How “Rational” Is Corruption in Urban Public Urban Government?
preprint
OA: closed
CC-BY-4.0
Abstract
Public corruption has long been a scourge for city governments. Current - and speculative - UN estimates of the costs of corruption of all forms amount to 5% of global GDP, a sizable number. In some places, and in some cities especially, the problem is more extensive and proportionally more costly. Rational actor models have become the dominant mode of analysis in the corruption arena, especially bribery, which sees actors as rational seekers of gain through transactions undertaken for mutual gain between corrupt parties though at the cost of the greater good. However, urban corruption takes many forms, and there has always been a recognition that, at a minimum, corruption may start out as rational and transactional but that it can build into something more relational and cultural, especially in dense cities with extensive political and social complexes such as local government "machines". This paper reviews the evolution of the concept of corruption over time and the urban corruption literature in particular to explore various patterns that have emerged in types and motivations of corrupt behavior at the municipal government level. The discussions closes with a template of urban corruption types encompassed in a number of “spheres”, with rational/transactional models explaining some instances, but others being more non-rational and social in nature.
My notes (saved in your browser only)
Citation neighborhood (no data yet)
We don't have any in-corpus citations linked to this paper yet. This is a recent paper (2025) — citers typically take a year or two to land, and the OpenAlex reference graph may still be filling in.
Source provenance
- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00
- unpaywall
- last seen: 2026-05-22T02:00:06.705733+00:00
License: CC-BY-4.0