Post-Quantum Cryptography for Military UAV Communication Systems A Comprehensive Framework for Quantum-Resistant Security in MAVLink-Based Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

2025 · doi:10.22541/au.176281850.08964861/v1
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The paper proposes a comprehensive framework for deploying NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography in military MAVLink-based UAV communication systems, focusing on lattice-based schemes such as Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. It provides mathematical security proofs tailored to MAVLink protocol requirements, benchmarks performance on resource-constrained embedded hardware with reported <1% operational overhead, and describes four implementation architectures with working code. A retrofit case study using an MQ-9 Reaper reports zero mission degradation, but the authors explicitly note the work is a preprint and not peer reviewed and that performance/data may be preliminary. This paper does not explicitly discuss endometriosis or adenomyosis; it was included in the corpus via a keyword match in the upstream search index.

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Abstract

The first comprehensive framework for deploying NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography in military UAV systems, bridging the critical gap between theoretical PQC algorithms and practical implementation on resource-constrained drone platforms. We provide rigorous mathematical security proofs for lattice-based schemes (Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+) tailored to MAVLink protocol requirements, extensive performance benchmarking demonstrating <1% operational overhead on embedded military hardware, and four complete implementation architectures with working code. Our NATO-compliant security frameworks integrate STANAG requirements with PQC mandates—addressing a gap in existing civilian-focused literature. We validate our approach through an MQ-9 Reaper retrofit case study achieving zero mission degradation, providing the defense community with an actionable roadmap for transitioning military UAV fleets to quantum resistance before cryptographically-relevant quantum computers emerge (projected 2028-2033).
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Abstract

The first comprehensive framework for deploying NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography in military UAV systems, bridging the critical gap between theoretical PQC algorithms and practical implementation on resource-constrained drone platforms. We provide rigorous mathematical security proofs for lattice-based schemes (Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+) tailored to MAVLink protocol requirements, extensive performance benchmarking demonstrating <1% operational overhead on embedded military hardware, and four complete implementation architectures with working code. Our NATO-compliant security frameworks integrate STANAG requirements with PQC mandates—addressing a gap in existing civilian-focused literature. We validate our approach through an MQ-9 Reaper retrofit case study achieving zero mission degradation, providing the defense community with an actionable roadmap for transitioning military UAV fleets to quantum resistance before cryptographically-relevant quantum computers emerge (projected 2028-2033). Supplementary Material File (post-quantum cryptography for military uav communication systems.pdf) - Download - 1.01 MB Information & Authors Information Version history Copyright This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

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Authors Metrics & Citations Metrics Article Usage 695views 368downloads Citations Download citation Liviu Ionut Epure. Post-Quantum Cryptography for Military UAV Communication Systems A Comprehensive Framework for Quantum-Resistant Security in MAVLink-Based Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Authorea. 10 November 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.22541/au.176281850.08964861/v1 DOI: https://doi.org/10.22541/au.176281850.08964861/v1 If you have the appropriate software installed, you can download article citation data to the citation manager of your choice. Simply select your manager software from the list below and click Download. For more information or tips please see 'Downloading to a citation manager' in the Help menu.

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License: CC-BY-NC-4.0