Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Indonesia–Russia Defense Diplomacy as Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific

Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Indonesia–Russia Defense Diplomacy as Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Indonesia–Russia Defense Diplomacy as Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific Aris Sarjito This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study explores Indonesia’s defense diplomacy with Russia as a strategic hedging mechanism amid intensifying United States–China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than pursuing strict alignment, Indonesia seeks to diversify its defense partnerships while upholding non-alignment principles. Drawing from defense white papers, strategic institutional data, and international legal instruments including CAATSA, the research analyzes how military cooperation with Russia, through arms procurement, joint exercises, and potential technology transfer, supports Indonesia’s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) roadmap and enhances strategic autonomy. Specifically, this cooperation bolsters Indonesia’s deterrence capability by expanding its arsenal beyond Western suppliers, potentially increasing its leverage in maritime and airspace security operations. It also contributes to Indonesia’s limited power projection in Southeast Asia by enabling sustained military presence and joint exercises. The study finds that Indonesia tactically frames its defense ties to minimize geopolitical exposure and navigate external legal constraints. Comparative perspectives from India and Vietnam reinforce the findings, revealing regional convergence in legal structuring, diplomatic signaling, and risk-mitigation strategies. This paper contributes to scholarly discourse on middle power diplomacy, strategic hedging, and regional security by highlighting Indonesia’s nuanced approach to sustaining adaptive sovereignty within an increasingly polarized Indo-Pacific order. Defense Diplomacy Indonesia–Russia Relations Indo-Pacific Security Non-Alignment Policy Strategic Hedging Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 1. Introduction The emergence of a multipolar global order in the post-Cold War era has redefined power alignments and regional strategies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. With the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, middle powers in Southeast Asia are navigating a complex diplomatic landscape where balancing national interests, security partnerships, and sovereignty has become increasingly challenging. Indonesia, as the largest archipelagic state in ASEAN and a self-declared non-aligned actor, stands at the heart of this evolving regional security architecture. The country's long-standing doctrine of non-alignment, rooted in its constitutional foreign policy principles, continues to shape its strategic behavior, particularly in defense policy ( 1 ). As the geopolitical contest intensifies, Indonesia has not aligned itself exclusively with any major power bloc. Instead, it pursues a policy of strategic hedging , which involves cultivating multiple partnerships while avoiding entanglement in formal alliances ( 2 ). This strategic flexibility enables Jakarta to maximize diplomatic and military benefits from multiple sources, such as the United States, China, Russia, and European partners, without jeopardizing its autonomy. A central component of this strategy is defense diplomacy , which Indonesia employs to engage diverse partners through military training, joint exercises, procurement agreements, and defense dialogues ( 3 ). In recent years, Indonesia’s defense cooperation with Russia has come under increasing scrutiny, particularly in light of global sanctions frameworks such as the United States’ Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Under this legislation, third-party countries acquiring military equipment from sanctioned Russian entities risk being penalized. Yet, despite the geopolitical and legal risks, Indonesia has proceeded with several procurement deals involving Russian platforms such as the Sukhoi Su-35 fighter aircraft and naval systems ( 4 ). This decision signals more than just transactional arms acquisition, it reflects a calculated policy maneuver embedded within Indonesia’s broader defense policy architecture, notably the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) roadmap and the Renstra Kemhan 2020–2024 . This research explores how the Indonesia–Russia military partnership contributes to Indonesia's strategic hedging posture and how it aligns with the country's national defense objectives. The analysis seeks to situate this bilateral cooperation within the framework of Indonesia's official defense policy , examining how it enables the country to diversify its defense capabilities, maintain diplomatic leverage, and resist external pressures such as CAATSA. The study also investigates the policy-level mechanisms that Indonesia can utilize to sustain such partnerships without compromising its long-standing commitment to neutrality and ASEAN centrality. This paper adopts the framework of strategic hedging as articulated by Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008), who identifies hedging as a strategy employed by secondary states to avoid choosing sides amid major power rivalry. Rather than aligning exclusively with one great power, hedging involves cultivating multiple relationships to preserve autonomy, minimizing strategic risks, and maintaining flexibility. This is particularly relevant to Indonesia’s historical preference for non-alignment. The analysis also draws on key principles from realism and liberal institutionalism. Realism helps explain Indonesia’s defense cooperation with Russia in terms of national interest and security imperatives, while liberal perspectives provide insight into Indonesia’s ongoing participation in regional multilateral frameworks. Together, these perspectives offer a comprehensive basis for understanding Indonesia’s nuanced strategic posture. There are three central research questions guiding this study: 1. How does Indonesia–Russia defense cooperation reflect Indonesia’s national defense priorities? This question seeks to explore how military engagement with Russia aligns with Indonesia’s MEF goals, technological modernization agenda, and strategic posture as outlined in core policy documents. 2. In what way is this partnership a component of Indonesia’s strategic hedging? The aim is to unpack how Indonesia's multidirectional defense diplomacy serves as a risk management tool amid growing strategic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. 3. How can Indonesia balance cooperation with Russia while managing legal and diplomatic constraints, especially under CAATSA? This question focuses on the institutional and diplomatic tactics that can be employed to navigate external pressures without derailing bilateral defense goals. By answering these questions, this paper seeks to contribute to scholarly and policy debates on how non-aligned states like Indonesia craft pragmatic defense policies that avoid binary alignments. It emphasizes the nuanced nature of defense diplomacy as both a reflection of and a tool for strategic hedging, particularly in a volatile and sanction-prone global environment. The findings aim to enhance our understanding of Southeast Asian strategic autonomy in the 21st century and provide insights for other regional actors facing similar geopolitical dilemmas. In doing so, this research bridges theoretical debates on hedging and non-alignment with practical implications for contemporary defense policy. 2. Theoretical Framework In the increasingly fluid and fragmented security architecture of the Indo-Pacific, the concepts of strategic hedging, defense diplomacy , and middle power behavior have emerged as central analytical tools for understanding the foreign and defense policies of Southeast Asian states. These interlocking frameworks offer a nuanced explanation for how countries like Indonesia navigate the growing pressures of major power competition without aligning exclusively with any geopolitical camp. This section elaborates on the theoretical pillars underpinning this study: strategic hedging, defense diplomacy as statecraft, and middle power autonomy , with an emphasis on the contributions of theorists such as Kuik Cheng-Chwee and Evelyn Goh . 2.1 Strategic Hedging: Between Alignment and Autonomy Strategic hedging refers to the deliberate effort of states to avoid binary choices in the international system by simultaneously pursuing policies of cooperation, deterrence, and risk mitigation. Unlike traditional balancing or bandwagoning, hedging involves maintaining relationships with multiple great powers while investing in national capabilities and regional multilateralism to preserve autonomy ( 5 ). The concept is particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific, where the rise of China and the reassertion of U.S. influence have created what Kuik terms a "pressure cooker" for secondary states ( 5 ). For Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, strategic hedging is a practical response to the asymmetric dependencies created by economic globalization and military modernization. As Goh (2020) explains, hedging strategies manifest through a "portfolio of ties", engagements that range from economic cooperation to defense partnerships, carefully calibrated to avoid triggering antagonistic responses from major powers. Indonesia’s approach to engaging both Russia and Western allies in defense cooperation fits squarely within this definition. While cooperating with the United States and participating in multilateral defense forums like the ADMM-Plus, Jakarta has also sought defense ties with Russia, South Korea, France, and China. Importantly, strategic hedging is not a passive policy born of indecision. On the contrary, it represents a calculated, risk-aware diplomacy , rooted in the structural realities of power politics and the normative commitment to non-alignment. Hedging allows Indonesia to preserve policy space in a contested region while avoiding full dependency on any singular power ( 7 ). It is also consistent with the strategic culture of Indonesia, which emphasizes self-reliance ( kemandirian ), sovereignty ( kedaulatan ), and multilateralism. 2.2 Defense Diplomacy: Military Cooperation as Foreign Policy Instrument Defense diplomacy , a term that gained prominence in the post–Cold War literature, refers to the peaceful application of military resources and relationships to advance a state’s foreign policy and strategic interests. According to Cottey (2004), defense diplomacy includes a wide range of activities, from military visits and training to joint exercises and arms cooperation, that aim to build trust, manage conflict, and increase political influence without coercion. In the context of Indonesia, defense diplomacy has increasingly become a pillar of foreign policy execution , especially under the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) doctrine, which prioritizes strategic partnerships for capability development. As Dorigné-Thomson (2023) asserts, Indonesia’s defense diplomacy is “an extension of its hedging behavior, enabling the state to diversify partnerships and avoid overdependence on any one supplier.” The bilateral relationship with Russia is illustrative of this strategy. Through military procurement (e.g., the Sukhoi fighter jet program), technological transfer negotiations, and joint military training, Indonesia leverages its defense ties with Russia to reduce reliance on U.S. and NATO-standard systems , thereby reinforcing its strategic autonomy. This form of military diplomacy also signals Jakarta's intent to retain maneuverability in foreign policy without shifting into formal alliance structures (10). 2.3 Middle Power Behavior: Indonesia as an Autonomous Regional Actor Indonesia’s behavior in the Indo-Pacific is also best understood through the lens of middle power theory , which explores how states with limited global influence, but significant regional weight seeks to shape international outcomes through coalition-building, norm entrepreneurship, and multilateral activism. According to ( 11 ), middle powers often operate as system stabilizers , attempting to preserve regional order while enhancing their own diplomatic standing. Indonesia has consistently portrayed itself as a normative middle power , emphasizing ASEAN centrality, promoting regional code-of-conduct mechanisms, and advancing initiatives like the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) . These actions reflect what Goh (2020) calls “strategic discretion,” whereby middle powers pursue agenda-setting without antagonizing the major powers. In its defense policy, Indonesia exhibits the hallmarks of middle power behavior by resisting security alignment while building capacity through diverse engagements. Its ability to interact with both China and the U.S., while also maintaining military ties with Russia, underscores its multivector strategy rooted in middle power identity. Defense diplomacy with Russia, therefore, is not an act of ideological alignment but rather an instrument of capacity enhancement and signaling within the logic of middle power positioning ( 12 ). 2.4 Strategic Autonomy in Practice The convergence of these three theoretical dimensions, hedging, defense diplomacy, and middle power behavior, coalesces in the concept of strategic autonomy , a principle central to Indonesia’s national defense strategy. As articulated in the Renstra Kemhan and the MEF doctrine, Indonesia seeks to develop a modern and independent defense capability that allows it to respond flexibly to regional threats and global uncertainty. Strategic autonomy does not imply isolationism or neutrality in the traditional sense. Rather, it involves active engagement with multiple partners , while ensuring that domestic decision-making is not unduly influenced by external actors. This principle is particularly salient when dealing with potential constraints like CAATSA sanctions. Indonesia's approach to mitigating these risks, such as by legal framing, procurement diversification, and timing adjustments, illustrates a mature application of strategic autonomy in a contested strategic environment ( 4 ). 3. Literature Review Indonesia’s approach to international defense relations cannot be understood without first revisiting the country’s enduring commitment to non-alignment , a principle that has deeply influenced its strategic culture and defense policy. From its foundational role in the 1955 Bandung Conference to its continued leadership within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) , Indonesia has consistently articulated a vision of international relations that rejects formal military alliances and champions sovereign autonomy ( 13 ). While the country has engaged with both Western and non-Western military powers over time, its constitutional commitment to an “independent and active” foreign policy ( politik luar negeri bebas aktif ) has constrained the extent of alignment with any bloc, an identity further embedded in its defense documents such as the Doktrin Pertahanan Negara . Scholars such as Evelyn Goh (2020) and Kuik (2020) have highlighted how non-aligned states, especially in Southeast Asia, practice strategic ambiguity as a way to secure benefits from competing powers without entrenching themselves in ideological loyalties. Indonesia's history of resisting Cold War bloc politics, while still acquiring military equipment from both the Soviet Union and the United States, serves as a historical precedent for its current policy of strategic hedging . This positioning is neither naïve neutrality nor passive balancing; rather, it reflects an intentional effort to secure space for sovereign policymaking in a contested region. In the post-Reformasi era , Indonesia has pursued a policy of defense diversification , expanding its military relations with a range of actors. Its partnership with the United States remains robust, particularly in the areas of training, counterterrorism, and interoperability. Initiatives such as the US–Indonesia Defense Framework Agreement (2021) and regular bilateral exercises like Garuda Shield signify deepening defense engagement ( 14 ). At the same time, Indonesia–China military exchanges have increased modestly, driven by growing economic interdependence and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Still, these ties are marked by caution and lack the depth of Indonesia’s partnerships with other powers. South Korea and France have emerged as important non-traditional partners in Indonesia’s defense modernization program. South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) collaborated on the development of the KF-21 Boramae fighter jet, with Indonesia as a co-developer, a rare case of joint high-tech defense production in the region ( 15 ). Similarly, France’s Naval Group has been involved in submarine development, reflecting Jakarta’s desire to develop domestic defense industries and reduce external dependency ( 16 ). Amid these multilateral ties, Russia remains a unique and longstanding partner . Dating back to the Sukarno era, Indonesia–Russia defense relations have persisted across political regimes, with Moscow supplying platforms like the Sukhoi Su-27/30/35, Mi-35 helicopters, and BMP-3F amphibious vehicles ( 4 ). This cooperation is often framed in terms of strategic balancing , offering Indonesia an alternative source of military capability outside the Western sphere of influence. Russia’s model of defense diplomacy , particularly in Southeast Asia, emphasizes arms sales, training exchanges, and strategic signaling. As Storey (2021) note, Moscow’s military engagements in the region aim to build influence in a manner that bypasses the alliance structures of the West, appealing to countries like Indonesia that are keen to maintain strategic autonomy. Yet, the continuation of this cooperation has not been without obstacles. Since the passage of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, states that procure weapons from Russia risk being subjected to secondary sanctions by the United States . For Indonesia, which had planned the acquisition of 11 Su-35 fighter jets, CAATSA introduced a legal and diplomatic dilemma. The deal was ultimately shelved, reportedly due in part to these pressures ( 18 ). This case illustrates the external legal constraints that now condition Indonesia’s hedging behavior, forcing Jakarta to re-evaluate the scope and structure of its military procurement strategies. Despite these constraints, academic literature suggests that Indonesia continues to hedge through structured ambiguity , combining short-term postponements with long-term diversification ( 19 ). For example, Jakarta maintains backchannel dialogues with Russian defense representatives and explores dual-use technologies that might fall outside the direct purview of CAATSA. Scholars such as Wu & Velasco (2024) have observed similar dynamics in other Southeast Asian states, where hedging is increasingly shaped not only by power asymmetry but by regulatory and legal regimes imposed by external actors. Within the growing corpus of work on Indonesia’s strategic culture , several scholars emphasize the consistency between Indonesia’s legal framework, foreign policy orientation, and defense planning. According to Goh (2020), Indonesia’s commitment to constitutional safeguards, such as the prohibition on foreign military bases and alliance treaties, ensures that its defense cooperation will always be embedded within a framework of non-permanence and national interest . These limits allow Jakarta to engage without entanglement , providing a durable foundation for hedging as a long-term strategy. Furthermore, the literature highlights how Indonesia frames its defense engagement in ways that avoid perceptional shifts in alignment. For instance, arms deal with Russia are often presented as technical cooperation rather than strategic partnerships. Training exchanges are kept low-profile, and agreements are embedded within broader multilateral exercises to avoid the appearance of bilateralism ( 14 ). In sum, the literature provides a coherent understanding of how Indonesia’s historical non-alignment has evolved into a contemporary strategy of multi-vector engagement , supported by diverse partnerships, legal caution, and defense diplomacy. The Indonesia–Russia relationship, while shaped by historical affinity and capability needs, is also constrained by evolving international norms and sanction regimes. What emerges is a pattern of selective cooperation , where Jakarta leverages its autonomy to sustain defense diversification while maneuvering carefully through the risks of external backlash. 4. Methodology This study employs a qualitative research design , anchored in the analysis of policy documents, strategic white papers, and legal frameworks, to examine the Indonesia–Russia defense relationship within the broader context of Indonesia’s national defense policy. A qualitative approach is particularly well-suited for this research because it allows for an interpretive and contextual exploration of how policy, strategy, and geopolitical realities interact. In contrast to quantitative approaches that focus on numerical data, qualitative analysis here aims to uncover intentions, motivations, and constraints that shape Indonesia's defense diplomacy as a strategic hedging mechanism. The focus of this study is not only what Indonesia does , but why and how it does so , given its unique historical legacy of non-alignment, current defense modernization goals, and the evolving regional security landscape. Following the tradition of interpretivist policy research, the goal is to uncover patterns, meanings, and political rationales behind Indonesia’s defense engagement with Russia, rather than test a hypothesis through statistical modeling ( 20 ). 4.1 Data Sources Primary Sources The core of this research is built upon a detailed review of Indonesia’s official defense policy documents , which provide insights into the country’s formal strategic posture and capability priorities. These include: Doktrin Pertahanan Negara (National Defense Doctrine) , the foundational document outlining the philosophical and operational principles of Indonesia’s defense orientation ( 21 ). Renstra Kemhan 2020–2024 (Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defense) , a five-year strategic guideline detailing procurement plans, capability targets, and partnership strategies ( 22 ). Minimum Essential Force (MEF) Doctrine – Indonesia’s phased force development strategy, defining minimum credible defense capacities by 2024 ( 23 ). These texts are analyzed both independently and in relation to each other to trace the coherence and evolution of Indonesia’s strategic hedging posture. Secondary Sources To provide a comparative and analytical context, the study integrates insights from secondary sources , such as: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database , to track arms procurement patterns and identify diversification trends. CSIS Indonesia and CSIS Washington Reports for expert commentary on policy formulation and regional dynamics. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance , to assess Indonesia’s defense capabilities relative to regional actors. Academic literature published in peer-reviewed journals such as Asian Security , The Pacific Review , and Contemporary Southeast Asia . These sources help position Indonesia’s bilateral engagement with Russia within a broader framework of defense modernization and geopolitical balancing. Legal and Regulatory References Given the centrality of CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) in shaping contemporary arms diplomacy, this study also includes a review of: CAATSA legislation and case-specific enforcement statements by the U.S. Department of State ( 24 ). International procurement and export control frameworks , including ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and WTO-compliant procurement principles ( 25 ). These legal references are crucial for understanding the constraints and diplomatic maneuvering required for states like Indonesia to sustain defense partnerships with Russia without triggering punitive measures. 4.2 Analytical Framework The analysis employs a triangulation framework methodology that integrates multiple sources and perspectives to enhance validity and robustness. In this case, the triangulation involves: Indonesia’s Defense Policy Objectives , as defined in MEF, Renstra, and defense doctrine. Foreign Policy Imperatives , including non-alignment, ASEAN centrality, and strategic autonomy. Geopolitical Constraints , such as CAATSA sanctions, power rivalry pressures, and institutional limitations. This tripartite analytical model allows the study to map how Indonesia’s engagement with Russia is situated at the intersection of strategic ambition and external risk. It captures the layered complexity of hedging behavior , where states simultaneously seek capacity enhancement, risk avoidance, and diplomatic signaling. This approach also facilitates comparative analysis by allowing reference to other case studies (e.g., India and Vietnam) that face similar dilemmas in navigating ties with Russia amid U.S.-led sanctions regimes. By situating Indonesia’s choices within this wider comparative field, the study contributes to theory-building around defense diplomacy and strategic hedging in non-aligned states. To analyze the strategic logic behind Indonesia’s defense policy choices, this study employs a triangulated framework. The framework integrates three key dimensions, defense objectives, foreign policy imperatives, and geopolitical constraints, each represented through formal policy or legal instruments. Table 1 Triangulated Policy Framework Component Policy Instrument Source Document Strategic Function Defense Goals MEF Phase III Renstra Kemhan Capability modernization Foreign Policy Imperatives ASEAN centrality, non-alignment Foreign Policy White Paper Regional diplomacy, autonomy Geopolitical Constraints CAATSA compliance, U.S. diplomacy Legal and diplomatic notes Risk mitigation, strategic balance Source : Gindarsah (2015); Rittberger et al. (2019); Rosyidin (2017) This framework provides a structured lens for interpreting Indonesia’s behavior not as reactive but as guided by coherent principles. It also allows comparative insights across other case studies with similar external pressures. The strategic logic of Indonesia’s defense policy can be captured through a tripartite framework combining defense goals, diplomatic imperatives, and geopolitical constraints. The following bar chart reflects their weighted influence. This visualization reinforces the study’s argument that Indonesia’s hedging behavior is not ad hoc, but structured anchored in defense modernization, foreign policy continuity, and international legal navigation. 5. Findings The empirical analysis of Indonesia–Russia military cooperation reveals a carefully calibrated strategy shaped by Indonesia’s defense modernization priorities , strategic hedging imperatives, and legal-institutional constraints. While bilateral military ties between Jakarta and Moscow are longstanding, recent trends suggest a nuanced recalibration, one that aligns defense cooperation with Indonesia’s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) goals , preserves non-alignment, and tactfully navigates the risks associated with U.S. sanctions under CAATSA. According to the Indonesia Defense White Paper ( 26 ), partnerships with non-traditional arms suppliers are encouraged to support the diversification and sustainability of Indonesia’s defense posture. In a 2020 public statement, the Indonesian Defense Minister emphasized the need for “strategic flexibility” in external partnerships amid changing global alignments ( 27 ). Russia’s strategic blueprint, the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” ( 28 ), explicitly mentions strengthening ties with Southeast Asian countries to counterbalance Western influence in Asia. This section elaborates on key patterns emerging from document analysis and policy tracking, categorized under four key domains: cooperation modalities, policy alignment, strategic hedging patterns, and institutional boundaries. 5.1 Case Analysis: Modalities of Indonesia–Russia Military Cooperation Indonesia’s defense cooperation with Russia is multi-faceted and includes arms purchases, joint military exercises, and nascent efforts in technology transfer. Arms Purchases One of the most prominent symbols of the Indonesia–Russia defense partnership has been Indonesia’s acquisition of Russian-made weapons platforms. Beginning with the purchase of Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets in the early 2000s, Indonesia continued to deepen its procurement ties through the planned acquisition of 11 Su-35 jets , although the deal was ultimately delayed and likely canceled under the shadow of CAATSA ( 29 ). Nonetheless, Russia remains the fourth-largest arms supplier to Indonesia , following the U.S., China, and South Korea ( 30 ). Indonesia has procured Mi-35P helicopters, BMP-3F amphibious vehicles , and AK-101 rifles , emphasizing a diversification strategy in sourcing key military platforms ( 2 ). Notably, Indonesian officials often frame these acquisitions as technical and capability-focused , thereby avoiding the optics of ideological alignment. Joint Exercises and Training Beyond procurement, Indonesia and Russia have engaged in military training programs and officer exchanges . Exercises such as Komodo and bilateral naval visits have allowed for limited tactical cooperation, although these remain largely symbolic compared to Indonesia’s more extensive engagements with the U.S. and Australia ( 14 ). Russia’s presence in these engagements reflects its interest in projecting influence in Southeast Asia while enabling Indonesia to balance military relationships . These interactions also help develop human capital and knowledge transfer in areas such as aircraft maintenance, engineering, and military logistics. Technology Transfer Potentials A more recent dimension involves technology transfer , particularly in naval systems and aircraft maintenance. While Russia has signaled willingness to localize some production under offset agreements , implementation has been limited by financing challenges and policy inertia in Indonesia’s defense industrial base ( 16 ). Nevertheless, Russia’s openness to joint development resonates with Indonesia’s long-term goal of strategic autonomy through domestic capacity-building, a key objective under the MEF Phase III framework. To understand the evolution of Indonesia–Russia defense cooperation, it is essential to trace the key events and milestones that have shaped the relationship over the past two decades. These engagements, while varied in scope, have remained consistent in reflecting Indonesia's strategy of capacity-building without formal alignment. Table 2 Timeline of Indonesia–Russia Defense Cooperation (2003–2024) Year Event / Agreement Type of Engagement Remarks 2003 Su-27/Su-30 procurement Arms acquisition First major Russian aircraft deal 2007 Defense MoU signed Strategic dialogue Institutionalizing cooperation 2013 Joint naval exercises (Makassar) Military exercise Limited scope, symbolic value 2015 BMP-3F amphibious vehicles delivery Arms acquisition Enhancing maritime defense 2018 Su-35 deals announced Procurement plan Later postponed due to CAATSA 2020 Helicopter maintenance cooperation Technical exchange Ongoing logistics cooperation 2024 Projected MEF Phase III closure Capability milestone Targeted completion of MEF goals Source : SIPRI (2025); AP NEWS (2025); Gindarsah (2016) As shown above, the cooperation has spanned procurement, joint exercises, and logistical collaboration. Despite fluctuations due to geopolitical tensions, the timeline illustrates a persistent pattern of engagement that aligns closely with Indonesia’s MEF goals and broader strategic doctrine. To better visualize the trajectory of Indonesia–Russia defense relations, a chronological chart is presented to illustrate key milestones and procurement trends between 2003 and 2024. The timeline shows that despite fluctuations in procurement momentum; Indonesia has consistently engaged Russia at critical junctures to support its defense modernization and diversify its partnerships. 5.2 Defense Policy Alignment: Supporting Indonesia’s Strategic Goals Indonesia’s cooperation with Russia is not ad hoc but rooted in clearly defined defense policy priorities. Supporting MEF Phase III The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) initiative, now in its third and final phase (2020–2024), is the cornerstone of Indonesia’s military modernization strategy. Its goals include achieving a minimum credible defense posture through modernization, interoperability, and readiness. Russia’s defense exports contribute directly to MEF targets by filling critical capability gaps, particularly in air superiority and mechanized ground forces ( 31 ). Russian platforms have proven effective in maritime patrols and amphibious support missions, two vital areas given Indonesia’s vast archipelagic geography. Strategic Autonomy and Deterrence Importantly, Indonesia’s decision to maintain defense ties with Russia serves a dual function: enhancing strategic deterrence and reinforcing autonomy in foreign policy . By diversifying defense suppliers, Indonesia reduces vulnerability to political pressure from any one power and enhances bargaining capacity in broader geopolitical negotiations ( 5 ). This supports the vision outlined in Indonesia’s Defense White Paper (2015) , which emphasizes the dual-track strategy of capacity-building and sovereignty protection. 5.3 Hedging Pattern: Balancing East and West Indonesia’s strategic behavior illustrates the core logic of hedging , characterized by simultaneous engagement with competing powers. Engaging Russia and the West Concurrently Indonesia has maintained parallel defense dialogues with both Russia and the West. While deepening cooperation with Russia , it has also participated in U.S.-led joint exercises (e.g., Garuda Shield ), conducted strategic dialogues with France and South Korea , and engaged with China in limited confidence-building measures. This multi-vector engagement reflects a deliberate attempt to avoid overdependence while maximizing gains from multiple partners ( 6 ). Such a balancing act is not a product of indecision but a calculated policy response to regional volatility. As Gindarsah (2016) explains, Indonesia’s hedging enables it to “build capacity without signaling alignment,” a practice that aligns with ASEAN’s emphasis on strategic equidistance . Navigating CAATSA through Framing and Timing The CAATSA legislation has presented a regulatory dilemma for Indonesia, as it risks being penalized for acquiring Russian military equipment. To mitigate this, Indonesian policymakers have employed several tactics: Framing purchases as legacy or technical acquisitions , not new strategic alignments Delaying major procurement decisions to await U.S. waivers or alternative suppliers Diversifying procurement portfolios to include non-sanctioned platforms from France, Turkey, and South Korea These tactics underscore Jakarta’s diplomatic skill in risk mitigation , ensuring that strategic hedging does not lead to punitive consequences from major powers ( 32 ). 5.4 Institutional Boundaries: Legal and Normative Constraints Indonesia’s defense diplomacy is shaped not only by policy ambitions but also by constitutional and institutional safeguards that limit entanglement. No Foreign Military Bases Allowed Article 11 of Indonesia’s Constitution and subsequent defense regulations prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases on national territory. This provision ensures that any military cooperation, whether with Russia, the U.S., or China, remains non-permanent and strictly operational ( 33 ). This legal boundary reinforces Indonesia’s credibility as a non-aligned actor , even as it deepens engagements across ideological lines. It also prevents the erosion of sovereignty, a concern deeply rooted in Indonesia’s post-colonial identity. Limited Alignment Under Doctrinal Safeguards Beyond legal codes, Indonesia’s Defense Doctrine (Doktrin Pertahanan Negara) stipulates a posture of active defense and strategic independence , rejecting participation in military alliances. These doctrinal principles function as normative constraints , ensuring that defense partnerships remain focused on capacity-building and strategic diversification , not alignment. Thus, the Indonesia–Russia relationship is designed to operate within a legally bounded space , where military cooperation must serve national objectives without infringing upon autonomy. This internal framing is essential for managing both domestic political expectations and external diplomatic perceptions ( 14 ). 6. Discussion Indonesia's defense engagement with Russia, as unpacked in the preceding analysis, is emblematic of a broader strategy of strategic diversification , a hallmark of its hedging approach. This section discusses the policy advantages, inherent challenges, and strategic implications of Indonesia’s maneuvering. It also considers how policy design and institutional framing allow Jakarta to mitigate risks, while drawing parallels with India and Vietnam , two other regional powers with comparable geopolitical postures. As a middle power, Indonesia’s approach to strategic hedging through defense diplomacy differs from that of India and Vietnam. While India adopts a more assertive balancing act with both Russia and the West, and Vietnam focuses on deterrence vis-à-vis China, Indonesia tends to frame its cooperation as a means to enhance autonomy while avoiding formal alignments. This distinct posture reflects Indonesia’s traditional non-alignment orientation within ASEAN, and its commitment to regional stability. From a regional perspective, Indonesia’s engagement with Russia does not appear to challenge ASEAN solidarity but rather signals a nuanced form of autonomy that complements existing multilateral commitments. Instead of raising concerns, it may in fact demonstrate that middle powers in the region can diversify partnerships without undermining collective interests. 6.1 Advantages of Strategic Diversification Indonesia’s multi-pronged defense diplomacy exemplifies the logic of strategic diversification , wherein states engage multiple partners to avoid entrapment and maximize autonomy. In the Indo-Pacific context, defined by growing Sino-American rivalry, such diversification is not merely tactical but existentially strategic . Reducing Dependency on Any One Bloc By diversifying its sources of defense cooperation, ranging from the U.S. and Russia to South Korea, France, and Turkey, Indonesia reduces its vulnerability to political leverage from any single power. As Kingsbury (2023) observes, this enables Jakarta to access advanced military technologies while maintaining political independence, consistent with its bebas aktif (free and active) foreign policy doctrine. The MEF (Minimum Essential Force) program, for instance, reflects a procurement portfolio designed to avoid overreliance on NATO-standard systems. Instead, Indonesia has sought to blend Western and non-Western platforms in its air and naval capabilities, thus ensuring redundancy, resilience, and bargaining power ( 30 ). Building Diplomatic Leverage Diversification also enhances Indonesia’s diplomatic leverage . Engaging with Russia allows Jakarta to signal to the West that it has alternatives, thereby improving its negotiating position. Conversely, its deepening cooperation with the U.S. and allies reassures Western partners that Indonesia is not shifting alignments. This delicate equilibrium enables Indonesia to remain a pivotal regional actor without compromising its non-alignment identity ( 6 ). Such flexibility has practical benefits: Indonesia has been able to sustain high-level dialogues with all major powers , maintain its leadership within ASEAN, and influence multilateral platforms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+). Indonesia’s defense diversification strategy becomes clearer when examining its broader portfolio of international defense partnerships. The table below outlines current engagements with major powers, highlighting the nature of each partnership and the associated risks or sensitivities. Table 3 Indonesia’s Defense Partnership Portfolio (2020–2024) Country Type of Cooperation Platform / Focus Alignment Sensitivity Russia Procurement, logistics Aircraft, ground systems High (due to CAATSA) United States Exercises, training Interoperability, C4ISR Moderate South Korea Joint development KF-21 fighter Low France Naval assets Submarines Low China Dialogue, occasional exercises Maritime safety Sensitive, limited trust Source : SIPRI (2025); Kingsbury (2023); Laksmana (2015) The breadth of Indonesia’s defense engagements reinforces its hedging doctrine. By pursuing multi-vector partnerships across ideological lines, Jakarta reduces dependency while enhancing leverage and strategic depth. Indonesia’s defense portfolio is characterized by a range of bilateral relationships, each carrying distinct levels of alignment sensitivity. The radar chart below maps these sensitivities to highlight Jakarta’s balancing act. The chart reveals that while Russia and China are perceived as higher-risk in geopolitical terms, Indonesia mitigates these risks through stronger engagement with lower-sensitivity partners like South Korea and France. 6.2 Challenges and Risks Despite its advantages, Indonesia’s hedging strategy carries real strategic and reputational risks , particularly in a world where middle powers are increasingly pressured to pick sides. Potential Backlash from U.S. Partners Indonesia’s defense engagement with Russia places it in legal jeopardy under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) . Although no sanctions have been imposed to date, the mere risk has delayed or canceled procurement projects , including the previously planned Su-35 fighter deal ( 35 ). This exposes Jakarta to the reputational cost of unpredictable procurement cycles , which can weaken investor confidence in its domestic defense industry and complicate relations with Western defense partners. Moreover, the optics of continued engagement with Russia, particularly after its invasion of Ukraine, have heightened sensitivity among Western allies . Even if framed as technical or legacy cooperation, such ties can be viewed as normatively inconsistent , especially by U.S. Congress or European defense lobbies (Rittberger et al., 2020). Risk of Misperception as Tilting Toward Russia Indonesia’s hedging behavior also risks misinterpretation , especially in an international climate where binary perceptions dominate. Defense cooperation with Russia, even if limited, may be read by external observers as evidence of strategic pivoting or ideological sympathy. This perception risks undermining Indonesia’s credibility as a neutral and stabilizing force in ASEAN. Misinterpretation may also affect Indonesia’s role in regional initiatives . For example, overemphasis on non-Western partnerships might erode Jakarta’s leadership in ASEAN-centered frameworks that seek to balance Chinese influence with Western engagement ( 36 ). 6.3 Policy Solutions: Framing and Institutional Structuring Indonesia has responded to these risks not by disengaging, but by refining how it frames and structures its defense diplomacy. Framing as Capacity-Building Indonesian policymakers frequently stress that their engagement with Russia is centered on technical modernization and capability enhancement , not alliance-building or ideological affinity. The narrative consistently presents these engagements as non-aligned, interest-driven , and short-term operational cooperation , often wrapped in broader frameworks of joint training or logistical support ( 37 ). This framing is more than rhetorical, it has been institutionalized in official statements, procurement announcements, and parliamentary briefings. Such clarity has helped Indonesia reduce political costs and manage expectations both at home and abroad. Legal Structuring under National Interest Doctrine Indonesia has further buffered itself through legal and doctrinal safeguards . The Doktrin Pertahanan Negara and related legislation prohibit foreign military bases , mandate non-alignment , and require parliamentary oversight for major procurement decisions. These legal structures serve dual functions: they reinforce domestic legitimacy and signal to external actors that defense cooperation is always subordinated to national interest and constitutional mandates. This legal framing has been essential in explaining Indonesia’s decisions regarding CAATSA, allowing Jakarta to delay, defer, or cancel arms deals without appearing to capitulate politically. 6.4 Comparative Insights: India and Vietnam as Hedging Case Studies Indonesia’s defense hedging is not unique; India and Vietnam present instructive parallels in how non-aligned states balance strategic autonomy with great power engagements. India: Institutionalized Strategic Hedging India has long maintained robust defense ties with Russia, purchasing everything from tanks to air-defense systems. Yet, it has also deepened its defense and intelligence relationships with the United States through the Quad and bilateral agreements such as COMCASA and BECA ( 12 ). Despite being threatened under CAATSA for its S-400 missile purchase , India leveraged its strategic significance to U.S. Indo-Pacific policy to obtain a waiver, demonstrating how geopolitical value can shield a country’s hedging behavior. Like Indonesia, India has emphasized its non-aligned heritage and presented procurement decisions as sovereign prerogatives rooted in defense needs . Vietnam: Quiet Diversification and Caution Vietnam’s model offers another parallel. Traditionally reliant on Russian arms, Vietnam has gradually diversified its defense suppliers, engaging Israel, Japan, and the U.S. While doing so, it has retained its ideological independence and avoided formal alignment . Ma & Kang (2023) notes that Vietnam’s defense policy reflects “tactical bandwagoning” without commitment , a strategy that combines deterrence against China with diplomatic engagements that avoid provoking Beijing. Like Indonesia, Vietnam has emphasized capacity-building, regional stability , and legal-military caution. Both India and Vietnam demonstrate that hedging is sustainable , even under intense geopolitical pressure, provided that states are able to institutionalize ambiguity , sustain diverse partnerships, and communicate their intent clearly. To better contextualize Indonesia’s hedging behavior, it is useful to compare its strategic choices with other regional powers that also rely on Russian defense systems while maintaining ties with Western partners. India and Vietnam present instructive cases in managing great power relations without compromising national autonomy. Table 4 Comparative Hedging Strategies — Indonesia, India, and Vietnam Country Key Supplier (Russia) Western Engagements CAATSA Exposure Hedging Strategy Indonesia Su-27, BMP-3F, Mi-35 U.S., France, S. Korea Moderate Legal framing, delayed procurement India S-400, T-90, BrahMos Quad, U.S. logistics pacts High Strategic value invoked for waiver Vietnam Submarines, Sukhois Japan, Israel, U.S. Low Quiet diversification, no public balancing Source : Bajpai et al. (2022); Wu & Velasco (2024); and Gindarsah (2015) This comparison reveals that Indonesia’s cautious, legally structured engagement with Russia is neither unique nor misaligned. Like India and Vietnam, Jakarta leverages ambiguity and institutional safeguards to maintain flexibility in an increasingly bipolar world. To place Indonesia’s hedging strategy in comparative perspective, the following chart contrasts key indicators of dependency, engagement, and risk exposure among Indonesia, India, and Vietnam. The comparison illustrates that Indonesia maintains a middle-ground posture, less exposed than India but more assertive than Vietnam, balancing engagement while minimizing strategic liabilities. 7. Conclusion Indonesia’s military cooperation with Russia, though at times politically sensitive, is not an anomaly, but rather a reflection of the country’s enduring strategic culture and evolving defense priorities. Rooted in a long-standing commitment to non-alignment, sovereign autonomy , and regional stability , Indonesia’s foreign and defense policy has consistently favored multi-vector engagement over rigid alignment. Within this framework, defense diplomacy with Russia offers more than procurement advantages, it serves as a platform for capacity-building , technological exploration, and strategic signaling in a shifting global order. This study has shown that such engagement is fully consistent with the objectives outlined in Indonesia’s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) strategy, Doktrin Pertahanan Negara , and Renstra Kemhan 2020, 2024 . Far from undermining neutrality, Indonesia’s diversified defense relationships enhance its ability to hedge, allowing it to cooperate broadly while preserving autonomy. Through calibrated diplomacy, legal prudence, and doctrinal safeguards, Indonesia demonstrates how middle powers can assert their interests without falling into the binary traps of great power rivalry. To sustain and improve this posture, several practical policy recommendations are warranted: Maintain balance through multilateral defense engagements . Strengthening military ties across a wide range of partners, NATO and non-NATO alike, helps Indonesia avoid over-dependence and reinforces its commitment to ASEAN centrality and regional balance. Use legal and diplomatic tools to reduce exposure to sanctions such as CAATSA . By carefully structuring arms agreements, delaying certain procurements, or framing partnerships in capacity-building terms, Indonesia can preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding punitive consequences. Institutionalize hedging as a long-term strategic doctrine . Rather than treating hedging as an ad hoc response to global tensions, Indonesia should codify it within its defense and foreign policy planning, ensuring continuity and clarity across administrations and military leadership. In a world increasingly polarized by power competition, Indonesia’s defense diplomacy offers a model of strategic restraint, autonomy, and adaptability . Its partnership with Russia, when framed within national interest and executed through deliberate policy mechanisms, enhances, rather than threatens, the country’s sovereignty and its role as a stabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific. Declarations Funding: The authors declare that no funds, grants, or other support were received during the preparation of this manuscript. Competing Interests: The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. Author Contributions: The author (Aris Sarjito) solely conceived, designed, and conducted the research. Material preparation, data collection, analysis, and writing were performed by Aris Sarjito. The author approved the final manuscript. Ethics approval: Not applicable. Consent to participate: Not applicable. Consent to publish: Not applicable. Clinical trial registration: This research does not involve clinical trials. References Nolde L. Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State, by John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson. Bijdr Taal Land Volkenkd [Internet]. 2018;174(1):81–3. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17401004 Gindarsah I. Strategic hedging in Indonesia’s defense diplomacy. 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RENCANA STRATEGIS KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN DAN TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA TAHUN 2020-2024. 2021 [cited 2025 Apr 18]; Available from: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id Permenhan-Nomor-19-Tahun-2012. KEBIJAKAN PENYELARASAN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE KOMPONEN UTAMA. 2012 [cited 2025 Apr 18]; Available from: https://www.kemhan.go.id/ppid/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Permenhan-Nomor-19-Tahun-2012-Lampiran-1.pdf U.S. Dept. of State. Implementing CAATSA Section 231 Diplomacy [Internet]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State; 2018. Available from: https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/implementing-caatsa-section-231-diplomacy/ Rittberger V, Zangl B, Kruck A, Dijkstra H. International Organization [Internet]. London: Bloomsbury Publishing; 2019 [cited 2025 Apr 18]. 1–286 p. Available from: https://books.google.co.id/books?id=H_tGEAAAQBAJ Kementerian Pertahanan RI. Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia [Internet]. Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia; 2015. Available from: https://peraturan.go.id Kementerian Pertahanan RI. Pertemuan Pertama Tingkat Menteri Luar Negeri dan Menteri Pertahanan (2+2) RI–RRT, Tingkatkan Kerja Sama Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership [Internet]. Kementerian Pertahanan RI; 2025. Available from: https://www.kemhan.go.id/2025/04/21/pertemuan-pertama-tingkat-menteri-luar-negeri-dan-menteri-pertahanan-22-ri-rrt-tingkatkan-kerja-sama-comprehensive-and-strategic-partnership.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation [Internet]. Moscow: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 2023. Available from: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/ AP NEWS. Russia and Indonesia hold talks to strengthen ties on defense and security. AP News [Internet]. 2025; Available from: https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-russia-sergei-shoigu-gafrie-sjamssoeddin-e6d49218197600b2a02dc5247ebf002f SIPRI. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database [Internet]. SIPRI; 2025. Available from: https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers Crane Keith, Oliker Olga, Nichiporuk Brian. Trends in Russia’s armed forces : an overview of budgets and capabilities [Internet]. RAND Corporation; 2019 [cited 2025 Apr 17]. 80 p. Available from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2573/RAND_RR2573.pdf Indonesia Defense. Mengenal CAATSA, Strategi AS Cegah Pembelian Alutsista dari Rusia. Indonesia Defense Magazine [Internet]. 2023 Jun 18; Available from: https://indonesiadefense.com/mengenal-caatsa-strategi-as-cegah-pembelian-alutsista-dari-rusia/ MKRI. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA PREAMBLE [Internet]. 2019 May [cited 2025 Apr 18]. Available from: https://en.mkri.id/download/constitution/constitution_1_1625426222_4c1e13f466840d7ed721.pdf Kingsbury D. Hatta and Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy: retrospect and prospect. South East Asia Res [Internet]. 2023;31(2):210–2. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/0967828X.2023.2224613 Sebastian LC, Marzuki K. Let sleeping bears lie: an analysis of the factors behind Indonesia’s response to the Russo–Ukrainian war and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region. International Politics [Internet]. 2024;61(5):975–1001. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00478-0 Agastia IGBD. Understanding Indonesia’s role in the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’: A role theory approach. Asia Pac Policy Stud. 2020 Sep 1;7(3):293–305. Wardhani B, Dharmaputra R. Indonesia’s ambivalence in the Russia-Ukraine war: Balancing equal sovereignty norms with a familial approach. Contemp Secur Policy [Internet]. 2024;45(4):627–42. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2397926 Ma X, Kang DC. Why Vietnam is not Balancing China: Vietnamese Security Priorities and the Dynamics in Sino-Vietnam Relations. Journal of East Asian Studies [Internet]. 2023/09/04. 2023;23(3):363–86. Available from: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/53F36E3CC4F848E181385E391943D2FB Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6528311","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":457622694,"identity":"5087cb95-a4a8-4f7f-8eb0-cad525e159cd","order_by":0,"name":"Aris Sarjito","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Indonesia Defense University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Aris","middleName":"","lastName":"Sarjito","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-04-25 11:08:15","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":83112358,"identity":"9e3cc111-1fb7-4ce8-993c-07fad05fa4e9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-05-20 07:34:29","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":43229,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eStrategic Weight – Triangulated Policy Framework. Developed by the author based on Gindarsah (2021), Rittberger et al. (2020), and Rosyidin (2017).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6528311/v1/5befe56dbe24f5d75eb1ebf4.png"},{"id":83112013,"identity":"7a5886db-327e-450b-bd79-6cb381de4b04","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-05-20 07:26:29","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":24291,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eTimeline of Indonesia–Russia Defense Cooperation (2003-2024). Compiled by the author based on data from SIPRI (2025), AP NEWS (2025), and Gindarsah (2015).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6528311/v1/2502a52530666adbb8b7611e.png"},{"id":83112010,"identity":"3b2c52d1-ddfe-4d1d-84c8-16416ef96dec","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-05-20 07:26:29","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":97145,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eIndonesia’s Defense Partnership Sensitivity. Compiled by the author based on SIPRI (2025), Kingsbury (2023), and Laksmana (2015).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6528311/v1/dd88e1ac4a18839e05debe43.png"},{"id":83112359,"identity":"e4469c89-7773-41b3-939e-89c1a4487249","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-05-20 07:34:29","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":32751,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eComparative Hedging Indicators. Compiled by the author based on Bajpai et al. (2022), Wu \u0026amp; Velasco (2024), and Gindarsah (2015).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6528311/v1/73b363a3f461e9385d444da8.png"},{"id":91498416,"identity":"05964e2c-ad64-42aa-bf02-b4d15aef0080","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-17 06:53:53","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1517071,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6528311/v1/23ef51c1-f9f6-4789-86d3-3adc01c2b76e.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Indonesia–Russia Defense Diplomacy as Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe emergence of a multipolar global order in the post-Cold War era has redefined power alignments and regional strategies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. With the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, middle powers in Southeast Asia are navigating a complex diplomatic landscape where balancing national interests, security partnerships, and sovereignty has become increasingly challenging. Indonesia, as the largest archipelagic state in ASEAN and a self-declared non-aligned actor, stands at the heart of this evolving regional security architecture. The country\u0026apos;s long-standing doctrine of non-alignment, rooted in its constitutional foreign policy principles, continues to shape its strategic behavior, particularly in defense policy (\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs the geopolitical contest intensifies, Indonesia has not aligned itself exclusively with any major power bloc. Instead, it pursues a policy of \u003cem\u003estrategic hedging\u003c/em\u003e, which involves cultivating multiple partnerships while avoiding entanglement in formal alliances (\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). This strategic flexibility enables Jakarta to maximize diplomatic and military benefits from multiple sources, such as the United States, China, Russia, and European partners, without jeopardizing its autonomy. A central component of this strategy is \u003cem\u003edefense diplomacy\u003c/em\u003e, which Indonesia employs to engage diverse partners through military training, joint exercises, procurement agreements, and defense dialogues (\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn recent years, \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense cooperation with Russia\u003c/em\u003e has come under increasing scrutiny, particularly in light of global sanctions frameworks such as the United States\u0026rsquo; \u003cem\u003eCountering America\u0026rsquo;s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act\u003c/em\u003e (CAATSA). Under this legislation, third-party countries acquiring military equipment from sanctioned Russian entities risk being penalized. Yet, despite the geopolitical and legal risks, Indonesia has proceeded with several procurement deals involving Russian platforms such as the Sukhoi Su-35 fighter aircraft and naval systems (\u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e). This decision signals more than just transactional arms acquisition, it reflects a calculated policy maneuver embedded within Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s broader defense policy architecture, notably the \u003cem\u003eMinimum Essential Force (MEF)\u003c/em\u003e roadmap and the \u003cem\u003eRenstra Kemhan 2020\u0026ndash;2024\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research explores how the Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia military partnership contributes to Indonesia\u0026apos;s strategic hedging posture and how it aligns with the country\u0026apos;s national defense objectives. The analysis seeks to situate this bilateral cooperation within the framework of \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026apos;s official defense policy\u003c/em\u003e, examining how it enables the country to diversify its defense capabilities, maintain diplomatic leverage, and resist external pressures such as CAATSA. The study also investigates the \u003cem\u003epolicy-level mechanisms\u003c/em\u003e that Indonesia can utilize to sustain such partnerships without compromising its long-standing commitment to neutrality and ASEAN centrality.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis paper adopts the framework of strategic hedging as articulated by Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008), who identifies hedging as a strategy employed by secondary states to avoid choosing sides amid major power rivalry. Rather than aligning exclusively with one great power, hedging involves cultivating multiple relationships to preserve autonomy, minimizing strategic risks, and maintaining flexibility. This is particularly relevant to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s historical preference for non-alignment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe analysis also draws on key principles from realism and liberal institutionalism. Realism helps explain Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense cooperation with Russia in terms of national interest and security imperatives, while liberal perspectives provide insight into Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s ongoing participation in regional multilateral frameworks. Together, these perspectives offer a comprehensive basis for understanding Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s nuanced strategic posture.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere are three central research questions guiding this study:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003cem\u003eHow does Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense cooperation reflect Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s national defense priorities?\u003c/em\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;This question seeks to explore how military engagement with Russia aligns with Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s MEF goals, technological modernization agenda, and strategic posture as outlined in core policy documents.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e2.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003eIn what way is this partnership a component of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s strategic hedging?\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe aim is to unpack how Indonesia\u0026apos;s multidirectional defense diplomacy serves as a risk management tool amid growing strategic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e3.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003eHow can Indonesia balance cooperation with Russia while managing legal and diplomatic constraints, especially under CAATSA?\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis question focuses on the institutional and diplomatic tactics that can be employed to navigate external pressures without derailing bilateral defense goals.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy answering these questions, this paper seeks to contribute to scholarly and policy debates on how non-aligned states like Indonesia craft pragmatic defense policies that avoid binary alignments. It emphasizes the nuanced nature of defense diplomacy as both a reflection of and a tool for strategic hedging, particularly in a volatile and sanction-prone global environment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe findings aim to enhance our understanding of Southeast Asian strategic autonomy in the 21st century and provide insights for other regional actors facing similar geopolitical dilemmas. In doing so, this research bridges theoretical debates on hedging and non-alignment with practical implications for contemporary defense policy.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Theoretical Framework","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the increasingly fluid and fragmented security architecture of the Indo-Pacific, the concepts of \u003cem\u003estrategic hedging, defense diplomacy\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003emiddle power behavior\u003c/em\u003e have emerged as central analytical tools for understanding the foreign and defense policies of Southeast Asian states. These interlocking frameworks offer a nuanced explanation for how countries like Indonesia navigate the growing pressures of major power competition without aligning exclusively with any geopolitical camp. This section elaborates on the theoretical pillars underpinning this study: \u003cem\u003estrategic hedging, defense diplomacy as statecraft, and middle power autonomy\u003c/em\u003e, with an emphasis on the contributions of theorists such as \u003cem\u003eKuik Cheng-Chwee\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eEvelyn Goh\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Strategic Hedging: Between Alignment and Autonomy\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic hedging refers to the deliberate effort of states to \u003cem\u003eavoid binary choices\u003c/em\u003e in the international system by simultaneously pursuing policies of cooperation, deterrence, and risk mitigation. Unlike traditional balancing or bandwagoning, hedging involves maintaining relationships with multiple great powers while \u003cem\u003einvesting in national capabilities and regional multilateralism\u003c/em\u003e to preserve autonomy (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e). The concept is particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific, where the rise of China and the reassertion of U.S. influence have created what Kuik terms a \"pressure cooker\" for secondary states (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, strategic hedging is a practical response to the \u003cem\u003easymmetric dependencies\u003c/em\u003e created by economic globalization and military modernization. As Goh (2020) explains, hedging strategies manifest through a \"portfolio of ties\", engagements that range from economic cooperation to defense partnerships, carefully calibrated to \u003cem\u003eavoid triggering antagonistic responses\u003c/em\u003e from major powers. Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s approach to engaging both Russia and Western allies in defense cooperation fits squarely within this definition. While cooperating with the United States and participating in multilateral defense forums like the ADMM-Plus, Jakarta has also sought defense ties with Russia, South Korea, France, and China.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImportantly, strategic hedging is not a passive policy born of indecision. On the contrary, it represents a \u003cem\u003ecalculated, risk-aware diplomacy\u003c/em\u003e, rooted in the structural realities of power politics and the normative commitment to non-alignment. Hedging allows Indonesia to preserve policy space in a contested region while avoiding full dependency on any singular power (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e). It is also consistent with the strategic culture of Indonesia, which emphasizes self-reliance (\u003cem\u003ekemandirian\u003c/em\u003e), sovereignty (\u003cem\u003ekedaulatan\u003c/em\u003e), and multilateralism.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Defense Diplomacy: Military Cooperation as Foreign Policy Instrument\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eDefense diplomacy\u003c/em\u003e, a term that gained prominence in the post\u0026ndash;Cold War literature, refers to the peaceful application of military resources and relationships to advance a state\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eforeign policy and strategic interests.\u003c/em\u003e According to Cottey (2004), defense diplomacy includes a wide range of activities, from military visits and training to joint exercises and arms cooperation, that aim to build trust, manage conflict, and increase political influence without coercion.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the context of Indonesia, defense diplomacy has increasingly become a \u003cem\u003epillar of foreign policy execution\u003c/em\u003e, especially under the \u003cem\u003eMinimum Essential Force (MEF)\u003c/em\u003e doctrine, which prioritizes strategic partnerships for capability development. As Dorign\u0026eacute;-Thomson (2023) asserts, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diplomacy is \u0026ldquo;an extension of its hedging behavior, enabling the state to diversify partnerships and avoid overdependence on any one supplier.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe bilateral relationship with Russia is illustrative of this strategy. Through military procurement (e.g., the Sukhoi fighter jet program), technological transfer negotiations, and joint military training, Indonesia leverages its defense ties with Russia to \u003cem\u003ereduce reliance on U.S. and NATO-standard systems\u003c/em\u003e, thereby reinforcing its strategic autonomy. This form of military diplomacy also signals Jakarta's intent to retain maneuverability in foreign policy without shifting into formal alliance structures (10).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 Middle Power Behavior: Indonesia as an Autonomous Regional Actor\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s behavior in the Indo-Pacific is also best understood through the lens of \u003cem\u003emiddle power theory\u003c/em\u003e, which explores how states with limited global influence, but significant regional weight seeks to shape international outcomes through coalition-building, norm entrepreneurship, and multilateral activism. According to (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e), middle powers often operate as \u003cem\u003esystem stabilizers\u003c/em\u003e, attempting to preserve regional order while enhancing their own diplomatic standing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia has consistently portrayed itself as a \u003cem\u003enormative middle power\u003c/em\u003e, emphasizing ASEAN centrality, promoting regional code-of-conduct mechanisms, and advancing initiatives like the \u003cem\u003eASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)\u003c/em\u003e. These actions reflect what Goh (2020) calls \u0026ldquo;strategic discretion,\u0026rdquo; whereby middle powers pursue \u003cem\u003eagenda-setting\u003c/em\u003e without antagonizing the major powers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn its defense policy, Indonesia exhibits the hallmarks of middle power behavior by resisting security alignment while building capacity through diverse engagements. Its ability to interact with both China and the U.S., while also maintaining military ties with Russia, underscores its \u003cem\u003emultivector strategy\u003c/em\u003e rooted in middle power identity. Defense diplomacy with Russia, therefore, is not an act of ideological alignment but rather an \u003cem\u003einstrument of capacity enhancement and signaling\u003c/em\u003e within the logic of middle power positioning (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4 Strategic Autonomy in Practice\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe convergence of these three theoretical dimensions, hedging, defense diplomacy, and middle power behavior, coalesces in the concept of \u003cem\u003estrategic autonomy\u003c/em\u003e, a principle central to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s national defense strategy. As articulated in the \u003cem\u003eRenstra Kemhan\u003c/em\u003e and the MEF doctrine, Indonesia seeks to develop a modern and independent defense capability that allows it to respond flexibly to regional threats and global uncertainty.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic autonomy does not imply isolationism or neutrality in the traditional sense. Rather, it involves \u003cem\u003eactive engagement with multiple partners\u003c/em\u003e, while ensuring that domestic decision-making is not unduly influenced by external actors. This principle is particularly salient when dealing with potential constraints like \u003cem\u003eCAATSA\u003c/em\u003e sanctions. Indonesia's approach to mitigating these risks, such as by legal framing, procurement diversification, and timing adjustments, illustrates a mature application of strategic autonomy in a contested strategic environment (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Literature Review","content":"\u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s approach to international defense relations cannot be understood without first revisiting the country\u0026rsquo;s enduring commitment to \u003cem\u003enon-alignment\u003c/em\u003e, a principle that has deeply influenced its strategic culture and defense policy. From its foundational role in the \u003cem\u003e1955 Bandung Conference\u003c/em\u003e to its continued leadership within the \u003cem\u003eNon-Aligned Movement (NAM)\u003c/em\u003e, Indonesia has consistently articulated a vision of international relations that rejects formal military alliances and champions sovereign autonomy (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e). While the country has engaged with both Western and non-Western military powers over time, its constitutional commitment to an \u0026ldquo;independent and active\u0026rdquo; foreign policy (\u003cem\u003epolitik luar negeri bebas aktif\u003c/em\u003e) has constrained the extent of alignment with any bloc, an identity further embedded in its defense documents such as the \u003cem\u003eDoktrin Pertahanan Negara\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eScholars such as Evelyn Goh (2020) and Kuik (2020) have highlighted how non-aligned states, especially in Southeast Asia, practice strategic ambiguity as a way to secure benefits from competing powers without entrenching themselves in ideological loyalties. Indonesia's history of resisting Cold War bloc politics, while still acquiring military equipment from both the Soviet Union and the United States, serves as a historical precedent for its current policy of \u003cem\u003estrategic hedging\u003c/em\u003e. This positioning is neither na\u0026iuml;ve neutrality nor passive balancing; rather, it reflects an intentional effort to secure space for sovereign policymaking in a contested region.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003epost-Reformasi era\u003c/em\u003e, Indonesia has pursued a policy of \u003cem\u003edefense diversification\u003c/em\u003e, expanding its military relations with a range of actors. Its \u003cem\u003epartnership with the United States\u003c/em\u003e remains robust, particularly in the areas of training, counterterrorism, and interoperability. Initiatives such as the \u003cem\u003eUS\u0026ndash;Indonesia Defense Framework Agreement (2021)\u003c/em\u003e and regular bilateral exercises like \u003cem\u003eGaruda Shield\u003c/em\u003e signify deepening defense engagement (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e). At the same time, \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026ndash;China military exchanges\u003c/em\u003e have increased modestly, driven by growing economic interdependence and China\u0026rsquo;s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Still, these ties are marked by caution and lack the depth of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s partnerships with other powers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eSouth Korea and France\u003c/em\u003e have emerged as important non-traditional partners in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense modernization program. South Korea\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eDefense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA)\u003c/em\u003e collaborated on the development of the \u003cem\u003eKF-21 Boramae\u003c/em\u003e fighter jet, with Indonesia as a co-developer, a rare case of joint high-tech defense production in the region (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, France\u0026rsquo;s Naval Group has been involved in submarine development, reflecting Jakarta\u0026rsquo;s desire to develop domestic defense industries and reduce external dependency (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAmid these multilateral ties, \u003cem\u003eRussia remains a unique and longstanding partner\u003c/em\u003e. Dating back to the Sukarno era, Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense relations have persisted across political regimes, with Moscow supplying platforms like the Sukhoi Su-27/30/35, Mi-35 helicopters, and BMP-3F amphibious vehicles (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e). This cooperation is often framed in terms of \u003cem\u003estrategic balancing\u003c/em\u003e, offering Indonesia an alternative source of military capability outside the Western sphere of influence. Russia\u0026rsquo;s model of \u003cem\u003edefense diplomacy\u003c/em\u003e, particularly in Southeast Asia, emphasizes arms sales, training exchanges, and strategic signaling. As Storey (2021) note, Moscow\u0026rsquo;s military engagements in the region aim to build influence in a manner that bypasses the alliance structures of the West, appealing to countries like Indonesia that are keen to maintain strategic autonomy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eYet, the continuation of this cooperation has not been without obstacles. Since the passage of the \u003cem\u003eCountering America\u0026rsquo;s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)\u003c/em\u003e in 2017, states that procure weapons from Russia risk being subjected to \u003cem\u003esecondary sanctions by the United States\u003c/em\u003e. For Indonesia, which had planned the acquisition of 11 Su-35 fighter jets, CAATSA introduced a legal and diplomatic dilemma. The deal was ultimately shelved, reportedly due in part to these pressures (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e). This case illustrates the \u003cem\u003eexternal legal constraints\u003c/em\u003e that now condition Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging behavior, forcing Jakarta to re-evaluate the scope and structure of its military procurement strategies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite these constraints, academic literature suggests that Indonesia continues to \u003cem\u003ehedge through structured ambiguity\u003c/em\u003e, combining short-term postponements with long-term diversification (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e). For example, Jakarta maintains backchannel dialogues with Russian defense representatives and explores dual-use technologies that might fall outside the direct purview of CAATSA. Scholars such as Wu \u0026amp; Velasco (2024) have observed similar dynamics in other Southeast Asian states, where hedging is increasingly shaped not only by power asymmetry but by \u003cem\u003eregulatory and legal regimes\u003c/em\u003e imposed by external actors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWithin the growing corpus of work on \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s strategic culture\u003c/em\u003e, several scholars emphasize the consistency between Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s legal framework, foreign policy orientation, and defense planning. According to Goh (2020), Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s commitment to constitutional safeguards, such as the prohibition on foreign military bases and alliance treaties, ensures that its defense cooperation will always be embedded within a framework of \u003cem\u003enon-permanence and national interest\u003c/em\u003e. These limits allow Jakarta to \u003cem\u003eengage without entanglement\u003c/em\u003e, providing a durable foundation for hedging as a long-term strategy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the literature highlights how Indonesia frames its defense engagement in ways that avoid perceptional shifts in alignment. For instance, arms deal with Russia are often presented as \u003cem\u003etechnical cooperation\u003c/em\u003e rather than strategic partnerships. Training exchanges are kept low-profile, and agreements are embedded within broader multilateral exercises to avoid the appearance of bilateralism (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, the literature provides a coherent understanding of how Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s historical non-alignment has evolved into \u003cem\u003ea contemporary strategy of multi-vector engagement\u003c/em\u003e, supported by diverse partnerships, legal caution, and defense diplomacy. The Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia relationship, while shaped by historical affinity and capability needs, is also constrained by evolving international norms and sanction regimes. What emerges is a pattern of \u003cem\u003eselective cooperation\u003c/em\u003e, where Jakarta leverages its autonomy to sustain defense diversification while maneuvering carefully through the risks of external backlash.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study employs a \u003cem\u003equalitative research design\u003c/em\u003e, anchored in the analysis of policy documents, strategic white papers, and legal frameworks, to examine the Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense relationship within the broader context of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s national defense policy. A qualitative approach is particularly well-suited for this research because it allows for an interpretive and contextual exploration of how policy, strategy, and geopolitical realities interact. In contrast to quantitative approaches that focus on numerical data, qualitative analysis here aims to uncover \u003cem\u003eintentions, motivations, and constraints\u003c/em\u003e that shape Indonesia's defense diplomacy as a strategic hedging mechanism.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe focus of this study is \u003cem\u003enot only what Indonesia does\u003c/em\u003e, but \u003cem\u003ewhy and how it does so\u003c/em\u003e, given its unique historical legacy of non-alignment, current defense modernization goals, and the evolving regional security landscape. Following the tradition of interpretivist policy research, the goal is to uncover patterns, meanings, and political rationales behind Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense engagement with Russia, rather than test a hypothesis through statistical modeling (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 Data Sources\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePrimary Sources\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe core of this research is built upon a detailed review of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eofficial defense policy documents\u003c/em\u003e, which provide insights into the country\u0026rsquo;s formal strategic posture and capability priorities. These include:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eDoktrin Pertahanan Negara (National Defense Doctrine)\u003c/em\u003e, the foundational document outlining the philosophical and operational principles of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense orientation (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eRenstra Kemhan 2020\u0026ndash;2024 (Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defense)\u003c/em\u003e, a five-year strategic guideline detailing procurement plans, capability targets, and partnership strategies (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eMinimum Essential Force (MEF)\u003c/em\u003e Doctrine \u0026ndash; Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s phased force development strategy, defining minimum credible defense capacities by 2024 (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese texts are analyzed both independently and in relation to each other to trace the coherence and evolution of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s strategic hedging posture.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSecondary Sources\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo provide a comparative and analytical context, the study integrates insights from \u003cem\u003esecondary sources\u003c/em\u003e, such as:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eSIPRI Arms Transfer Database\u003c/em\u003e, to track arms procurement patterns and identify diversification trends.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eCSIS Indonesia and CSIS Washington Reports\u003c/em\u003e for expert commentary on policy formulation and regional dynamics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eThe International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance\u003c/em\u003e, to assess Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense capabilities relative to regional actors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eAcademic literature\u003c/em\u003e published in peer-reviewed journals such as \u003cem\u003eAsian Security\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eThe Pacific Review\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eContemporary Southeast Asia\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese sources help position Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s bilateral engagement with Russia within a broader framework of defense modernization and geopolitical balancing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eLegal and Regulatory References\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGiven the centrality of \u003cem\u003eCAATSA (Countering America\u0026rsquo;s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)\u003c/em\u003e in shaping contemporary arms diplomacy, this study also includes a review of:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eCAATSA legislation and case-specific enforcement statements\u003c/em\u003e by the U.S. Department of State (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eInternational procurement and export control frameworks\u003c/em\u003e, including ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and WTO-compliant procurement principles (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese legal references are crucial for understanding the constraints and diplomatic maneuvering required for states like Indonesia to sustain defense partnerships with Russia without triggering punitive measures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Analytical Framework\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analysis employs a \u003cem\u003etriangulation framework\u003c/em\u003e methodology that integrates multiple sources and perspectives to enhance validity and robustness. In this case, the triangulation involves:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s Defense Policy Objectives\u003c/em\u003e, as defined in MEF, Renstra, and defense doctrine.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eForeign Policy Imperatives\u003c/em\u003e, including non-alignment, ASEAN centrality, and strategic autonomy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eGeopolitical Constraints\u003c/em\u003e, such as CAATSA sanctions, power rivalry pressures, and institutional limitations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis tripartite analytical model allows the study to map how Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s engagement with Russia is \u003cem\u003esituated at the intersection\u003c/em\u003e of strategic ambition and external risk. It captures the \u003cem\u003elayered complexity of hedging behavior\u003c/em\u003e, where states simultaneously seek capacity enhancement, risk avoidance, and diplomatic signaling.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis approach also facilitates \u003cem\u003ecomparative analysis\u003c/em\u003e by allowing reference to other case studies (e.g., India and Vietnam) that face similar dilemmas in navigating ties with Russia amid U.S.-led sanctions regimes. By situating Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s choices within this wider comparative field, the study contributes to theory-building around \u003cem\u003edefense diplomacy and strategic hedging\u003c/em\u003e in non-aligned states.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo analyze the strategic logic behind Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense policy choices, this study employs a triangulated framework. The framework integrates three key dimensions, defense objectives, foreign policy imperatives, and geopolitical constraints, each represented through formal policy or legal instruments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTriangulated Policy Framework\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eComponent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicy Instrument\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSource Document\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic Function\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefense Goals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMEF Phase III\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRenstra Kemhan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapability modernization\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign Policy Imperatives\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eASEAN centrality, non-alignment\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign Policy White Paper\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegional diplomacy, autonomy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeopolitical Constraints\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCAATSA compliance, U.S. diplomacy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal and diplomatic notes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk mitigation, strategic balance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eSource\u003c/b\u003e: Gindarsah (2015); Rittberger et al. (2019); Rosyidin (2017)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis framework provides a structured lens for interpreting Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s behavior not as reactive but as guided by coherent principles. It also allows comparative insights across other case studies with similar external pressures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe strategic logic of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense policy can be captured through a tripartite framework combining defense goals, diplomatic imperatives, and geopolitical constraints. The following bar chart reflects their weighted influence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis visualization reinforces the study\u0026rsquo;s argument that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging behavior is not ad hoc, but structured anchored in defense modernization, foreign policy continuity, and international legal navigation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Findings","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe empirical analysis of Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia military cooperation reveals a carefully calibrated strategy shaped by \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense modernization priorities\u003c/em\u003e, strategic hedging imperatives, and legal-institutional constraints. While bilateral military ties between Jakarta and Moscow are longstanding, recent trends suggest a nuanced recalibration, one that aligns defense cooperation with \u003cem\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) goals\u003c/em\u003e, preserves non-alignment, and tactfully navigates the risks associated with U.S. sanctions under CAATSA. According to the Indonesia Defense White Paper (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e), partnerships with non-traditional arms suppliers are encouraged to support the diversification and sustainability of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense posture.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn a 2020 public statement, the Indonesian Defense Minister emphasized the need for \u0026ldquo;strategic flexibility\u0026rdquo; in external partnerships amid changing global alignments (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e). Russia\u0026rsquo;s strategic blueprint, the \u0026ldquo;Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation\u0026rdquo; (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e), explicitly mentions strengthening ties with Southeast Asian countries to counterbalance Western influence in Asia.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis section elaborates on key patterns emerging from document analysis and policy tracking, categorized under four key domains: cooperation modalities, policy alignment, strategic hedging patterns, and institutional boundaries.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.1 Case Analysis: Modalities of Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia Military Cooperation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense cooperation with Russia is multi-faceted and includes arms purchases, joint military exercises, and nascent efforts in technology transfer.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eArms Purchases\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne of the most prominent symbols of the Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense partnership has been Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s acquisition of Russian-made weapons platforms. Beginning with the purchase of \u003cem\u003eSukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets\u003c/em\u003e in the early 2000s, Indonesia continued to deepen its procurement ties through the planned acquisition of \u003cem\u003e11 Su-35 jets\u003c/em\u003e, although the deal was ultimately delayed and likely canceled under the shadow of \u003cem\u003eCAATSA\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNonetheless, \u003cem\u003eRussia remains the fourth-largest arms supplier to Indonesia\u003c/em\u003e, following the U.S., China, and South Korea (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e). Indonesia has procured \u003cem\u003eMi-35P helicopters, BMP-3F amphibious vehicles\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eAK-101 rifles\u003c/em\u003e, emphasizing a diversification strategy in sourcing key military platforms (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). Notably, Indonesian officials often frame these acquisitions as \u003cem\u003etechnical and capability-focused\u003c/em\u003e, thereby avoiding the optics of ideological alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eJoint Exercises and Training\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond procurement, Indonesia and Russia have engaged in \u003cem\u003emilitary training programs and officer exchanges\u003c/em\u003e. Exercises such as \u003cem\u003eKomodo\u003c/em\u003e and bilateral naval visits have allowed for limited tactical cooperation, although these remain largely symbolic compared to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s more extensive engagements with the U.S. and Australia (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRussia\u0026rsquo;s presence in these engagements reflects its interest in projecting influence in Southeast Asia while enabling Indonesia to \u003cem\u003ebalance military relationships\u003c/em\u003e. These interactions also help develop human capital and knowledge transfer in areas such as \u003cem\u003eaircraft maintenance, engineering, and military logistics.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eTechnology Transfer Potentials\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA more recent dimension involves \u003cem\u003etechnology transfer\u003c/em\u003e, particularly in naval systems and aircraft maintenance. While Russia has signaled willingness to localize some production under \u003cem\u003eoffset agreements\u003c/em\u003e, implementation has been limited by financing challenges and policy inertia in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense industrial base (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, Russia\u0026rsquo;s openness to joint development resonates with Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s long-term goal of \u003cem\u003estrategic autonomy\u003c/em\u003e through domestic capacity-building, a key objective under the \u003cem\u003eMEF Phase III\u003c/em\u003e framework.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo understand the evolution of Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense cooperation, it is essential to trace the key events and milestones that have shaped the relationship over the past two decades. These engagements, while varied in scope, have remained consistent in reflecting Indonesia's strategy of capacity-building without formal alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTimeline of Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia Defense Cooperation (2003\u0026ndash;2024)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvent / Agreement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eType of Engagement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRemarks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2003\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSu-27/Su-30 procurement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eArms acquisition\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst major Russian aircraft deal\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2007\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefense MoU signed\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic dialogue\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutionalizing cooperation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2013\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eJoint naval exercises (Makassar)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMilitary exercise\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimited scope, symbolic value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2015\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBMP-3F amphibious vehicles delivery\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eArms acquisition\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnhancing maritime defense\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2018\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSu-35 deals announced\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProcurement plan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLater postponed due to CAATSA\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2020\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHelicopter maintenance cooperation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTechnical exchange\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOngoing logistics cooperation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2024\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProjected MEF Phase III closure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapability milestone\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTargeted completion of MEF goals\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eSource\u003c/b\u003e: SIPRI (2025); AP NEWS (2025); Gindarsah (2016)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs shown above, the cooperation has spanned procurement, joint exercises, and logistical collaboration. Despite fluctuations due to geopolitical tensions, the timeline illustrates a persistent pattern of engagement that aligns closely with Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s MEF goals and broader strategic doctrine.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo better visualize the trajectory of Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia defense relations, a chronological chart is presented to illustrate key milestones and procurement trends between 2003 and 2024.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe timeline shows that despite fluctuations in procurement momentum; Indonesia has consistently engaged Russia at critical junctures to support its defense modernization and diversify its partnerships.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.2 Defense Policy Alignment: Supporting Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s Strategic Goals\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s cooperation with Russia is not ad hoc but rooted in clearly defined \u003cem\u003edefense policy priorities.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSupporting MEF Phase III\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eMinimum Essential Force (MEF)\u003c/em\u003e initiative, now in its third and final phase (2020\u0026ndash;2024), is the cornerstone of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s military modernization strategy. Its goals include achieving a minimum credible defense posture through modernization, interoperability, and readiness.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRussia\u0026rsquo;s defense exports contribute directly to \u003cem\u003eMEF targets\u003c/em\u003e by filling critical capability gaps, particularly in \u003cem\u003eair superiority and mechanized ground forces\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e). Russian platforms have proven effective in maritime patrols and amphibious support missions, two vital areas given Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s vast archipelagic geography.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eStrategic Autonomy and Deterrence\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImportantly, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s decision to maintain defense ties with Russia serves a dual function: enhancing \u003cem\u003estrategic deterrence\u003c/em\u003e and reinforcing \u003cem\u003eautonomy in foreign policy\u003c/em\u003e. By diversifying defense suppliers, Indonesia reduces vulnerability to political pressure from any one power and enhances bargaining capacity in broader geopolitical negotiations (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e). This supports the vision outlined in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eDefense White Paper (2015)\u003c/em\u003e, which emphasizes the dual-track strategy of \u003cem\u003ecapacity-building and sovereignty protection.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.3 Hedging Pattern: Balancing East and West\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s strategic behavior illustrates the \u003cem\u003ecore logic of hedging\u003c/em\u003e, characterized by simultaneous engagement with competing powers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eEngaging Russia and the West Concurrently\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia has maintained parallel defense dialogues with both Russia and the West. While deepening cooperation with \u003cem\u003eRussia\u003c/em\u003e, it has also participated in \u003cem\u003eU.S.-led joint exercises\u003c/em\u003e (e.g., \u003cem\u003eGaruda Shield\u003c/em\u003e), conducted strategic dialogues with \u003cem\u003eFrance and South Korea\u003c/em\u003e, and engaged with \u003cem\u003eChina\u003c/em\u003e in limited confidence-building measures. This \u003cem\u003emulti-vector engagement\u003c/em\u003e reflects a deliberate attempt to \u003cem\u003eavoid overdependence\u003c/em\u003e while maximizing gains from multiple partners (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuch a balancing act is not a product of indecision but a calculated policy response to regional volatility. As Gindarsah (2016) explains, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging enables it to \u0026ldquo;build capacity without signaling alignment,\u0026rdquo; a practice that aligns with ASEAN\u0026rsquo;s emphasis on \u003cem\u003estrategic equidistance\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eNavigating CAATSA through Framing and Timing\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe CAATSA legislation has presented a \u003cem\u003eregulatory dilemma\u003c/em\u003e for Indonesia, as it risks being penalized for acquiring Russian military equipment. To mitigate this, Indonesian policymakers have employed several tactics:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eFraming purchases as legacy or technical acquisitions\u003c/em\u003e, not new strategic alignments\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eDelaying major procurement decisions\u003c/em\u003e to await U.S. waivers or alternative suppliers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eDiversifying procurement portfolios\u003c/em\u003e to include non-sanctioned platforms from France, Turkey, and South Korea\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese tactics underscore Jakarta\u0026rsquo;s diplomatic skill in \u003cem\u003erisk mitigation\u003c/em\u003e, ensuring that strategic hedging does not lead to punitive consequences from major powers (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.4 Institutional Boundaries: Legal and Normative Constraints\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diplomacy is shaped not only by policy ambitions but also by \u003cem\u003econstitutional and institutional safeguards\u003c/em\u003e that limit entanglement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eNo Foreign Military Bases Allowed\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArticle 11 of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s Constitution and subsequent defense regulations prohibit the establishment of \u003cem\u003eforeign military bases\u003c/em\u003e on national territory. This provision ensures that any military cooperation, whether with Russia, the U.S., or China, remains \u003cem\u003enon-permanent and strictly operational\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis legal boundary reinforces Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s credibility as a \u003cem\u003enon-aligned actor\u003c/em\u003e, even as it deepens engagements across ideological lines. It also prevents the erosion of sovereignty, a concern deeply rooted in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-colonial identity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eLimited Alignment Under Doctrinal Safeguards\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond legal codes, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eDefense Doctrine (Doktrin Pertahanan Negara)\u003c/em\u003e stipulates a posture of \u003cem\u003eactive defense\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003estrategic independence\u003c/em\u003e, rejecting participation in military alliances. These doctrinal principles function as \u003cem\u003enormative constraints\u003c/em\u003e, ensuring that defense partnerships remain focused on \u003cem\u003ecapacity-building\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003estrategic diversification\u003c/em\u003e, not alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, the Indonesia\u0026ndash;Russia relationship is designed to operate within \u003cem\u003ea legally bounded space\u003c/em\u003e, where military cooperation must serve national objectives without infringing upon autonomy. This internal framing is essential for managing both \u003cem\u003edomestic political expectations\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eexternal diplomatic perceptions\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eIndonesia's defense engagement with Russia, as unpacked in the preceding analysis, is emblematic of a broader strategy of \u003cem\u003estrategic diversification\u003c/em\u003e, a hallmark of its hedging approach. This section discusses the policy advantages, inherent challenges, and strategic implications of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s maneuvering. It also considers how policy design and institutional framing allow Jakarta to mitigate risks, while drawing parallels with \u003cem\u003eIndia and Vietnam\u003c/em\u003e, two other regional powers with comparable geopolitical postures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs a middle power, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s approach to strategic hedging through defense diplomacy differs from that of India and Vietnam. While India adopts a more assertive balancing act with both Russia and the West, and Vietnam focuses on deterrence vis-\u0026agrave;-vis China, Indonesia tends to frame its cooperation as a means to enhance autonomy while avoiding formal alignments. This distinct posture reflects Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s traditional non-alignment orientation within ASEAN, and its commitment to regional stability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a regional perspective, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s engagement with Russia does not appear to challenge ASEAN solidarity but rather signals a nuanced form of autonomy that complements existing multilateral commitments. Instead of raising concerns, it may in fact demonstrate that middle powers in the region can diversify partnerships without undermining collective interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.1 Advantages of Strategic Diversification\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s multi-pronged defense diplomacy exemplifies the logic of \u003cem\u003estrategic diversification\u003c/em\u003e, wherein states engage multiple partners to avoid entrapment and maximize autonomy. In the Indo-Pacific context, defined by growing Sino-American rivalry, such diversification is not merely tactical but \u003cem\u003eexistentially strategic\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eReducing Dependency on Any One Bloc\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy diversifying its sources of defense cooperation, ranging from the U.S. and Russia to South Korea, France, and Turkey, Indonesia reduces its \u003cem\u003evulnerability to political leverage\u003c/em\u003e from any single power. As Kingsbury (2023) observes, this enables Jakarta to access advanced military technologies while maintaining political independence, consistent with its \u003cem\u003ebebas aktif\u003c/em\u003e (free and active) foreign policy doctrine.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe MEF (Minimum Essential Force) program, for instance, reflects a procurement portfolio designed to avoid overreliance on NATO-standard systems. Instead, Indonesia has sought to blend Western and non-Western platforms in its air and naval capabilities, thus \u003cem\u003eensuring redundancy, resilience, and bargaining power\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eBuilding Diplomatic Leverage\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiversification also enhances Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003ediplomatic leverage\u003c/em\u003e. Engaging with Russia allows Jakarta to signal to the West that it has alternatives, thereby improving its negotiating position. Conversely, its deepening cooperation with the U.S. and allies reassures Western partners that Indonesia is not shifting alignments. This \u003cem\u003edelicate equilibrium\u003c/em\u003e enables Indonesia to remain a pivotal regional actor without compromising its \u003cem\u003enon-alignment identity\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuch flexibility has practical benefits: Indonesia has been able to \u003cem\u003esustain high-level dialogues with all major powers\u003c/em\u003e, maintain its leadership within ASEAN, and influence multilateral platforms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers\u0026rsquo; Meeting-Plus (ADMM+).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diversification strategy becomes clearer when examining its broader portfolio of international defense partnerships. The table below outlines current engagements with major powers, highlighting the nature of each partnership and the associated risks or sensitivities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s Defense Partnership Portfolio (2020\u0026ndash;2024)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eType of Cooperation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlatform / Focus\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlignment Sensitivity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRussia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProcurement, logistics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAircraft, ground systems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh (due to CAATSA)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited States\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExercises, training\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteroperability, C4ISR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModerate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSouth Korea\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eJoint development\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKF-21 fighter\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNaval assets\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubmarines\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eChina\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDialogue, occasional exercises\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime safety\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSensitive, limited trust\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eSource\u003c/b\u003e: SIPRI (2025); Kingsbury (2023); Laksmana (2015)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe breadth of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense engagements reinforces its hedging doctrine. By pursuing multi-vector partnerships across ideological lines, Jakarta reduces dependency while enhancing leverage and strategic depth.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense portfolio is characterized by a range of bilateral relationships, each carrying distinct levels of alignment sensitivity. The radar chart below maps these sensitivities to highlight Jakarta\u0026rsquo;s balancing act.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe chart reveals that while Russia and China are perceived as higher-risk in geopolitical terms, Indonesia mitigates these risks through stronger engagement with lower-sensitivity partners like South Korea and France.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.2 Challenges and Risks\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite its advantages, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging strategy carries real \u003cem\u003estrategic and reputational risks\u003c/em\u003e, particularly in a world where middle powers are increasingly pressured to pick sides.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePotential Backlash from U.S. Partners\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense engagement with Russia places it in \u003cem\u003elegal jeopardy\u003c/em\u003e under the \u003cem\u003eCountering America\u0026rsquo;s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)\u003c/em\u003e. Although no sanctions have been imposed to date, the mere risk has \u003cem\u003edelayed or canceled procurement projects\u003c/em\u003e, including the previously planned Su-35 fighter deal (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e). This exposes Jakarta to the reputational cost of \u003cem\u003eunpredictable procurement cycles\u003c/em\u003e, which can weaken investor confidence in its domestic defense industry and complicate relations with Western defense partners.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, the optics of continued engagement with Russia, particularly after its invasion of Ukraine, have heightened \u003cem\u003esensitivity among Western allies\u003c/em\u003e. Even if framed as technical or legacy cooperation, such ties can be viewed as \u003cem\u003enormatively inconsistent\u003c/em\u003e, especially by U.S. Congress or European defense lobbies (Rittberger et al., 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eRisk of Misperception as Tilting Toward Russia\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging behavior also risks \u003cem\u003emisinterpretation\u003c/em\u003e, especially in an international climate where binary perceptions dominate. Defense cooperation with Russia, even if limited, may be read by external observers as evidence of \u003cem\u003estrategic pivoting\u003c/em\u003e or ideological sympathy. This perception risks undermining Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s credibility as a \u003cem\u003eneutral and stabilizing force\u003c/em\u003e in ASEAN.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisinterpretation may also \u003cem\u003eaffect Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s role in regional initiatives\u003c/em\u003e. For example, overemphasis on non-Western partnerships might erode Jakarta\u0026rsquo;s leadership in ASEAN-centered frameworks that seek to balance Chinese influence with Western engagement (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.3 Policy Solutions: Framing and Institutional Structuring\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia has responded to these risks not by disengaging, but by refining how it \u003cem\u003eframes and structures its defense diplomacy.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eFraming as Capacity-Building\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesian policymakers frequently stress that their engagement with Russia is centered on \u003cem\u003etechnical modernization and capability enhancement\u003c/em\u003e, not alliance-building or ideological affinity. The narrative consistently presents these engagements as \u003cem\u003enon-aligned, interest-driven\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eshort-term operational cooperation\u003c/em\u003e, often wrapped in broader frameworks of joint training or logistical support (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis framing is more than rhetorical, it has been \u003cem\u003einstitutionalized\u003c/em\u003e in official statements, procurement announcements, and parliamentary briefings. Such clarity has helped Indonesia reduce political costs and \u003cem\u003emanage expectations\u003c/em\u003e both at home and abroad.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eLegal Structuring under National Interest Doctrine\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia has further buffered itself through \u003cem\u003elegal and doctrinal safeguards\u003c/em\u003e. The \u003cem\u003eDoktrin Pertahanan Negara\u003c/em\u003e and related legislation prohibit \u003cem\u003eforeign military bases\u003c/em\u003e, mandate \u003cem\u003enon-alignment\u003c/em\u003e, and require \u003cem\u003eparliamentary oversight\u003c/em\u003e for major procurement decisions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese legal structures serve dual functions: they \u003cem\u003ereinforce domestic legitimacy\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003esignal to external actors\u003c/em\u003e that defense cooperation is always subordinated to \u003cem\u003enational interest\u003c/em\u003e and constitutional mandates. This legal framing has been essential in explaining Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s decisions regarding CAATSA, allowing Jakarta to delay, defer, or cancel arms deals without appearing to capitulate politically.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.4 Comparative Insights: India and Vietnam as Hedging Case Studies\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense hedging is not unique; \u003cem\u003eIndia and Vietnam\u003c/em\u003e present instructive parallels in how non-aligned states balance strategic autonomy with great power engagements.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eIndia: Institutionalized Strategic Hedging\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia has long maintained robust defense ties with Russia, purchasing everything from tanks to air-defense systems. Yet, it has also deepened its defense and intelligence relationships with the United States through the Quad and bilateral agreements such as \u003cem\u003eCOMCASA\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eBECA\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite being threatened under CAATSA for its \u003cem\u003eS-400 missile purchase\u003c/em\u003e, India leveraged its \u003cem\u003estrategic significance to U.S. Indo-Pacific policy\u003c/em\u003e to obtain a waiver, demonstrating how geopolitical value can shield a country\u0026rsquo;s hedging behavior. Like Indonesia, India has emphasized its \u003cem\u003enon-aligned heritage\u003c/em\u003e and presented procurement decisions as \u003cem\u003esovereign prerogatives rooted in defense needs\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eVietnam: Quiet Diversification and Caution\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVietnam\u0026rsquo;s model offers another parallel. Traditionally reliant on Russian arms, Vietnam has gradually diversified its defense suppliers, engaging Israel, Japan, and the U.S. While doing so, it has retained its \u003cem\u003eideological independence\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eavoided formal alignment\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMa \u0026amp; Kang (2023) notes that Vietnam\u0026rsquo;s defense policy reflects \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;tactical bandwagoning\u0026rdquo; without commitment\u003c/em\u003e, a strategy that combines deterrence against China with diplomatic engagements that avoid provoking Beijing. Like Indonesia, Vietnam has emphasized \u003cem\u003ecapacity-building, regional stability\u003c/em\u003e, and legal-military caution.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoth India and Vietnam demonstrate that \u003cem\u003ehedging is sustainable\u003c/em\u003e, even under intense geopolitical pressure, provided that states are able to \u003cem\u003einstitutionalize ambiguity\u003c/em\u003e, sustain diverse partnerships, and communicate their intent clearly.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo better contextualize Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging behavior, it is useful to compare its strategic choices with other regional powers that also rely on Russian defense systems while maintaining ties with Western partners. India and Vietnam present instructive cases in managing great power relations without compromising national autonomy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Hedging Strategies \u0026mdash; Indonesia, India, and Vietnam\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKey Supplier (Russia)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWestern Engagements\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCAATSA Exposure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHedging Strategy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSu-27, BMP-3F, Mi-35\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eU.S., France, S. Korea\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModerate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal framing, delayed procurement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS-400, T-90, BrahMos\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuad, U.S. logistics pacts\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic value invoked for waiver\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVietnam\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubmarines, Sukhois\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eJapan, Israel, U.S.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuiet diversification, no public balancing\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eSource\u003c/b\u003e: Bajpai et al. (2022); Wu \u0026amp; Velasco (2024); and Gindarsah (2015)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis comparison reveals that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s cautious, legally structured engagement with Russia is neither unique nor misaligned. Like India and Vietnam, Jakarta leverages ambiguity and institutional safeguards to maintain flexibility in an increasingly bipolar world.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo place Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hedging strategy in comparative perspective, the following chart contrasts key indicators of dependency, engagement, and risk exposure among Indonesia, India, and Vietnam.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe comparison illustrates that Indonesia maintains a middle-ground posture, less exposed than India but more assertive than Vietnam, balancing engagement while minimizing strategic liabilities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"7. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eIndonesia\u0026rsquo;s military cooperation with Russia, though at times politically sensitive, is not an anomaly, but rather a reflection of the country\u0026rsquo;s enduring strategic culture and evolving defense priorities. Rooted in a long-standing commitment to \u003cem\u003enon-alignment, sovereign autonomy\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eregional stability\u003c/em\u003e, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s foreign and defense policy has consistently favored \u003cem\u003emulti-vector engagement\u003c/em\u003e over rigid alignment. Within this framework, defense diplomacy with Russia offers more than procurement advantages, it serves as a platform for \u003cem\u003ecapacity-building\u003c/em\u003e, technological exploration, and \u003cem\u003estrategic signaling\u003c/em\u003e in a shifting global order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study has shown that such engagement is \u003cem\u003efully consistent\u003c/em\u003e with the objectives outlined in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eMinimum Essential Force (MEF)\u003c/em\u003e strategy, \u003cem\u003eDoktrin Pertahanan Negara\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eRenstra Kemhan 2020, 2024\u003c/em\u003e. Far from undermining neutrality, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s diversified defense relationships enhance its ability to hedge, allowing it to cooperate broadly while preserving autonomy. Through calibrated diplomacy, legal prudence, and doctrinal safeguards, Indonesia demonstrates how middle powers can assert their interests \u003cem\u003ewithout falling into the binary traps\u003c/em\u003e of great power rivalry.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo sustain and improve this posture, several \u003cem\u003epractical policy recommendations\u003c/em\u003e are warranted:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eMaintain balance through multilateral defense engagements\u003c/em\u003e. Strengthening military ties across a wide range of partners, NATO and non-NATO alike, helps Indonesia avoid over-dependence and reinforces its commitment to ASEAN centrality and regional balance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eUse legal and diplomatic tools to reduce exposure to sanctions such as CAATSA\u003c/em\u003e. By carefully structuring arms agreements, delaying certain procurements, or framing partnerships in capacity-building terms, Indonesia can preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding punitive consequences.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eInstitutionalize hedging as a long-term strategic doctrine\u003c/em\u003e. Rather than treating hedging as an ad hoc response to global tensions, Indonesia should codify it within its defense and foreign policy planning, ensuring continuity and clarity across administrations and military leadership.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn a world increasingly polarized by power competition, Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diplomacy offers a model of \u003cem\u003estrategic restraint, autonomy, and adaptability\u003c/em\u003e. Its partnership with Russia, when framed within national interest and executed through deliberate policy mechanisms, enhances, rather than threatens, the country\u0026rsquo;s sovereignty and its role as a stabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eFunding:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that no funds, grants, or other support were received during the preparation of this manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCompeting Interests:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAuthor Contributions: \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe author (Aris Sarjito) solely conceived, designed, and conducted the research. Material preparation, data collection, analysis, and writing were performed by Aris Sarjito. The author approved the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthics approval: Not applicable. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConsent to participate: Not applicable. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConsent to publish: Not applicable. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClinical trial registration: This research does not involve clinical trials. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNolde L. Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State, by John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson. Bijdr Taal Land Volkenkd [Internet]. 2018;174(1):81\u0026ndash;3. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17401004\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGindarsah I. Strategic hedging in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diplomacy. Defense \u0026amp; Security Analysis [Internet]. 2016;32(4):336\u0026ndash;53. 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Available from: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/53F36E3CC4F848E181385E391943D2FB\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Defense Diplomacy, Indonesia–Russia Relations, Indo-Pacific Security, Non-Alignment Policy, Strategic Hedging","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study explores Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s defense diplomacy with Russia as a strategic hedging mechanism amid intensifying United States\u0026ndash;China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than pursuing strict alignment, Indonesia seeks to diversify its defense partnerships while upholding non-alignment principles. Drawing from defense white papers, strategic institutional data, and international legal instruments including CAATSA, the research analyzes how military cooperation with Russia, through arms procurement, joint exercises, and potential technology transfer, supports Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) roadmap and enhances strategic autonomy. Specifically, this cooperation bolsters Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s deterrence capability by expanding its arsenal beyond Western suppliers, potentially increasing its leverage in maritime and airspace security operations. It also contributes to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s limited power projection in Southeast Asia by enabling sustained military presence and joint exercises. The study finds that Indonesia tactically frames its defense ties to minimize geopolitical exposure and navigate external legal constraints. Comparative perspectives from India and Vietnam reinforce the findings, revealing regional convergence in legal structuring, diplomatic signaling, and risk-mitigation strategies. This paper contributes to scholarly discourse on middle power diplomacy, strategic hedging, and regional security by highlighting Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s nuanced approach to sustaining adaptive sovereignty within an increasingly polarized Indo-Pacific order.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Indonesia–Russia Defense Diplomacy as Strategic Hedging in the Indo-Pacific","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-05-20 07:26:24","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6528311/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"8a91dc48-892d-4731-a851-93e48c1afa30","owner":[],"postedDate":"May 20th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-09-17T06:53:33+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-05-20 07:26:24","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6528311","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6528311","identity":"rs-6528311","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}