraisal of a threatening situation (Buhle et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Koenigsberg et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, electrophysiological activity in superior temporal regions (Maffei, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e), especially in the right hemisphere, has been previously linked with unpleasant negative emotions. According to this evidence, our result of an increased STG activity fits with the interpretation that participants in the rational thinking group were better able to immerse themselves in the proposed scenarios than the irrational thinking group.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTaken together, these results highlight that rational thinking shapes brain activity toward increased recruitment of brain regions that allow for immersion in an imagined scenario, thus reducing the avoidance of interaction with negative/unpleasant scenarios. Given the negative nature of the scripts employed in this study, we might advance that rational thinking, allowing for improved regulation of the negative emotions arising from the task (as highlighted by participants\u0026rsquo; self-reports), prompts a more efficient regulation of activity in these regions. Thus, participants instructed to adopt rational thinking were more able to reappraise the negative scenarios, leading to an improved ability to picture themselves in these scenes without experiencing stronger negative emotions. It is possible that AAC (anterior cerebral cortex), which was observed in Cristea (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) to be activated in rational condition (vs. irrational condition), is responsible for some of these brain changes, although it was not itself clearly evident in this sample; therefore, future studies should further investigate this hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe current study also has several limitations. First, we used a non-clinical sample of individuals in our study, limiting the generalizability of the findings. Future research should aim to replicate these findings in clinical populations, such as individuals diagnosed with depression or anxiety, who typically endorse more irrational beliefs. Examining these effects in clinical populations could provide deeper insights into the neurobiological correlates of irrational beliefs vs. rational beliefs. Second, the current sample consisted of more female participants, and the age range was relatively young. This imbalance may affect the generalizability of the results. Future studies should aim for more balanced gender representation and include a broader age range to ensure the findings are applicable across diverse demographic groups. Third, the absence of a neutral condition in the experimental design limits the ability to compare the endorsement of irrational or rational beliefs with pure cognitive or attentional effort. Including such a condition would provide a clearer understanding of brain activation during the employment of rational and irrational beliefs and their specificity. Finally, while the study employed hypothetical emotionally stressful scenarios, future research could benefit from using more personally relevant or autobiographical emotionally stressful stimuli. This adjustment could enhance the ecological validity of the study and better capture the effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain activations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDespite these limitations, the study provides valuable insights into the effects of rational versus irrational beliefs on brain reactivity in response to emotionally stressful scenarios. Specifically, individuals adopting a rational approach exhibited higher activity in brain regions involved in emotional processing, such as the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula, compared to those endorsing irrational beliefs. The increased activity in these regions among participants adopting rational thinking suggests a more remarkable ability to generate detailed mental representations of the emotional scenarios presented. These results might imply that rational thinking facilitates better regulation of negative emotions triggered by emotionally stressful scenarios, leading to more efficient activity regulation in relevant brain regions. Thus, participants instructed to adopt rational thinking might be more able to reappraise the negative scenarios, which led to an improved ability to picture themselves in these scenes without experiencing stronger negative emotions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, this study underscores the importance of rational versus irrational thinking in shaping brain activity in the context of emotionally stressful scenarios. Also, this study contributes to our understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of rational and irrational beliefs and their implications for emotional regulation. Thus, interventions targeting individuals' irrational beliefs and replacing them with rational beliefs (i.e., REBT) hold promise for enhancing emotional well-being and fostering a more adaptive approach to negative scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDeclarations of interest:\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no conflict of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical Approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was approved by the Scientific Council of the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca (Protocol No. 11.671 / 02.07.2018). All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformed Consent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInformed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data supporting this study\u0026apos;s findings are available from the corresponding author, [DD], upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e*Acknowledgment:\u003c/strong\u003e The first two authors have contributed equally to this work.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was partially supported by:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, as Intermediary Body for the Operational Programme Competitiveness 2014-2020 project code SMIS 2014+ 127725, contract no. \u0026nbsp; 352/390028/23.09.2021, acronym project INSPIRE;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Ministry of European Investment and Projects (MIPE) as Managing Authority for the Smart Growth, Digitalization and Financial Instruments Programme 2021 - 2027 and the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization (MCID) as Intermediary Research Body, project code SMIS 2021+ 324771 contract MIPE no. G-2024-71962/23.10.2024 and contract MCID no.390005/23.10.2024, project acronym INSPIRE-II.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlso, Razvan Predatu was supported by a grant from the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, CNCS-UEFISCDI: PN\u0026ndash;III\u0026ndash;P1-1.1-PD-2021-0808.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAppelbaum M, Cooper H, Kline RB, Mayo-Wilson E, Nezu AM, Rao SM (2018) Journal article reporting standards for quantitative research in psychology: The APA Publications and Communications Board task force report. 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Front Hum Neurosci 12:16. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.3389/fnhum.2018.00016\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.3389/fnhum.2018.00016\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"REBT, rational beliefs, irrational beliefs, fMRI, emotional functioning","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7875472/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7875472/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIntroduction:\u003c/strong\u003e This study aimed to investigate the neural correlates of adopting rational versus irrational beliefs in response to emotionally stressful scenarios, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Grounded in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), we explored how endorsing rational or irrational beliefs modulates brain activity while evaluating hypothetical stressful situations.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMethods:\u003c/strong\u003e Seventy-five participants (48 females, aged 19–35) were randomly assigned to a rational or irrational belief group. Participants underwent fMRI while imagining emotionally stressful scenarios and endorsing corresponding beliefs.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResults:\u003c/strong\u003e We found that a rational way of approaching a given emotionally stressful scenario was associated with significantly higher activity in the right cuneus, superior temporal gyrus, and insula compared to the irrational thinking group.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDiscussions: \u003c/strong\u003eThe current result suggests that participants adopting a rational approach toward the unpleasant scenarios were able to generate better mental representations of the scenes, likely because rational thinking allows for improved regulation of the unpleasant arousal that these emotionally stressful scenarios could trigger. Interventions targeting irrational beliefs and promoting rational thinking, such as REBT, promise to improve emotional functioning and facilitate a more adaptive approach to negative scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The effects of rational and irrational beliefs on brain response to emotional scenarios: An fMRI study","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-04 11:09:32","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7875472/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"3b1ee243-7622-4f79-b316-a8d0f4d2fd14","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 4th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-07T15:40:12+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-04 11:09:32","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7875472","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7875472","identity":"rs-7875472","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}