Keywords
monkeypox virus, modeling, epidemic, real-time analysis, situational awareness 26
27
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Abstract
28
In June of 2022, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Mpox Response wanted 29
timely answers to important epidemiological questions which can now be answered more effectively 30
through infectious disease modeling. Infectious disease models have shown to be valuable tool for 31
decision making during outbreaks; however, model complexity often makes communicating the results 32
and limitations of models to decision makers difficult. We performed nowcasting and forecasting for the 33
2022 mpox outbreak in the United States using the R package EpiNow2. We generated 34
nowcasts/forecasts at the national level, by Census region, and for jurisdictions reporting the greatest 35
number of mpox cases. Modeling results were shared for situational awareness within the CDC Mpox 36
Response and publicly on the CDC website. We retrospectively evaluated forecast predictions at four key 37
phases during the outbreak using three metrics, the weighted interval score, mean absolute error, and 38
prediction interval coverage. We compared the performance of EpiNow2 with a naïve Bayesian 39
generalized linear model (GLM). The EpiNow2 model had less probabilistic error than the GLM during 40
every outbreak phase except for the early phase. We share our experiences with an existing tool for 41
nowcasting/forecasting and highlight areas of improvement for the development of future tools. We also 42
reflect on lessons learned regarding data quality issues and adapting modeling results for different 43
audiences. 44
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Background
45
The 2022 mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) outbreak is the first major infectious disease 46
outbreak since the COVID-19 pandemic and was declared a Public Health Emergency of International 47
Concern by the World Health Organization on July 23, 2022 (1). As of April 13, 2023, a total of 86,956 48
confirmed cases have been reported in 110 countries and territories (2). Unlike COVID-19, mpox is a 49
disease known to be endemic in West and Central Africa for decades; it is caused by monkeypox virus 50
(MPXV), a zoonotic orthopoxvirus (3). Historically, classical symptoms involved fever, headache, muscle 51
aches, fatigue, lymphadenopathy, and rash (4). Human-to-human MPXV transmission occurs through 52
close contact with infectious material from skin lesions, respiratory secretions during prolonged face-to-53
face contact, and fomites, such as linens and bedding (5). The 2022 mpox outbreak began in May and 54
spread rapidly in non-endemic countries. This outbreak was characterized by human-to-human 55
transmission of MPXV through close physical contact (often associated with sexual activities) and has 56
disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (6). 57
During a public health crisis such as the mpox outbreak, difficult and rapid decisions with limited 58
available data are often required (7). Infectious disease models may assist with informing policy and 59
practice by predicting the magnitude and duration of an outbreak or epidemic, evaluating characteristics 60
of pathogen transmission such as transmissibility, and designing vaccination strategies, among others (8, 61
9). However, infectious disease models are often complex, integrating data from heterogenous sources 62
with many parameter assumptions that are subject to uncertainty. These aspects make it challenging to 63
effectively implement such models and communicate the results and potential limitations to decision 64
makers, other public health partners, and the general public (10, 11). 65
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the state of the art of outbreak analysis advanced considerably 66
(12). Methods and tools for estimating key epidemiological parameters, such as the effective reproduction 67
number, Rt, were developed and shared in real-time (13). Monitoring Rt, the average number of secondary 68
cases caused by a single infected individual in a large population, during an outbreak is useful for 69
assessing transmission dynamics and evaluating the effectiveness of public health measures (e.g., 70
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vaccination, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine) (14). Nowcasts and forecasts have been produced 71
by numerous research groups around the globe (15-18), the results of which were instrumental for 72
decision makers weighing possible control measures (19) such as social distancing measures. Outbreak 73
forecasting predicts specific outcomes (e.g., number of cases, deaths, or hospitalizations) at some specific 74
future times (e.g., weeks, months, etc.), whereas nowcasting estimates those outcomes for the current 75
time, accounting for delays in reporting. 76
In this manuscript, we share our experience nowcasting and forecasting the mpox outbreak, 77
including adapting the modeling output to different audiences. We also describe challenges faced vis-a-78
vis data quality, parameter estimation, and model application and propose ways to improve nowcasting 79
and short-term forecasting efforts for future outbreaks. 80
Methods
81
Nowcasting/forecasting the mpox outbreak 82
We used data on probable and confirmed mpox cases in the United States (see “Case definition” 83
in Supplementary methods) reported to CDC by state and local public health jurisdictions from May 17, 84
2022, through March 16, 2023. Data were submitted in several different formats throughout the outbreak 85
period. These formats included: a CDC-operated call center through the Emergency Operations Center 86
(EOC), a long and a short case report form (CRF), and the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 87
System (NNDSS). Cases could have data submitted via more than one format and jurisdictions could 88
update data on cases after initial submission (Supplementary methods). All reported data were processed 89
in CDC’s Data Collation and Integration for Public Health Event Response (DCIPHER) platform, an 90
instance of Palantir Foundry (Palantir Technologies Inc, Denver, CO). DCIPHER is a secure, cloud-based 91
data integration, analytics, and situational awareness platform used by the Centers for Disease Control 92
and Prevention (CDC), federal partners, and state, tribal, local, and territorial public health jurisdictions to 93
collect, collaborate on, and share public health data (20). DCIPHER collates data of differing origin, 94
structure, and purpose to provide near real-time insights into public health problems, with the goal of 95
providing a complete picture of situational awareness. 96
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We considered three approaches for estimating Rt which are implemented in the R packages 97
EpiEstim (version 2.2-4) (21), earlyR (version 0.0.5) (22), and EpiNow2 (version 1.3.2) (23) 98
(Supplementary methods). Initially, we used all three methods to estimate Rt at the national level as well 99
as for jurisdictions reporting the highest incidence of mpox. Although estimates of the historical range of 100
the serial interval of mpox were available at the start of the outbreak, they were based on data from the 101
Democratic Republic of Congo, which reflected largely non-sexual household spread (24). We considered 102
these historical parameter estimates as a starting point for early outbreak analysis, using them (along with 103
sensitivity analyses) until new estimates were generated. Updated estimates characterized by the mean 104
and standard deviation were needed for the global outbreak given the novel mode of transmission. In June 105
2022, we were able to use an estimated mean serial interval (i.e., the period of time between symptom 106
onset in the primary case and symptom onset in the secondary case) of 9.8 days (95% credible interval 107
[CrI]: 5.9 – 21.4) from 17 case pairs reported by the United Kingdom (6). At that time, symptom onset 108
date was available for most reported cases, and imported cases were still contributing to a high proportion 109
of MPXV transmission. EpiEstim results were considered the most appropriate at this stage of the 110
outbreak because this method accounts for imported vs. locally acquired cases, has a stable codebase, is 111
widely used, and is computationally efficient (25). 112
In July 2022, we started exclusively using EpiNow2, which uses a similar approach as EpiEstim 113
(a branching process model, Supplementary methods), but it better accounts for reporting delays and 114
incorporates multiple sources of uncertainty (13); for example, it removes noise associated with weekend 115
effects and uses random walks for temporal smoothing. Forecasting is supported internally for Rt, number 116
of infections, cases by date of report, and growth rate. Unlike EpiEstim, EpiNow2 does not distinguish 117
between imported vs. locally acquired infections. EpiNow2 is the most computationally expensive 118
approach, requiring longer model run times (Supplementary methods). The model assumes that testing 119
procedures, surveillance effort, and reporting delays remain constant over the estimation period. To use 120
EpiNow2, cases by date of report must be provided as well as the generation time distribution (the time 121
between infection of a primary and secondary case), incubation period distribution (the time between 122
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infection and symptom onset in a case), and any other delay distributions (e.g., the delay between 123
symptom onset and report date). The model estimates the number of new cases by date of report, number 124
of cases by their date of infection, Rt, and time-varying growth rate. Estimates over the last 16 days of the 125
time-series are based on partial data due to the presumption of reporting delays. Input parameters and 126
Methods
for adjusting for right-truncation evolved as we learned more about the outbreak. 127
Communication methods 128
Rt estimates were shared internally through Situational Reports and leadership meetings and 129
publicly through CDC’s Technical Reports (26) and CDC’s public-facing mpox website (27). The 130
Technical Reports were co-led by the Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA) and the 2022 131
Multi-National Mpox Outbreak Response. Estimates were generated for distribution at least once per 132
week. The technical reports were intended for scientific audiences. The purpose of sharing these results 133
was to improve understanding of the outbreak and inform further scientific inquiry. 134
Performance assessment methods 135
We chose eight dates during four key outbreak phases to retrospectively evaluate our short-term 136
(one-week-ahead) forecasts of reported mpox cases generated from EpiNow2: 1. one month into the 137
outbreak prior to exponential growth (June 13 and June 27); 2. during exponential growth (July 5); 3. near 138
the outbreak peak (July 27); and 4. during the declining phase (September 6, September 19, October 11, 139
and December 5). Ideally, the same day of the week would be used, but some historical versions of the 140
dataset were not available for this analysis and some dates fell on national holidays which may have 141
introduced additional delays. Like the real-time analyses, we used rash onset date as the first reference 142
date to define the reporting delay distribution for all eight time points, while the second reference date 143
changed over time (Table S1). 144
We used three metrics to evaluate the forecasts. Our primary metric was the weighted interval 145
score (WIS). For each of the eight time points considered, WIS was computed for each daily prediction 146
and averaged across the seven-day forecast. The WIS measures the consistency of a group of prediction 147
intervals with an observed value (probabilistic accuracy). The WIS is positive, and lower values 148
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correspond to smaller error (Supplementary methods) (15). To evaluate the error in the forecast’s point 149
estimate, we used the mean absolute error (MAE), which was computed as /g1839/g1827/g1831 /g3404
/g2869
/g3015 ∑| /g1877 /g3036 /g3398/g1877 /g3548 /g3036 |/g3015
/g3036/g2880/g2869 , 150
where /g1877 /g3036 is the observed number of mpox cases on day /g1861 , /g1877 /g3548/g3036 is the median forecast on day /g1861 , and N = 7 151
(15). We also used prediction interval (PI) coverage rates, which check the degree to which the model 152
provides calibrated predictions. Coverage rates are calculated by determining the proportion of times the 153
50% or 90% PIs included the observed value (for example, a well-calibrated forecast would have a 50% 154
PI coverage close to 0.50. Also see Supplementary methods) (15). 155
We compared the performance of EpiNow2 with a naïve Bayesian generalized linear model 156
(GLM, Supplementary methods). We calculated the relative WIS and relative MAE for EpiNow2 and the 157
GLM as /g2016 /g3006/g3043/g3036/g3015/g3042/g3050/g2870,/g3008/g3013/g3014 /g3404
/g3040/g3032/g3028/g3041 /g3046/g3030/g3042/g3045/g3032 /g3042/g3033 /g3006/g3043/g3036/g3015/g3042/g3050/g2870
/g3040/g3032/g3028/g3041 /g3046/g3030/g3042/g3045/g3032 /g3042/g3033 /g3008/g3013/g3014 , where the mean score is the average of the models’ 158
performance (WIS or MAE) over all eight dates evaluated. If /g2016 /g3006/g3043/g3036/g3015/g3042/g3050/g2870,/g3008/g3013/g3014 was less than 1, that indicated 159
the forecasts generated by EpiNow2 had less error than the GLM, whereas /g2016 /g3006/g3043/g3036/g3015/g3042/g3050/g2870,/g3008/g3013/g3014 > 1 indicated 160
EpiNow2 performed worse. 161
For both EpiNow2 and the GLM, we removed recent cases (defined as cases reported in the last 3 162
– 5 days) from the time series to adjust for right truncation of the data for all four outbreak phases (Table 163
S1). Forecasts were evaluated using mpox data as of March 16, 2023. We used the most recent version of 164
event date as the basis for the comparison. 165
Results
166
Challenges of nowcasting/forecasting 167
It is voluntary for jurisdictions to report mpox cases to CDC, with only minimal data needed to 168
submit a case report form (e.g., case ID and reporting jurisdiction) in part, because not all cases may be 169
reached or fully investigated. CDC asks jurisdictions to collect and report additional data variables to 170
achieve situational awareness and surveillance goals. The number of variables on the case report form 171
was decreased to reduce reporting burden. Despite these efforts, jurisdictional case surveillance systems 172
may not have aligned to CDC’s requested data variables, and jurisdictions may choose to limit what data 173
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are shared with CDC based on local reporting practices. Received data were subjected to additional 174
manual data cleaning to standardize formats and correct obvious data entry errors. As a result, even key 175
data variables such as demographic characteristics (e.g., age, race/ethnicity, HIV status, vaccination) were 176
not consistently available across all jurisdictions and time periods, precluding detailed sub-analyses. For 177
example, out of 29,921 cases in DCIPHER through December 31, 2022, 21,480 (71.8%) were missing 178
HIV status, 16,474 (55.1%) were missing smallpox vaccination, 3,913 (13.1%) were missing gender 179
identity, 3,172 (10.6%) were missing race, 2,928 (9.8%) were missing ethnicity, and 250 (0.8%) were 180
missing age. The timing and frequency of data submission varied between jurisdictions and changed over 181
the course of the outbreak. Some jurisdictions reported case data in near real-time whereas others 182
submitted a large number of cases all at once, the latter of which caused large, artificial spikes in the time-183
series. There were instances of duplicate cases being reported from several jurisdictions which may be 184
attributed to the changes in reporting processes. Spurious cases at the end of the time series had to be 185
investigated (and usually removed) because they artificially inflated the nowcasts/forecasts. These data 186
issues required us to monitor the model output closely and modify the code as needed. 187
In early July 2022, reporting of mpox cases to CDC started to lag in some jurisdictions, especially 188
those most affected by the outbreak. These few jurisdictions were publicly reporting more cases on their 189
websites than what CDC had received reports for. This led to a lengthy case reconciliation process during 190
which case data uncertainty prevented it from being used for nowcasting/forecasting at the national level. 191
Also in July, an increasing proportion of cases were reported with missing symptom onset dates (from 192
26% to 53% for rash onset date between June 13 and July 5). To ensure each case had a date associated 193
with it for plotting epidemic curves, a new event date field was created which we started using for 194
nowcasting/forecasting. The new calculated date field selected the best available date among possible date 195
fields based on the following priority, ordered from most to least preferable: orthopoxvirus test date, date 196
of call to the call center, date the short CRF was created, and the long CRF timestamp (Figure S1). The 197
date in which the record was created was least preferred due to artificial spikes in the time series caused 198
by bulk uploading data. In September 2022, a different date was adopted by the response for reporting 199
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case data. This date field was defined as the earliest among all available dates for a case including 200
symptom onset, which facilitated improved visualization of epidemic curves. However, this new date 201
presented challenges for its use in the EpiNow2 framework because the delay from symptom onset to this 202
new date would have more variation than the delay using the original event date, including a delay of zero 203
for some cases. Thus, we worked to create a new event date field specifically for nowcasting/forecasting 204
which was similar to the original event date. The definition was expanded to include dates available in 205
NNDSS data. 206
Successes of nowcasting/forecasting 207
During the case reconciliation process in July, publicly available data through health department 208
websites was used for subnational analyses [e.g., California (28) and New York City (29). We used 209
WebPlotDigitizer (30) to extract time series data from pdfs when the underlying data were not available 210
for download. 211
In October, we updated estimates of the serial interval for rash onset of 7.0 days (95% CrI 5.8 – 212
8.4) from 40 case pairs and incubation period for rash onset of 7.5 days (95% CrI 6.0 – 9.8) from 35 U.S. 213
case-patients and used those as model inputs for EpiNow2 (31). These data were obtained through the 214
collaboration of several U.S. jurisdictions on a special study. The estimated serial interval for the 2022 215
outbreak was on the lower end of the historical range observed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (7 – 216
23 days) (24). 217
Adapting model output and communicating nowcasts/forecasts 218
We adapted the presentation of our results for a scientific/technical audience and the general 219
public. The default plots from EpiNow2 included three panels: cases by date of report, cases by date of 220
infection, and Rt. Green represented estimates based on complete data, orange represented estimates based 221
on partial data, and purple represented the forecast (the default is seven days). Gray bars in the top panel 222
showed the actual time series of reported cases, while gray bars in the middle panel showed the back-223
calculated infection time series. For the Technical Reports, Situational Reports, and response updates 224
meetings, we removed the middle panel (Figure 1) (26). For the website, we only showed Rt, removed the 225
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forecast, and removed the 20% credible intervals to minimize confusion (Figure 2) (27). We included a 226
simple description of the plot that could be understood by non-experts. In accordance with CDC’s Data 227
Modernization Initiative, a national effort aimed at modernizing state and national core data and 228
surveillance infrastructure (32), data for the underlying plots were made available for download as 229
comma-separated values (csv) files with the Technical Reports. 230
Sub-national analyses revealed some differences between regions regarding the start of the 231
outbreak, when it peaked, and how long it lasted (Figures 3 – 4). For example, Figure 4 demonstrates a 232
later introduction date and slightly longer tail for Texas compared to other jurisdictions. 233
Performance assessment 234
The GLM had lower WIS compared to EpiNow2 for early phase of the outbreak (Table 1); 235
however, during all other phases, EpiNow2 had a slight advantage. The relative WIS was 0.89 over all 236
eight time points considered, indicating that EpiNow2 had on average 11% less probabilistic error than 237
the GLM. 238
EpiNow2 had lower MAE than the GLM for six out of eight time points, but performance was 239
similar: the relative MAE was 0.96. In other words, EpiNow2 had only 4% less point error than the GLM. 240
Overall, predictions were moderately well calibrated. For the 90% PI, EpiNow2 achieved 241
coverage rates within 10% of the desired coverage level for seven out of eight time points compared to six 242
out of eight for the GLM. For the 50% PI, EpiNow2 achieved coverage rates within 10% of the desired 243
coverage level for only two out of eight time points compared to five out of eight for the GLM. 244
Qualitative results of the nowcasts/forecasts are shown in Figure S2. The 90% CrIs from 245
EpiNow2 were very wide for the early phase of the outbreak, while the GLM had large uncertainty 246
around the outbreak’s peak. Both models underestimated reported mpox cases for the seventh time point 247
on October 11 which could be due to a discrepancy in the data available at the time versus the ground-248
truth data (Figure S3). This time point had the lowest PI coverage rates. 249
Discussion
250
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We performed nowcasting/forecasting to inform the U.S. response to the 2022 mpox outbreak in 251
real-time. Validation showed that the method implemented in EpiNow2 predicted case counts reasonably 252
well, but improvements are needed around key time periods such as the outbreak’s peak. One reason that 253
the nowcasts/forecasts did not always align with reality is because the definition of event date changed 254
over time, while the study data were constructed the most recent version of the event date field. We found 255
a higher WIS for EpiNow2 in the early phase of the outbreak compared to the GLM which could be due 256
to choices of priors for parameters (e.g., wide intervals for Rt). 257
Subnational analyses allowed us to better understand the spatial heterogeneity of the epidemic 258
which may be attributed to differences between jurisdictions in terms of composition (e.g., population age 259
structure, density, and contact patterns) and public health activities (e.g., vaccination, surveillance 260
methods, frequency of testing) (33) as well as the timing and frequency of case reporting. One limitation 261
of nowcasting/forecasting at the subregional or jurisdictional level is that the effects of bulk uploads are 262
more apparent, resulting in greater uncertainty (wider credible intervals). Another limitation is that 263
movement between jurisdictions could have a greater impact on subnational estimates, as mobility is not 264
accounted for in our approach. Finally, some jurisdictions stopped reporting rash onset date, which 265
decreased the sample size available for estimating the reporting delay distribution over time. 266
Data Quality 267
Nowcasting/forecasting methods perform best when the underlying surveillance data are accurate, 268
timely, and complete, but they are often sub-optimal and variable as the outbreak evolves; while data may 269
improve as an outbreak progresses, they may re-deteriorate once the outbreak slows and intensity of effort 270
is low. Fortunately, the quality and frequency of data improved over the course of the U.S. mpox 271
outbreak. Communicating with specific jurisdictions about our priority dates for modeling improved data 272
quality. These prompts to the jurisdictions need to be continued regularly throughout the outbreak. Close 273
collaboration between epidemiologists/modelers and informaticians, including the use of an issue tracking 274
system in DCIPHER, also facilitated quick investigation and resolution of data errors. 275
EpiNow2 Limitations 276
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The main limitation of EpiNow2 is its steep learning curve due to limited documentation of 277
package functions and few reports of its application to other outbreaks. Increasing commenting in the 278
code, creating more tutorials or vignettes, and developing a graphical user interface could help. 279
Another limitation is the long computing time required for the analyses. We were able to increase 280
computational efficiency by running the model on multiple cores in parallel, but the processing time 281
became particularly cumbersome if an analysis needed to be repeated. In the future, cloud-based 282
computing could be used to obtain more consistent and faster model run times. 283
There were also instances of unusually long run times whereby the first two Markov chain Monte 284
Carlo (MCMC) chains performed as expected, but subsequent chains never finished processing. Some 285
MCMC convergence issues were resolved by reducing the parameter fitting period (e.g., truncating the 286
beginning of the time series). One study reported that EpiNow2 estimates are more reliable when case 287
numbers at each time step are large and there are at least 14 timepoints without zeroes (34). Large daily 288
fluctuations and limited case counts could substantially affect model estimates, which should be 289
interpreted with caution. 290
Another limitation is that the method we used does not account for under-ascertainment, which 291
occurs when not all infections are diagnosed and reported as cases of the disease to the surveillance 292
system. The under-ascertainment rate is needed to understand the true burden of disease caused by the 293
outbreak; however, current estimates for the U.S. mpox outbreak are lacking. Indirect evidence from a 294
recent modeling study (35) suggests that 65% of mpox infections were diagnosed and reported in 295
Washington, D.C. However, the model was not designed to measure the under-ascertainment rate (Patrick 296
Clay, personal communication, March 10, 2023), and this quantity should be assessed by other methods 297
(e.g., models specifically designed to assess under-ascertainment, serological surveys, and community-298
based surveys). 299
Strategies for Forecasting the Next Outbreak 300
For the next outbreak, it is important for CDC to develop strategies for regularly capturing and 301
storing snapshots of surveillance data which remain easily accessible for systematic analysis. For routine 302
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case-based surveillance of notifiable diseases, such as rabies, most analyses are performed only after the 303
data have undergone a rigorous and routine reconciliation and closeout process by data submitters with 304
further validation by CDC surveillance epidemiologists; however, timely outbreak response decision 305
support does not allow for such processes. Instead, jurisdictions are asked to submit available case data in 306
near real-time and submit additional data or corrections to data entry errors as time and resources permit. 307
Snapshots of the surveillance data were saved in an ad hoc manner (by exporting data on a particular day 308
and saving a csv file locally), and as a consequence, a complete history of the data is not available, 309
especially around key points in the outbreak, such as the peak. A complete history would help to 310
understand key delay distributions and other quirks (e.g., backfilling and revision of reference dates) 311
involved in the data-generating process. Understanding the data generating process is crucial for the 312
improvement of methods and tools for nowcasting/forecasting and aligns with one of the five priorities of 313
CDC’s Data Modernization Initiative (Accelerating Data for Action: Tapping into more data sources, 314
promoting health equity, and increasing capacities for scalable outbreak response, forecasting, and 315
predictive analytics) (32). In the future, the process of saving snapshots of the data could be automated. 316
Ensemble models have been used for a variety of infectious disease outbreaks, such as COVID-317
19 (15, 36), Zika (37), influenza (38), and Ebola (39). Ensembles combine predictions from several 318
models that use different methodology and sometimes input data. Because some models overpredict, 319
while others underpredict, ensemble models often outperform individual models over time. In the future, 320
we may consider using at least two simpler models and comparing them. 321
One potentially useful addition to EpiNow2 and other currently available tools for 322
nowcasting/forecasting outbreaks would be flexibility in handling dates. We frequently encountered 323
missing dates for cases in the mpox surveillance data. Ideally, a method or tool would be able to keep 324
track of multiple dates for a case and estimate missing dates based on the full distribution of dates across 325
all cases. Epinowcast is a new hierarchical nowcasting package that enables more flexibility in adjusting 326
for truncated data (40). Novel nowcasting approaches use hierarchical generalized additive models, which 327
can provide even more flexibility to modify the model in real-time to the evolving data environment (41). 328
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Another improvement would be to reduce the time required to run the analyses. Rather than focusing on 329
the efficiency of the MCMC algorithm, computation time could be reduced if the model only needed to be 330
run on the new data. Finally, the imputed time series of cases by symptom onset date would be a useful 331
data visualization output that is not currently available in EpiNow2. As described above, defining the date 332
field for the presentation of epidemic curves was a challenge in the mpox outbreak and having an imputed 333
symptom onset date for each case would have been useful for comparison purposes. 334
CFA played an important advisory role in our nowcasting/forecasting efforts. CFA produces 335
models and forecasts to characterize the state of an outbreak and its course, inform public health decision 336
makers on potential consequences of deploying control measures, and support innovation to continuously 337
improve the science of outbreak analytics and modeling (42). In the future, CFA plans to create new tools 338
for outbreak analysis and modeling. CFA could also serve as a link between CDC modelers and 339
jurisdictions with modeling capacity to share experiences and code. Technical Reports represent a new 340
way for CDC to share timely information with the federal government, state and local leaders, and 341
scientists in academia and industry. Technical Reports have been well received within and outside CDC 342
(43-45) and their publication aligns with CDC’s current restructuring efforts aimed at making the agency 343
more response ready, including sharing science and data faster (46). 344
Conclusion
345
Real-time estimation of Rt as well as nowcasting/forecasting is one method for determining the 346
extent to which current public health measures are effective and/or need to be modified but is subject to 347
limitations. The quality and timeliness of reported data pose challenges to these analyses. Ease of use, 348
model computing time, and ability to handle multiple dates are priorities for consideration in the 349
development of future nowcasting/forecasting tools. A naïve model may be superior to a complex one, 350
such as EpiNow2, during the early phase of an outbreak when data scarcity causes Rt to be largely 351
unconstrained, especially once reporting delays are considered. Future outbreak response activities could 352
be enhanced through inclusion of clear and consistent communication about modeling outputs as well as 353
close collaboration between modeling and informatics/data teams. 354
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355
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Tables 356
Table 1. Evaluation of short-term (one-week-ahead) forecasts of reported mpox cases during the 2022 U.S. outbreak. For WIS, bold indicates 357
where one model performed better than the other. 358
EpiNow2 Bayesian GLM with negative binomial
Forecast date Outbreak
phase
90% PI
coverage
50% PI
coverage
WIS MAE 90% PI
coverage
50% PI
coverage
WIS MAE
Monday, June 13 Early 1 0.71 33.8 4.3 0.86 0.57 6.4 5.1
Monday, June 27 Early 0.86 0 34.0 29.0 0.86 0.14 24.7 26.9
Tuesday, July 5 Exponential
growth
0.86 0.71 35.6 32.4 1 0.57 38.5 34.1
Wednesday, July 27 Peak 1 0.57 137.0 107.9 1 0.57 184.3 94.4
Tuesday, September 6 Decline 0.86 0.71 107.6 84.3 0.86 0.43 117.1 86.8
Monday, September 19 Decline 0.86 0.43 61.2 52.4 0.71 0.43 81.8 65.9
Tuesday, October 11 Decline 0.43 0.29 30.6 33.4 0.57 0.14 38.3 41.9
Monday, December 5 Decline 1 0.71 4.3 3.1 1 0.71 6.4 4.6
PI: prediction interval; WIS: weighted interval score; MAE: mean absolute error; GLM: generalized linear model 359
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Figures 360
Figure 1. Effective reproduction number estimates for the U.S. 2022 mpox outbreak intended for a 361
technical/scientific audience. The top panel shows estimates of cases by date of report with actual cases 362
shown by gray bars. The bottom panel shows estimates of the effective reproduction number by date. In 363
all panels, shaded regions reflect 90%, 50%, and 20% credible intervals in order from lightest to darkest. 364
Green shows estimates, red shows estimates based on partial data, and purple shows forecasts. Event date 365
is determined by a hierarchy across the different data streams where priority is given to diagnosis date, 366
orthopoxvirus test date, orthopoxvirus test confirmation date, case investigation start date, orthopoxvirus 367
sample collection date, date of call to CDC call center, report date (to public health department, county, or 368
state), date CDC announced case, and the date the case was entered into DCIPHER, in that order. 369
370
Figure 2. Effective reproduction number (Rt) estimates for the U.S. 2022 mpox outbreak intended for the 371
general public. The graph shows the Rt estimation over time based on complete data (gray) or partial data 372
(blue). The most recent data are considered incomplete due to delays in reporting mpox cases. As a result, 373
there is more uncertainty associated with the most recent Rt estimates. Rt > 1 means the epidemic is 374
growing. Rt < 1 means the epidemic is shrinking. Shading represents the 50% and 90% credible intervals 375
(uncertainty in the estimates) 376
377
Figure 3. Effective reproduction number estimates for the 2022 mpox outbreak in four U.S. Census 378
regions. The left panels show estimates of cases by date of report with actual cases shown by gray bars. 379
The right panels show estimates of the effective reproduction number by date. In all panels, shaded 380
regions reflect 90%, 50%, and 20% credible intervals in order from lightest to darkest. Green shows 381
estimates, red shows estimates based on partial data, and purple shows forecasts. Event date is determined 382
by a hierarchy across the different data streams where priority is given to diagnosis date, orthopoxvirus 383
test date, orthopoxvirus test confirmation date, case investigation start date, orthopoxvirus sample 384
collection date, date of call to CDC call center, report date (to public health department, county, or state), 385
date CDC announced case, and the date the case was entered into DCIPHER, in that order. 386
387
Figure 4. Effective reproduction number estimates of the 2022 mpox outbreak for the six jurisdictions in 388
the U.S. with the highest case counts. The left panels show estimates of cases by date of report with actual 389
cases shown by gray bars. The right panels show estimates of the effective reproduction number by date. 390
In all panels, shaded regions reflect 90%, 50%, and 20% credible intervals in order from lightest to 391
darkest. Green shows estimates, red shows estimates based on partial data, and purple shows forecasts. 392
Event date is determined by a hierarchy across the different data streams where priority is given to 393
diagnosis date, orthopoxvirus test date, orthopoxvirus test confirmation date, case investigation start date, 394
orthopoxvirus sample collection date, date of call to CDC call center, report date (to public health 395
department, county, or state), date CDC announced case, and the date the case was entered into 396
DCIPHER, in that order. 397
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Data availability 398
Data and code to run the nowcasts/forecasts and perform model validation will be available on GitHub 399
following publication in a peer-reviewed journal. 400
401
Acknowledgements
402
We thank all public health professionals involved in reporting mpox cases to CDC. We also acknowledge 403
the Mpox Response Data Analytics and Visualization Task Force Informatics Team for data management 404
and support, and we thank Dr. Sam Abbott for helpful discussions about EpiNow2 methods. 405
406
Declaration of interest 407
The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as 408
potential competing interests: Kelly Charniga reports a relationship with Systems Planning and Analysis 409
Inc that includes: consulting or advisory. 410
411
Disclaimer 412
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 413
official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and 414
Human Services. 415
416
Ethics statement 417
This activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC 418
policy (45 C.F.R. part 46, 21 C.F.R. part 56; 42 U.S.C. Sect. 241(d); 5 U.S.C. Sect. 552a; 44 U.S.C. Sect. 419
3501 et seq). 420
421
Funding 422
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No specific funding was obtained for this work. 423
424
Author contributions 425
Conceptualization (KC, YN), data curation (KC, JA), formal analysis (KC, ZJM), investigation (KC, 426
ZJM), methodology (KC, ZJM, JA), project administration (KC), software (KC, ZJM, NBM), supervision 427
(JA, YN, IHS), validation (KC, ZJM), visualization (KC, ZJM), writing – original draft preparation (KC, 428
ZJM), writing – review & editing (KC, ZJM, NBM, JA, YN, IHS). 429
430
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