The pitfalls of false dichotomies in cognitive science: a reply to Corlett et al.

A recent proposal has positioned paranoid delusions as the result of domain-general uncertainty processes rather than disruptions in dedicated social mechanisms. The authors propose that altered social experience and behaviour in paranoia can be explained by ‘pseudosocial’ cognition. We offer the following objections. First, the notion of pseudosocial cognition is conceptually incoherent. There is no more a ‘pseudosocial’ cognition than there is a ‘pseudospatial’ cognition. Second, social cognitive explanations do not rely on the need for ‘dedicated’ processes for their validity and, contrary to the authors' claim, we have not posited an informationally-encapsulated social module to explain paranoia. Third, heuristic and recursive mentalising properties do not need to be at odds to explain social behaviour: the social cognitive toolbox contains but is not limited to recursive mentalising. We also highlight some limitations regarding the relation drawn by the authors between volatility and paranoia.