“The trust is gone”: Smallholder poultry producers’ perceptions of biosecurity measures against highly pathogenic avian influenza

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Andrew, Heidi Tworek, Chelsea Himsworth, Kaylee A. Byers This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8254317/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 09 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in BMC Veterinary Research → Version 1 posted 12 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Background Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has caused recurrent epizootics in wildlife and poultry in North America between 2005 and 2025. B.C. is located within the Canadian portion of the Pacific Americas Flyway, one of several migratory pathways involved in the global transmission of HPAI to western Canada, which also includes the Yukon, Canada’s northwesternmost territory. HPAI affects both commercial and smallholder poultry production, but little is known about smallholder poultry producers in this region. HPAI biosecurity and communications-focused tools remain among the few available for HPAI prevention in smallholder flocks in Canada. Thus, understanding their perceptions of these topics is crucial for HPAI prevention in this population. Methods We used qualitative research methods, including interviews and focus groups, guided by the Health Belief Model (HBM) to explore the perceptions and beliefs of smallholder poultry producers in B.C. and the Yukon, Canada, regarding HPAI and its prevention, especially biosecurity. Results We found that smallholder poultry producers generally understand the benefits of biosecurity and the severity of HPAI, and they display strong self-efficacy in implementing biosecurity measures. However, smallholder producers need to believe that they and their flocks are potentially susceptible to HPAI virus to implement consistent biosecurity measures. Producers appeared more likely to enact biosecurity measures if they felt they were susceptible to HPAI. We identified many barriers to implementing biosecurity measures, especially barriers related to information quality, specificity, and volume. Participants were influenced by various cues to action. Finally, multiple modifying factors exist, including government trust and perceptions of what constitutes healthy poultry. Conclusions The results of this study suggest that smallholder poultry producers require better support in navigating information about HPAI; that governments need to cultivate trust with smallholder producers through their HPAI communications; and that communications focused on smallholder biosecurity need to appeal to smallholder-specific needs and values beyond HPAI prevention alone. Smallholder poultry producers need better, not more, information. To communicate effectively with them, messaging should focus on each aspect of the HBM and be tailored through risk communication strategies that emphasize engagement, trust-building, and multiple benefits of biosecurity for smallholder poultry health. These results may apply to smallholder producer populations in North America and abroad. backyard poultry biosecurity HPAI health belief model risk communication smallholder poultry trust Figures Figure 1 Introduction Avian influenza viruses (AIV) are carried by wild bird reservoirs and certain strains (i.e. highly pathogenic avian influenza virus [HPAIV]) can cause devastating rates of morbidity and mortality when they spillover into domestic poultry, wild birds, non-human mammals, and potentially humans ( 1 – 9 ). Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) caused by an H5Nx HPAIV has caused recurrent epizootics in wildlife and poultry in North America since 2021 ( 1 , 2 , 10 ). As of November 3, 2025, a prolonged epizootic that began in Canada in December 2021 has resulted in the deaths of 17,647,800 poultry, with over 11 million birds affected in the westernmost province of British Columbia (B.C.) alone ( 1 , 10 ). B.C. is located within the Canadian portion of the Pacific Americas Flyway, one of several migratory pathways involved in the global transmission of HPAI to western Canada, which also includes the Yukon, Canada’s northwesternmost territory ( 11 , 12 ). HPAIV affects both commercial and smallholder poultry production, but little is known about smallholder poultry producers across B.C. and the Yukon. At the time of recruitment for this study, the non-commercial (smallholder) poultry case definition for HPAI outbreaks worldwide was applied to any establishment with fewer than 300 birds, and commercial flocks were defined as those that produce poultry for commercial sale under Canada’s supply-managed system ( 1 ). Smallholder poultry ownership has increased in popularity in the United States in recent years, and similar trends are expected in Canada; however, the geographic extent, size, and number of smallholder poultry industries are largely unknown ( 13 – 15 ). Smallholder poultry flocks are considered to be at increased risk of exposure to HPAIV because these producers are thought to be less knowledgeable about HPAI-related risks and less likely to implement preventative measures ( 15 – 18 ). For example, there have been 968 reported HPAI outbreaks in smallholder flocks in the United States (US) between 2022 and 2025, compared to 840 in commercial flocks ( 2 ). As there is no vaccine available for HPAIV in poultry in North America and the disease cannot be eradicated due to the presence of a sylvatic (wildlife) reservoir, biosecurity remains the most critical measure to prevent poultry infections with HPAIV. For this reason, risk communication campaigns with a particular focus on biosecurity have been a priority for animal health agencies seeking to prevent HPAI on smallholder farms. However, these campaigns require knowledge of the target audience itself ( 19 ). Yet very little is known about smallholder producers’ perceptions and beliefs regarding HPAI risk and prevention, including biosecurity measures. A previous qualitative study in B.C. examined smallholder producer perspectives around HPAI control measures and poultry health, and found that smallholder perspectives were frequently misaligned with current HPAI control strategies in Canada, that many utilized production and husbandry practices that may put them at increased risk of HPAI, and that governments had an essential role in keeping smallholder poultry producers informed about HPAI outbreaks and prevention ( 20 ). Smallholder poultry producers sometimes do not consider themselves as part of the wider poultry industry and frequently, their biosecurity measures are variable and incomplete compared to recommendations ( 21 – 23 ). The objective of this study is to begin to explore the perceptions and beliefs held by smallholder poultry producers in B.C. and the Yukon, Canada, regarding HPAI and HPAI prevention, particularly biosecurity. We chose to focus on this jurisdiction as this province and territory are situated within the Pacific Flyway, where the majority of Canadian HPAI outbreaks have occurred ( 1 ). However, the perspectives gleaned from this research may apply to broader smallholder populations in North America and beyond, where demographics, poultry production practices, and HPAI management could be similar. Methods Study design Conceptual framework Behaviour change models, such as the Health Belief Model (HBM), are often used as frameworks to better understand people’s decision-making processes regarding health risk prevention behaviours, such as implementing biosecurity measures ( 24 , 25 ). A conventional HBM includes six model components, also referred to as constructs: perceived benefits and perceived barriers (likelihood of risk reduction or health promotion action), perceived susceptibility and perceived severity (threat perceptions), cues to action , and self-efficacy (Table 1 ) ( 25 ). Some researchers also include modifying factors (demographic and psychosocial) within an HBM, but infrequently evaluate how these modifying factors influence the other constructs (Table 1 ) ( 25 ). Understanding specific characteristics of HBM constructs for a population or health risk of interest can be useful in designing more effective health interventions, risk communication campaigns, and health promotion efforts ( 26 ). For example, one study used the HBM to explore the beliefs of commercial smallholder poultry producers in Bangladesh regarding biosecurity measures and identified several ways to improve the delivery and implementation of biosecurity information within this group ( 27 ). They found that perceived barriers had the strongest influence on smallholder poultry producers’ biosecurity behaviours and highlighted the importance of delivering messages that would be most well-received and understood—considering factors like language and literacy levels—by those responsible for implementation (e.g., rural women) ( 27 ). We qualitatively explored smallholder poultry producers’ attitudes and beliefs around HPAI biosecurity behaviour guided by the HBM (Fig. 1 ). Table 1 Adapted definitions for Health Belief Model constructs. Category Health Belief Model Construct Definition Perceived Threat (1) Perceived Susceptibility Perceived risk of the producer and their flock to HPAI exposure and infection. (2) Perceived Severity The producer’s judgement of the seriousness of HPAI exposure and infection. Beliefs About Behaviour to Counter Threat (3) Perceived Benefits The producer’s evaluation of the positive outcomes of implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI. (4) Perceived Barriers The producer’s evaluation of the costs or difficulty associated with implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI. Self-Efficacy (5) Self-Efficacy Personal belief of one’s own ability to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI. Cues to Action (6) Cues to Action Internal and external prompts that may trigger the producer to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI. Modifying Factors ( 7 ) Demographic factors Producer demographic factors which may influence likelihood of implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI (e.g., gender, age, education status, annual household income, ethnicity, religion, etc.). Psychosocial factors (‘self-identity’) The salient and enduring part of one’s self-perception as it may relate to their willingness to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI. Outcome Likelihood of Action The culmination of all constructs that results in an individual’s likelihood to implement biosecurity (the health promoting behaviour). Participant eligibility, recruitment, and data collection Eligible participants were smallholder poultry producers residing in either B.C. or the Yukon, Canada, who own or seasonally raise up to 300 poultry birds (e.g., chickens, turkeys, ducks, quail) ( 1 ). We used two data collection methods for this study: semi-structured interviews and focus groups ( 29 , 30 ). Participants were recruited to take part in focus group discussions following five B.C. Ministry of Agriculture and Food workshops on HPAI awareness and prevention targeted towards smallholder producers across B.C. These events were conducted in English across five municipalities in B.C. during October and November 2022. Recruitment for interviews took place between September 2022 and December 2024 via agriculture-specific Facebook groups, e-newsletters and listservs, as well as at feed stores, veterinary clinics, and agricultural fairs. The HBM was used to develop a guide for the focus groups and interviews (Appendix 1) ( 27 , 28 ). All data were collected in English. Focus group sessions were recorded and subsequently transcribed using NVivo Transcription (Lumivero). Focus groups with a total of 18 participants were held in five B.C. municipalities: Chilliwack (two participants), Kelowna (five participants), Langley (one participant), Merville (three participants), and Salt Spring Island (seven participants). Sessions lasted approximately 30 to 70 minutes. Transcripts were verified for accuracy and de-identified by CA. Interviews ( n = 19) were conducted in English on Zoom Workplace (v. 6.4.12) between January 6 and 30, 2025. Interviews lasted 25–124 minutes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim using Zoom, and transcripts were verified for accuracy and de-identified by CA. We used a combination of an information power framework and a sample size calculator guided by data saturation theory to determine our target sample size. Information power sample size determination involves interactions between the study aim, specificity, theory, dialogue, and analysis type ( 31 ). The saturation theory formula used was [P = No-show rate *((scope*diversity*method)/expertise]. Combining these principles, the estimated number of participants to recruit was 25 for interviews and 38 for focus groups ( 32 ). While the calculated sample size estimate was not met due to recruitment constraints (discussed in limitations), our resultant sample size is believed to have sufficient information power particularly due to strong quality of dialogue, reported shadowed data, the application of theory (the HBM model), a relatively narrow aim, and perceived saturation during data analysis (i.e., adding more data did not yield any further thematic insights) ( 31 , 33 , 34 ). Data analysis We used a six-step reflexive thematic analysis: 1. Data familiarization; 2. Initial code generation; 3. Theme generation; 4. Potential theme review; 5. Defining and naming themes; and 6. Report production ( 35 , 36 ). Overall, we used constructivist epistemology, experiential orientation, and both semantic and latent coding ( 35 ). Transcripts were both inductively coded (without a pre-existing codebook) and deductively categorized into a priori sub-themes under each HBM construct. Reflexive and iterative thematic analysis took place in either NVivo (v. 14.24.3, Lumivero) or manually using printed copies. CA was a primary data analysis instrument, deeply immersing herself reflexively and repeatedly in the data ( 35 , 36 ). CA used field notes, journal notes, and verbatim participant transcripts during the analysis process. KAB supported code and themation for one transcript. CA and KAB discussed code creation and theme construction to cross-validate the codes and themes. All co-authors contributed to theme organization. For the purposes of approximating and defining quantifying terminology in this work, each focus group was counted as one, resulting in a total sample size of 24 (5 focus groups and 19 interviewees), as not everyone in each focus group responded to every question. As such, quantifying terminology used to express how many times the theme or idea was expressed was defined as follows: few (less than 10% of participants, i.e., less than 3); several (less than 20% of participants, i.e.., 3 to 5 participants); some or often (25% or more participants, i.e., 6–10); many or frequently (approximately 50% of participants, i.e., 11–13 or more); most (more than 75%, i.e., more than 18); and vast majority (more than 90% i.e., 22 or more). Researcher positionality The first author (CA) conducted most of the study data collection, data analysis, and manuscript development. CA is a white cisgender woman, a veterinarian with undergraduate training in wildlife biology and conservation and has a background in livestock production and environmental activism. She has received extensive training in veterinary and public health epidemiology and has taken coursework and workshops in qualitative research for application within and outside of veterinary epidemiology. This was the first qualitative study she conducted, with considerable guidance from all co-authors, particularly in the study design and manuscript revision. CH is a veterinary epidemiologist and veterinary pathologist, as well as the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer of B.C. KAB is an experienced qualitative researcher with expertise in One Health and is an Assistant Professor in the University of British Columbia's School of Population and Public Health. HT is a Canada Research Chair and Professor at the University of British Columbia with extensive experience in qualitative research, health communication, and policy research. Results Participant demographic characteristics Demographic characteristics were obtained only from interview participants. In one case, two participants (a couple) participated in an interview together and were counted as one participant. Demographic characteristics were not obtained from focus group participants. Interview participants ( n = 19) consisted of 16 (84.2%) from B.C. and three (15.8%) from the Yukon. There were interview participants from across all eight Agricultural Regions in B.C.: Vancouver Island/Coast ( n = 3; 15.8%), South Coast ( n = 5; 26.3%), Cariboo Chilcotin Coast ( n = 1; 5.3%), Thompson-Nicola ( n = 1; 5.3%), Okanagan ( n = 3; 15.8%), Kootenay ( n = 1; 5.3%), Omineca Skeena ( n = 1; 5.3%), and Peace ( n = 1; 5.3%) ( 37 ). All Yukon interviewees currently reside in or near Whitehorse. One focus group took place in the Okanagan, two in the South Coast agricultural region (Chilliwack and Langley), and two in the Vancouver Island/Coast regions (Merville and Salt Spring Island). Of the 12 interview participants who took an associated survey and identified their gender, 6/12 (50.0%) were men (M), 5/12 (41.7%) were women (W), and 1/12 (8.33%) was non-binary (NB). Flock compositions are reported only for interviewees. One (5.26%) interview participant kept birds for exhibition only, one (5.26%) participant kept broiler (meat production) birds only, three (15.8%) participants reported keeping specifically dual-purpose or heritage breed hens without other birds, and five (26.3%) participants kept (egg) layers only. Nearly half ( n = 9, 47.4%) of interview participants reported having a mixed flock of avian species, not solely chickens, including pigeons, turkeys, ducks, peacocks, doves, and geese. There was one reported ‘mixed aviary’ of which the species present were not disclosed. The birds’ purposes in the interviewees’ flocks were diverse, including as layers, for exhibition, for pest control, as pets, and for ornamental purposes, in addition to the production of traditional poultry products such as meat and eggs. Interview participants kept approximately 8 to 200 birds, with one person also keeping up to 2000 seasonal broilers in addition to their eight laying hens. Several participants, including one participant with a mixed aviary, did not know the exact number of birds they had. Birds were kept as egg layers, for enjoyment or as pets, for maintenance of heritage and dual-purpose (egg and meat) breeds, for meat (broilers), for exhibition or show, for ornamental or display purposes, for protection for the other birds (geese), and for pest control. Health Belief Model Results Perceived Threat (1) Perceived susceptibility to HPAIV Overall, most participants appeared to be aware that their flocks were at risk of exposure to HPAIV. However, several participants believed that smallholder flocks were at much lower risk of exposure, as they had only heard in the news about commercial flocks being affected. Additionally, a few participants expressed that they thought they were at a reduced risk of exposure simply because they had fewer birds than commercial flocks, or were not near commercial flocks, representing a potential misunderstanding of what constitutes exposure risk (i.e., typically potential contact with wild migratory birds): “No more risk than anybody else that has chickens, I suppose. Maybe less because they're smaller you know than a large operation where you can have it. One gets it and 300 get it or 500 or 1,000. So, with a smaller flock, maybe less propensity to getting the avian flu.” (South Coast B.C. I#8, NA) (2) Perceived severity of HPAI Participants generally understood that HPAI would cause nearly 100% mortality in their flocks and that infection would lead to government-mandated depopulation of their flock as part of eradication efforts ( 38 ). Many were aware that HPAI is a reportable disease and that large numbers of commercial flocks were being culled as part of eradication measures across North America. However, some participants expressed that they were not necessarily familiar with the reasons why this control measure was implemented, or why alternative preventive and control measures, such as vaccination, were not being utilized: “I am aware, though, one thing that I was very curious about in some of the research that we were doing is that there are vaccines, there's like been a vaccine available for 20 years and why, I wanted to know, why has that not been… Why have that like if we know knew that this virus was coming for so long, why has that not been implemented on a larger scale, especially for the poultry barns?” (Okanagan B.C. I#15, W) People’s relationship with their birds —whether as livestock or pets —and the financial implications of HPAIV infection had mixed effects on perceptions of severity. Some participants with a stronger agricultural background or a sentiment that their birds are livestock rather than pets appeared to have a reduced emotional response to the idea that their flocks could be culled due to HPAIV. However, another participant felt they would be more concerned as their flock grew due to the financial investment, and those who expressed the most exasperation or overwhelm at the thought of losing their flock either depended on their flock for financial income or had invested considerable funds. Overall, most participants, regardless of their birds' purpose, felt that flock infection with HPAIV would have a negative psychological impact on them as caretakers or on those around them. These interviewees expressed wanting to take measures to prevent the adverse psychological effects that would come with their birds getting sick, dying, or having to be culled because of HPAIV. Specifically, many participants described the potential outcome of exposure to HPAIV and the loss of their birds to be “devastating” (multiple participants), and some experienced mental turmoil, including panic, worry, or nightmares, due to concern about HPAI, indicating that they were motivated to avoid it: “And then also like there's the 4-H kids who like X like I, it would break my heart to email that 4-H kid and go, hey, just so you know, your birds died from avian influenza. Or I think what would probably be worse is, your bird is going to have to be depopulated because there's avian influenza on the property or in the flock… So from an emotional standpoint, I don't want to do that, especially for the kids so… I had a nightmare about it..” (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C., I#10, NB) Several participants specifically expressed concerns about smallholder poultry flocks potentially being a major source for zoonotic disease transmission and even pandemic development due to the poor standards of care and suboptimal biosecurity measures they had witnessed in other producers’ flocks, either in person or on social media: “Like I said, I really truly think the pandemic is going to start with these backyard flocks who just like bring in their sick coughing chicken into their home with no biosecurity measures. As well as other ones like Salmonella outbreaks and things like that and food safety and security and all those things, right? You see like baskets of eggs just being sold like at the end of the road right road with no refrigeration control and things like that.” (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) Beliefs About Behaviors to Counter Threat (3) Perceived benefits of biosecurity measures Protection for birds Participants often expressed the belief that biosecurity was vital for maintaining their birds’ overall health, not only for protecting against HPAI but also against other infectious pathogens. Many interviewees felt that good biosecurity was simply an extension of responsible animal ownership. A few also felt that biosecurity measures, such as preventing interactions with unfamiliar people and other animals, visibly or audibly reduced stress in their birds. Some participants discussed rodent control as a major motivator for improving biosecurity, while others also mentioned preventing predator access. They expressed that preventing rodent or predator access felt like a much larger challenge to overcome than reducing exposure to infectious disease: “Biosecurity is, I suppose, if we think broadly about it, avian influenza is, I would say, I mean, it's terrible because that's devastating for the flock but I'll say that the more difficult problem I'm dealing with is the rat problem.” (South Coast B.C. I #1, M) Protection for people The desire to reduce the risks of disease spread from birds to people was present for some participants but not all. When there was uncertainty surrounding zoonotic risk, people exhibited mixed motivations regarding biosecurity. While one participant reported increasing their biosecurity measures when having children to mitigate the risk of zoonotic exposure to other pathogens, they were not aware of the specific zoonotic risk posed by HPAIV. Several participants, particularly those with backgrounds in healthcare or relatives in healthcare, were more aware of the zoonotic risk of HPAIV, highlighted the benefits of biosecurity to protect themselves and their families: “Well the number one is…keeping myself and my family healthy. Because like, you know, just knowing that there are some diseases that can jump from humans to animal or animals to humans My number one concern would be like keeping myself and my kids safe. So that's the biggest benefit in my mind.” (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W) (4) Perceived barriers to implementing biosecurity measures Informational barriers Participants experienced a breadth of barriers to implementing biosecurity measures in their flocks, and many of these barriers were related to information. Some participants felt that the volume of information available regarding HPAI was overwhelming: “…there's just so much involved in this and and and the fact that it's it's really, really hard it's hard to keep on top of all these things and what has to be done and… it's it's it's it's a big it's a big thing to deal with.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG) Others felt that there was a paucity of information specific enough to their production system to be useful, or that the information they needed to make informed decisions about smallholder poultry health and biosecurity specifically was difficult to find: “I think information is big because there's a lot of the information that, that is out there is provided by big commercial operations. So it's not really applicable to, you know, me and my 15 chickens. Or it's not available to me and my 15 chickens. Or a lot of the information that's out there, I like to call it the Google Gods, right? The Google Gods have provided or the Facebook group or whatever. And that's not necessarily, you know, now I'm going to be dosing my chicken like it's a sheep for, you know, there's just not, the information isn't necessarily easily available.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG) Participants frequently expressed that there was an immense amount of problematic information online: “From like being in chicken groups online - drives me nuts people that think that avian influenza is a hoax. It's the government trying to, what is it? Uh, get rid of small flock producers so that they can force us to eat the commercial eggs and they want some - it's nuts. Nuts, the misinformation out there.” (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C., I#10, NB) Discernment and critical appraisal of the wide variety of available information, both accurate and problematic, were identified as a significant barrier. The large amount of problematic information prompted some participants to use their judgment and avoid web searches or viewing social media content “with a grain of salt” (multiple participants). Instead, they relied on sources they considered reputable, such as government websites, veterinary extension sites, and knowledgeable community members. While participants often said they found government and health official resources trustworthy and reputable, they experienced barriers related to the accessibility of these resources (e.g., technical terminology, format, and length): “…I'd like to like the Canadian government website to like have better information or like just more easily accessed because like I find every time I try and look something up on there, it's always like downloading 800 PDFs. And like, it's just, and I'm just like, okay, this is like important information. I'm like, but I'm on my phone.” (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W) Participants also expressed frustration with contacting government agencies directly. They mentioned that they or people they knew “…got a runaround” (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG) from government employees, and that they experienced great difficulty reaching government officials to answer questions about HPAIV prevention or the government control orders that had been put in place. Others expressed frustration over the lack of integration between municipal, provincial/territorial, and federal regulations for smallholder poultry, which made it difficult for them to comply with the rules. Regarding the specific content of governmental communications, participants noticed that the standard recommendations to “contact your vet[erinarian]” (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) with questions or concerns about HPAIV prevention was problematic given a persistent veterinary shortage in Canada and few veterinarians being able or willing to provide services for smallholder poultry: “I called every single vet clinic in [city]. Nobody would see or like even talk to us on the phone, like I asked for like a phone consult, you know, kind of like go through with the symptoms were, what we should do, safety, all that kind of stuff, nobody would even talk to us... But it was kind of in my back of my mind like but because they say on this information, they're like, oh, if you're suspecting your flock has avian influenza, contact your vet. And it's like. Who am I going to contact?” (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) ( 39 – 41 ). Furthermore, participants sometimes expressed feeling that the government's messaging appeared to lack strong rationale, which may impact people’s willingness to follow recommendations in the face of competing messaging: “Yeah, I don't know how you find, but when I talk to people around me who also have birds, I hear so much superstition. So much practice is because, you know, and people come with magic potions and and different things that they try uh that has no basis in science or fact. And then if we get additional messaging from the government that may make sense in some you know in some theoretical or it is derived from something. But if it's not presented with the rationale clearly, then I think people will be unlikely to, to follow it.” (South Coast B.C., I#1, M) One interviewee involved in regulation identified two additional obstacles for newcomer immigrant smallholder poultry producers: language barriers and, at times, limited understanding of Canadian welfare, biosecurity, and livestock management standards, as well as cultural and traditional practices that do not easily align with these standards. Resource and structural barriers Beyond information, some interviewees noted that resource and infrastructural limitations were key barriers to people’s ability and willingness to implement biosecurity measures. For example, time and financial constraints were raised, as well as limitations to participants’ ability to make changes to coop design, either because they were working with structures that were previously built without practical biosecurity measures in mind, or that they were trying to refurbish or renovate their current infrastructure but faced financial or other constraints to this. Several participants kept their poultry on shared properties and either did not want to invest in modifications on other owners’ properties or buildings or felt constrained in implementing biosecurity measures related to land-sharing arrangements: “One it's not my property… Two the barn is incredibly old. Um, yeah, those were. I mean, if the if the barn was on my property, I could put in biosecurity measures. If the barn was on my property, it being incredibly old would be a definite issue. But, yeah, no, the major issue, it's not my property.” (South Coast #1 B.C. FG) These participants also reported challenges enforcing biosecurity rules among different property users, including those who entered the property to purchase products from them or from others sharing the property. Interestingly, potentially in relation to early recommendations for people to take bird feeders down, participants frequently stated an inability to prevent small songbirds from entering their enclosure, indicating that they believed it was never possible to have completely impenetrable biosecurity because of this: “You're supposed to keep your birds isolated. So inside, you know, people talk about biosecurity. And sure, they've got their runs covered. You have the little birds that come through your pens so I don't know that it's super effective just to have a covered pen.” (South Coast B.C. I#3, W) ( 42 ) Finally, a barrier against biosecurity implementation was people’s perception of the efficacy of the measures themselves. This places less emphasis on the individual's perceived ability to perform the activity (see self-efficacy below) and more on their perception of whether the action is rational to them and will meaningfully reduce their risk: “Like for us, it's kind of like, does it make sense? Is this actually a thing that's going to do, do like, reduce the risk?” (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C. I#10, NB) (5) Self-efficacy in enacting biosecurity measures Participants frequently demonstrated a strong duty of care towards their animals and a desire to do the right thing to keep them healthy: “I obviously don't want them to get sick and die. Like avian influenza specifically is terrible. Like it would devastate our flock but other illnesses too, right? We're like, we're trying to keep them as healthy and safe and all of that as possible from all illnesses. So with the biosecurity, we're also trying to keep out like rodents and pests and other animals that might spread illnesses to them, whether that's like mites or lice or Salmonella, things like that. So trying to keep the animals specifically as healthy as possible.” (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) Although participants often believed they could prevent HPAIV from entering their flock through adequate biosecurity, they identified several risk factors beyond their control, including the biosecurity practices of others, the presence of songbirds in their coop, and the movement or presence of migratory birds on their property. Some expressed concerns about inadequate care and biosecurity practices they observed on other properties or farms, as well as worries that others’ actions (or inaction, such as not attending the MAF workshops on HPAI) might undermine their own biosecurity efforts: “ Our neighborhood is full of – everybody’s got chickens, like 6 chickens or whatever in the backyards. We walk down the road, and you see them out and they’re, they’ve got them out in their front yard, like they’re all over the whole yard, and they’re not here, I see. So, it’s people like that... Yeah and we're wondering where they all are?” (Kelowna, Okanagan B.C. FG) Most participants stated they felt they could not reduce their risk of HPAI exposure entirely. A few participants expressed a sense of inevitability regarding HPAI exposure and questioned their ability to prevent it, given the challenges with prevention, even in commercial flocks: “And, what's the data? What's the percentage of large flock AI outbreaks compared to small flock AI outbreaks? Where's the problem? You know the, the large-scale guys have got access to the best extension services on, or, veterinary care, science. Dedicated veterinarians, instant results from pathology… and then biosecurity enforceable biosecurity, and they're having just as many outbreaks.” (Okanagan B.C. I#7, M) (6) Cues to action to implement biosecurity measures Trust and rapport Essential factors that motivated people to act on HPAI biosecurity were trust, increased visibility or access, and building rapport with the agency or the individuals delivering the message through consultation. People tended to seek advice from those they know and trust, whether those were people in official roles or community members: “And being in a smaller place when you know people too, you also talk to the people that you know. And we know people in both those departments so, so it's easy, probably because it's easier to reach out when you know someone. So you can just send an email or a text and not feel like it's going to be this formal thing that you get like… you can just ask for information and you know that you will get a, like a… honest response to information… Yukon Agriculture has had events and they work with people and they're kind of out there talking to people, they show that they're listening. And so that definitely builds trust of who you want to go talk to when something is tricky or you're not sure or something seems off. Like you want to, yeah, go to a trustworthy and open kind of place.” (Yukon I#2, NA) Centralized communication through flock registration Frequently, people supported increased, centralized government communication with smallholder poultry producers about HPAI and biosecurity recommendations and felt that this would help keep them informed about HPAI. Yet, they are unaware that a mandatory PID system already exists in B.C. and is encouraged in the Yukon: “I mean, obviously it would be great to be able to register your birds so you would be aware of what's going on. So there's no registration other than what happens at the food place.” (South Coast B.C., I#14, M) Risk self-assessment – immediacy and proximity Participants used various tools to assess their immediate risk and decide whether risk reduction was necessary or feasible. For example, several mentioned using publicly available HPAI case maps to evaluate their risk, but often felt these maps lacked sufficient resolution for accurate assessment. People also self-assessed their risk and made decisions based on the seasonality of migratory birds, particularly in northern areas. However, a few participants noted that guidelines recommending the use of seasonality as a preventative measure are not specific enough—for example, when the migratory season ends or which wild bird species are most important. Even if participants were aware of HPAI and its transmission from wild birds, they frequently judged whether wild birds were ‘close enough’ to their coops or whether the bird species posed a risk to their flock's exposure to HPAIV. Overall, a smallholder producer’s belief in their current, recurrent, or near-term susceptibility to HPAI, or disease in general, appears to significantly influence how strongly efforts to implement and reinforce biosecurity measures are prioritized: “It is on my mind all the time now. So, like, every time I go out to do something for the chickens, that's what I'm, that's what I'm thinking about. Um. You know, so like just little things like the decision to move their feeders inside the coop. Like normally we didn't do that just because I'm like, well, I don't want to attract rodents into the coop. But now I'm like, well. You know the threat of a wild bird bringing some kind of disease in is probably a higher risk than rodents, right? So it's just like‚ when I'm trying to like weigh priorities like that, like the avian influenza is always the deciding factor.” (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W) While several participants felt that biosecurity maintenance was essential and straightforward, some participants thought they would backslide and would not prioritize the implementation of biosecurity measures if there was not an apparent imminent risk present: “Nothing [would make me continue to implement biosecurity measures in the absence of an outbreak]. I wouldn't do it if I didn't have to because who’s got time for extra stuff for no reason.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG) Alternatively, people who believed that immediate exposure risk and their susceptibility were low appeared to be much less motivated to adopt enhanced biosecurity measures: “It's going to be basically what I'm doing now. Just limiting the amount of people that go in the barn and minor biosecurity stuff. I don't think I need to spend more money to keep away a problem I don't think is going to happen up here.” (Peace B.C., I#2, M) Transmission to other flocks Those who believed there was a risk of transmission to other flocks around them expressed a strong sense of community duty of care towards other producers. Most producers felt that they were very geographically and functionally isolated from other flocks, such that the likelihood of transmission from themselves to others was low, and few participants were aware of any commercial poultry flocks nearby. However, for several participants, awareness of potential connections between their own flocks and others, especially if those other flocks depended on their poultry for income, was a key reason for altruistically adopting biosecurity measures to prevent transmission of HPAIV: “Well, the only thing that I make sure not to do is go over to the egg farm. With anything that's been near my turkeys. Right… So different shoes. That sort of stuff because they live just down the road and I don't want to impact, like anything that's going over there. That would, that would break my heart. So, you know, it's really not so much my flock that I'm worried about. It's about making sure I don't spread it to someone else.” (Yukon, I#1, W) Concern for public health Another critical cue to action that was identified was concern for public health. In most cases, those who were aware of the public health risks associated with HPAI and other zoonotic pathogens of poultry were most supportive of increased regulation of smallholders, premises registration, and the implementation of comprehensive biosecurity measures: “I think, especially when we have something like avian influenza circulating, where it can impact human health, not only bird health, or other animal health as well, I think the responsibility’s for everybody to be conscientious of biosecurity. We had just had a, you know, pandemic, like we should all… be aware. And I'm hoping that there are lessons learned from that are not lost. Although some days it seems like they are so… But yeah, especially people like us who are handling the birds daily, we have an extra added responsibility to make sure that we are on top of the best information, also things like having the B.C. ID, farm ID. I think that's really important too for tracking.” (Okanagan B.C., I#15, W) (7) Modifying Factors Anti-commercialized poultry production and the naturalness bias Many people participate in smallholder poultry production to oppose commercialized food systems. Participants often said that the food they get from their smallholder birds is healthier and more nutritious for their families than products from the commercial poultry industry (i.e., ‘factory farms’). Several participants were especially motivated by the idea of regenerative, circular, alternative, or organic food economies. A common belief among smallholder producers is that smallholder poultry farming is a key way to take control of the food they eat, know where it comes from, and increase their food security. A few participants strongly believed in the naturalness bias—an extension of the appeal-to-nature fallacy—which holds that something is better or healthier simply because it is labelled or perceived as “natural” or unmodified by humans ( 43 , 44 ). The extent to which smallholder poultry producers oppose the commercial poultry industry and hold a naturalness bias may directly influence their willingness to adopt recommended biosecurity measures. If individuals strongly believe that maintaining poultry health requires free-range (i.e., “natural”) methods, many biosecurity measures may appear diametrically opposed to these anti-commercial production beliefs. In such cases, they are less likely to implement measures that restrict wildlife access, prevent standing water, or confine poultry to a coop: “Well, yeah, no one wants [HPAI]. It's important. But I'm trying to, I'm trying to think about how we would keep our flock away from wild birds. And keep them as healthy as possible, right? So, it's like kind of more about health, right? The flock's health. And for them to get out in the run and scratch in the forest… is a very healthy thing for them to do because then they get all the minerals that they need for the gullet and they can get other sources of protein that the feed wouldn't necessarily, like a more a more dimensional source of food and protein and things right? And exercise and things, right? And so all that is just lending itself to very healthy birds, right? And keeping them cooped in a smaller enclosure where, you know, we'd have to like muck them out more often, like physically remove their manure and stuff so that they're not just like concentrating all that stuff sounds like a more adverse health risks there.” (South Coast B.C., I#17, M) Similarly, smallholder producers specifically may also perceive that the birds can only experience happiness with free-range access and may personify or anthropomorphize the experiences of their birds, stating: “And I don’t want to put them in a little run when they just love free ranging all over the place.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG) Government trust, mistrust, or distrust Further important modifying factors within the smallholder industry include psychosocial factors related to government mistrust or distrust, as well as personal viewpoints on the role of regulatory oversight of smallholder production. Themes related to the government's lack of prioritization of smallholder poultry producer interests, issues of trust versus mistrust/distrust in the government, the level of government regulation versus increased support, and government defiance or avoidance of reporting were often identified. While a few participants self-identified as rule followers, there were also several times when participants expressed sentiments that the government did not make decisions with smallholders’ interests in mind: “I think knowing that the government is using the information about what's going on. And using a lens of a global market makes me a little apprehensive to believe what they're saying completely because it seems like they're really looking out for the big commercial growers or producers, the ones that are intending to export their food... So, to really put that much trust into an entity that is not looking out for backyard flock owners is really hard not to look at it with the level of skepticism. I'd be more inclined to talk to you and have a collective voice as flock owners as opposed to someone in Ottawa who's making these decisions, or someone at the legislature who's never kept birds before and things like that. So, I really I lean on my community so much more than I think a lot of folks might let on. Those who have a little bit more faith in the government. But I'm really apprehensive to put that much trust in the system. I'm sorry.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG) Several participants reported seeing or hearing of people who expressed distrust of government interventions for infectious disease control, and were more likely to “shoot, shovel, and shut up” (Cariboo Chilcotin Coast B.C., I#9, W), if they suspected HPAI, rather than reporting suspicious symptoms. Further, they believed that there was specifically a post-COVID-19 pandemic development of government mistrust and libertarianism, particularly around infectious disease management across many smallholder producers: “Now… if bird flu was around in 2019, everybody would be like okay well you know, we'll close things down, we’ll be more careful but now because it's 2025, everybody's like: “Screw the government! We're going to just let our sick animals on every plane and bus.”… The trust is gone. It's just 100% shot.” (Cariboo Chilcotin Coast B.C., I#9, W) Further suspicion of significant underreporting of HPAI in smallholder flocks may be linked to people’s perception of government oversight, a lack of awareness of reporting regulations, or a lack of knowledge of one’s role within the national poultry system: “ How big is the AI problem in Vancouver? I bet you it's five times worse than what government knows. People just have all their chickens die. Throw them in the garbage, or take them and dump them in the bush. Get more chickens.” (Okanagan B.C., I#7, M) Smallholder producer regulation Some participants were very supportive of increased regulation of smallholder poultry producers, while others were not. Some participants believe that increased government regulation of smallholder poultry to support HPAI prevention and control is necessary to safeguard poultry and public health and a diversified food system, because they think outreach and education alone are not enough, considering their current state and the target audience of these measures: “People, again, that are trying to do that, like the B.C. Poultry Health Network and the ask of vet and all of that. But again, you're reaching like, you know, preaching to the choir. You're reaching the selective audience of those who are already going to be seeking this information out and using that information. So, I think that's where the government comes in with providing regulations to make sure that not only those who are seeking that information are still required to follow that. And they also could provide, like I said, the better education materials.” (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) Some participants expressed concern that continued outbreaks in smallholder flocks could lead to increased regulation of the sector or even its banning altogether. Some expressed that increased regulation, enhanced enforcement, or banning of smallholder production would lead to greater defiance of government oversight and under-reporting of HPAI and illegal keeping of poultry: “If they tell me I can’t have chickens, I’ll just get more chickens.” (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG) Discussion Smallholder poultry producers generally want to keep themselves, their families, and others safe from HPAI. They often understand the benefits of biosecurity and are frequently aware of the severity of exposure to the virus. However, they still face challenges in consistently and effectively implementing biosecurity measures which span multiple HBM constructs. Smallholders require better support in navigating HPAI information One implementation challenge is informational, arising across various constructs, including barriers, susceptibility, and cues to action. We found that the informational barrier is not so much a lack of information volume as a lack of information quality and specificity. To improve this informational challenge, smallholder producers require information tailored to their needs, rather than simply extensions of recommendations for commercial producers. Through smallholder producer workshops on HPAI biosecurity in the UK, researchers also found that producers preferred guidance that was more specific to smallholders ( 45 ). An HBM-focused study conducted in Bangladesh also found that producer-specific informational barriers among smallholders significantly affected their biosecurity self-efficacy ( 27 ). Beyond specificity, information accessibility is also vital to improve uptake and understanding of biosecurity. Information for smallholders must be accessible in terms of format, length, density, language, and presentation. Information should be in accessible formats for mobile devices, since this is often how people will find and use it. Multimedia sources should be used to engage audiences across different channels and be both timely at the start of outbreaks and frequent so producers maintain a current sense of susceptibility ( 46 , 47 ). For example, distributing audio-visual materials, including videos with clear instructions and success stories from more relatable individuals (e.g., other producers), could be effective, along with social media posts featuring producer/farmer “influencers” to directly counteract problematic information and leverage community trust ( 48 , 49 ). In biosecurity co-production workshops held in the UK, it was found that providing visual examples and examples of materials or equipment they may already have (e.g., different shoes and a pair of coop-only clothes) would likely improve biosecurity uptake ( 50 ). Informational resources should be developed in plain language and in languages that match population demographics. Finally, particularly in response to problematic information (e.g., HPAI is a hoax), information should clearly emphasize that smallholders are susceptible to HPAI and specify which activities specifically make them so ( 27 , 46 ). Overall, our study suggests that smallholder producers do not require more information to make improved decisions around biosecurity implementation – they need better information. Cultivating government trust Themes surrounding government trust were also prominent in this study – a throughline that spanned barriers, susceptibility, severity, modifying factors, and cues to action. While some participants discussed the distrust they witnessed among other smallholder poultry producers, the study participants themselves generally expressed trust in government resources. However, this trust was eroded by specific behaviour patterns practiced by officials. For example, producers expressed frustration that they could not access government employees directly for advice. This can create a sense of a lack of transparency and disconnect between regulators and smallholder producers ( 47 ). Additionally, producers were unwilling to follow advice that lacked clear justification. In other words, producers need to clearly understand not only what they should be doing but why they should be doing it. While established crisis communication dogmas suggest that scientific messages should be simplified for lay audiences, we demonstrate that such messages still require justification for clarity and uptake ( 51 ). Without providing a comprehensive rationale for HPAI biosecurity (prevention) and management actions, including addressing uncertainty, smallholders may be prone to following problematic advice from unverified sources ( 47 ). In line with transparency and cultivating trust, government engagement with smallholder poultry communities is crucial, as involving public stakeholders and civil society, and encouraging citizen participation both empower individuals and foster confidence in authority ( 47 ). Trust-building techniques include co-creation of biosecurity recommendations, recurrent or continuous training, and collaborative learning facilitated by governments and health officials that consider the lived experiences and context of smallholders’ needs ( 48 , 50 ). For example, recommendations should not hinge on resources that smallholder producers do not have access to, such as veterinarians, as most smallholder producers in Canada do not have access to a poultry veterinarian. Other studies have also found that government trust and rapport significantly affect farmers’ intentions to report infectious diseases and to follow regulations focused on infectious disease mitigation and management ( 49 , 52 , 53 ). As such, more collaborative, bidirectional communication may not only identify strategies more tenable for smallholders but also improve the acceptance and uptake of biosecurity measures. Appeal to smallholder-specific needs and values Smallholder producers’ desire to keep their birds healthy, with a focus on what health means to them, interacts with benefits, barriers, modifying factors, and cues to action associated with biosecurity against HPAI. Biosecurity recommendations for smallholder poultry producers should resonate with their psychosocial values and emotions, emphasize co-benefits beyond HPAIV prevention, and prioritize ease of integration. Smallholder producers expressed strong emotions focused on their birds, and particularly surrounding the prospect of culling or the death of their birds due to HPAIV (i.e., devastation, nausea, panic). Therefore, understanding and addressing the ‘emotional epidemiology’ associated with HPAI outbreaks may be just as crucial to management as understanding the biological and ecological aspects of HPAI, especially among those with diminished trust in government and science ( 54 , 55 ). We found that smallholder poultry producers are motivated to take actions they believe will effectively safeguard or enhance their birds’ health. However, their understanding of health and happiness for their birds is sometimes seen as conflicting with commercial poultry practices (e.g., confinement, restrictions on outdoor access, and avoidance of multi-species interactions) and biosecurity measures, which might be associated with these production systems. A UK-based study also found that some producers were “unwilling to house their birds” due to perceived welfare impacts ( 45 ). Another multiple-method study found that smallholder producers had significant concerns about the welfare of their birds, also centred on confining birds indoors (one of the key biosecurity recommendations for preventing HPAI) ( 56 ). Given the nature of the smallholder production movement, its focus on anti-industrial agriculture rhetoric, and the influence of social pressures on smallholder producers, communication approaches that directly clarify what birds truly need to be healthy and happy, with optimized welfare, could help increase biosecurity adoption among smallholder poultry producers ( 27 , 57 ). Smallholder engagement and co-production, as discussed above, can also support the development of tailored recommendations that appeal to smallholders’ specific values. A helpful communication strategy in this area could be to focus on producers’ feelings and values through stories and narratives to influence behaviour change ( 47 ). Smallholder-focused biosecurity communications are also likely to be more effective if they frame biosecurity as having multiple co-benefits beyond HPAI prevention alone. For example, communications could focus on aspects of smallholder production that are more familiar than HPAIV, such as predator or rodent control, and show how integrating biosecurity measures provides health benefits by protecting them against multiple risks, including other infectious diseases and risks to public health ( 58 , 59 ). Using familiar words and information can improve clarity and, subsequently, comprehension of health promotion materials ( 51 ). Addressing HPAI biosecurity recommendations as having multiple co-benefits beyond HPAI prevention may support habit-building and behavioural sustainability, be a more cost-effective use of limited resources, and appeal more successfully to smallholder producers’ motivation to keep their birds healthy. Overall, biosecurity messaging for smallholder producers that is focused on the psychosocial interpretations and impacts of biosecurity implementation and the diverse health benefits of biosecurity, while considering what health means to this population, could enhance biosecurity implementation. Study limitations There are several limitations associated with this study. We did not directly observe or systematically ask about participant biosecurity practices, which limits our ability to confirm people’s perspectives with actual implemented behaviour. We collected sparse demographic data, which limits our ability to compare our sample with the general smallholder producer population. Given the qualitative nature of this study, we were able to elucidate nuanced details of constructs but not quantify them. We used a combination of an information power framework and a sample size calculator guided by data saturation theory to determine our target sample size. Although we did not obtain the recommended sample sizes, we achieved data saturation through data analysis, where no new themes were identified as we reached the end of our dataset ( 34 ). As a result, our sample size appears sufficient to address the research questions at hand. We employed thorough and diverse recruitment strategies, but our efforts may have been limited by mistrust of authority and health institutions, including academia and government ( 60 , 61 ). This may have contributed to our recruitment success, to a smaller sample size, and to the development of a non-random, purposive sample that may be affected by non-response bias ( 62 ). The nature of the non-response bias makes it difficult to confirm that our sample is representative of the entire smallholder poultry producer population in B.C. and the Yukon. However, since this is the first published study we are aware of that explores the perceptions and beliefs of this population in Canada, it provides an important first step toward better understanding how to enhance communication with smallholder producers about HPAI biosecurity. Conclusion Using the HBM has allowed us to examine and describe the motivations and beliefs of smallholder poultry producers surrounding HPAI biosecurity. Understanding the motivations and beliefs of smallholder producers regarding biosecurity is critical to improving communication between disease regulators and this population. Ultimately, smallholder poultry producers: 1) need better and more targeted information and support in navigating that information; 2) require increased trust building with the government; and 3) require biosecurity messaging to be in alignment with their understandings of poultry health and focused on the integration of flock health beyond preventing HPAI alone. Communications about biosecurity aimed at smallholder producers in Canada would benefit from directly addressing each construct of the HBM, especially barriers, susceptibility, modifying (psychosocial and demographic) factors, and cues to action. It should also incorporate principles from democratic public health communications and outbreak information management, such as empowerment, engagement, and trust-building, while appealing to values, emotions, and stories ( 47 , 63 ). Declarations Contributions All co-authors contributed to the study design. CA conducted data acquisition and analysis. CA conducted an extensive interpretation of data with support from all other co-authors. CA drafted the work, and all co-authors contributed to revisions. Data availability The transcripts generated from interviews and focus groups in this study are not publicly available because participants provided consent only for the research team to have full access. Acknowledgements We thank Dr. Victoria Bowes, Dr. Tony Redford, and the British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture and Food for their support with recruitment and study design. We thank the Government of Yukon Animal Health Unit, specifically Dr. Jane Harms and Dr. Michelle Thompson, who supported the development of the interview guide and a Yukon-specific recruitment plan. We thank the members of the Fraser Valley Poultry Fanciers Association, especially Clayton Botkin, for supporting the pre-testing of the interview guide. We thank the Yukon Agricultural Association, the B.C. Small-Scale Meat Producers Association, and the B.C. Meat Inspection Program; organizations that all supported recruitment advertisements. We want to extend our thanks to all the feed stores and events that posted our recruitment posters. Finally, we would like to heartily thank all the focus group and interview participants for their time and the expertise they graciously shared. Funding Funding for this research was provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (PGS D-589564-2024), the Yukon-Canada Sustainable Agricultural Partnership, the B.C. MAF, the Canada Research Chair programme (CRC 2020-00132), and the Michael Smith Health Research B.C. Scholar Award. Ethics declarations Ethics approval and consent to participate This study was approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board (H22-02345). Interview participants had access to study information and a consent form prior to signing up for an interview. The consent form was reviewed before interviews and focus groups commenced. Verbal consent was obtained from each focus group and interview participant. Interview participants also received a copy of the consent form via email for their records. Consent to publish Informed consent for publication, including the use of quotations, was obtained from each participant as above. 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Jewitt S, Smallman-Raynor M, McClaughlin E, Clark M, Dunham S, Elliott S, et al. Exploring the responses of smallscale poultry keepers to avian influenza regulations and guidance in the United Kingdom, with recommendations for improved biosecurity messaging. Heliyon. 2023;9(9):e19211. Rimi NA, Sultana R, Ishtiak-Ahmed K, Rahman MZ, Hasin M, Islam MS, et al. Understanding the failure of a behavior change intervention to reduce risk behaviors for avian influenza transmission among backyard poultry raisers in rural Bangladesh: a focused ethnography. BMC Public Health. 2016;16(1):858. Tworek H, Beacock I, Ojo E. Democratic Health Communications during Covid-19: A RAPID Response. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions; 2020 Sept. Moya S, Lamont K, Brennan ML, Ciavarino G, Costa M, Allepuz A, et al. Stakeholders’ perspectives on communicating biosecurity to encourage behavior change in farmers. Front Vet Sci. 2025;12:1562648. Cargill JS. Farms, flea markets, and Facebook: Perspectives on regulation, biosecurity, and infectious disease risk among producers and poultry vendors in multiple settings [Doctor of Public Health]. Maryland]: Johns Hopkins University;: [Baltimore; 2023. Jewitt S, Smallman-Raynor M, McClaughlin E, Clark M, Dunham S, Elliott S et al. Exploring the responses of smallscale poultry keepers to avian influenza regulations and guidance in the United Kingdom, with recommendations for improved biosecurity messaging. Heliyon [Internet]. 2023 Sept 1 [cited 2025 Jan 23];9(9). Available from: https://www.cell.com/heliyon/abstract/S2405-8440(23)06419-8 Baur C, Prue C. The CDC clear communication index Is a new evidence-based tool to prepare and review health information. Health Promot Pract. 2014 Sept 1;15(5):629–37. Scutt K, Walker I, Ernst I. The influence of trust and social identity in farmers’ intentions to report suspected emergency disease outbreaks. Prev Vet Med. 2023;212:105855. Burns TE, Ribble C, McLaws M, Kelton D, Stephen C. Perspectives of an underrepresented stakeholder group, backyard flock owners, on poultry health and avian influenza control. J Risk Res 2012 Sept 25;16(2):245–60. Boyle P, Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC). 2022 [cited 2025 Sept 19]. Widespread distrust in science: Is the way we communicate to blame? Available from: https://www.aamc.org/news/widespread-distrust-science-way-we-communicate-blame Ofri D. The emotional epidemiology of H1N1 influenza vaccination. N Engl J Med. 2009;361(27):2594–5. Mace JL, Knight A. From the backyard to our beds: The spectrum of care, attitudes, relationship types, and welfare in non-commercial chicken care. Animals. 2024;14(2):288. Carreiro N. Motivations and the lived experience of keeping non-permitted backyard chickens in the city of Winnipeg [Master of Science]. [Winnipeg, Manitoba]: University of Manitoba; 2015. Brochu NM, Guerin MT, Varga C, Lillie BN, Brash ML, Susta L. A two-year prospective study of small poultry flocks in Ontario, Canada, part 1: prevalence of viral and bacterial pathogens. J Vet Diagn Invest. 2019;31(3):327–35. Pohjola L, Nykäsenoja S, Kivistö R, Soveri T, Huovilainen A, Hänninen ML, et al. Zoonotic public health hazards in backyard chickens. Zoonoses Public Health. 2016;63(5):420–30. Tanner A. Another truck convoy protest is in the works — this one sparked by farmers and feathers | Canada’s National Observer: Climate News. The National Observer [Internet]. 2025 Nov 17 [cited 2025 Nov 19]; Available from: https://www.nationalobserver.com/2025/11/18/opinion/ostrich-farm-cull-convoy-protest Smirnoff M, Wilets I, Ragin DF, Adams R, Holohan J, Rhodes R, et al. A paradigm for understanding trust and mistrust in medical research: The Community VOICES study. AJOB Empir Bioeth. 2018;9(1):39–47. Mergenthaler M, Kemnade M, Ollier-Höppe C, Schröter I. Association of recruitment pathways and response quality with farm and farmer characteristics within an online-survey among German livestock farmers. Int J Food Syst Dyn 2025 June 3;16:158–80. Eysenbach G. How to Fight an Infodemic: The Four Pillars of Infodemic Management. J Med Internet Res. 2020 June;29(6):e21820. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Adapted from multiple sources to demonstrate how seven HBM constructs interact to influence health promotion or risk prevention behaviours, including potentially the implementation of biosecurity measures against HPAI among smallholder poultry producers (27,28).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8254317/v1/9d0518f42d331765bc610880.png"},{"id":104739683,"identity":"9504a68d-c98c-41c2-901c-66bd78ca0b04","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-16 16:12:00","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1236789,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8254317/v1/c8ec0e98-005a-4f1c-8ab6-8fd079b5c82d.pdf"},{"id":97833023,"identity":"70b07c08-cbab-4104-8d79-87f092e2c816","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-10 00:40:11","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":31860,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix1hbmmanuscript.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8254317/v1/d491fd4a0a802cdecf0c712b.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"“The trust is gone”: Smallholder poultry producers’ perceptions of biosecurity measures against highly pathogenic avian influenza","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eAvian influenza viruses (AIV) are carried by wild bird reservoirs and certain strains (i.e. highly pathogenic avian influenza virus [HPAIV]) can cause devastating rates of morbidity and mortality when they spillover into domestic poultry, wild birds, non-human mammals, and potentially humans (\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR2 CR3 CR4 CR5 CR6 CR7 CR8\" citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e). Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) caused by an H5Nx HPAIV has caused recurrent epizootics in wildlife and poultry in North America since 2021 (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e). As of November 3, 2025, a prolonged epizootic that began in Canada in December 2021 has resulted in the deaths of 17,647,800 poultry, with over 11\u0026nbsp;million birds affected in the westernmost province of British Columbia (B.C.) alone (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e). B.C. is located within the Canadian portion of the Pacific Americas Flyway, one of several migratory pathways involved in the global transmission of HPAI to western Canada, which also includes the Yukon, Canada\u0026rsquo;s northwesternmost territory (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHPAIV affects both commercial and smallholder poultry production, but little is known about smallholder poultry producers across B.C. and the Yukon. At the time of recruitment for this study, the non-commercial (smallholder) poultry case definition for HPAI outbreaks worldwide was applied to any establishment with fewer than 300 birds, and commercial flocks were defined as those that produce poultry for commercial sale under Canada\u0026rsquo;s supply-managed system (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). Smallholder poultry ownership has increased in popularity in the United States in recent years, and similar trends are expected in Canada; however, the geographic extent, size, and number of smallholder poultry industries are largely unknown (\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR14\" citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e). Smallholder poultry flocks are considered to be at increased risk of exposure to HPAIV because these producers are thought to be less knowledgeable about HPAI-related risks and less likely to implement preventative measures (\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR16 CR17\" citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e). For example, there have been 968 reported HPAI outbreaks in smallholder flocks in the United States (US) between 2022 and 2025, compared to 840 in commercial flocks (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs there is no vaccine available for HPAIV in poultry in North America and the disease cannot be eradicated due to the presence of a sylvatic (wildlife) reservoir, biosecurity remains the most critical measure to prevent poultry infections with HPAIV. For this reason, risk communication campaigns with a particular focus on biosecurity have been a priority for animal health agencies seeking to prevent HPAI on smallholder farms. However, these campaigns require knowledge of the target audience itself (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e). Yet very little is known about smallholder producers\u0026rsquo; perceptions and beliefs regarding HPAI risk and prevention, including biosecurity measures. A previous qualitative study in B.C. examined smallholder producer perspectives around HPAI control measures and poultry health, and found that smallholder perspectives were frequently misaligned with current HPAI control strategies in Canada, that many utilized production and husbandry practices that may put them at increased risk of HPAI, and that governments had an essential role in keeping smallholder poultry producers informed about HPAI outbreaks and prevention (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e). Smallholder poultry producers sometimes do not consider themselves as part of the wider poultry industry and frequently, their biosecurity measures are variable and incomplete compared to recommendations (\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR22\" citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe objective of this study is to begin to explore the perceptions and beliefs held by smallholder poultry producers in B.C. and the Yukon, Canada, regarding HPAI and HPAI prevention, particularly biosecurity. We chose to focus on this jurisdiction as this province and territory are situated within the Pacific Flyway, where the majority of Canadian HPAI outbreaks have occurred (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). However, the perspectives gleaned from this research may apply to broader smallholder populations in North America and beyond, where demographics, poultry production practices, and HPAI management could be similar.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eStudy design\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eConceptual framework\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBehaviour change models, such as the Health Belief Model (HBM), are often used as frameworks to better understand people\u0026rsquo;s decision-making processes regarding health risk prevention behaviours, such as implementing biosecurity measures (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e). A conventional HBM includes six model components, also referred to as constructs: \u003cem\u003eperceived benefits\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eperceived barriers\u003c/em\u003e (likelihood of risk reduction or health promotion action), \u003cem\u003eperceived susceptibility\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eperceived severity\u003c/em\u003e (threat perceptions), \u003cem\u003ecues to action\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eself-efficacy\u003c/em\u003e (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e). Some researchers also include \u003cem\u003emodifying factors\u003c/em\u003e (demographic and psychosocial) within an HBM, but infrequently evaluate how these modifying factors influence the other constructs (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e). Understanding specific characteristics of HBM constructs for a population or health risk of interest can be useful in designing more effective health interventions, risk communication campaigns, and health promotion efforts (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e). For example, one study used the HBM to explore the beliefs of commercial smallholder poultry producers in Bangladesh regarding biosecurity measures and identified several ways to improve the delivery and implementation of biosecurity information within this group (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e). They found that perceived barriers had the strongest influence on smallholder poultry producers\u0026rsquo; biosecurity behaviours and highlighted the importance of delivering messages that would be most well-received and understood\u0026mdash;considering factors like language and literacy levels\u0026mdash;by those responsible for implementation (e.g., rural women) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e). We qualitatively explored smallholder poultry producers\u0026rsquo; attitudes and beliefs around HPAI biosecurity behaviour guided by the HBM (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdapted definitions for Health Belief Model constructs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCategory\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHealth Belief Model Construct\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDefinition\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceived Threat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1) Perceived Susceptibility\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceived risk of the producer and their flock to HPAI exposure and infection.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2) Perceived Severity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe producer\u0026rsquo;s judgement of the seriousness of HPAI exposure and infection.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeliefs About Behaviour to Counter Threat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3) Perceived Benefits\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe producer\u0026rsquo;s evaluation of the positive outcomes of implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4) Perceived Barriers\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe producer\u0026rsquo;s evaluation of the costs or difficulty associated with implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSelf-Efficacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(5) Self-Efficacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePersonal belief of one\u0026rsquo;s own ability to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCues to Action\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(6) Cues to Action\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInternal and external prompts that may trigger the producer to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eModifying Factors (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDemographic factors\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProducer demographic factors which may influence likelihood of implementing biosecurity measures against HPAI (e.g., gender, age, education status, annual household income, ethnicity, religion, etc.).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePsychosocial factors (\u0026lsquo;self-identity\u0026rsquo;)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe salient and enduring part of one\u0026rsquo;s self-perception as it may relate to their willingness to implement biosecurity measures against HPAI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOutcome\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLikelihood of Action\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe culmination of all constructs that results in an individual\u0026rsquo;s likelihood to implement biosecurity (the health promoting behaviour).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eParticipant eligibility, recruitment, and data collection\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEligible participants were smallholder poultry producers residing in either B.C. or the Yukon, Canada, who own or seasonally raise up to 300 poultry birds (e.g., chickens, turkeys, ducks, quail) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). We used two data collection methods for this study: semi-structured interviews and focus groups (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants were recruited to take part in focus group discussions following five B.C. Ministry of Agriculture and Food workshops on HPAI awareness and prevention targeted towards smallholder producers across B.C. These events were conducted in English across five municipalities in B.C. during October and November 2022. Recruitment for interviews took place between September 2022 and December 2024 via agriculture-specific Facebook groups, e-newsletters and listservs, as well as at feed stores, veterinary clinics, and agricultural fairs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe HBM was used to develop a guide for the focus groups and interviews (Appendix 1) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e). All data were collected in English. Focus group sessions were recorded and subsequently transcribed using NVivo Transcription (Lumivero). Focus groups with a total of 18 participants were held in five B.C. municipalities: Chilliwack (two participants), Kelowna (five participants), Langley (one participant), Merville (three participants), and Salt Spring Island (seven participants). Sessions lasted approximately 30 to 70 minutes. Transcripts were verified for accuracy and de-identified by CA. Interviews (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;19) were conducted in English on Zoom Workplace (v. 6.4.12) between January 6 and 30, 2025. Interviews lasted 25\u0026ndash;124 minutes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim using Zoom, and transcripts were verified for accuracy and de-identified by CA. We used a combination of an information power framework and a sample size calculator guided by data saturation theory to determine our target sample size. Information power sample size determination involves interactions between the study aim, specificity, theory, dialogue, and analysis type (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e). The saturation theory formula used was [P\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;No-show rate *((scope*diversity*method)/expertise]. Combining these principles, the estimated number of participants to recruit was 25 for interviews and 38 for focus groups (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e). While the calculated sample size estimate was not met due to recruitment constraints (discussed in limitations), our resultant sample size is believed to have sufficient information power particularly due to strong quality of dialogue, reported shadowed data, the application of theory (the HBM model), a relatively narrow aim, and perceived saturation during data analysis (i.e., adding more data did not yield any further thematic insights) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData analysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe used a six-step reflexive thematic analysis: 1. Data familiarization; 2. Initial code generation; 3. Theme generation; 4. Potential theme review; 5. Defining and naming themes; and 6. Report production (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e). Overall, we used constructivist epistemology, experiential orientation, and both semantic and latent coding (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e). Transcripts were both inductively coded (without a pre-existing codebook) and deductively categorized into \u003cem\u003ea priori\u003c/em\u003e sub-themes under each HBM construct. Reflexive and iterative thematic analysis took place in either NVivo (v. 14.24.3, Lumivero) or manually using printed copies. CA was a primary data analysis instrument, deeply immersing herself reflexively and repeatedly in the data (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e). CA used field notes, journal notes, and verbatim participant transcripts during the analysis process. KAB supported code and themation for one transcript. CA and KAB discussed code creation and theme construction to cross-validate the codes and themes. All co-authors contributed to theme organization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor the purposes of approximating and defining quantifying terminology in this work, each focus group was counted as one, resulting in a total sample size of 24 (5 focus groups and 19 interviewees), as not everyone in each focus group responded to every question. As such, quantifying terminology used to express how many times the theme or idea was expressed was defined as follows: few (less than 10% of participants, i.e., less than 3); several (less than 20% of participants, i.e.., 3 to 5 participants); some or often (25% or more participants, i.e., 6\u0026ndash;10); many or frequently (approximately 50% of participants, i.e., 11\u0026ndash;13 or more); most (more than 75%, i.e., more than 18); and vast majority (more than 90% i.e., 22 or more).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResearcher positionality\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe first author (CA) conducted most of the study data collection, data analysis, and manuscript development. CA is a white cisgender woman, a veterinarian with undergraduate training in wildlife biology and conservation and has a background in livestock production and environmental activism. She has received extensive training in veterinary and public health epidemiology and has taken coursework and workshops in qualitative research for application within and outside of veterinary epidemiology. This was the first qualitative study she conducted, with considerable guidance from all co-authors, particularly in the study design and manuscript revision. CH is a veterinary epidemiologist and veterinary pathologist, as well as the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer of B.C. KAB is an experienced qualitative researcher with expertise in One Health and is an Assistant Professor in the University of British Columbia's School of Population and Public Health. HT is a Canada Research Chair and Professor at the University of British Columbia with extensive experience in qualitative research, health communication, and policy research.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eParticipant demographic characteristics\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDemographic characteristics were obtained only from interview participants. In one case, two participants (a couple) participated in an interview together and were counted as one participant. Demographic characteristics were not obtained from focus group participants. Interview participants (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;19) consisted of 16 (84.2%) from B.C. and three (15.8%) from the Yukon. There were interview participants from across all eight Agricultural Regions in B.C.: Vancouver Island/Coast (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3; 15.8%), South Coast (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5; 26.3%), Cariboo Chilcotin Coast (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; 5.3%), Thompson-Nicola (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; 5.3%), Okanagan (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3; 15.8%), Kootenay (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; 5.3%), Omineca Skeena (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; 5.3%), and Peace (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1; 5.3%) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e). All Yukon interviewees currently reside in or near Whitehorse. One focus group took place in the Okanagan, two in the South Coast agricultural region (Chilliwack and Langley), and two in the Vancouver Island/Coast regions (Merville and Salt Spring Island).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOf the 12 interview participants who took an associated survey and identified their gender, 6/12 (50.0%) were men (M), 5/12 (41.7%) were women (W), and 1/12 (8.33%) was non-binary (NB).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFlock compositions are reported only for interviewees. One (5.26%) interview participant kept birds for exhibition only, one (5.26%) participant kept broiler (meat production) birds only, three (15.8%) participants reported keeping specifically dual-purpose or heritage breed hens without other birds, and five (26.3%) participants kept (egg) layers only. Nearly half (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;9, 47.4%) of interview participants reported having a mixed flock of avian species, not solely chickens, including pigeons, turkeys, ducks, peacocks, doves, and geese. There was one reported \u0026lsquo;mixed aviary\u0026rsquo; of which the species present were not disclosed. The birds\u0026rsquo; purposes in the interviewees\u0026rsquo; flocks were diverse, including as layers, for exhibition, for pest control, as pets, and for ornamental purposes, in addition to the production of traditional poultry products such as meat and eggs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterview participants kept approximately 8 to 200 birds, with one person also keeping up to 2000 seasonal broilers in addition to their eight laying hens. Several participants, including one participant with a mixed aviary, did not know the exact number of birds they had. Birds were kept as egg layers, for enjoyment or as pets, for maintenance of heritage and dual-purpose (egg and meat) breeds, for meat (broilers), for exhibition or show, for ornamental or display purposes, for protection for the other birds (geese), and for pest control.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eHealth Belief Model Results\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePerceived Threat\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(1) Perceived susceptibility to HPAIV\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e Overall, most participants appeared to be aware that their flocks were at risk of exposure to HPAIV. However, several participants believed that smallholder flocks were at much lower risk of exposure, as they had only heard in the news about commercial flocks being affected. Additionally, a few participants expressed that they thought they were at a reduced risk of exposure simply because they had fewer birds than commercial flocks, or were not near commercial flocks, representing a potential misunderstanding of what constitutes exposure risk (i.e., typically potential contact with wild migratory birds):\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;No more risk than anybody else that has chickens, I suppose. Maybe less because they're smaller you know than a large operation where you can have it. One gets it and 300 get it or 500 or 1,000. So, with a smaller flock, maybe less propensity to getting the avian flu.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C. I#8, NA)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(2) Perceived severity of HPAI\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants generally understood that HPAI would cause nearly 100% mortality in their flocks and that infection would lead to government-mandated depopulation of their flock as part of eradication efforts (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e). Many were aware that HPAI is a reportable disease and that large numbers of commercial flocks were being culled as part of eradication measures across North America. However, some participants expressed that they were not necessarily familiar with the reasons why this control measure was implemented, or why alternative preventive and control measures, such as vaccination, were not being utilized:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I am aware, though, one thing that I was very curious about in some of the research that we were doing is that there are vaccines, there's like been a vaccine available for 20 years and why, I wanted to know, why has that not been\u0026hellip; Why have that like if we know knew that this virus was coming for so long, why has that not been implemented on a larger scale, especially for the poultry barns?\u0026rdquo; (Okanagan B.C. I#15, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePeople\u0026rsquo;s relationship with their birds \u0026mdash;whether as livestock or pets \u0026mdash;and the financial implications of HPAIV infection had mixed effects on perceptions of severity. Some participants with a stronger agricultural background or a sentiment that their birds are livestock rather than pets appeared to have a reduced emotional response to the idea that their flocks could be culled due to HPAIV. However, another participant felt they would be more concerned as their flock grew due to the financial investment, and those who expressed the most exasperation or overwhelm at the thought of losing their flock either depended on their flock for financial income or had invested considerable funds. Overall, most participants, regardless of their birds' purpose, felt that flock infection with HPAIV would have a negative psychological impact on them as caretakers or on those around them. These interviewees expressed wanting to take measures to prevent the adverse psychological effects that would come with their birds getting sick, dying, or having to be culled because of HPAIV. Specifically, many participants described the potential outcome of exposure to HPAIV and the loss of their birds to be \u0026ldquo;devastating\u0026rdquo; (multiple participants), and some experienced mental turmoil, including panic, worry, or nightmares, due to concern about HPAI, indicating that they were motivated to avoid it:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;And then also like there's the 4-H kids who like X like I, it would break my heart to email that 4-H kid and go, hey, just so you know, your birds died from avian influenza. Or I think what would probably be worse is, your bird is going to have to be depopulated because there's avian influenza on the property or in the flock\u0026hellip; So from an emotional standpoint, I don't want to do that, especially for the kids so\u0026hellip; I had a nightmare about it..\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C., I#10, NB)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Several participants specifically expressed concerns about smallholder poultry flocks potentially being a major source for zoonotic disease transmission and even pandemic development due to the poor standards of care and suboptimal biosecurity measures they had witnessed in other producers\u0026rsquo; flocks, either in person or on social media:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Like I said, I really truly think the pandemic is going to start with these backyard flocks who just like bring in their sick coughing chicken into their home with no biosecurity measures. As well as other ones like Salmonella outbreaks and things like that and food safety and security and all those things, right? You see like baskets of eggs just being sold like at the end of the road right road with no refrigeration control and things like that.\u0026rdquo; (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eBeliefs About Behaviors to Counter Threat\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(3) Perceived benefits of biosecurity measures\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eProtection for birds\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants often expressed the belief that biosecurity was vital for maintaining their birds\u0026rsquo; overall health, not only for protecting against HPAI but also against other infectious pathogens. Many interviewees felt that good biosecurity was simply an extension of responsible animal ownership. A few also felt that biosecurity measures, such as preventing interactions with unfamiliar people and other animals, visibly or audibly reduced stress in their birds. Some participants discussed rodent control as a major motivator for improving biosecurity, while others also mentioned preventing predator access. They expressed that preventing rodent or predator access felt like a much larger challenge to overcome than reducing exposure to infectious disease:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Biosecurity is, I suppose, if we think broadly about it, avian influenza is, I would say, I mean, it's terrible because that's devastating for the flock but I'll say that the more difficult problem I'm dealing with is the rat problem.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C. I #1, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eProtection for people\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe desire to reduce the risks of disease spread from birds to people was present for some participants but not all. When there was uncertainty surrounding zoonotic risk, people exhibited mixed motivations regarding biosecurity. While one participant reported increasing their biosecurity measures when having children to mitigate the risk of zoonotic exposure to other pathogens, they were not aware of the specific zoonotic risk posed by HPAIV. Several participants, particularly those with backgrounds in healthcare or relatives in healthcare, were more aware of the zoonotic risk of HPAIV, highlighted the benefits of biosecurity to protect themselves and their families:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Well the number one is\u0026hellip;keeping myself and my family healthy. Because like, you know, just knowing that there are some diseases that can jump from humans to animal or animals to humans My number one concern would be like keeping myself and my kids safe. So that's the biggest benefit in my mind.\u0026rdquo; (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(4) Perceived barriers to implementing biosecurity measures\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eInformational barriers\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e Participants experienced a breadth of barriers to implementing biosecurity measures in their flocks, and many of these barriers were related to information. Some participants felt that the volume of information available regarding HPAI was overwhelming:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u0026hellip;there's just so much involved in this and and and the fact that it's it's really, really hard it's hard to keep on top of all these things and what has to be done and\u0026hellip; it's it's it's it's a big it's a big thing to deal with.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOthers felt that there was a paucity of information specific enough to their production system to be useful, or that the information they needed to make informed decisions about smallholder poultry health and biosecurity specifically was difficult to find:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I think information is big because there's a lot of the information that, that is out there is provided by big commercial operations. So it's not really applicable to, you know, me and my 15 chickens. Or it's not available to me and my 15 chickens. Or a lot of the information that's out there, I like to call it the Google Gods, right? The Google Gods have provided or the Facebook group or whatever. And that's not necessarily, you know, now I'm going to be dosing my chicken like it's a sheep for, you know, there's just not, the information isn't necessarily easily available.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants frequently expressed that there was an immense amount of problematic information online:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;From like being in chicken groups online - drives me nuts people that think that avian influenza is a hoax. It's the government trying to, what is it? Uh, get rid of small flock producers so that they can force us to eat the commercial eggs and they want some - it's nuts. Nuts, the misinformation out there.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C., I#10, NB)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDiscernment and critical appraisal of the wide variety of available information, both accurate and problematic, were identified as a significant barrier. The large amount of problematic information prompted some participants to use their judgment and avoid web searches or viewing social media content \u0026ldquo;with a grain of salt\u0026rdquo; (multiple participants). Instead, they relied on sources they considered reputable, such as government websites, veterinary extension sites, and knowledgeable community members. While participants often said they found government and health official resources trustworthy and reputable, they experienced barriers related to the accessibility of these resources (e.g., technical terminology, format, and length):\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u0026hellip;I'd like to like the Canadian government website to like have better information or like just more easily accessed because like I find every time I try and look something up on there, it's always like downloading 800 PDFs. And like, it's just, and I'm just like, okay, this is like important information. I'm like, but I'm on my phone.\u0026rdquo; (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants also expressed frustration with contacting government agencies directly. They mentioned that they or people they knew \u0026ldquo;\u0026hellip;got a runaround\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #1 B.C. FG) from government employees, and that they experienced great difficulty reaching government officials to answer questions about HPAIV prevention or the government control orders that had been put in place. Others expressed frustration over the lack of integration between municipal, provincial/territorial, and federal regulations for smallholder poultry, which made it difficult for them to comply with the rules.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRegarding the specific content of governmental communications, participants noticed that the standard recommendations to \u0026ldquo;contact your vet[erinarian]\u0026rdquo; (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) with questions or concerns about HPAIV prevention was problematic given a persistent veterinary shortage in Canada and few veterinarians being able or willing to provide services for smallholder poultry:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I called every single vet clinic in [city]. Nobody would see or like even talk to us on the phone, like I asked for like a phone consult, you know, kind of like go through with the symptoms were, what we should do, safety, all that kind of stuff, nobody would even talk to us... But it was kind of in my back of my mind like but because they say on this information, they're like, oh, if you're suspecting your flock has avian influenza, contact your vet. And it's like. Who am I going to contact?\u0026rdquo; (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W) (\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR40\" citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Furthermore, participants sometimes expressed feeling that the government's messaging appeared to lack strong rationale, which may impact people\u0026rsquo;s willingness to follow recommendations in the face of competing messaging:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Yeah, I don't know how you find, but when I talk to people around me who also have birds, I hear so much superstition. So much practice is because, you know, and people come with magic potions and and different things that they try uh that has no basis in science or fact. And then if we get additional messaging from the government that may make sense in some you know in some theoretical or it is derived from something. But if it's not presented with the rationale clearly, then I think people will be unlikely to, to follow it.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C., I#1, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne interviewee involved in regulation identified two additional obstacles for newcomer immigrant smallholder poultry producers: language barriers and, at times, limited understanding of Canadian welfare, biosecurity, and livestock management standards, as well as cultural and traditional practices that do not easily align with these standards.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eResource and structural barriers\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeyond information, some interviewees noted that resource and infrastructural limitations were key barriers to people\u0026rsquo;s ability and willingness to implement biosecurity measures. For example, time and financial constraints were raised, as well as limitations to participants\u0026rsquo; ability to make changes to coop design, either because they were working with structures that were previously built without practical biosecurity measures in mind, or that they were trying to refurbish or renovate their current infrastructure but faced financial or other constraints to this. Several participants kept their poultry on shared properties and either did not want to invest in modifications on other owners\u0026rsquo; properties or buildings or felt constrained in implementing biosecurity measures related to land-sharing arrangements:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;One it's not my property\u0026hellip; Two the barn is incredibly old. Um, yeah, those were. I mean, if the if the barn was on my property, I could put in biosecurity measures. If the barn was on my property, it being incredibly old would be a definite issue. But, yeah, no, the major issue, it's not my property.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast #1 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese participants also reported challenges enforcing biosecurity rules among different property users, including those who entered the property to purchase products from them or from others sharing the property.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterestingly, potentially in relation to early recommendations for people to take bird feeders down, participants frequently stated an inability to prevent small songbirds from entering their enclosure, indicating that they believed it was never possible to have completely impenetrable biosecurity because of this:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;You're supposed to keep your birds isolated. So inside, you know, people talk about biosecurity. And sure, they've got their runs covered. You have the little birds that come through your pens so I don't know that it's super effective just to have a covered pen.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C. I#3, W) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, a barrier against biosecurity implementation was people\u0026rsquo;s perception of the efficacy of the measures themselves. This places less emphasis on the individual's perceived ability to perform the activity (see self-efficacy below) and more on their perception of whether the action is rational to them and will meaningfully reduce their risk:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Like for us, it's kind of like, does it make sense? Is this actually a thing that's going to do, do like, reduce the risk?\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast B.C. I#10, NB)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(5) Self-efficacy in enacting biosecurity measures\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e Participants frequently demonstrated a strong duty of care towards their animals and a desire to do the right thing to keep them healthy:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I obviously don't want them to get sick and die. Like avian influenza specifically is terrible. Like it would devastate our flock but other illnesses too, right? We're like, we're trying to keep them as healthy and safe and all of that as possible from all illnesses. So with the biosecurity, we're also trying to keep out like rodents and pests and other animals that might spread illnesses to them, whether that's like mites or lice or Salmonella, things like that. So trying to keep the animals specifically as healthy as possible.\u0026rdquo; (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Although participants often believed they could prevent HPAIV from entering their flock through adequate biosecurity, they identified several risk factors beyond their control, including the biosecurity practices of others, the presence of songbirds in their coop, and the movement or presence of migratory birds on their property. Some expressed concerns about inadequate care and biosecurity practices they observed on other properties or farms, as well as worries that others\u0026rsquo; actions (or inaction, such as not attending the MAF workshops on HPAI) might undermine their own biosecurity efforts:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u003c/em\u003eOur neighborhood is full of \u0026ndash; everybody\u0026rsquo;s got chickens, like 6 chickens or whatever in the backyards. We walk down the road, and you see them out and they\u0026rsquo;re, they\u0026rsquo;ve got them out in their front yard, like they\u0026rsquo;re all over the whole yard, and they\u0026rsquo;re not here, I see. So, it\u0026rsquo;s people like that... Yeah and we're wondering where they all are?\u0026rdquo; (Kelowna, Okanagan B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMost participants stated they felt they could not reduce their risk of HPAI exposure entirely. A few participants expressed a sense of inevitability regarding HPAI exposure and questioned their ability to prevent it, given the challenges with prevention, even in commercial flocks:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;And, what's the data? What's the percentage of large flock AI outbreaks compared to small flock AI outbreaks? Where's the problem? You know the, the large-scale guys have got access to the best extension services on, or, veterinary care, science. Dedicated veterinarians, instant results from pathology\u0026hellip; and then biosecurity enforceable biosecurity, and they're having just as many outbreaks.\u0026rdquo; (Okanagan B.C. I#7, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(6) Cues to action to implement biosecurity measures\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTrust and rapport\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eEssential factors that motivated people to act on HPAI biosecurity were trust, increased visibility or access, and building rapport with the agency or the individuals delivering the message through consultation. People tended to seek advice from those they know and trust, whether those were people in official roles or community members:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;And being in a smaller place when you know people too, you also talk to the people that you know. And we know people in both those departments so, so it's easy, probably because it's easier to reach out when you know someone. So you can just send an email or a text and not feel like it's going to be this formal thing that you get like\u0026hellip; you can just ask for information and you know that you will get a, like a\u0026hellip; honest response to information\u0026hellip; Yukon Agriculture has had events and they work with people and they're kind of out there talking to people, they show that they're listening. And so that definitely builds trust of who you want to go talk to when something is tricky or you're not sure or something seems off. Like you want to, yeah, go to a trustworthy and open kind of place.\u0026rdquo; (Yukon I#2, NA)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eCentralized communication through flock registration\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrequently, people supported increased, centralized government communication with smallholder poultry producers about HPAI and biosecurity recommendations and felt that this would help keep them informed about HPAI. Yet, they are unaware that a mandatory PID system already exists in B.C. and is encouraged in the Yukon:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I mean, obviously it would be great to be able to register your birds so you would be aware of what's going on. So there's no registration other than what happens at the food place.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C., I#14, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eRisk self-assessment \u0026ndash; immediacy and proximity\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticipants used various tools to assess their immediate risk and decide whether risk reduction was necessary or feasible. For example, several mentioned using publicly available HPAI case maps to evaluate their risk, but often felt these maps lacked sufficient resolution for accurate assessment. People also self-assessed their risk and made decisions based on the seasonality of migratory birds, particularly in northern areas. However, a few participants noted that guidelines recommending the use of seasonality as a preventative measure are not specific enough\u0026mdash;for example, when the migratory season ends or which wild bird species are most important. Even if participants were aware of HPAI and its transmission from wild birds, they frequently judged whether wild birds were \u0026lsquo;close enough\u0026rsquo; to their coops or whether the bird species posed a risk to their flock's exposure to HPAIV.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, a smallholder producer\u0026rsquo;s belief in their current, recurrent, or near-term susceptibility to HPAI, or disease in general, appears to significantly influence how strongly efforts to implement and reinforce biosecurity measures are prioritized:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;It is on my mind all the time now. So, like, every time I go out to do something for the chickens, that's what I'm, that's what I'm thinking about. Um. You know, so like just little things like the decision to move their feeders inside the coop. Like normally we didn't do that just because I'm like, well, I don't want to attract rodents into the coop. But now I'm like, well. You know the threat of a wild bird bringing some kind of disease in is probably a higher risk than rodents, right? So it's just like\u0026sbquo; when I'm trying to like weigh priorities like that, like the avian influenza is always the deciding factor.\u0026rdquo; (Omineca Skeena B.C., I#4, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile several participants felt that biosecurity maintenance was essential and straightforward, some participants thought they would backslide and would not prioritize the implementation of biosecurity measures if there was not an apparent imminent risk present:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Nothing [would make me continue to implement biosecurity measures in the absence of an outbreak]. I wouldn't do it if I didn't have to because who\u0026rsquo;s got time for extra stuff for no reason.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlternatively, people who believed that immediate exposure risk and their susceptibility were low appeared to be much less motivated to adopt enhanced biosecurity measures:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;It's going to be basically what I'm doing now. Just limiting the amount of people that go in the barn and minor biosecurity stuff. I don't think I need to spend more money to keep away a problem I don't think is going to happen up here.\u0026rdquo; (Peace B.C., I#2, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTransmission to other flocks\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThose who believed there was a risk of transmission to other flocks around them expressed a strong sense of community duty of care towards other producers. Most producers felt that they were very geographically and functionally isolated from other flocks, such that the likelihood of transmission from themselves to others was low, and few participants were aware of any commercial poultry flocks nearby. However, for several participants, awareness of potential connections between their own flocks and others, especially if those other flocks depended on their poultry for income, was a key reason for altruistically adopting biosecurity measures to prevent transmission of HPAIV:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Well, the only thing that I make sure not to do is go over to the egg farm. With anything that's been near my turkeys. Right\u0026hellip; So different shoes. That sort of stuff because they live just down the road and I don't want to impact, like anything that's going over there. That would, that would break my heart. So, you know, it's really not so much my flock that I'm worried about. It's about making sure I don't spread it to someone else.\u0026rdquo; (Yukon, I#1, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec27\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eConcern for public health\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAnother critical cue to action that was identified was concern for public health. In most cases, those who were aware of the public health risks associated with HPAI and other zoonotic pathogens of poultry were most supportive of increased regulation of smallholders, premises registration, and the implementation of comprehensive biosecurity measures:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I think, especially when we have something like avian influenza circulating, where it can impact human health, not only bird health, or other animal health as well, I think the responsibility\u0026rsquo;s for everybody to be conscientious of biosecurity. We had just had a, you know, pandemic, like we should all\u0026hellip; be aware. And I'm hoping that there are lessons learned from that are not lost. Although some days it seems like they are so\u0026hellip; But yeah, especially people like us who are handling the birds daily, we have an extra added responsibility to make sure that we are on top of the best information, also things like having the B.C. ID, farm ID. I think that's really important too for tracking.\u0026rdquo; (Okanagan B.C., I#15, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec28\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e(7) Modifying Factors\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec29\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAnti-commercialized poultry production and the naturalness bias\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMany people participate in smallholder poultry production to oppose commercialized food systems. Participants often said that the food they get from their smallholder birds is healthier and more nutritious for their families than products from the commercial poultry industry (i.e., \u0026lsquo;factory farms\u0026rsquo;). Several participants were especially motivated by the idea of regenerative, circular, alternative, or organic food economies. A common belief among smallholder producers is that smallholder poultry farming is a key way to take control of the food they eat, know where it comes from, and increase their food security. A few participants strongly believed in the naturalness bias\u0026mdash;an extension of the appeal-to-nature fallacy\u0026mdash;which holds that something is better or healthier simply because it is labelled or perceived as \u0026ldquo;natural\u0026rdquo; or unmodified by humans (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e). The extent to which smallholder poultry producers oppose the commercial poultry industry and hold a naturalness bias may directly influence their willingness to adopt recommended biosecurity measures. If individuals strongly believe that maintaining poultry health requires free-range (i.e., \u0026ldquo;natural\u0026rdquo;) methods, many biosecurity measures may appear diametrically opposed to these anti-commercial production beliefs. In such cases, they are less likely to implement measures that restrict wildlife access, prevent standing water, or confine poultry to a coop:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Well, yeah, no one wants [HPAI]. It's important. But I'm trying to, I'm trying to think about how we would keep our flock away from wild birds. And keep them as healthy as possible, right? So, it's like kind of more about health, right? The flock's health. And for them to get out in the run and scratch in the forest\u0026hellip; is a very healthy thing for them to do because then they get all the minerals that they need for the gullet and they can get other sources of protein that the feed wouldn't necessarily, like a more a more dimensional source of food and protein and things right? And exercise and things, right? And so all that is just lending itself to very healthy birds, right? And keeping them cooped in a smaller enclosure where, you know, we'd have to like muck them out more often, like physically remove their manure and stuff so that they're not just like concentrating all that stuff sounds like a more adverse health risks there.\u0026rdquo; (South Coast B.C., I#17, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, smallholder producers specifically may also perceive that the birds can only experience happiness with free-range access and may personify or anthropomorphize the experiences of their birds, stating: \u0026ldquo;And I don\u0026rsquo;t want to put them in a little run when they just love free ranging all over the place.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eGovernment trust, mistrust, or distrust\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurther important modifying factors within the smallholder industry include psychosocial factors related to government mistrust or distrust, as well as personal viewpoints on the role of regulatory oversight of smallholder production. Themes related to the government's lack of prioritization of smallholder poultry producer interests, issues of trust versus mistrust/distrust in the government, the level of government regulation versus increased support, and government defiance or avoidance of reporting were often identified. While a few participants self-identified as rule followers, there were also several times when participants expressed sentiments that the government did not make decisions with smallholders\u0026rsquo; interests in mind:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;I think knowing that the government is using the information about what's going on. And using a lens of a global market makes me a little apprehensive to believe what they're saying completely because it seems like they're really looking out for the big commercial growers or producers, the ones that are intending to export their food... So, to really put that much trust into an entity that is not looking out for backyard flock owners is really hard not to look at it with the level of skepticism. I'd be more inclined to talk to you and have a collective voice as flock owners as opposed to someone in Ottawa who's making these decisions, or someone at the legislature who's never kept birds before and things like that. So, I really I lean on my community so much more than I think a lot of folks might let on. Those who have a little bit more faith in the government. But I'm really apprehensive to put that much trust in the system. I'm sorry.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG)\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSeveral participants reported seeing or hearing of people who expressed distrust of government interventions for infectious disease control, and were more likely to \u0026ldquo;shoot, shovel, and shut up\u0026rdquo; (Cariboo Chilcotin Coast B.C., I#9, W), if they suspected HPAI, rather than reporting suspicious symptoms. Further, they believed that there was specifically a post-COVID-19 pandemic development of government mistrust and libertarianism, particularly around infectious disease management across many smallholder producers:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Now\u0026hellip; if bird flu was around in 2019, everybody would be like okay well you know, we'll close things down, we\u0026rsquo;ll be more careful but now because it's 2025, everybody's like: \u0026ldquo;Screw the government! We're going to just let our sick animals on every plane and bus.\u0026rdquo;\u0026hellip; The trust is gone. It's just 100% shot.\u0026rdquo; (Cariboo Chilcotin Coast B.C., I#9, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurther suspicion of significant underreporting of HPAI in smallholder flocks may be linked to people\u0026rsquo;s perception of government oversight, a lack of awareness of reporting regulations, or a lack of knowledge of one\u0026rsquo;s role within the national poultry system:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u003c/em\u003eHow big is the AI problem in Vancouver? I bet you it's five times worse than what government knows. People just have all their chickens die. Throw them in the garbage, or take them and dump them in the bush. Get more chickens.\u0026rdquo; (Okanagan B.C., I#7, M)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec31\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eSmallholder producer regulation\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome participants were very supportive of increased regulation of smallholder poultry producers, while others were not. Some participants believe that increased government regulation of smallholder poultry to support HPAI prevention and control is necessary to safeguard poultry and public health and a diversified food system, because they think outreach and education alone are not enough, considering their current state and the target audience of these measures:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;People, again, that are trying to do that, like the B.C. Poultry Health Network and the ask of vet and all of that. But again, you're reaching like, you know, preaching to the choir. You're reaching the selective audience of those who are already going to be seeking this information out and using that information. So, I think that's where the government comes in with providing regulations to make sure that not only those who are seeking that information are still required to follow that. And they also could provide, like I said, the better education materials.\u0026rdquo; (Thompson-Nicola B.C., I#6, W)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome participants expressed concern that continued outbreaks in smallholder flocks could lead to increased regulation of the sector or even its banning altogether. Some expressed that increased regulation, enhanced enforcement, or banning of smallholder production would lead to greater defiance of government oversight and under-reporting of HPAI and illegal keeping of poultry:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;If they tell me I can\u0026rsquo;t have chickens, I\u0026rsquo;ll just get more chickens.\u0026rdquo; (Vancouver Island/Coast #2 B.C. FG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eSmallholder poultry producers generally want to keep themselves, their families, and others safe from HPAI. They often understand the benefits of biosecurity and are frequently aware of the severity of exposure to the virus. However, they still face challenges in consistently and effectively implementing biosecurity measures which span multiple HBM constructs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec33\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eSmallholders require better support in navigating HPAI information\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne implementation challenge is informational, arising across various constructs, including barriers, susceptibility, and cues to action. We found that the informational barrier is not so much a lack of information volume as a lack of information quality and specificity. To improve this informational challenge, smallholder producers require information tailored to their needs, rather than simply extensions of recommendations for commercial producers. Through smallholder producer workshops on HPAI biosecurity in the UK, researchers also found that producers preferred guidance that was more specific to smallholders (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e). An HBM-focused study conducted in Bangladesh also found that producer-specific informational barriers among smallholders significantly affected their biosecurity self-efficacy (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBeyond specificity, information accessibility is also vital to improve uptake and understanding of biosecurity. Information for smallholders must be accessible in terms of format, length, density, language, and presentation. Information should be in accessible formats for mobile devices, since this is often how people will find and use it. Multimedia sources should be used to engage audiences across different channels and be both timely at the start of outbreaks and frequent so producers maintain a current sense of susceptibility (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e). For example, distributing audio-visual materials, including videos with clear instructions and success stories from more relatable individuals (e.g., other producers), could be effective, along with social media posts featuring producer/farmer \u0026ldquo;influencers\u0026rdquo; to directly counteract problematic information and leverage community trust (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e). In biosecurity co-production workshops held in the UK, it was found that providing visual examples and examples of materials or equipment they may already have (e.g., different shoes and a pair of coop-only clothes) would likely improve biosecurity uptake (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e). Informational resources should be developed in plain language and in languages that match population demographics. Finally, particularly in response to problematic information (e.g., HPAI is a hoax), information should clearly emphasize that smallholders are susceptible to HPAI and specify which activities specifically make them so (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e). Overall, our study suggests that smallholder producers do not require more information to make improved decisions around biosecurity implementation \u0026ndash; they need better information.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec34\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eCultivating government trust\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThemes surrounding government trust were also prominent in this study \u0026ndash; a throughline that spanned barriers, susceptibility, severity, modifying factors, and cues to action. While some participants discussed the distrust they witnessed among other smallholder poultry producers, the study participants themselves generally expressed trust in government resources. However, this trust was eroded by specific behaviour patterns practiced by officials. For example, producers expressed frustration that they could not access government employees directly for advice. This can create a sense of a lack of transparency and disconnect between regulators and smallholder producers (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, producers were unwilling to follow advice that lacked clear justification. In other words, producers need to clearly understand not only what they should be doing but why they should be doing it. While established crisis communication dogmas suggest that scientific messages should be simplified for lay audiences, we demonstrate that such messages still require justification for clarity and uptake (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e). Without providing a comprehensive rationale for HPAI biosecurity (prevention) and management actions, including addressing uncertainty, smallholders may be prone to following problematic advice from unverified sources (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn line with transparency and cultivating trust, government engagement with smallholder poultry communities is crucial, as involving public stakeholders and civil society, and encouraging citizen participation both empower individuals and foster confidence in authority (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e). Trust-building techniques include co-creation of biosecurity recommendations, recurrent or continuous training, and collaborative learning facilitated by governments and health officials that consider the lived experiences and context of smallholders\u0026rsquo; needs (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e). For example, recommendations should not hinge on resources that smallholder producers do not have access to, such as veterinarians, as most smallholder producers in Canada do not have access to a poultry veterinarian. Other studies have also found that government trust and rapport significantly affect farmers\u0026rsquo; intentions to report infectious diseases and to follow regulations focused on infectious disease mitigation and management (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e). As such, more collaborative, bidirectional communication may not only identify strategies more tenable for smallholders but also improve the acceptance and uptake of biosecurity measures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAppeal to smallholder-specific needs and values\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSmallholder producers\u0026rsquo; desire to keep their birds healthy, with a focus on what health means to them, interacts with benefits, barriers, modifying factors, and cues to action associated with biosecurity against HPAI. Biosecurity recommendations for smallholder poultry producers should resonate with their psychosocial values and emotions, emphasize co-benefits beyond HPAIV prevention, and prioritize ease of integration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSmallholder producers expressed strong emotions focused on their birds, and particularly surrounding the prospect of culling or the death of their birds due to HPAIV (i.e., devastation, nausea, panic). Therefore, understanding and addressing the \u0026lsquo;emotional epidemiology\u0026rsquo; associated with HPAI outbreaks may be just as crucial to management as understanding the biological and ecological aspects of HPAI, especially among those with diminished trust in government and science (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e). We found that smallholder poultry producers are motivated to take actions they believe will effectively safeguard or enhance their birds\u0026rsquo; health. However, their understanding of health and happiness for their birds is sometimes seen as conflicting with commercial poultry practices (e.g., confinement, restrictions on outdoor access, and avoidance of multi-species interactions) and biosecurity measures, which might be associated with these production systems. A UK-based study also found that some producers were \u0026ldquo;unwilling to house their birds\u0026rdquo; due to perceived welfare impacts (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e). Another multiple-method study found that smallholder producers had significant concerns about the welfare of their birds, also centred on confining birds indoors (one of the key biosecurity recommendations for preventing HPAI) (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e). Given the nature of the smallholder production movement, its focus on anti-industrial agriculture rhetoric, and the influence of social pressures on smallholder producers, communication approaches that directly clarify what birds truly need to be healthy and happy, with optimized welfare, could help increase biosecurity adoption among smallholder poultry producers (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e). Smallholder engagement and co-production, as discussed above, can also support the development of tailored recommendations that appeal to smallholders\u0026rsquo; specific values. A helpful communication strategy in this area could be to focus on producers\u0026rsquo; feelings and values through stories and narratives to influence behaviour change (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSmallholder-focused biosecurity communications are also likely to be more effective if they frame biosecurity as having multiple co-benefits beyond HPAI prevention alone. For example, communications could focus on aspects of smallholder production that are more familiar than HPAIV, such as predator or rodent control, and show how integrating biosecurity measures provides health benefits by protecting them against multiple risks, including other infectious diseases and risks to public health (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e). Using familiar words and information can improve clarity and, subsequently, comprehension of health promotion materials (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e). Addressing HPAI biosecurity recommendations as having multiple co-benefits beyond HPAI prevention may support habit-building and behavioural sustainability, be a more cost-effective use of limited resources, and appeal more successfully to smallholder producers\u0026rsquo; motivation to keep their birds healthy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, biosecurity messaging for smallholder producers that is focused on the psychosocial interpretations and impacts of biosecurity implementation and the diverse health benefits of biosecurity, while considering what health means to this population, could enhance biosecurity implementation.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Study limitations","content":"\u003cp\u003eThere are several limitations associated with this study. We did not directly observe or systematically ask about participant biosecurity practices, which limits our ability to confirm people\u0026rsquo;s perspectives with actual implemented behaviour. We collected sparse demographic data, which limits our ability to compare our sample with the general smallholder producer population. Given the qualitative nature of this study, we were able to elucidate nuanced details of constructs but not quantify them. We used a combination of an information power framework and a sample size calculator guided by data saturation theory to determine our target sample size. Although we did not obtain the recommended sample sizes, we achieved data saturation through data analysis, where no new themes were identified as we reached the end of our dataset (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e). As a result, our sample size appears sufficient to address the research questions at hand. We employed thorough and diverse recruitment strategies, but our efforts may have been limited by mistrust of authority and health institutions, including academia and government (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e). This may have contributed to our recruitment success, to a smaller sample size, and to the development of a non-random, purposive sample that may be affected by non-response bias (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e). The nature of the non-response bias makes it difficult to confirm that our sample is representative of the entire smallholder poultry producer population in B.C. and the Yukon. However, since this is the first published study we are aware of that explores the perceptions and beliefs of this population in Canada, it provides an important first step toward better understanding how to enhance communication with smallholder producers about HPAI biosecurity.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eUsing the HBM has allowed us to examine and describe the motivations and beliefs of smallholder poultry producers surrounding HPAI biosecurity. Understanding the motivations and beliefs of smallholder producers regarding biosecurity is critical to improving communication between disease regulators and this population. Ultimately, smallholder poultry producers: 1) need better and more targeted information and support in navigating that information; 2) require increased trust building with the government; and 3) require biosecurity messaging to be in alignment with their understandings of poultry health and focused on the integration of flock health beyond preventing HPAI alone. Communications about biosecurity aimed at smallholder producers in Canada would benefit from directly addressing each construct of the HBM, especially barriers, susceptibility, modifying (psychosocial and demographic) factors, and cues to action. It should also incorporate principles from democratic public health communications and outbreak information management, such as empowerment, engagement, and trust-building, while appealing to values, emotions, and stories (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eContributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll co-authors contributed to the study design. CA conducted data acquisition and analysis. CA conducted an extensive interpretation of data with support from all other co-authors. CA drafted the work, and all co-authors contributed to revisions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe transcripts generated from interviews and focus groups in this study are not publicly available because participants provided consent only for the research team to have full access.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eWe thank Dr. Victoria Bowes, Dr. Tony Redford, and the British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture and Food for their support with recruitment and study design. We thank the Government of Yukon Animal Health Unit, specifically Dr. Jane Harms and Dr. Michelle Thompson, who supported the development of the interview guide and a Yukon-specific recruitment plan. We thank the members of the Fraser Valley Poultry Fanciers Association, especially Clayton Botkin, for supporting the pre-testing of the interview guide. We thank the Yukon Agricultural Association, the B.C. Small-Scale Meat Producers Association, and the B.C. Meat Inspection Program; organizations that all supported recruitment advertisements. We want to extend our thanks to all the feed stores and events that posted our recruitment posters. Finally, we would like to heartily thank all the focus group and interview participants for their time and the expertise they graciously shared.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eFunding for this research was provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (PGS D-589564-2024), the Yukon-Canada Sustainable Agricultural Partnership, the\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB.C. MAF, the Canada Research Chair programme (CRC 2020-00132), and the Michael Smith Health Research B.C. Scholar Award.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics declarations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEthics approval and consent to participate\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was approved by the University of British Columbia\u0026rsquo;s Behavioural Research Ethics Board (H22-02345). Interview participants had access to study information and a consent form prior to signing up for an interview. The consent form was reviewed before interviews and focus groups commenced. Verbal consent was obtained from each focus group and interview participant. Interview participants also received a copy of the consent form via email for their records. \u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eConsent to publish\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eInformed consent for publication, including the use of quotations, was obtained from each participant as above.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCanadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). Status of ongoing avian influenza response by province [Internet]. 2025 [cited 2025 June 16]. 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J Med Internet Res. 2020 June;29(6):e21820.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"bmc-veterinary-research","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [BMC Veterinary Research](http://bmcvetres.biomedcentral.com/)","snPcode":"12917","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/12917/3?","title":"BMC Veterinary Research","twitterHandle":"@BMC_series","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"BMC Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"backyard poultry, biosecurity, HPAI, health belief model, risk communication, smallholder poultry, trust","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8254317/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8254317/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003ch2\u003eBackground\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eHighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has caused recurrent epizootics in wildlife and poultry in North America between 2005 and 2025. B.C. is located within the Canadian portion of the Pacific Americas Flyway, one of several migratory pathways involved in the global transmission of HPAI to western Canada, which also includes the Yukon, Canada\u0026rsquo;s northwesternmost territory. HPAI affects both commercial and smallholder poultry production, but little is known about smallholder poultry producers in this region. HPAI biosecurity and communications-focused tools remain among the few available for HPAI prevention in smallholder flocks in Canada. Thus, understanding their perceptions of these topics is crucial for HPAI prevention in this population.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eMethods\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe used qualitative research methods, including interviews and focus groups, guided by the Health Belief Model (HBM) to explore the perceptions and beliefs of smallholder poultry producers in B.C. and the Yukon, Canada, regarding HPAI and its prevention, especially biosecurity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eResults\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe found that smallholder poultry producers generally understand the benefits of biosecurity and the severity of HPAI, and they display strong self-efficacy in implementing biosecurity measures. However, smallholder producers need to believe that they and their flocks are potentially susceptible to HPAI virus to implement consistent biosecurity measures. Producers appeared more likely to enact biosecurity measures if they felt they were susceptible to HPAI. We identified many barriers to implementing biosecurity measures, especially barriers related to information quality, specificity, and volume. Participants were influenced by various cues to action. Finally, multiple modifying factors exist, including government trust and perceptions of what constitutes healthy poultry.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eConclusions\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results of this study suggest that smallholder poultry producers require better support in navigating information about HPAI; that governments need to cultivate trust with smallholder producers through their HPAI communications; and that communications focused on smallholder biosecurity need to appeal to smallholder-specific needs and values beyond HPAI prevention alone. Smallholder poultry producers need better, not more, information. To communicate effectively with them, messaging should focus on each aspect of the HBM and be tailored through risk communication strategies that emphasize engagement, trust-building, and multiple benefits of biosecurity for smallholder poultry health. These results may apply to smallholder producer populations in North America and abroad.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"“The trust is gone”: Smallholder poultry producers’ perceptions of biosecurity measures against highly pathogenic avian influenza","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-10 00:40:06","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8254317/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-01-19T05:25:22+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-12-30T19:24:36+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"4599650987488204256903749501838964616","date":"2025-12-22T09:04:30+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"279690477481114158597828266960545988520","date":"2025-12-21T04:13:51+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"54851717019745067368896176526988662203","date":"2025-12-19T12:00:57+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-12-09T17:13:42+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"206693919474776429738430841382508278931","date":"2025-12-08T17:45:03+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-08T17:28:07+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-08T09:47:15+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-12-08T03:08:27+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-12-08T03:07:41+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"BMC Veterinary Research","date":"2025-12-01T22:55:46+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"bmc-veterinary-research","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [BMC Veterinary Research](http://bmcvetres.biomedcentral.com/)","snPcode":"12917","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/12917/3?","title":"BMC Veterinary Research","twitterHandle":"@BMC_series","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"BMC Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"b9ecda55-0a00-4f6a-b4cd-a33cdb2b71b5","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 10th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-16T16:07:27+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-8254317","link":"https://doi.org/10.1186/s12917-026-05406-x","journal":{"identity":"bmc-veterinary-research","isVorOnly":false,"title":"BMC Veterinary Research"},"publishedOn":"2026-03-09 15:59:07","publishedOnDateReadable":"March 9th, 2026"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-10 00:40:06","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1186/s12917-026-05406-x","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1186/s12917-026-05406-x","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8254317","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8254317","identity":"rs-8254317","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}