Rethinking Governance Effectiveness: Sustainable Development in an Unrecognised State

Rethinking Governance Effectiveness: Sustainable Development in an Unrecognised State | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Rethinking Governance Effectiveness: Sustainable Development in an Unrecognised State Mohamed Farah, Alvedi Sabani This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 11 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract As global challenges such as trade disruption, climate instability, and widening inequality expose the fragility of multilateral governance, the need to understand how sustainable development can be achieved in politically contested and resource-constrained contexts has grown increasingly urgent. While dominant development models emphasise state capacity, institutional formalism, and international recognition, this study examines how effective governance for sustainable development is operationalised in Somaliland, an unrecognised state in the Horn of Africa that has maintained relative peace and developmental progress despite lacking formal international status. Drawing on qualitative data from 26 in-depth interviews with state actors, civil society organisations, business leaders, and traditional authorities, the study identifies three critical dimensions of governance effectiveness: (1) governance modes and arrangements, (2) the diversity of governance actors, and (3) multistakeholder dialogue. The findings reveal that Somaliland’s governance success is rooted in its hybrid institutional arrangements, internal legitimacy, and adaptive decision-making processes that draw on customary, religious, and modern governance traditions. This research challenges conventional assumptions that equate effectiveness with institutional formality and state sovereignty, offering a context-sensitive perspective on governance in fragile or de facto states. It contributes to broader debates on hybridity, legitimacy, and inclusive development in international political economy and comparative development studies. Humanities/Cultural and media studies Social science/Cultural and media studies Social science/Development studies Social science/Environmental studies Social science/Politics and international relations Social science/Social policy Governance Sustainable Development Somaliland Unrecongised States Hybridity Comparative Governance Figures Figure 1 1 Introduction In an era marked by intensifying geopolitical tension, global trade wars, and widening inequality, the importance of effective governance for sustainable development has become increasingly urgent (Omri and Mabrouk 2020 ). As multilateral commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) face unprecedented strain, questions of governance effectiveness, particularly in politically complex and resource-constrained contexts, demand closer scrutiny (Burkolter and Perch 2014 ; Scheffran 2025 ). Disruptions in global trade, food systems, and climate governance have further highlighted the need for institutional frameworks that are not only accountable and inclusive but also resilient to shocks and responsive to local realities. While much of the existing scholarship focuses on state-centric models of governance in established democracies (Bendaña and Chopra 2013 ; Coggins 2014 ; Eriksen 2017 ; Ostrom 2010 ) or development assistance in recognized fragile states (Bräutigam and Knack 2004 ; Brinkerhoff and Johnson 2008 ), less attention has been paid to unrecognised or de facto states navigating development independently. One such example is Somaliland, a self-declared republic in the Horn of Africa that has operated autonomously from Somalia since 1991 but remains diplomatically unrecognised. Despite lacking formal international status and enduring chronic resource scarcity, Somaliland has maintained relative peace and stability, functioning with a hybrid governance structure that combines customary law, Islamic principles, and modern state institutions. This study contributes to the expanding literature aimed at deepening our understanding of governance beyond conventional metrics. It examines Somaliland's distinctive governance arrangements and evaluates their impact on its development trajectory. By foregrounding an under-examined, post-conflict context, this research fills a significant gap in comparative development studies, specifically regarding how governance arrangements can effectively function in the absence of formal international legitimacy, and what implications this holds for sustainable development in fragile or contested states (Farah 2024 ; Glass and Newig 2019 ; Omri and Mabrouk 2020 ). Accordingly, the study investigates the research question: How can governance for sustainable development be effectively realised in Somaliland? Through qualitative fieldwork involving interviews with key actors across public, private, and civil society sectors, the study applies thematic analysis to identify the governance arrangements and institutional dynamics that underpin Somaliland’s developmental progress. By foregrounding a functionally stable yet diplomatically unrecognised context, this research extends theoretical debates on governance, hybridity, and state-building in contested and post-conflict spaces. 2 Literature Review 2.1 Governance and Development Nexus The concept of governance encompasses various dimensions of effectiveness, typically including accountability, transparency, rule of law, participation, responsiveness, equity, effectiveness/efficiency, and strategic vision that together shape a state’s developmental trajectory. The effectiveness of governance plays a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the development of a state (Güney 2017 ). Major international bodies and scholars have defined governance in terms of these core principles. A survey of literature on various forms of governance over the past two decades reveals a significant increase in research in this field. However, one of the challenges encountered in studying these forms lies in the different interpretations and understandings of essential elements, because the meanings associated with the term can differ across different disciplines. Table 1 presents a variety of definitions of governance and their key dimensions as provided by diverse sources, from development banks to academic theorists, underscoring common elements of good governance (e.g. accountability, transparency, combating corruption, stakeholder participation, legal frameworks) in driving development outcomes (African Development Bank 1999; Ansell and Torfing 2016 ; Kooiman 1999 ). For instance, the World Bank ( 2019 views governance as the manner in which power is exercised for development, highlighting public sector management, legal frameworks, accountability and transparency while the United Nations Development Programme ( 1997 initiated the definition of governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs, underlining citizen participation, equity and accountability. Likewise, Kaufmann and Kraay ( 2008 focus on effective policy formulation and implementation through rule of law, transparency and government effectiveness, and scholars such as Kooiman (Kooiman 1999 ; Kooiman 2003 ) describe governance as the “totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities” , thereby stressing interactive arrangements between state and non-state actors in achieving collective goals. Across these definitions, governance effectiveness is seen as multi-dimensional–requiring formal institutions to be accountable and inclusive, while engaging society in decision-making processes – all with the ultimate goal of fostering holistic development, promoting sustainable practices and ensuring the well-being of citizens and the state. Table 1 Forms of Governance in the Social Sciences Disciplines Concepts of Governance Meaning of Governance Sources Political Science Governance Governance is the process and structure by which public institutions and actors exercise authority, make decisions, implement policies and manage resources within a society. It refers to the way power is distributed and exercised and how public affairs are conducted. Governance encompasses both formal and informal mechanisms, institutions and practices that shape political, economic and social interactions. (Chhotray et al. 2009 ; Peters 2011a ; Stoker 1998 ) Development studies Good governance Good governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the public sector from institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political interaction, to decision-making structures that determine priorities among public problems and allocate resources to respond to them, to organisations that manage administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic arenas’ (Grindle 2004 ; Kaufmann and Kraay 2008 ; Kiely 1998 ; Philip 1999 ) Good enough governance ‘Good enough governance is a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits development initiatives to go forward’ (Börzel and Grimm 2018 ; Brinkerhoff and Johnson 2008 ; Evans 2012 ; Grindle 2004 ; Grindle 2007 ; Grindle 2011 ) Sociology Governance: Self-organisation ‘Refers to self-organisation of societies and communities, beyond the market and short of the state. Typical is the work of Elinor Ostrom, who studied the capacity of communities in different places and times to manage common pool resources and prevent their depletion (a prime example is overfishing). Small local communities have done so without the help of a formal government through bottom-up self-government by associations, informal understandings, negotiations, regulations, trust relations and informal social control rather than state coercion’ (Ostrom 1990 ; Rhodes 1996 ) Building upon existing understandings of governance effectiveness, Ziaja et al. ( 2019 , offer an empirical typology of state fragility characterized by violence control, implementation capacity, and empirical legitimacy. Somaliland exhibits notable strengths in these dimensions despite the constraints associated with its unrecognised status. For instance, violence control is significantly effective due to the integration of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, including the Guurti, alongside formal security institutions. Implementation capacity, while challenged by resource constraints, is bolstered by a decentralized governance system engaging multiple local stakeholders. Empirical legitimacy in Somaliland emerges from hybrid governance structures that reflect local sociopolitical norms, aligning closely with Ziaja et al.'s recognition of legitimacy as rooted in domestic acceptance rather than solely external recognition. Effective governance is thus intimately linked to sustainable development. There is broad recognition in development discourse that without good governance, sustainable development is difficult to achieve (Farah and Sabani 2019 ; Glass and Newig 2019 ; Omri and Mabrouk 2020 ; Towah 2019 ). This nexus has been explicitly incorporated into global development frameworks, most notably the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development broadened the focus beyond the earlier MDGs (which applied mainly to developing countries) to a universal set of goals that include governance-related targets for all nations. In particular, Goal 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” signals that peace, effective institutions, and inclusive governance are crucial prerequisites for sustainable development. Recent studies have reinforced these linkages: effective governance can facilitate economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability, whereas poor governance can derail development efforts (Goran 2007 ; Meadowcroft 2007 ; Weiss 2000 ). In sum, the literature establishes a clear governance-development nexus: improvements in governance quality (through accountable leadership, citizen participation, rule of law, etc.) tend to support more robust and equitable development outcomes, and conversely, sustainable development initiatives often require supportive governance structures to succeed. This nexus provides an important foundation for analysing Somaliland’s experience, where governance arrangements have been central to its peace and development over the past three decades. 2.2 State-centric vs Hybrid Governance Models Mainstream governance literature has historically been state-centric, focusing on the capacity of formal state institutions to deliver services and uphold rules. Conventional development models often assume that strengthening government apparatus, bureaucratic efficiency, rule of law, anti-corruption measures – will translate into better development outcomes (Grindle (Grindle 2004 ; Hydén et al. 2000 ). However, in many developing or post-conflict contexts, this state-centric lens is insufficient, as it overlooks the vital role of informal and traditional institutions. Critics like Richards ( 2009 and Wiuff Moe ( 2011 have highlighted the limitations of defining governance purely in terms of Western-state institutional frameworks, noting that such definitions may fail to capture the “informal institutions that govern the political landscape” in real-world contexts, particularly of societies with deep traditional forms of governing (Clements et al. 2007 ). In societies where the state’s reach is limited or where customary authority retains legitimacy, governance is not exercised by the state alone. Thus, an emerging body of literature examines hybrid governance models that blend formal and informal systems, challenging the dominance of purely state-centric paradigms (Herring et al. 2020 ; Njeri 2019 ; South 2018 ). The concept of hybrid political order or institutional hybridity has gained traction in explaining governance in fragile and post-colonial settings. Hybridity in governance refers to the coexistence and interplay of formal state structures with informal, customary, and traditional institutions in the same polity. Rather than a neat separation between a modern state and traditional society, these elements become interconnected, intertwined and interdependent (Kraushaar and Lambach 2009 ; Wiuff Moe 2011 ). In other words, hybrid governance systems blend formal state norms and institutions with those of the informal sphere, including traditional and customary practices. Somaliland offers a prime example of this type of blend: its governance approach is characterised by co-governance arrangements in which clan elders and customary authorities are integrated into the formal state apparatus. The establishment of the Guurti (House of Elders) as the upper house of Parliament is one illustration of this institutional hybridity, merging customary leadership with a constitutional structure. Such hybrid models can fill the governance void in weak states by leveraging local forms of authority and social regulation. Researchers argue that in places like Somaliland, informal networks and clan structures have provided legitimacy and social order that the nascent state alone could not supply (Boege 2006 ; Wiuff Moe 2011 ). This stands in contrast to the classic Weberian notion of a monopoly of authority by the state; instead, authority in hybrid orders is negotiated among state actors, traditional leaders, and local communities. Recent scholarship on hybrid governance and legitimacy theory suggests that a balance between formal and informal institutions can enhance stability and development in fragile contexts. Boege et al. ( 2008 and others describe “hybrid political orders” where customary governance mechanisms (e.g. councils of elders, customary law) work alongside formal government, creating a pragmatic form of order and service provision. In Somaliland’s case, the integration of clan elders into state governance has been credited with fostering a high degree of local legitimacy and ownership of political processes. “This hybrid formula is still regarded as one of the factors that is maintaining statehood and fostering favourable state–society relations” even decades after Somaliland’s self-declaration of independence (Richards 2016 ; Walls 2014 ). By tapping into indigenous structures of authority, the Somaliland government managed to establish peace and consensus in a manner that externally designed state institutions alone likely could not have achieved. On the other hand, purely state-centric approaches – such as those focused narrowly on building formal state capacity or institutions modelled on international best practices – often misjudge or undervalue these indigenous governance resources. This paper, therefore calls for a reconceptualization of governance in fragile settings, moving beyond a state-versus-tradition dichotomy to understand the hybrid governance arrangements that actually operate on the ground (Kraushaar and Lambach 2009 ). In summary, while traditional views prioritise state capacity and formal institutions, empirical observations (including the Somaliland case) highlight that informal and customary institutions can be equally critical. A hybrid governance model – recognizing the role of elders, religious authorities, and local norms in concert with the state – may provide a more comprehensive explanation for governance effectiveness in certain contexts than a strictly state-centric model. Somaliland’s governance success is rooted in its hybrid institutional arrangements, legitimacy theory, and adaptive decision-making processes that draw on customary, religious, and modern governance traditions. This hybridity aligns with McKie ( 2017 analysis, which highlights the critical role of institutional choices shaped by electoral uncertainty and the strategic control of constitutional reform processes in sub-Saharan Africa. McKie's findings suggest that institutional designs, such as the inclusion of presidential term limits, serve as political insurance mechanisms under conditions of electoral uncertainty. Somaliland's incorporation of traditional and customary authorities within formal state structures similarly reflects strategic institutional adaptation to manage internal political uncertainty, particularly during the critical formative years post-1991. 2.3 Unrecognised States and Fragile Contexts Somaliland’s experience also speaks to a notable gap in development studies: the under-representation of de facto states (unrecognised or self-declared states) in governance and development research. Mainstream development discourse and international policy often focus on recognized nation-states, meaning that territories like Somaliland which lack formal international recognition are seldom examined in comparative development studies (Phillips 2013 ; Richards 2016 ). This omission is significant, as unrecognised states present unique governance dynamics: they must govern and deliver services without the diplomatic recognition, external aid frameworks, or legitimacy that recognised states can rely on. Somaliland, for instance, has operated as a de facto state for over 30 years, achieving a degree of peace, stable governance, and development outcomes despite its lack of recognition. Yet, scholarly attention to such cases has been limited, partly due to their ambiguous international status. As a result, the literature on governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas has only recently begun to incorporate insights from de facto states like Somaliland, Transnistria, or Northern Cyprus, which exist in legal and developmental limbo. In general, fragile and post-conflict contexts have prompted considerable analysis in development literature. Studies of governance in war-torn or fragile states emphasize challenges like weak institutions, legitimacy deficits, external interference, and the importance of peacebuilding (Milton 2021 ; Njeri 2019 ; Ridout 2012 ). For internationally recognised fragile states (e.g. Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan), researchers and practitioners have explored how to rebuild effective governance – often stressing institution-building, inclusion of local actors, and international support. However, unrecognised states operate under different constraints: they cannot receive direct support from multilateral institutions and must derive legitimacy almost entirely from internal sources rather than international recognition. This creates an interesting paradox: while lacking external legitimacy, some de facto states have cultivated strong internal legitimacy through successful governance practices. Somaliland exemplifies this paradox; it has been described as a “phenomenon that deserves investigation” due to its unexpected success in establishing order and development without recognition (Phillips 2013 ; Richards 2016 ). Its government has had to negotiate legitimacy domestically, through power-sharing among clans and consistent delivery of security and basic services, to compensate for the absence of external validation. The literature on such cases remains emergent. Analysts like Richards ( 2016 ) argue that Somaliland’s case challenges conventional state-building theories, showing that alternative pathways to stability exist outside the typical frameworks of international statecraft. In Somaliland and similar contexts, local ownership of governance and bottom-up state formation play a decisive role. Moreover, as some scholars note, de facto states often pursue development goals in isolation, which can lead to innovative practices unencumbered by external prescriptions (Balthasar 2013 ; Eubank 2012 ). There is a growing recognition that studying unrecognised states can provide valuable insights into resilience and adaptive governance in extreme conditions. By comparing governance across fragile contexts – both recognised and unrecognised – we see that inclusive political settlements and hybrid institutions (customary and formal) are recurring themes in achieving stability (Menkhaus 2007 ; Phillips 2013 ). This paper addresses the gap by examining Somaliland within the governance for development discourse, thereby shedding light on how a de facto state manages to function and even thrive. Ultimately, understanding Somaliland’s governance offers broader lessons for fragile-state governance, illustrating how legitimacy and effectiveness can be built from the ground up when international blueprints are absent. To frame this argument more clearly, Table 2 summarises the comparative attributes of governance across three governance contexts including established democracies, recognised fragile states, and unrecognised/de facto states, drawing on Somaliland as an illustrative case within the latter category. Table 2 Comparative Attributes of Governance Across State Contexts (Including Somaliland as a De Facto Case) Attribute Established Democracies Recognised Fragile States Unrecognised / De Facto States (e.g., Somaliland) Typical Focus of Scholarship Institutional performance, rule of law, democratic accountability (Ostrom, 2010 ; Eriksen, 2017 ) State-building, aid effectiveness, post-conflict reconstruction (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004 ; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2008 ) Hybrid orders, legitimacy theory, informal institutions (Phillips, 2013 ; Richards, 2016 ; Eubank, 2012 ) Common Governance Assumptions Strong formal institutions, electoral legitimacy Capacity gaps addressed via institutional reform and aid Formal capacity is limited; legitimacy is informally negotiated (Richards, 2016 ) Primary Governance Actors Elected officials, bureaucrats, civic institutions Transitional governments, international actors, NGOs State elites, traditional authorities, civil society, and business networks (Renders & Terlinden, 2010 ; Eubank, 2012 ) Sources of Legitimacy Legal-rational authority, electoral processes External recognition, donor conditionality Internal consensus, performance legitimacy, customary norms (Phillips, 2013 ) Role of Informal Institutions Minimal or complementary Often excluded from formal reform efforts Integral to governance structure; often institutionalised (e.g. Somaliland’s Guurti) (Balthasar, 2013 ) Attention to Inclusion Strong policy and legal frameworks Variable; often donor-driven Marginalised actors (women, IDPs, youth) often excluded despite formal roles (Maboudi 2020 ; Njeri, 2019 ; Menkhaus, 2007 ) Level of Scholarly Attention Extensive Moderate to extensive Emerging, with limited empirical studies (Phillips, 2013 ; Richards, 2016 ) Inclusive and participatory governance processes have been shown to yield significant democratic dividends. Maboudi ( 2020 demonstrates through a comprehensive analysis of constitution-making processes that broader citizen participation significantly enhances democratic provisions within constitutions. Somaliland’s hybrid governance arrangements similarly emphasize broad participatory and inclusive processes, particularly visible through clan conferences and public consultations during critical periods such as constitutional drafting and conflict resolution initiatives. The empirical link established by Maboudi underscores how these locally driven participatory mechanisms have reinforced democratic norms, contributing significantly to Somaliland’s political stability and developmental resilience. 2.4 Theoretical Anchors This study draws on a composite theoretical framework to analyse how governance for sustainable development is negotiated and enacted in Somaliland. Four key conceptual lenses guide the inquiry: institutional hybridity and legitimacy theory serve as the primary interpretive frameworks, while adaptive governance and multi-level governance (MLG) offer auxiliary insights into institutional dynamics and actor interactions. The following analytical matrix (Fig. 1 ) consolidates these theoretical perspectives into a structured framework, clarifying how each lens contributes conceptually to the study of governance in fragile or unrecognised contexts. This framework provides a structured and comparative foundation for interpreting empirical findings across different dimensions of governance. Together, these theories frame a nuanced analytical approach capable of capturing the complexity of governance in a de facto state that operates without international recognition but exhibits relative stability and developmental progress. Institutional hybridity is the principal lens for understanding how governance operates through the integration of formal state mechanisms and informal, customary institutions. The theory of hybrid political orders (Boege et al. 2008 ; Kraushaar and Lambach 2009 )(Boege et al., 2008 ; Kraushaar & Lambach, 2009 ) conceptualises political authority in fragile and post-colonial contexts as emerging from negotiated arrangements between state and non-state actors. In Somaliland, governance is exercised through a layered system involving the elected executive and legislative branches, the House of Elders (Guurti), customary leaders, and religious authorities. This coexistence of parallel but interlinked institutions exemplifies an embedded hybridity, rather than a transitional or ad hoc response to weak state capacity (Renders and Terlinden 2010 ; Wiuff Moe 2011 ). The institutionalisation of this hybridity evident in the formal recognition of customary leaders within the constitutionally mandated Guurti distinguishes Somaliland from many other fragile or post-conflict settings, suggesting that hybrid governance can be structurally durable rather than temporally contingent. Closely connected to hybridity is the concept of legitimacy theory , which offers a second primary anchor for this study. Drawing on Weberian distinctions between legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic forms of authority (Spencer 1970 ; Suchman Full publication date: Jul., 1995 1995), this perspective emphasises how legitimacy is not a fixed status conferred by international recognition, but a dynamic process negotiated through local practices, social contracts, and performance. In Somaliland, legitimacy has been constructed through mechanisms such as clan conferences (“shir”), public consultations, and consensus-building processes, particularly in the aftermath of state collapse in 1991 (Wiuff Moe 2011 ). These practices have helped build a form of output legitimacy rooted in local expectations and service delivery, rather than legal sovereignty (Eubank 2012 ; Phillips 2013 ). The state's reliance on traditional elders to confer and reaffirm political authority, often through informal structures, aligns with theories of legitimacy that prioritise internal consent and responsiveness over formal legality(Von Steinsdorff and Fruhstorfer 2012 ). The analysis thus treats legitimacy in Somaliland not as an institutional endpoint but as an ongoing, negotiated relationship between rulers and ruled, shaped by both performance and participation. A third conceptual anchor is adaptive governance , which helps illuminate the evolutionary nature of Somaliland’s political system. Originally developed in the field of environmental governance (Folke et al. 2005 ), adaptive governance refers to institutional capacities for learning, flexibility, and iterative problem-solving in response to uncertainty. In the Somaliland context, adaptation is evident in pragmatic innovations such as term extensions during electoral delays, the use of transitional power-sharing agreements, or the strategic inclusion of diaspora actors in policy and economic planning. These practices reflect an ability to recalibrate governance structures in response to shifting political, economic, and social pressures, rather than adherence to a fixed institutional blueprint. Although not always normatively ideal, these adaptive responses have enabled Somaliland to maintain political continuity and functional governance in a volatile region. As such, adaptive governance provides a valuable lens to analyse how institutional resilience can emerge in the absence of conventional state-building support or international aid frameworks. Finally, the study engages multi-level governance as a supplementary framework to capture the vertical and horizontal dispersion of authority across state and non-state actors. MLG, originally formulated in European integration studies (Farah 2024 ; Schakel et al. 2015 ), posits that governance occurs across overlapping jurisdictions and actor constellations. Although Somaliland is excluded from formal international governance structures, the MLG perspective remains useful for analysing how power and responsibility are distributed between local councils, regional authorities, state ministries, civil society organisations (CSOs), traditional leaders, and private sector actors. This perspective allows the research to trace how coordination, contestation, and co-governance unfold at multiple levels simultaneously revealing both synergies and tensions in the governance landscape. In doing so, it contributes to an understanding of governance as a relational and networked process, rather than a state-centric or top-down function. 3 Method 3.1 Research Design This research adopted a qualitative case study design, focusing in-depth on the single case of Somaliland. A case study approach was chosen to enable a rich, contextual understanding of how governance for sustainable development functions in Somaliland’s unique setting. As an intrinsic case, Somaliland is of great interest because of its unusual political trajectory – a self-declared state that has maintained stability and development without international recognition. Scholars have described Somaliland as a “phenomenon that deserves investigation” (Phillips 2013 ; Richards 2016 ), given its unexpected success in state-building and governance. By selecting Somaliland as the case, the study aims to explore the factors behind its governance effectiveness in detail, generating insights that might be overlooked in comparative large-N studies. The choice of Somaliland is further justified by the research gap identified: de facto states like Somaliland are under explored in development research despite their instructive experiences. This case serves as an illustrative example of hybrid governance and legitimacy theory, offering lessons that could inform broader theories of governance in fragile contexts. The study was positioned within an interpretivist paradigm specifically, constructivism acknowledging that social realities like “good governance” are constructed through the perceptions and interactions of stakeholders. The researcher’s own positionality as a Somali and familiarity with the local context were transparently considered as part of the methodological positioning. This design allowed for an in-depth analysis of Somaliland on its own terms, providing nuanced insights into the governance-development nexus in an atypical context. 3.2 Data Collection The data collection for this study was grounded in fieldwork conducted in Somaliland and employed a multi-method qualitative approach, including semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and document analysis. The primary data source comprised 26 semi-structured interviews with a strategically selected and demographically varied group of stakeholders spanning key sectors of Somaliland society. Participants were drawn from the public sector, civil society, private business community, and traditional institutions, ensuring that a broad spectrum of voices was captured. Respondents included government officials (e.g., ministers, civil servants), local NGO leaders and activists, private sector entrepreneurs, clan elders, and other influential community figures. This diversity was not only institutional but also demographic, spanning a range of age groups (from 18 to over 70 years old), gender (though male participants predominated), and educational backgrounds (from secondary schooling to doctoral-level qualifications). The inclusion of both public and private actors, as well as female leaders and younger participants, provided valuable perspectives on governance across generational, gendered, and hierarchical lines. Most interviews were conducted in person in Hargeisa, the capital city, though a few participants travelled from other regions to participate in group sessions. One notable example was a focus group discussion with multiple traditional elders, which enabled the researchers to observe group dynamics and collective reasoning on governance issues. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, combining a standard set of open-ended questions with adaptive, in-depth probing. Conversations often extended beyond their scheduled timeframes, as participants were eager to share their insights and lived experiences. All interviews were conducted with informed consent, and participants were assured of confidentiality. Audio recordings were made where permitted and were later transcribed for thematic analysis. In line with ethical standards, anonymity was preserved using participant codes. A purposive and snowball sampling strategy was employed. Initial key informants were identified based on their leadership roles or institutional influence within Somaliland’s governance landscape. These individuals then referred the researcher to other knowledgeable actors in their networks. This approach was particularly effective for reaching elite and hard-to-access respondents, aided by personal introductions, professional networks, and social media outreach. While the sample was predominantly male and drawn from the educated elite reflecting the demographic realities of leadership in Somaliland, deliberate efforts were made to incorporate female voices and youth representatives. For instance, participants ranged from a teenage female entrepreneur to senior male policymakers over 60, allowing the study to capture intergenerational differences in perspectives on governance and reform. The demographic profile of participants is summarised in Table 3 below: Table 3 Profile of Respondents Code Age Gender Education Role (Sector) Years of Experience P1 31–45 Male Doctoral degree Private actor More than 10 years P2 31–45 Male Master’s degree Public actor 4–7 years P3 31–45 Male Doctoral degree Private actor 4–7 years P4 31–45 Male Secondary school Private actor More than 10 years P5 31–45 Male Doctoral degree Private actor Less than 3 years P6 18–20 Female Secondary School Private actor Less than 3 years P7 46–60 Male Master’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P8 21–30 Male Doctoral Degree Public actor 4–7 years P9 31–45 Male Doctoral degree Private actor 4–7 years P10 31–45 Male Bachelor’s degree Private actor 8–10 years P11 46–60 Female Bachelor’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P12 21–30 Male Master’s degree Public actor Less than 3 years P13 61–70 Male Bachelor’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P14 61–70 Male Master’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P15 31–45 Male Diploma Public actor Less than 3 years P16 61–70 Male Doctoral degree Private actor More than 10 years P17 31–45 Female Master’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P18 31–45 Female Master’s degree Public actor 4–7 years P19 31–45 Female Master’s degree Private actor 8–10 years P20 31–45 Female Master’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P21 31–45 Male Master’s degree Private actor Less than 3 years P22 61–70 Male Bachelor’s degree Private actor More than 10 years P23 31–45 Male Master’s degree Private actor 4–7 years P24 31–45 Male Master’s degree Public actor Less than 3 years P25 31–45 Male Master’s degree Public actor 4–7 years P26 31–45 Male Master’s degree Private actor More than 10 years In addition to interviews, the study analysed a range of relevant documents to contextualise and validate the primary data. These included national development plans, policy documents, Somaliland’s Constitution, clan agreements, legal frameworks, and reports from international development agencies. Media sources were also consulted to track narratives and timelines. Document analysis enabled the researcher to triangulate claims made during interviews and add historical and institutional context to the findings. By comparing evidence across interviews, observations, and documentary sources, the study achieved methodological triangulation. Recurring themes across different sources increased the robustness and credibility of insights, while inconsistencies were explored through follow-up questions and supplementary inquiries. This triangulated, multi-method approach ensured a comprehensive and well-rounded evidence base, in line with best practices in qualitative case research. 3.3 Thematic Analysis This study employed a thematic analysis approach to systematically examine the qualitative data. The analytical process was guided by established frameworks for coding and theme development, particularly drawing on the work of Boyatzis ( 1998 ) and Attride-Stirling ( 2001 . According to Boyatzis ( 1998 , a theme is a “pattern found in the information that describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (Boyatzis 1998 :4). This definition underpinned how the researcher identified and treated themes in the data. Using NVivo software, the interview transcripts and fieldnotes were carefully reviewed and coded. Initially, a deductive coding scheme was applied – the researcher developed a set of preliminary codes based on the conceptual framework and literature review (the “top-down” approach). For example, codes corresponding to expected themes such as “accountability mechanisms,” “clan elders’ role,” “international aid (absence),” “sustainable development strategies,” and “legitimacy” were defined in advance to reflect key concepts of interest. This study followed a top-down approach to data analysis wherein codes were in part predetermined by the theoretical propositions. Each transcript was then coded line-by-line: segments of text were labelled with one or more codes whenever they related to those concepts. The next step was to cluster these codes into themes and sub-themes. Using guidance from thematic analysis techniques (Boyatzis 1998 ; Braun & Clarke 2006), related codes were grouped to form higher-order themes. For example, codes such as “elders mediating disputes,” “clan representation in government,” and “blending customary and formal law” were grouped under a broader theme of “Hybrid Governance Structures.” Thematic networks (Attride-Stirling 2001 ) were then developed to organize themes into coherent patterns: basic codes aggregated into organising themes, which in turn mapped onto overarching global themes that answer the research question. Through this process, key thematic findings emerged – such as the importance of power-sharing, the role of local ownership in development projects, challenges in institutional capacity, and adaptive policy responses in Somaliland. Throughout the analysis, the researcher continually mapped the emergent themes back to the broader conceptual and theoretical debates outlined in the literature review. This involved interpreting how governance practices in Somaliland engaged with established theories of governance and development, particularly the governance-development nexus, hybrid governance, legitimacy, and adaptive governance. For instance, findings related to centralised authority and power asymmetries were analysed against the backdrop of the governance effectiveness literature (Güney 2017 ; Kaufmann and Kraay 2008 ; Sharma et al. 2020 ), highlighting how Somaliland’s approach deviates from the normative emphasis on decentralisation, accountability, and participatory decision-making. Simultaneously, the institutionalised co-governance arrangements between clan elders, CSOs, and formal state actors were examined through the lens of hybrid governance theory (Farah 2024 ; Hersi 2018 ; Richards 2015 ), revealing both the integrative strengths and exclusionary tendencies of these structures. Themes such as the politicisation of traditional leadership and the marginalisation of IDPs and women were linked to the literature on legitimacy theory and inclusion (Englebert 2009 ; Weber 1978 ), illustrating that internal legitimacy in Somaliland is deeply embedded in customary norms and clan networks, yet remains selective and stratified. Similarly, the persistence of Somaliland’s stability despite the lack of international recognition was analysed in relation to the growing body of work on de facto states and unrecognised political orders (Phillips 2013 ; Richards 2016 ), reinforcing the argument that governance effectiveness can emerge independently of external sovereignty, driven instead by internal consensus, performance legitimacy, and adaptive resilience. 4 Findings 4.1 Overview In examining how governance effectiveness for sustainable development is achieved in Somaliland, a self-declared, unrecognised state with hybrid governance structures, this study reveals a multifaceted and contextually grounded landscape of governance. Findings highlight that Somaliland’s governance modes and arrangements navigate a complex balancing act: centralised authority provides control over scarce resources but often limits local responsiveness; collaborative processes, while culturally embedded, are frequently elite driven, revealing tensions between communal norms and power asymmetries. We have also noticed a perceptible shift of authority from traditional leaders to formal state actors has occurred over the last 34 years of the state’s existence, though legitimacy gaps persist, and the governance framework remains fluid, blending Sharia-Laws, Customary Law (Xeer), and formal institutions to adapt to changing circumstances. Moreover, unlike states heavily reliant on foreign aid, Somaliland has maintained a notable degree of internal legitimacy by depending largely on domestic resources and locally driven governance structures. Baldwin and Winters (2020 reveal that government legitimacy in aid-dependent countries is often undermined when citizens perceive governance effectiveness as externally rather than internally driven. In contrast, Somaliland’s legitimacy is derived primarily from domestic performance and local consensus-building rather than international aid flows. This internal legitimacy stands as a distinct and instructive contrast to many recognised but fragile states, underscoring Somaliland's unique approach to governance effectiveness. In our research we have also discovered that diverse actors play crucial roles in shaping governance outcomes. State elites have consolidated power in the post-war period, steering political and economic agendas. Civil society organisations act as both service providers and peacekeepers, filling gaps where state capacity falls short, while business interest groups wield considerable economic influence that also translates into political power, often reinforcing elite interests. Traditional leaders, once viewed as custodians of norms and stabilisers of society, are increasingly politicised and male-dominated, complicating their role in governance. The multistakeholder landscape further exposes critical tensions: internally displaced persons (IDPs), despite contributing to local economies, remain legally excluded and face systemic barriers to inclusion, while women’s participation in governance continues to be contested, negotiated within cultural norms, and constrained by political dynamics. These findings demonstrate that Somaliland’s governance effectiveness is not a product of formal institutional strength but rather emerges from the adaptive interplay of diverse actors and frameworks that are deeply rooted in local realities. This underscores the need to reimagine governance effectiveness not only in terms of institutional capacity but also through the lens of legitimacy, inclusivity, and resilience in contexts marked by political ambiguity and resource scarcity. The following sections present the empirical evidence underpinning these insights, detailing how governance arrangements, actor dynamics, and stakeholder experiences collectively shape Somaliland’s unique governance trajectory. 4.2 Governance Modes and Arrangements - Centralised authority Somaliland’s governance is characterised by a highly centralised distribution of authority concentrated in key national officials (the executive and directors-general). While decentralisation is often linked to democratisation in developing contexts (Khumalo 2015), Somaliland’s power remains top-down, leading to erosion of authority in crucial ministries. Respondents widely observed a “centralised authority” system where the government exerts full, micro-level control over public services through presidentially appointed directors-general. As one public official (P2) explained: “The Somaliland government exercises full control, often a top-down, micro-level management of its public services and delivery of goods by nominating directors-general to operational positions within government agencies and ministries.”. This top-down approach is seen as inefficient, confirming arguments that horizontal power-sharing would better democratise decision-making (Peters 2016). Indeed, because authority is so concentrated, major decisions rest with a few individuals; one interviewee (P2) noted “the directors-general receive instructions by the president … [and] often the president’s directives supersede the minister’s”. Centralisation has had mixed effects. On one hand, it enabled tight control of scarce national resources, helping Somaliland manage a small budget that grew from under $100 million to $400 million (P13). On the other hand, it weakened local governance by failing to devolve authority. Excessive hierarchy means communities outside major districts receive minimal public services. A respondent from rural Awdal (P3) illustrated this disparity, describing how his mother walked 15 miles twice a week to fetch water from a distant town because local provision was absent. Such evidence shows that a centralised authority, combined with limited resources, leaves many citizens underserved. Scholars argue that Somaliland must embrace decentralisation (Mal 2017) to empower local governments and elites to deliver critical services. In sum, decentralising power would distribute governance responsibilities more democratically and help maintain peace and stability across regions. - Collaborative processes Collaboration is described as an intrinsic aspect of Somali culture, involving elders, clan leaders and religious figures working jointly with government officials in consensus-oriented forums. An academic (P9) noted that: “Somalis are naturally a collaborative society. We share resources, lands and wealth within our communities, either by direct descendants, relation or clan lineages. Our tribal and traditional leaders administer our social affairs and judge our disputes in cooperation with the local authorities to reach a desirable outcome”. However, informal actors tend to wield the greatest influence in these collaborative governance processes. Power often lies with traditional authorities, confirming that the legitimacy of formal public actors in Somaliland is historically derived from clan elders and religious leaders (Renders 2012). Even with formal democratic structures, these informal actors can sway decisions by leveraging traditional authority over their constituents. Somaliland’s government has also co-opted private agents and elders to help manage societal affairs, a practice that has yielded “more challenges than solutions” (Mule 2001). Civil society organizations (CSOs) attempt to broaden participation and accountability in such forums. As one CSO project officer (P6) explained: “Our responsibility … includes giving the different civil society actors a voice in the process of governing, peacebuilding and the development of Somaliland … [and] tirelessly to give voice to the women in Somaliland.” Empowering women through collaboration is seen as vital for effective development outcomes (McEwan 2003), since traditional elders are men and may not grasp issues affecting women. CSO initiatives have lobbied for bills to protect women (e.g. against female genital mutilation and rape) and have pledged to “ be a supporting arm [to] the government ” rather than impose their will (P6). Despite these efforts, entrenched patriarchal structures limit progress. Women’s advocacy successes in the lower house were overturned by the male-dominated upper house (Guurti). A female parliamentarian (P18) lamented that because no women sit in the Guurti, “no matter what policies or bills are passed in favour of women we will never get our rights”. When young, educated women challenge cultural and religious barriers, “we are immediately suppressed and our intentions are misrepresented … [Men] say why are you trying to destroy the peace we have worked so hard to build” (P19). Nevertheless, several respondents (including men) acknowledged that Somaliland’s development will be more effective and equitable if women are genuinely included in collaborative governance processes. - Perceptible shifts in power Over the past decades, power in Somaliland has visibly shifted from traditional informal authorities to formal state institutions. Studies note that modernisation of political systems often diminishes the centuries-old traditional power base (Phillips 2020; Richards 2009). In Somaliland, especially since its constitutional referendum, much authority that once rested with clan elders and cultural leaders has gradually transferred to state actors and elites. A public official (P7) observed this firsthand: “I have seen the ‘old guard’ of traditional and cultural leaders gradually shifting their authority and power to the public actors of the state and convincing their followers to entrust the state with their economic and social affairs.” Simultaneously, power has dispersed even within the informal sphere. The ranks of local customary leaders (aaqils and sultans) have proliferated in the last two decades (Moe and Simojoki 2013), diluting the influence of any single traditional leader. An academic (P9) noted that the explosion in the number of aaqils and sultans has “significantly reduced their power base and influence,” making it unclear who the legitimate customary authorities are. This diffusion, driven by population growth and increasingly complex clan structures, has weakened the authority of traditional leaders to act decisively. The waning dominance of the “old guard” that founded the post-1991 Somaliland state (Richards 2016) opened the door to a hybrid governance arrangement blending traditional and modern elements. This hybrid system has proven resilient against external pressures to fail (Renders and Terlinden 2010). One official (P15) emphasized Somaliland’s unique model: “There is no system of governance like [this] anywhere else… we have perfected a mode of arrangement between public and private actors to govern society.” However, these longstanding actors (state elites and traditional elders) have also formed a monopoly on power by prioritising peace and stability (Wiuff Moe 2011; Musa and Horst 2019). Such “ peaceocracy ” (Lynch et al. 2019) led by elites (Debiel et al. 2009) may face future resistance as calls grow for broader inclusion, women’s participation, justice and equality beyond just maintaining stability. - Dynamic governance Effective governance in Somaliland requires a dynamic blend of traditional and modern practices rather than a rigid, static system. Scholars argue that governance arrangements must adapt to local customs and context (Renders and Terlinden 2010). Somaliland’s history reflects this: the government has adopted a mixed governance approach, integrating formal and customary elements to suit its deeply cultural society. One interviewee (P8) stressed the necessity of this flexibility: “Dynamism is crucial in Somaliland’s governance system… Our society is deeply cultural… We cannot be governed by a system that is not a byproduct of the historical and cultural foundations of our people.” The Somali clan system remains a fundamental social structure (Moe and Simojoki 2013), so any governance mechanism must accommodate clan-based norms and values. Somaliland’s political elites have largely succeeded in melding these traditions with modern state institutions, leveraging their clan ties and historical legitimacy to do so. A prime example of this dynamic governance is the judicial system. As a senior solicitor (P17) explained, “The formal courts of Somaliland have three systems of justice: the rule of law, customary law and Sharia law.” This coexistence illustrates how historical norms are combined with a modern legal framework. In practice, however, one system often dominates. According to the solicitor and another respondent (P1), “The justice system of Somaliland is built upon… customary law and Sharia law. The laws of the state nor the Constitution can supersede those two… Sharia law is the ultimate law of the land.” Indeed, the constitution itself mandates that all laws conform to Islamic Sharia. Still, certain customary rules. For instance, forbidding a wife to appear in court without her husband have no place in a progressive society. Moreover, serious crimes are often settled out of court by clan elders, allowing perpetrators to evade formal justice (Moe and Simojoki 2013). This tension demonstrates that even a well-integrated hybrid system has weaknesses when one facet consistently overrules the others. To strengthen dynamic governance, research suggests creating a mediating institution to harmonize traditional and formal systems. Such a body would help traditional, and reformist actors agree on simple, transparent and accountable rules enforceable by legal precedent (Chirayath et al. 2005). This reform could ensure that Somaliland’s unique fusion of governance continues to evolve effectively, marrying tradition with the needs of a modern state. 4.3 Diverse Actors of Governance - State elites State elites, comprising formal government figures (e.g. the executive, ministers, MPs, judiciary) and influential informal actors (traditional elders, clan and religious leaders), are key decision-makers in Somaliland’s governance (Bradbury et al. 2003; Debiel et al. 2009). During the Somaliland independence war, these groups formed a united front. A journalist (P14) recounted how statesmen “joined hands with their clan elders and leaders to co-govern the newly formed Republic of Somaliland,” combining traditional legitimacy and political leadership to fight the civil war and build the state. Traditional leaders mobilised resources and legitimacy through clan networks, while state elites formed political coalitions. This collaboration brought peace and stability, along with economic development (Ahmed 2000; Musa and Horst 2019). However, this initial integrity has eroded. A traditional leader (P13) observed: “The old statesmen were truly state elites… Today we have guerrilla fighters who call themselves statesmen… they have no philosophy, no vision and do not know how to run a state.” He further lamented: “The old traditional leaders… achieved their objective. Today’s traditional leaders use their role to live off the state… [to benefit] their lineage.” Despite such concerns, state elites retain great influence, dominating decision-making and often controlling institutions through patronage. A consultant (P1) explained that director-general posts in ministries are frequently filled by underqualified individuals appointed based on clan ties, undermining governance effectiveness (Mal 2017; Musa and Horst 2019). - Civil society organisations CSOs play an essential governance role in Somaliland, often substituting for the state in delivering public services, social welfare, and advocacy (Van Leeuwen 2009; Rossi 2014; Saggiomo 2014). A CSO leader (P11) explained that their organisations act as “the arm of the government,” reaching places the state cannot and securing international aid (Phillips 2020). CSOs prioritise women’s rights and justice where state efforts have fallen short. A CSO activist (P11) observed that justice for women and children in rape cases was a critical gap. CSOs also mediate conflicts in areas beyond state reach, employing local clan members to negotiate peace. A field agent (P6) described their role: “Our people in the field are from the pastoral communities… We recruit them to act as agents of peace.” CSOs complement government by extending services and amplifying voices on gender inclusion and human rights. A female parliamentarian (P18) stated: “The women of Somaliland need the CSOs’ political, social, legal and financial aid to continue voicing our disapproval and discontent.” - Business interest groups Powerful business groups, notably Dahabshiil and Telesom, dominate Somaliland’s economy and wield influence over governance, often stifling competition (World Bank 2015; Musa and Horst 2019). A respondent (P10) described how Dahabshiil’s expansion was driven by clan ties and inducements. A former employee turned official (P24) confirmed: “Small businesses… cannot compete… their influence effectively impacts people’s lives for the worse.” Business-political collusion fosters corruption, undermining governance (Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge 1995; Sabani et al. 2019). One businessman (P10) observed, “Because of the clan system, public officials are almost certain to receive gifts and bribes… You won’t be offered an official post if you’re not compromised.” Meanwhile, some officials condemn corruption, warning it threatens stability. An official (P25) asserted: “Corruption has no place in Somaliland, and it will lead to violence, instability and undo everything…since independence.” - Traditional leaders Traditional leaders hold dual roles: safeguarding cultural norms and participating in formal governance through the Guurti, which reviews legislation to ensure it aligns with Somali traditions and Islam (Richards 2016; Renders 2012). An elder (P22) explained: “[We] uphold Somali values… Our purpose is to check and balance civilian policies to ensure they don’t conflict with Somali values, customs and beliefs.” However, some use this authority to block progressive reforms. A legal scholar (P5) noted a shift from past integrity to present-day self-interest: “The traditional leaders of the past lived humble lives… Today’s leaders… live lavishly… Greed, popularity and power have corrupted traditional leaders.” Many elders now inherit their roles, contributing to stagnation. While they remain vital for social cohesion, their participation in governance must evolve to embrace inclusivity and accountability. Further understanding the roles of non-state actors, Cho (2024 highlights how NGOs leverage political influence within donor governments to shape aid allocations. Although Somaliland operates independently from substantial international aid frameworks, Cho’s findings offer valuable insights into how civil society and private sector actors can strategically influence governance processes. Somaliland exemplifies this dynamic, as evidenced by its vibrant civil society and influential business networks, which actively participate in governance dialogues and policy implementation, significantly shaping developmental trajectories and governance effectiveness. 4.4 Multistakeholder Dialogue - Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) IDPs in Somaliland face marginalisation and exclusion from governance processes. Displacement is often seen as a temporary issue, addressed through humanitarian aid rather than long-term integration. Approximately 85,000 IDPs, mostly fleeing conflicts in Yemen, Ethiopia, and south-central Somalia, have settled in Somaliland. A humanitarian worker (P20) confirmed: “In Somaliland we have more than 85,000 refugees… we accept them because we have peace and stability. But they do not have the rights Somalilanders enjoy.” Legal frameworks restrict citizenship based on paternal lineage at independence, excluding IDPs and leaving them in a liminal state. These displaced populations often include minority clans and have limited access to education, housing, and healthcare. A CSO worker (P11) observed that the government tolerates IDPs’ presence due to their contribution to the economy but fails to offer support: “The government… does not want to support these groups, because the perception is that these people are not citizens and therefore do not deserve equal rights and support.” International organisations provide some aid, but long-term solutions are limited. Without greater empathy and inclusive policies, IDPs remain marginalised, perpetuating their vulnerability and undermining governance effectiveness. - Women’s participation Women’s participation in governance is shaped by deep cultural and religious norms. While some view gender roles as fixed and natural, others advocate for greater inclusion. A female academic (P20) stated: “The West’s ideals of women’s equality are very different from what our religion and culture teach… We must be realistic – some roles are just made for men.” This belief often confines women to domestic roles, excluding them from political leadership (Bourque and Grossholtz 1974). However, many women are active in civil society, leading NGOs and community initiatives. An older woman (P11) said: “As a woman… I must help… as a volunteer or coordinator in a social organisation. As a political figure I would not be able to do this – I would be constrained by… bureaucracy, clan politics and public view.” Some women have broken these barriers, such as the Minister of Environment and Rural Development, but systemic challenges remain. A lawyer (P19) highlighted persistent inequality: “I have never been given the opportunity for advancement… or [equal] status… to the males.” She emphasised that cultural change is necessary for true inclusivity. Younger women increasingly advocate for balanced participation that respects tradition while expanding opportunities. Achieving inclusive governance requires addressing structural barriers and shifting societal attitudes towards gender roles. 5 Discussion The findings demonstrate that governance effectiveness in this unrecognised, resource-constrained, and politically complex context is not predicated on conventional, state-centric models of governance, but rather emerges from a locally constituted hybrid system that balances formal authority with informal, traditional institutions. By examining Somaliland’s unique governance structures, this study offers a nuanced understanding of how governance effectiveness is crafted and sustained in an atypical setting. The following sections unpack the key themes that emerged from the data, integrating these insights with the broader theoretical and empirical literature. To guide the discussion, the Table 4 below maps the core empirical themes against the theoretical lenses outlined in the literature review. This provides a structured analytical framework for interpreting how governance effectiveness is negotiated and enacted in Somaliland. Table 4 Theory-to-Theme Mapping Empirical Theme Theoretical Lens Applied Interpretive Insight Centralised Authority Legitimacy, Hybridity Centralised control is legitimated through clan-state authority negotiated via traditional norms. Collaborative Processes Hybridity, Multi-Level Governance (MLG) Governance occurs through layered, consensus-based collaboration across formal and informal actors. Shifting Power from Traditional to State Elites Hybridity, Legitimacy Traditional authority is waning as formal institutions gain primacy, though legitimacy remains negotiated. Dynamic Governance Practices Adaptive Governance, Hybridity Blended systems evolve pragmatically in response to sociopolitical pressures and institutional constraints. State Elites and Political Capture Legitimacy, Adaptive Governance Elite control is maintained through informal legitimacy and flexible institutional arrangements. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Multi-Level Governance, Legitimacy CSOs reinforce governance by filling state capacity gaps and advocating for inclusion. Business Influence and Elite Capture Adaptive Governance, Hybridity Economic actors shape governance through informal ties, often reinforcing elite dominance. Traditional Leaders Hybridity, Legitimacy Cultural custodianship is formalised, but co-optation undermines their moral authority. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Multi-Level Governance, Legitimacy Legal exclusion despite economic contribution reveals limitations in inclusive legitimacy. Women’s Participation in Governance Legitimacy, Multi-Level Governance Gender inclusion is constrained by patriarchal norms, despite advocacy from civil society and formal gains. The synthesis of the findings presented in the table above, reveals that governance effectiveness in Somaliland emerges from a contextually embedded, hybrid system where legitimacy is continuously negotiated across formal, informal, and religious domains. Centralised authority is sustained through clan-based legitimacy, while collaborative governance thrives via multi-level interactions among state, civil society, and traditional actors. Power has shifted from traditional to state elites, yet legitimacy remains contested and negotiated. Adaptive governance practices illustrate the system’s pragmatic evolution in response to institutional and social pressures. However, this hybrid stability also facilitates elite capture, with political and business actors reinforcing their dominance through informal ties. Civil society organisations act as critical intermediaries, compensating for state capacity gaps, though their role remains structurally under-integrated. Meanwhile, marginalised groups especially IDPs and women face systemic exclusion, revealing persistent legitimacy deficits despite broad-based contributions to society. Overall, the findings underscore that Somaliland’s governance resilience is not rooted in institutional formality, but in its flexible, negotiated, and pluralistic political order. 5.1 Challenging Governance Orthodoxy A dominant assumption in governance and development studies is that effectiveness correlates with the establishment of strong, formal state institutions modelled on Weberian principles of bureaucracy, rule of law, and a monopoly over legitimate use of force (Grindle 2004 ; Hydén et al. 2000 ). However, Somaliland defies this orthodoxy. As one respondent (P2) noted, “The Somaliland government exercises full control, often a top-down, micro-level management of its public services and delivery of goods by nominating directors-general to operational positions within government agencies and ministries,” yet this control is mediated by negotiations with clan elders and informal networks. This hybrid model illustrates that effectiveness can emerge even where formal state structures are incomplete or absent (Casson et al. 2010 ; Herring et al. 2020 ). The resilience of Somaliland’s governance highlights that “peace and stability are achieved not because of international recognition or external aid, but because local actors negotiate authority and legitimacy through customary norms and pragmatic arrangements” (Phillips 2013 ). The empirical evidence underscores that effectiveness is not tied solely to formal capacity; rather, it is generated through dynamic interactions between state elites, traditional leaders, civil society, and business interests. This supports Boege et al. ( 2008 concept of hybrid political orders, where governance effectiveness stems from a blend of formal institutions and informal, negotiated authority structures. In addition, the findings align with the principles of adaptive governance (Folke et al., 2005 ), where governance effectiveness is achieved through pragmatic and iterative institutional responses to contextual constraints, rather than through strict adherence to a fixed governance blueprint. MLG further offers insight into the power imbalance between national and local authorities. The top-down centralisation observed in Somaliland’s governance system constrains horizontal accountability and undermines local autonomy which are key features of MLG that emphasise distributed authority and negotiated coordination across different levels of governance. 5.2 Hybridity as a Feature, not a Bug The findings affirm that hybridity in governance manifested through the coexistence of formal institutions, customary norms, and religious principles is a deliberate feature of Somaliland’s political system rather than a flaw to be rectified. The Guurti, or House of Elders, epitomizes this hybridity, serving as both a constitutional body and a traditional authority. As an elder (P22) stated, “[We] uphold Somali values… Our purpose is to check and balance civilian policies to ensure they don’t conflict with Somali values, customs and beliefs.” This arrangement has contributed to relative political stability and local legitimacy. However, hybridity also enables elite capture and exclusion. Many respondents, including a traditional leader (P13), lamented the shift from integrity to self-interest among both state elites and customary authorities: “The old statesmen were truly state elites… Today we have guerrilla fighters who call themselves statesmen… they have no philosophy, no vision and do not know how to run a state.” Furthermore, the proliferation of traditional leaders (aaqils and sultans) over recent decades has diluted the authority of any single figure and contributed to a competitive and often exclusionary governance environment (Moe and Simojoki 2013 ). Business elites, such as Dahabshiil and Telesom, have leveraged clan connections to dominate markets and influence governance, as one respondent (P10) observed: “Small businesses… cannot compete… their influence effectively impacts people’s lives for the worse.” This dual nature of hybridity, both stabilizing and exclusionary, reflects broader debates in governance literature. While hybridity can provide resilience in fragile contexts (Kraushaar & Lambach, 2009 ), it can also reinforce entrenched power dynamics and inhibit genuine democratization, especially when elite actors prioritize stability over inclusivity (Musa and Horst 2019 ; Wiuff Moe 2011 ). Furthermore, hybridity in Somaliland is not static; it functions within a dynamic governance framework that continuously negotiates between formal institutions and traditional practices to address evolving contextual challenges. This dynamism exemplifies adaptive governance, where institutional flexibility and negotiation among multiple actors are essential for maintaining political stability and responsiveness. 5.3 Rethinking Inclusion and Legitimacy A central finding of this study is that while local legitimacy, derived from negotiated authority and performance, underpins Somaliland’s governance, inclusion remains deeply uneven. Women, youth, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) face systemic barriers to participation. For instance, a female parliamentarian (P18) stated, “The women of Somaliland need the CSOs’ political, social, legal and financial aid to continue voicing our disapproval and discontent,” underscoring the reliance on civil society to advocate for gender rights where formal structures exclude them. Despite the presence of women in NGOs and some government roles, entrenched patriarchal norms, especially within the Guurti to limit their influence. As one respondent (P19) explained, “We are immediately suppressed and our intentions are misrepresented… [Men] say why are you trying to destroy the peace we have worked so hard to build.” Similarly, IDPs, despite contributing to local economies, remain marginalized. A humanitarian worker (P20) highlighted the exclusionary citizenship laws: “In Somaliland we have more than 85,000 refugees… we accept them because we have peace and stability. But they do not have the rights Somalilanders enjoy.” This exclusion challenges the sustainability of governance legitimacy. While local consensus has maintained order, exclusion risks alienating significant portions of the population and undermining long-term stability. This finding aligns with legitimacy theory, which posits that legitimacy is maintained through both output (service delivery) and procedural inclusivity. Somaliland’s governance excels in the former but struggles with the latter. The findings also reveal a gap in multi-level governance, where civil society organisations (CSOs), though active and impactful, lack a formalised mandate to participate in co-governance alongside state institutions. While CSOs contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding, advocacy, and essential service delivery (P6, P11), their roles are often peripheral and ad hoc. Strengthening multi-level governance would involve institutionalising the engagement of CSOs and marginalised groups, thereby fostering more inclusive, representative, and responsive governance structures. Moreover, the coexistence of religious, customary, and formal legal systems produces a form of legitimacy that is adaptive but unevenly applied. While this legal pluralism enables governance to resonate with diverse societal values, it also introduces inconsistencies and inequities. The state's focus on performance legitimacy delivering services and maintaining order must be complemented by procedural legitimacy rooted in broad-based inclusion, legal equity, and accountable institutional mechanisms. 5.4 Implications for Development Practice The Somaliland case carries important implications for development interventions in fragile and unrecognised states. First, the findings caution against bypassing informal and hybrid governance structures. International actors and development agencies should recognize and work with local authorities whether formal or traditional to design interventions that resonate with local norms and practices. As one CSO leader (P11) noted, “Our responsibility… includes giving the different civil society actors a voice in the process of governing, peacebuilding and the development of Somaliland.” Second, policies should emphasize adaptability over rigid adherence to formal governance benchmarks. Somaliland’s hybrid arrangements have proven resilient precisely because they evolve in response to contextual needs. This supports the adaptive governance literature (Folke et al. 2005 ), which highlights the importance of institutional flexibility and learning. For instance, Somaliland’s judicial system integrates customary, Sharia, and formal law, demonstrating the capacity to negotiate competing legal norms in ways that preserve stability, albeit with notable trade-offs. Such flexible legal pluralism should be recognised not as a failure of formalisation but as a functional response to cultural, religious, and social realities. Third, development interventions must address systemic exclusion. Focusing on capacity building for women, youth, and marginalized groups including legal reforms to expand citizenship rights for IDPs can strengthen both inclusivity and legitimacy. Without such efforts, governance effectiveness may be undermined by growing inequalities and discontent. Moreover, as multiple respondents indicated, the co-optation of traditional leaders and business elites threatens to entrench elite dominance, suggesting that development strategies should incorporate mechanisms for accountability and equitable participation. Finally, the role of business interest groups deserves closer attention. While their influence has supported economic growth and diasporic remittance channels (Ahmed 2000 ), it has also enabled elite collusion and market capture. Future development practice must therefore strike a balance between leveraging economic actors and ensuring regulatory oversight to avoid undermining governance integrity. 5.5 Propositions for Future Research Building on the empirical findings and theoretical analysis of this study, a series of propositions are proposed to guide future research on governance effectiveness in unrecognised, fragile, and hybrid political contexts. These propositions are grounded in the interplay of legitimacy, hybridity, and adaptive governance observed in Somaliland, and they aim to inform comparative, longitudinal, and interdisciplinary investigations across similar settings. Together, they reflect an effort to distil conceptual insights from an empirically rich case and to stimulate further theory development and empirical validation in the field of governance for sustainable development. Proposition 1 Governance effectiveness in unrecognised or fragile states can emerge from negotiated authority and legitimacy, rather than formal institutional strength or external recognition. This proposition challenges the dominant assumption that state legitimacy and governance capacity are inherently dependent on formal recognition or Weberian institutional structures. As demonstrated in Somaliland, effectiveness can be constructed through locally embedded authority systems and contextually legitimacy, underscoring the importance of alternative governance paradigms in fragile or contested environments. Proposition 2 Hybrid governance arrangements, while enabling resilience, also create conditions for elite capture and the marginalisation of women, youth, and displaced populations. While hybridity facilitates adaptive governance by integrating traditional and formal systems, it can also reinforce structural inequalities and limit procedural inclusion. This duality highlights the need for governance research to interrogate who benefits from hybrid models and under what conditions inclusive participation can be institutionalised. Proposition 3 The adaptability of governance systems in politically complex contexts depends on their ability to blend traditional norms with modern bureaucratic mechanisms in ways that are flexible, negotiated, and context responsive. Governance in Somaliland illustrates the importance of institutional dynamism, where legitimacy and authority are not fixed but constantly reconstituted through interactions among diverse actors. Future research should explore how such dynamic arrangements evolve, and how traditional, religious, and bureaucratic institutions co-adapt in response to social and political change. Proposition 4 Legitimacy in hybrid systems is maintained more through performance legitimacy (i.e., service delivery and stability) than through procedural legitimacy (i.e., inclusive participation and formal rule compliance). This proposition draws attention to the asymmetry between output-based and input-based forms of legitimacy in hybrid contexts. While the provision of public goods contributes to perceived governance effectiveness, sustained legitimacy requires greater attention to participatory governance, accountability, and equitable access to decision-making. Proposition 5 Dominant business actors in fragile and unrecognised states often reinforce clan-based hierarchies and economic exclusion, influencing both governance arrangements and social equity outcomes. The role of economic elites, particularly those tied to kinship and diaspora networks that raises important questions about the concentration of power, corruption, and market capture. This proposition calls for future research to investigate the intersections of economic dominance, political authority, and social marginalisation. Proposition 6 Development interventions in hybrid political orders must engage with informal governance actors and local legitimacy systems, rather than relying solely on formal state institutions. Effective and context-sensitive development practice requires an appreciation of the pluralistic governance landscape in settings like Somaliland. This proposition highlights the importance of working with customary, religious, and civic actors who hold substantive influence over local governance outcomes, service delivery, and conflict resolution. Together, these propositions offer a conceptual bridge between the findings of this study and broader debates in political science, development studies, and governance theory. They invite empirical testing, comparative analysis, and theoretical refinement, particularly in settings that are marginal to mainstream governance scholarship yet central to understanding the diversity of political order in the contemporary world. 6 Conclusion and Future Directions This study has explored how governance effectiveness for sustainable development is realised in Somaliland, an unrecognised polity characterised by limited formal capacity yet sustained internal stability. Drawing on thematic analysis of interviews with 26 governance actors, the findings reveal that effectiveness in such contexts does not derive solely from formal institutions, but rather emerges through hybrid arrangements that integrate traditional, religious, and bureaucratic structures. Theoretically, this research contributes to debates on governance in fragile and contested contexts by challenging state-centric models. It demonstrates that informal authority, legitimacy, and institutional adaptability can support governance outcomes where conventional benchmarks are absent or inapplicable. In doing so, it calls for a broader conceptualisation of governance effectiveness that is sensitive to local realities and plural forms of legitimacy. For policymakers and development practitioners, the findings underscore the importance of engaging with diverse governance actors beyond the formal state. In Somaliland, civil society organisations, traditional leaders, and business elites play significant roles in service provision, conflict resolution, and social cohesion. Development strategies should therefore be context-sensitive and inclusive, building on local governance logics rather than imposing external institutional models. Attention must also be paid to systemic exclusions, particularly of women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and younger generations whose participation is crucial for sustainable development and long-term legitimacy. In sum, by applying multiple theoretical lenses—hybridity and electoral uncertainty (McKie, 2017 ), state fragility and governance effectiveness (Ziaja et al., 2019 ), participatory democratic outcomes (Maboudi, 2020 ), internally-derived legitimacy in aid-independent contexts (Baldwin & Winters, 2020 ), and civil society's influence (Cho, 2024 ). This study advances a nuanced understanding of governance for sustainable development in unrecognised states like Somaliland. Future research could extend this inquiry through comparative studies of other unrecognised or de facto states such as Palestine, Northern Cyprus, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or Abkhazia to assess whether similar patterns of hybrid legitimacy and negotiated authority prevail. Employing mixed methods approaches, including large-scale surveys on legitimacy, trust, and inclusion, would further enrich understanding of governance perceptions in contested contexts. Additionally, focused studies on gendered governance, intergenerational leadership dynamics, and the political role of business actors would offer valuable insight into how power, participation, and exclusion are navigated in everyday governance. Ethnographic research on marginalised populations would also help illuminate the lived experiences of those often left out of dominant governance narratives. Together, these directions can contribute to a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of governance effectiveness in fragile, hybrid, and unrecognised settings. Ultimately, this study highlights the value of empirically engaging with underexplored governance contexts to challenge normative assumptions and enrich theoretical and policy understandings of sustainable development in fragile and hybrid systems. Declarations Conflict of interest The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Informed Consent In this study, electronic informed consent was obtained from all participants between November 22, 2021 and January 8, 2022. Prior to participation, participants were informed of the study objectives, confidentiality of their responses, the absence of risks in the study, and their right to withdraw at any time without repercussions. All collected data were anonymized to protect participants’ identities and ensure confidentiality. Ethics Declaration This study received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), Research and Innovation Office, RMIT University (Approval No. 22779; NHMRC Code: EC00237) on 1 July 2020. All procedures involving human participants were conducted in accordance with the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research and the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research. Participants’ confidentiality and anonymity were strictly maintained to protect their privacy throughout the research process. Funding Statement I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship. Author Contribution M.F. prepared the research scope, conducted data collection and analysis, and developed the methodology and discussion. This research data forms part of M.F.'s doctoral thesis study. A.S. reviewed and edited the manuscript and contributed to the development of the tables, frameworks, introduction, and conclusion. All authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript. Data Availability The qualitative data supporting the findings of this study is part of a doctoral thesis completed by M.F. in 2024. The full data analysis, including interview excerpts and methodological details, is available via the RMIT University Research Repository at the following URL:https://research-repository.rmit.edu.au/articles/thesis/Alternative_View_on_ Governance_in_Developing_Countries_An_Integrative_Analysis_ of_Governance_for_Sustainable_Development_in_Somaliland/25779630 References Bank Group Policy on Good Governance (1999) Bank Group Policy on Good Governance , (July 1999). https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/21-EN-Bank_Group_Policy_on_Good_Governance.pdf Ahmed II (2000) Remittances and their economic impact in post-war Somaliland. Disasters 24(4):380–389 Ansell CK, Torfing J (2016) Handbook on theories of governance. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Glos Northampton, Massachusetts Attride-Stirling J (2001) Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. Qualitative Res 1(3):385–405 Baldwin K, Winters MS (2020) How do different forms of foreign aid affect government legitimacy? Evidence from an informational experiment in Uganda. Stud Comp Int Dev 55(2):160–183 Balthasar D (2013) Somaliland's best kept secret: shrewd politics and war projects as means of state-making. J East Afr Stud 7(2):218–238 Bendaña A, Chopra T (2013) Women's rights, state-centric rule of law, and legal pluralism in Somaliland. Hague J Rule Law 5(1):44–73 Boege V (2006) Traditional approaches to conflict transformation. Potentials and limits' Boege V, Brown A, Clements K, Nolan A (2008) 'On hybrid political orders and emerging states: state formation in the context of ‘fragility’' Börzel TA, Grimm S (2018) 'Building good (enough) governance in postconflict societies & areas of limited statehood: The European Union & the Western Balkans', Daedalus , 147(1):116–127 Boyatzis RE (1998) Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development. sage Bradbury M, Abokor AY, Yusuf HA (2003) Somaliland: Choosing politics over violence. Rev Afr Polit Econ 30(97):455–478 Bräutigam DA, Knack S (2004) Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Econ Dev Cult Change 52(2):255–285 Brinkerhoff DW, Johnson R (2008) Good enough governance in fragile states: The role of center-periphery relations and local government Burkolter P, Perch L (2014) Greening growth in the south: Practice, policies and new frontiers. South Afr J Int affairs 21(2):235–259 Casson MC, Della Giusta M, Kambhampati US (2010) Formal and informal institutions and development. World Dev 38(2):137–141 Chhotray V, Stoker G, Chhotray V, Stoker G (2009) Governance: From theory to practice. Springer Cho E (2024) 'Development NGOs, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Aid Allocations'. Stud Comp Int Dev :1–28 Clements KP, Boege V, Brown A, Foley W, Nolan A (2007) State building reconsidered: The role of hybridity in the formation of political order. Political Sci 59(1):45–56 Coggins B (2014) Power politics and state formation in the twentieth century: The dynamics of recognition. Cambridge University Press Debiel T, Glassner R, Schetter C, Terlinden U (2009) Local state-building in Afghanistan and Somaliland. Peace Rev 21(1):38–44 Englebert P (2009) Africa: Unity, sovereignty, sorrow. Lynne Rienner Eriksen SS (2017) State effects and the effects of state building: institution building and the formation of state-centred societies. Third World Q 38(4):771–786 Eubank N (2012) Taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: Lessons from Somaliland. J Dev Stud 48(4):465–480 Evans M (2012) Beyond the integrity paradox–towards ‘good enough’governance? Policy Stud 33(1):97–113 Farah M (2024) Alternative View on Governance in Developing Countries: An Integrative Analysis of Governance for Sustainable Development in Somaliland RMIT University. https://research-repository.rmit.edu.au/articles/thesis/Alternative_View_on_Governance_in_Developing_Countries_An_Integrative_ Analysis_of_Governance_for_Sustainable_Development_ in_Somaliland/25779630 Farah MH, Sabani A (2019) Towards Sustainable Development Goals: A Literature Review and a Conceptual Framework of Governance Issues in Africa. ACM, p 1450366449 Folke C, Hahn T, Olsson P, Norberg J (2005) Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. Annu Rev Environ Resour 30(1):441–473 Glass L-M, Newig J (2019) Governance for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: How important are participation, policy coherence, reflexivity, adaptation and democratic institutions? Earth Syst Gov 2:100031 Goran H (2007) 'Governance and poverty reduction in Africa', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 104(43):16751. 10.1073/pnas.0700696104 Grindle MS (2004) Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. Governance 17(4):525–548 Grindle MS (2007) Good enough governance revisited. Dev policy Rev 25(5):533–574 Grindle MS (2011) Good enough governance revisited. Dev policy Rev 29:s199–s221 Güney T (2017) Governance and sustainable development: How effective is governance? J Int Trade Economic Dev 26(3):316–335 Herring E, Ismail L, McCullough A, Saed M (2020) Somalia, fragmented hybrid governance and inclusive development. Limited statehood and informal governance in the Middle East and Africa. Routledge Hersi MF (2018) 'State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building', Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development Hydén G, Olowu D, Okoth-Ogendo HWO (2000) African perspectives on governance. Africa World, Trenton, NJ Kaufmann D, Kraay A (2008) Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going? World Bank, Washington, DC Kiely R (1998) Neoliberalism revised? A critical account of World Bank conceptions of good governance and market friendly intervention. Int J Health Serv 28(4):683–702 Kooiman J (1999) Social-Political Governance: Overview, reflections and design. Public Management: Int J Res Theory 1(1):67–92. 10.1080/14719037800000005 Kooiman J (2003) Governing as governance. SAGE, London Kraushaar M, Lambach D (2009) Hybrid political orders: the added value of a new concept. Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Brisbane Maboudi T (2020) Participation, inclusion, and the democratic content of constitutions. Stud Comp Int Dev 55(1):48–76 McKie K (2017) The politics of institutional choice across sub-Saharan Africa: Presidential term limits. Stud Comp Int Dev 52(4):436–456 Meadowcroft J (2007) Who is in charge here? Governance for sustainable development in a complex world. J Environ Planning Policy Manage 9(3–4):299–314 Menkhaus K (2007) Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. Int Secur 31(3):74–106 Milton S (2021) Higher education and sustainable development goal 16 in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. High Educ 81(1):89–108 Moe LW, Simojoki MV (2013) Custom, contestation and co-operation: peace and justice promotion in Somaliland. Confl Secur Dev 13(4):393–416 Musa AM, Horst C (2019) State formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland: the impact of the private sector in an unrecognised state. Confl Secur Dev 19(1):35–53 Njeri S (2019) Somaliland; the viability of a liberal peacebuilding critique beyond state building, state formation and hybridity. Peacebuilding 7(1):37–50 Omri A, Mabrouk NB (2020) Good governance for sustainable development goals: Getting ahead of the pack or falling behind? Environ Impact Assess Rev 83:106388 Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge New York Ostrom E (2010) Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems. Am Econ Rev 100(3):641–672 Peters BG (2011a) Governing in the shadows. Asia Pac J public Adm 33(1):1–16 Philip G (1999) The dilemmas of good governance: A Latin American perspective. Government Opposition 34(2):226–242 Phillips S (2013) 'Political settlements and state formation: the case of Somaliland'. Res Paper, 23 Renders M, Terlinden U (2010) Negotiating statehood in a hybrid political order: The case of Somaliland. Dev Change 41(4):723–746 Rhodes R (1996) The new governance: governing without government. Polit Stud 44(4):652–667 Richards R (2009) Challenging the Ideal? Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland. University of Bristol Richards R (2015) Bringing the outside in: Somaliland, statebuilding and dual hybridity. J Intervention Statebuilding 9(1):4–25 Richards R (2016) Understanding statebuilding: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland. Routledge Ridout TA (2012) Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success. J Middle East Afr 3(2):136–156 Schakel AH, Hooghe L, Marks G (2015) 'Multilevel governance and the state', The Oxford handbook of transformations of the state :269–285 Scheffran J (2025) Planetary Boundaries, Polycrisis and Politics in the Anthropocene: Climate Pathways, Tipping Cascades and Transition to Sustainable Peace in Integrative Geography. Towards Rethinking Politics, Policy and Polity in the Anthropocene: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Springer Sharma GD, Yadav A, Chopra R (2020) Artificial intelligence and effective governance: A review, critique and research agenda. Sustainable Futures 2:100004 South A (2018) Hybrid governance and the politics of legitimacy in the Myanmar peace process. J Contemp Asia 48(1):50–66 Spencer ME (1970) Weber on legitimate norms and authority. Br J Sociol 21(2):123–134 Stoker G (1998) Governance as theory: Five propositions. Int social Sci J 50(1):17–28 Suchman MC (1995) Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. Acad Manage Rev 20(3):571–610. 10.2307/258788 . http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/stable/258788 Towah WD (2019) 'The Impact of Good Governance and Stability on Sustainable Development in Ghana' United Nations Development Programme (1997) Governance for sustainable human development: A UNDP policy document. United Nations Development Programme Von Steinsdorff S, Fruhstorfer A (2012) Post-Soviet de facto states in search of internal and external legitimacy. Introduction. Communist Post-Communist Stud 45(1–2):117–121 Walls M (2014) A Somali nation-state: history. culture and Somaliland's political transition' Weber M (1978) Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Univ of California Weiss TG (2000) Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges. Third World Q 21(5):795–814. 10.1080/713701075 Wiuff Moe L (2011) Hybrid and ‘everyday’political ordering: constructing and contesting legitimacy in Somaliland. J Legal Pluralism Unoff Law 43(63):143–177 World Bank (2019) World Bank Open Data , https://data.worldbank.org/ Ziaja S, Grävingholt J, Kreibaum M (2019) Constellations of fragility: An empirical typology of states. Stud Comp Int Dev 54:299–321 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 21 Nov, 2025 Reviews received at journal 05 Nov, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 03 Nov, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 03 Nov, 2025 Reviews received at journal 29 Oct, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 26 Oct, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 14 Oct, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 01 Oct, 2025 Editor invited by journal 01 Oct, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 12 Sep, 2025 First submitted to journal 12 Sep, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7296005","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":535411116,"identity":"5f7b93cb-3253-4dde-95a9-603431acce3b","order_by":0,"name":"Mohamed Farah","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"RMIT University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Mohamed","middleName":"","lastName":"Farah","suffix":""},{"id":535411117,"identity":"78241366-fa0d-44eb-968b-5edecf8c1f54","order_by":1,"name":"Alvedi Sabani","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"RMIT University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Alvedi","middleName":"","lastName":"Sabani","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-08-05 04:08:10","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":94587606,"identity":"58fee44f-6fb1-4f88-bdc4-f31ee9c178eb","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:18:25","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":170442,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"BlindedManuscript3.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/66643c8594c0a9cdfcd975f7.docx"},{"id":94586498,"identity":"d63e7f62-4349-419d-b08a-e278e6a15165","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:16:58","extension":"json","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":4925,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"bf135f1df5cd4ebf924663ccbd8fede3.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/6f379b5b48acd8e7a6064132.json"},{"id":94587315,"identity":"ab0d07bc-b093-4b00-b805-0b0bcc757e92","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:18:05","extension":"xml","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":196429,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"bf135f1df5cd4ebf924663ccbd8fede31enriched.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/efeadd29f99fb24c5fd42864.xml"},{"id":94587621,"identity":"43504adc-7bb8-45b1-90c9-34f583550771","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:18:28","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":4491,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Onlinefloatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/343e315dc72e527118dbb1fe.png"},{"id":94586782,"identity":"3606436f-88a0-45c3-8d23-8ac35f6f7541","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:17:23","extension":"xml","order_by":5,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":192750,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"bf135f1df5cd4ebf924663ccbd8fede31structuring.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/410bb5f6a0656a39981eff1b.xml"},{"id":94587296,"identity":"9bf7235e-1d17-41c5-a4b5-992ddfd6aadc","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:18:03","extension":"html","order_by":6,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":203115,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/e9975aeb2789a5ae3cd9d32e.html"},{"id":94587618,"identity":"97867417-9929-4e5b-ae54-b7be8155ebc3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:18:27","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":12474,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eAnalytical Matrix\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/8c114e4983def1894997d704.png"},{"id":94596459,"identity":"09d1f6db-613a-4525-908a-18c32bc6315e","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:42:10","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1138512,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7296005/v1/07edd6cc-28b4-4966-a55d-041d6a98cce1.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Rethinking Governance Effectiveness: Sustainable Development in an Unrecognised State","fulltext":[{"header":"1 Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn an era marked by intensifying geopolitical tension, global trade wars, and widening inequality, the importance of effective governance for sustainable development has become increasingly urgent (Omri and Mabrouk \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). As multilateral commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) face unprecedented strain, questions of governance effectiveness, particularly in politically complex and resource-constrained contexts, demand closer scrutiny (Burkolter and Perch \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Scheffran \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Disruptions in global trade, food systems, and climate governance have further highlighted the need for institutional frameworks that are not only accountable and inclusive but also resilient to shocks and responsive to local realities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile much of the existing scholarship focuses on state-centric models of governance in established democracies (Benda\u0026ntilde;a and Chopra \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Coggins \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Eriksen \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Ostrom \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) or development assistance in recognized fragile states (Br\u0026auml;utigam and Knack \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Brinkerhoff and Johnson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e), less attention has been paid to unrecognised or de facto states navigating development independently. One such example is Somaliland, a self-declared republic in the Horn of Africa that has operated autonomously from Somalia since 1991 but remains diplomatically unrecognised. Despite lacking formal international status and enduring chronic resource scarcity, Somaliland has maintained relative peace and stability, functioning with a hybrid governance structure that combines customary law, Islamic principles, and modern state institutions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study contributes to the expanding literature aimed at deepening our understanding of governance beyond conventional metrics. It examines Somaliland's distinctive governance arrangements and evaluates their impact on its development trajectory. By foregrounding an under-examined, post-conflict context, this research fills a significant gap in comparative development studies, specifically regarding how governance arrangements can effectively function in the absence of formal international legitimacy, and what implications this holds for sustainable development in fragile or contested states (Farah \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Glass and Newig \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Omri and Mabrouk \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Accordingly, the study investigates the research question: \u003cem\u003eHow can governance for sustainable development be effectively realised in Somaliland?\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThrough qualitative fieldwork involving interviews with key actors across public, private, and civil society sectors, the study applies thematic analysis to identify the governance arrangements and institutional dynamics that underpin Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s developmental progress. By foregrounding a functionally stable yet diplomatically unrecognised context, this research extends theoretical debates on governance, hybridity, and state-building in contested and post-conflict spaces.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2 Literature Review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1 Governance and Development Nexus\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe concept of governance encompasses various dimensions of effectiveness, typically including accountability, transparency, rule of law, participation, responsiveness, equity, effectiveness/efficiency, and strategic vision that together shape a state\u0026rsquo;s developmental trajectory. The effectiveness of governance plays a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the development of a state (G\u0026uuml;ney \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Major international bodies and scholars have defined governance in terms of these core principles. A survey of literature on various forms of governance over the past two decades reveals a significant increase in research in this field. However, one of the challenges encountered in studying these forms lies in the different interpretations and understandings of essential elements, because the meanings associated with the term can differ across different disciplines. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e presents a variety of definitions of governance and their key dimensions as provided by diverse sources, from development banks to academic theorists, underscoring common elements of good governance (e.g. accountability, transparency, combating corruption, stakeholder participation, legal frameworks) in driving development outcomes (African Development Bank 1999; Ansell and Torfing \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Kooiman \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). For instance, the World Bank (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e views governance as the manner in which power is exercised for development, highlighting public sector management, legal frameworks, accountability and transparency while the United Nations Development Programme (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e initiated the definition of governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation\u0026rsquo;s affairs, underlining citizen participation, equity and accountability. Likewise, Kaufmann and Kraay (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e focus on effective policy formulation and implementation through rule of law, transparency and government effectiveness, and scholars such as Kooiman (Kooiman \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Kooiman \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e) describe governance as the \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e, thereby stressing interactive arrangements between state and non-state actors in achieving collective goals. Across these definitions, governance effectiveness is seen as multi-dimensional\u0026ndash;requiring formal institutions to be accountable and inclusive, while engaging society in decision-making processes \u0026ndash; all with the ultimate goal of fostering holistic development, promoting sustainable practices and ensuring the well-being of citizens and the state.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eForms of Governance in the Social Sciences\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDisciplines\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConcepts of\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMeaning of Governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSources\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolitical Science\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance is the process and structure by which public institutions and actors exercise authority, make decisions, implement policies and manage resources within a society. It refers to the way power is distributed and exercised and how public affairs are conducted. Governance encompasses both formal and informal mechanisms, institutions and practices that shape political, economic and social interactions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(Chhotray et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Peters \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011a\u003c/span\u003e; Stoker \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDevelopment studies\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGood governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGood governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the public sector from institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political interaction, to decision-making structures that determine priorities among public problems and allocate resources to respond to them, to organisations that manage administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic arenas\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Kaufmann and Kraay \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Kiely \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Philip \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGood enough governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;Good enough governance is a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits development initiatives to go forward\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(B\u0026ouml;rzel and Grimm \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Brinkerhoff and Johnson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Evans \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSociology\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance: \u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSelf-organisation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026lsquo;Refers to self-organisation of societies and communities, beyond the market and short of the state. Typical is the work of Elinor Ostrom, who studied the capacity of communities in different places and times to manage common pool resources and prevent their depletion (a prime example is overfishing). Small local communities have done so without the help of a formal government through bottom-up self-government by associations, informal understandings, negotiations, regulations, trust relations and informal social control rather than state coercion\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(Ostrom \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1990\u003c/span\u003e; Rhodes \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBuilding upon existing understandings of governance effectiveness, Ziaja et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e, offer an empirical typology of state fragility characterized by violence control, implementation capacity, and empirical legitimacy. Somaliland exhibits notable strengths in these dimensions despite the constraints associated with its unrecognised status. For instance, violence control is significantly effective due to the integration of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, including the Guurti, alongside formal security institutions. Implementation capacity, while challenged by resource constraints, is bolstered by a decentralized governance system engaging multiple local stakeholders. Empirical legitimacy in Somaliland emerges from hybrid governance structures that reflect local sociopolitical norms, aligning closely with Ziaja et al.'s recognition of legitimacy as rooted in domestic acceptance rather than solely external recognition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEffective governance is thus intimately linked to sustainable development. There is broad recognition in development discourse that without good governance, sustainable development is difficult to achieve (Farah and Sabani \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Glass and Newig \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Omri and Mabrouk \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Towah \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). This nexus has been explicitly incorporated into global development frameworks, most notably the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development broadened the focus beyond the earlier MDGs (which applied mainly to developing countries) to a universal set of goals that include governance-related targets for all nations. In particular, Goal 16 \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e signals that peace, effective institutions, and inclusive governance are crucial prerequisites for sustainable development.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRecent studies have reinforced these linkages: effective governance can facilitate economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability, whereas poor governance can derail development efforts (Goran \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Meadowcroft \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Weiss \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). In sum, the literature establishes a clear governance-development nexus: improvements in governance quality (through accountable leadership, citizen participation, rule of law, etc.) tend to support more robust and equitable development outcomes, and conversely, sustainable development initiatives often require supportive governance structures to succeed. This nexus provides an important foundation for analysing Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s experience, where governance arrangements have been central to its peace and development over the past three decades.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.2 State-centric vs Hybrid Governance Models\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMainstream governance literature has historically been state-centric, focusing on the capacity of formal state institutions to deliver services and uphold rules. Conventional development models often assume that strengthening government apparatus, bureaucratic efficiency, rule of law, anti-corruption measures \u0026ndash; will translate into better development outcomes (Grindle (Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Hyd\u0026eacute;n et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). However, in many developing or post-conflict contexts, this state-centric lens is insufficient, as it overlooks the vital role of informal and traditional institutions. Critics like Richards (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e and Wiuff Moe (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e have highlighted the limitations of defining governance purely in terms of Western-state institutional frameworks, noting that such definitions may fail to capture the \u0026ldquo;informal institutions that govern the political landscape\u0026rdquo; in real-world contexts, particularly of societies with deep traditional forms of governing (Clements et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). In societies where the state\u0026rsquo;s reach is limited or where customary authority retains legitimacy, governance is not exercised by the state alone. Thus, an emerging body of literature examines hybrid governance models that blend formal and informal systems, challenging the dominance of purely state-centric paradigms (Herring et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Njeri \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; South \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe concept of hybrid political order or institutional hybridity has gained traction in explaining governance in fragile and post-colonial settings. Hybridity in governance refers to the coexistence and interplay of formal state structures with informal, customary, and traditional institutions in the same polity. Rather than a neat separation between a modern state and traditional society, these elements become \u003cem\u003einterconnected, intertwined and interdependent\u003c/em\u003e (Kraushaar and Lambach \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Wiuff Moe \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). In other words, hybrid governance systems \u003cem\u003eblend formal state norms and institutions\u003c/em\u003e with those of the informal sphere, including traditional and customary practices. Somaliland offers a prime example of this type of blend: its governance approach is characterised by co-governance arrangements in which clan elders and customary authorities are integrated into the formal state apparatus. The establishment of the Guurti (House of Elders) as the upper house of Parliament is one illustration of this institutional hybridity, merging customary leadership with a constitutional structure. Such hybrid models can fill the governance void in weak states by leveraging local forms of authority and social regulation. Researchers argue that in places like Somaliland, informal networks and clan structures have provided legitimacy and social order that the nascent state alone could not supply (Boege \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Wiuff Moe \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). This stands in contrast to the classic Weberian notion of a monopoly of authority by the state; instead, authority in hybrid orders is negotiated among state actors, traditional leaders, and local communities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRecent scholarship on hybrid governance and legitimacy theory suggests that a balance between formal and informal institutions can enhance stability and development in fragile contexts. Boege et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e and others describe \u0026ldquo;hybrid political orders\u0026rdquo; where customary governance mechanisms (e.g. councils of elders, customary law) work alongside formal government, creating a pragmatic form of order and service provision. In Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s case, the integration of clan elders into state governance has been credited with fostering a high degree of local legitimacy and ownership of political processes. \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;This hybrid formula is still regarded as one of the factors that is maintaining statehood and fostering favourable state\u0026ndash;society relations\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e even decades after Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s self-declaration of independence (Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Walls \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). By tapping into indigenous structures of authority, the Somaliland government managed to establish peace and consensus in a manner that externally designed state institutions alone likely could not have achieved. On the other hand, purely state-centric approaches \u0026ndash; such as those focused narrowly on building formal state capacity or institutions modelled on international best practices \u0026ndash; often misjudge or undervalue these indigenous governance resources.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper, therefore calls for a reconceptualization of governance in fragile settings, moving beyond a state-versus-tradition dichotomy to understand the hybrid governance arrangements that actually operate on the ground (Kraushaar and Lambach \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). In summary, while traditional views prioritise state capacity and formal institutions, empirical observations (including the Somaliland case) highlight that informal and customary institutions can be equally critical. A hybrid governance model \u0026ndash; recognizing the role of elders, religious authorities, and local norms in concert with the state \u0026ndash; may provide a more comprehensive explanation for governance effectiveness in certain contexts than a strictly state-centric model.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSomaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance success is rooted in its hybrid institutional arrangements, legitimacy theory, and adaptive decision-making processes that draw on customary, religious, and modern governance traditions. This hybridity aligns with McKie (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e analysis, which highlights the critical role of institutional choices shaped by electoral uncertainty and the strategic control of constitutional reform processes in sub-Saharan Africa. McKie's findings suggest that institutional designs, such as the inclusion of presidential term limits, serve as political insurance mechanisms under conditions of electoral uncertainty. Somaliland's incorporation of traditional and customary authorities within formal state structures similarly reflects strategic institutional adaptation to manage internal political uncertainty, particularly during the critical formative years post-1991.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.3 Unrecognised States and Fragile Contexts\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eSomaliland\u0026rsquo;s experience also speaks to a notable gap in development studies: the under-representation of de facto states (unrecognised or self-declared states) in governance and development research. Mainstream development discourse and international policy often focus on recognized nation-states, meaning that territories like Somaliland which lack formal international recognition are seldom examined in comparative development studies (Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). This omission is significant, as unrecognised states present unique governance dynamics: they must govern and deliver services without the diplomatic recognition, external aid frameworks, or legitimacy that recognised states can rely on. Somaliland, for instance, has operated as a \u003cem\u003ede facto\u003c/em\u003e state for over 30 years, achieving a degree of peace, stable governance, and development outcomes despite its lack of recognition. Yet, scholarly attention to such cases has been limited, partly due to their ambiguous international status. As a result, the literature on governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas has only recently begun to incorporate insights from de facto states like Somaliland, Transnistria, or Northern Cyprus, which exist in legal and developmental limbo.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn general, fragile and post-conflict contexts have prompted considerable analysis in development literature. Studies of governance in war-torn or fragile states emphasize challenges like weak institutions, legitimacy deficits, external interference, and the importance of peacebuilding (Milton \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Njeri \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Ridout \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). For internationally recognised fragile states (e.g. Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan), researchers and practitioners have explored how to rebuild effective governance \u0026ndash; often stressing institution-building, inclusion of local actors, and international support. However, unrecognised states operate under different constraints: they cannot receive direct support from multilateral institutions and must derive legitimacy almost entirely from internal sources rather than international recognition. This creates an interesting paradox: while lacking external legitimacy, some de facto states have cultivated strong internal legitimacy through successful governance practices. Somaliland exemplifies this paradox; it has been described as a \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;phenomenon that deserves investigation\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e due to its unexpected success in establishing order and development without recognition (Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Its government has had to negotiate legitimacy domestically, through power-sharing among clans and consistent delivery of security and basic services, to compensate for the absence of external validation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe literature on such cases remains emergent. Analysts like Richards (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) argue that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s case challenges conventional state-building theories, showing that alternative pathways to stability exist outside the typical frameworks of international statecraft. In Somaliland and similar contexts, local ownership of governance and bottom-up state formation play a decisive role. Moreover, as some scholars note, de facto states often pursue development goals in isolation, which can lead to innovative practices unencumbered by external prescriptions (Balthasar \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Eubank \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). There is a growing recognition that studying unrecognised states can provide valuable insights into resilience and adaptive governance in extreme conditions. By comparing governance across fragile contexts \u0026ndash; both recognised and unrecognised \u0026ndash; we see that inclusive political settlements and hybrid institutions (customary and formal) are recurring themes in achieving stability (Menkhaus \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). This paper addresses the gap by examining Somaliland within the governance for development discourse, thereby shedding light on how a de facto state manages to function and even thrive. Ultimately, understanding Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance offers broader lessons for fragile-state governance, illustrating how legitimacy and effectiveness can be built from the ground up when international blueprints are absent. To frame this argument more clearly, Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e summarises the comparative attributes of governance across three governance contexts including established democracies, recognised fragile states, and unrecognised/de facto states, drawing on Somaliland as an illustrative case within the latter category.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eComparative Attributes of Governance Across State Contexts (Including Somaliland as a De Facto Case)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAttribute\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEstablished Democracies\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRecognised Fragile States\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnrecognised / De Facto States (e.g., Somaliland)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTypical Focus of Scholarship\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInstitutional performance, rule of law, democratic accountability (Ostrom, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Eriksen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eState-building, aid effectiveness, post-conflict reconstruction (Br\u0026auml;utigam \u0026amp; Knack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Brinkerhoff \u0026amp; Johnson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHybrid orders, legitimacy theory, informal institutions (Phillips, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Eubank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCommon Governance Assumptions\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStrong formal institutions, electoral legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCapacity gaps addressed via institutional reform and aid\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFormal capacity is limited; legitimacy is informally negotiated (Richards, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrimary Governance Actors\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eElected officials, bureaucrats, civic institutions\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTransitional governments, international actors, NGOs\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eState elites, traditional authorities, civil society, and business networks (Renders \u0026amp; Terlinden, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Eubank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSources of Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLegal-rational authority, electoral processes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExternal recognition, donor conditionality\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInternal consensus, performance legitimacy, customary norms (Phillips, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRole of Informal Institutions\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMinimal or complementary\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOften excluded from formal reform efforts\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIntegral to governance structure; often institutionalised (e.g. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s Guurti) (Balthasar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAttention to Inclusion\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStrong policy and legal frameworks\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable; often donor-driven\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMarginalised actors (women, IDPs, youth) often excluded despite formal roles (Maboudi \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Njeri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLevel of Scholarly Attention\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExtensive\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eModerate to extensive\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmerging, with limited empirical studies (Phillips, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInclusive and participatory governance processes have been shown to yield significant democratic dividends. Maboudi (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e demonstrates through a comprehensive analysis of constitution-making processes that broader citizen participation significantly enhances democratic provisions within constitutions. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s hybrid governance arrangements similarly emphasize broad participatory and inclusive processes, particularly visible through clan conferences and public consultations during critical periods such as constitutional drafting and conflict resolution initiatives. The empirical link established by Maboudi underscores how these locally driven participatory mechanisms have reinforced democratic norms, contributing significantly to Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s political stability and developmental resilience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.4 Theoretical Anchors\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study draws on a composite theoretical framework to analyse how governance for sustainable development is negotiated and enacted in Somaliland. Four key conceptual lenses guide the inquiry: \u003cem\u003einstitutional hybridity\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003elegitimacy theory\u003c/em\u003e serve as the primary interpretive frameworks, while \u003cem\u003eadaptive governance\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003emulti-level governance (MLG)\u003c/em\u003e offer auxiliary insights into institutional dynamics and actor interactions. The following analytical matrix (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e) consolidates these theoretical perspectives into a structured framework, clarifying how each lens contributes conceptually to the study of governance in fragile or unrecognised contexts. This framework provides a structured and comparative foundation for interpreting empirical findings across different dimensions of governance. Together, these theories frame a nuanced analytical approach capable of capturing the complexity of governance in a de facto state that operates without international recognition but exhibits relative stability and developmental progress.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eInstitutional hybridity\u003c/em\u003e is the principal lens for understanding how governance operates through the integration of formal state mechanisms and informal, customary institutions. The theory of hybrid political orders (Boege et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Kraushaar and Lambach \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e)(Boege et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Kraushaar \u0026amp; Lambach, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) conceptualises political authority in fragile and post-colonial contexts as emerging from negotiated arrangements between state and non-state actors. In Somaliland, governance is exercised through a layered system involving the elected executive and legislative branches, the House of Elders (Guurti), customary leaders, and religious authorities. This coexistence of parallel but interlinked institutions exemplifies an embedded hybridity, rather than a transitional or ad hoc response to weak state capacity (Renders and Terlinden \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Wiuff Moe \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). The institutionalisation of this hybridity evident in the formal recognition of customary leaders within the constitutionally mandated Guurti distinguishes Somaliland from many other fragile or post-conflict settings, suggesting that hybrid governance can be structurally durable rather than temporally contingent.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eClosely connected to hybridity is the concept of \u003cem\u003elegitimacy theory\u003c/em\u003e, which offers a second primary anchor for this study. Drawing on Weberian distinctions between legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic forms of authority (Spencer \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1970\u003c/span\u003e; Suchman Full publication date: Jul., 1995 1995), this perspective emphasises how legitimacy is not a fixed status conferred by international recognition, but a dynamic process negotiated through local practices, social contracts, and performance. In Somaliland, legitimacy has been constructed through mechanisms such as clan conferences (\u0026ldquo;shir\u0026rdquo;), public consultations, and consensus-building processes, particularly in the aftermath of state collapse in 1991 (Wiuff Moe \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). These practices have helped build a form of output legitimacy rooted in local expectations and service delivery, rather than legal sovereignty (Eubank \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). The state's reliance on traditional elders to confer and reaffirm political authority, often through informal structures, aligns with theories of legitimacy that prioritise internal consent and responsiveness over formal legality(Von Steinsdorff and Fruhstorfer \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). The analysis thus treats legitimacy in Somaliland not as an institutional endpoint but as an ongoing, negotiated relationship between rulers and ruled, shaped by both performance and participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA third conceptual anchor is \u003cem\u003eadaptive governance\u003c/em\u003e, which helps illuminate the evolutionary nature of Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s political system. Originally developed in the field of environmental governance (Folke et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e), adaptive governance refers to institutional capacities for learning, flexibility, and iterative problem-solving in response to uncertainty. In the Somaliland context, adaptation is evident in pragmatic innovations such as term extensions during electoral delays, the use of transitional power-sharing agreements, or the strategic inclusion of diaspora actors in policy and economic planning. These practices reflect an ability to recalibrate governance structures in response to shifting political, economic, and social pressures, rather than adherence to a fixed institutional blueprint. Although not always normatively ideal, these adaptive responses have enabled Somaliland to maintain political continuity and functional governance in a volatile region. As such, adaptive governance provides a valuable lens to analyse how institutional resilience can emerge in the absence of conventional state-building support or international aid frameworks.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, the study engages \u003cem\u003emulti-level governance\u003c/em\u003e as a supplementary framework to capture the vertical and horizontal dispersion of authority across state and non-state actors. MLG, originally formulated in European integration studies (Farah \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Schakel et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e), posits that governance occurs across overlapping jurisdictions and actor constellations. Although Somaliland is excluded from formal international governance structures, the MLG perspective remains useful for analysing how power and responsibility are distributed between local councils, regional authorities, state ministries, civil society organisations (CSOs), traditional leaders, and private sector actors. This perspective allows the research to trace how coordination, contestation, and co-governance unfold at multiple levels simultaneously revealing both synergies and tensions in the governance landscape. In doing so, it contributes to an understanding of governance as a relational and networked process, rather than a state-centric or top-down function.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3 Method","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.1 Research Design\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis research adopted a qualitative case study design, focusing in-depth on the single case of Somaliland. A case study approach was chosen to enable a rich, contextual understanding of how governance for sustainable development functions in Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s unique setting. As an intrinsic case, Somaliland is of great interest because of its unusual political trajectory \u0026ndash; a self-declared state that has maintained stability and development without international recognition. Scholars have described Somaliland as a \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;phenomenon that deserves investigation\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e), given its unexpected success in state-building and governance. By selecting Somaliland as the case, the study aims to explore the factors behind its governance effectiveness in detail, generating insights that might be overlooked in comparative large-N studies. The choice of Somaliland is further justified by the research gap identified: de facto states like Somaliland are under explored in development research despite their instructive experiences. This case serves as an illustrative example of hybrid governance and legitimacy theory, offering lessons that could inform broader theories of governance in fragile contexts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study was positioned within an interpretivist paradigm specifically, constructivism acknowledging that social realities like \u0026ldquo;good governance\u0026rdquo; are constructed through the perceptions and interactions of stakeholders. The researcher\u0026rsquo;s own positionality as a Somali and familiarity with the local context were transparently considered as part of the methodological positioning. This design allowed for an in-depth analysis of Somaliland on its own terms, providing nuanced insights into the governance-development nexus in an atypical context.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.2 Data Collection\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe data collection for this study was grounded in fieldwork conducted in Somaliland and employed a multi-method qualitative approach, including semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and document analysis. The primary data source comprised 26 semi-structured interviews with a strategically selected and demographically varied group of stakeholders spanning key sectors of Somaliland society. Participants were drawn from the public sector, civil society, private business community, and traditional institutions, ensuring that a broad spectrum of voices was captured. Respondents included government officials (e.g., ministers, civil servants), local NGO leaders and activists, private sector entrepreneurs, clan elders, and other influential community figures. This diversity was not only institutional but also demographic, spanning a range of age groups (from 18 to over 70 years old), gender (though male participants predominated), and educational backgrounds (from secondary schooling to doctoral-level qualifications). The inclusion of both public and private actors, as well as female leaders and younger participants, provided valuable perspectives on governance across generational, gendered, and hierarchical lines.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Most interviews were conducted in person in Hargeisa, the capital city, though a few participants travelled from other regions to participate in group sessions. One notable example was a focus group discussion with multiple traditional elders, which enabled the researchers to observe group dynamics and collective reasoning on governance issues. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, combining a standard set of open-ended questions with adaptive, in-depth probing. Conversations often extended beyond their scheduled timeframes, as participants were eager to share their insights and lived experiences. All interviews were conducted with informed consent, and participants were assured of confidentiality. Audio recordings were made where permitted and were later transcribed for thematic analysis. In line with ethical standards, anonymity was preserved using participant codes. A purposive and snowball sampling strategy was employed. Initial key informants were identified based on their leadership roles or institutional influence within Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance landscape. These individuals then referred the researcher to other knowledgeable actors in their networks. This approach was particularly effective for reaching elite and hard-to-access respondents, aided by personal introductions, professional networks, and social media outreach.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile the sample was predominantly male and drawn from the educated elite reflecting the demographic realities of leadership in Somaliland, deliberate efforts were made to incorporate female voices and youth representatives. For instance, participants ranged from a teenage female entrepreneur to senior male policymakers over 60, allowing the study to capture intergenerational differences in perspectives on governance and reform. The demographic profile of participants is summarised in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e below:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProfile of Respondents\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCode\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEducation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eRole (Sector)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYears of Experience\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP1\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP2\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP3\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP4\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecondary school\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP5\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP6\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e18\u0026ndash;20\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecondary School\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP7\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e46\u0026ndash;60\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP8\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21\u0026ndash;30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral Degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP9\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP10\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBachelor\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8\u0026ndash;10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP11\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e46\u0026ndash;60\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBachelor\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP12\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21\u0026ndash;30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP13\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e61\u0026ndash;70\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBachelor\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP14\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e61\u0026ndash;70\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP15\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDiploma\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP16\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e61\u0026ndash;70\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctoral degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP17\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP18\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP19\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8\u0026ndash;10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP20\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP21\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP22\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e61\u0026ndash;70\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBachelor\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP23\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP24\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLess than 3 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP25\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u0026ndash;7 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eP26\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMaster\u0026rsquo;s degree\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrivate actor\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore than 10 years\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition to interviews, the study analysed a range of relevant documents to contextualise and validate the primary data. These included national development plans, policy documents, Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s Constitution, clan agreements, legal frameworks, and reports from international development agencies. Media sources were also consulted to track narratives and timelines. Document analysis enabled the researcher to triangulate claims made during interviews and add historical and institutional context to the findings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBy comparing evidence across interviews, observations, and documentary sources, the study achieved methodological triangulation. Recurring themes across different sources increased the robustness and credibility of insights, while inconsistencies were explored through follow-up questions and supplementary inquiries. This triangulated, multi-method approach ensured a comprehensive and well-rounded evidence base, in line with best practices in qualitative case research.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.3 Thematic Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study employed a thematic analysis approach to systematically examine the qualitative data. The analytical process was guided by established frameworks for coding and theme development, particularly drawing on the work of Boyatzis (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e) and Attride-Stirling (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e. According to Boyatzis (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e, a \u003cem\u003etheme is a \u0026ldquo;pattern found in the information that describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Boyatzis \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e:4). This definition underpinned how the researcher identified and treated themes in the data. Using NVivo software, the interview transcripts and fieldnotes were carefully reviewed and coded. Initially, a deductive coding scheme was applied \u0026ndash; the researcher developed a set of preliminary codes based on the conceptual framework and literature review (the \u0026ldquo;top-down\u0026rdquo; approach). For example, codes corresponding to expected themes such as \u0026ldquo;accountability mechanisms,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;clan elders\u0026rsquo; role,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;international aid (absence),\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;sustainable development strategies,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;legitimacy\u0026rdquo; were defined in advance to reflect key concepts of interest. This study followed a top-down approach to data analysis wherein codes were in part predetermined by the theoretical propositions. Each transcript was then coded line-by-line: segments of text were labelled with one or more codes whenever they related to those concepts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe next step was to cluster these codes into themes and sub-themes. Using guidance from thematic analysis techniques (Boyatzis \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Braun \u0026amp; Clarke 2006), related codes were grouped to form higher-order themes. For example, codes such as \u0026ldquo;elders mediating disputes,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;clan representation in government,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;blending customary and formal law\u0026rdquo; were grouped under a broader theme of \u0026ldquo;Hybrid Governance Structures.\u0026rdquo; Thematic networks (Attride-Stirling \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) were then developed to organize themes into coherent patterns: basic codes aggregated into organising themes, which in turn mapped onto overarching global themes that answer the research question. Through this process, key thematic findings emerged \u0026ndash; such as the importance of power-sharing, the role of local ownership in development projects, challenges in institutional capacity, and adaptive policy responses in Somaliland.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThroughout the analysis, the researcher continually mapped the emergent themes back to the broader conceptual and theoretical debates outlined in the literature review. This involved interpreting how governance practices in Somaliland engaged with established theories of governance and development, particularly the governance-development nexus, hybrid governance, legitimacy, and adaptive governance. For instance, findings related to centralised authority and power asymmetries were analysed against the backdrop of the governance effectiveness literature (G\u0026uuml;ney \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Kaufmann and Kraay \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Sharma et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e), highlighting how Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s approach deviates from the normative emphasis on decentralisation, accountability, and participatory decision-making. Simultaneously, the institutionalised co-governance arrangements between clan elders, CSOs, and formal state actors were examined through the lens of hybrid governance theory (Farah \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Hersi \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e), revealing both the integrative strengths and exclusionary tendencies of these structures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThemes such as the politicisation of traditional leadership and the marginalisation of IDPs and women were linked to the literature on legitimacy theory and inclusion (Englebert \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Weber \u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1978\u003c/span\u003e), illustrating that internal legitimacy in Somaliland is deeply embedded in customary norms and clan networks, yet remains selective and stratified. Similarly, the persistence of Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s stability despite the lack of international recognition was analysed in relation to the growing body of work on de facto states and unrecognised political orders (Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Richards \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e), reinforcing the argument that governance effectiveness can emerge independently of external sovereignty, driven instead by internal consensus, performance legitimacy, and adaptive resilience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4 Findings","content":"\u003ch2\u003e4.1 \u0026nbsp;Overview\u0026nbsp;\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn examining how governance effectiveness for sustainable development is achieved in Somaliland, a self-declared, unrecognised state with hybrid governance structures, this study reveals a multifaceted and contextually grounded landscape of governance. Findings highlight that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance modes and arrangements navigate a complex balancing act: centralised authority provides control over scarce resources but often limits local responsiveness; collaborative processes, while culturally embedded, are frequently elite driven, revealing tensions between communal norms and power asymmetries. We have also noticed a perceptible shift of authority from traditional leaders to formal state actors has occurred over the last 34 years of the state\u0026rsquo;s existence, though legitimacy gaps persist, and the governance framework remains fluid, blending Sharia-Laws, Customary Law (Xeer), and formal institutions to adapt to changing circumstances. Moreover, unlike states heavily reliant on foreign aid, Somaliland has maintained a notable degree of internal legitimacy by depending largely on domestic resources and locally driven governance structures. Baldwin and Winters (2020 reveal that government legitimacy in aid-dependent countries is often undermined when citizens perceive governance effectiveness as externally rather than internally driven. In contrast, Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s legitimacy is derived primarily from domestic performance and local consensus-building rather than international aid flows. This internal legitimacy stands as a distinct and instructive contrast to many recognised but fragile states, underscoring Somaliland\u0026apos;s unique approach to governance effectiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn our research we have also discovered that diverse actors play crucial roles in shaping governance outcomes. State elites have consolidated power in the post-war period, steering political and economic agendas. Civil society organisations act as both service providers and peacekeepers, filling gaps where state capacity falls short, while business interest groups wield considerable economic influence that also translates into political power, often reinforcing elite interests. Traditional leaders, once viewed as custodians of norms and stabilisers of society, are increasingly politicised and male-dominated, complicating their role in governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe multistakeholder landscape further exposes critical tensions: internally displaced persons (IDPs), despite contributing to local economies, remain legally excluded and face systemic barriers to inclusion, while women\u0026rsquo;s participation in governance continues to be contested, negotiated within cultural norms, and constrained by political dynamics. These findings demonstrate that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance effectiveness is not a product of formal institutional strength but rather emerges from the adaptive interplay of diverse actors and frameworks that are deeply rooted in local realities. This underscores the need to reimagine governance effectiveness not only in terms of institutional capacity but also through the lens of legitimacy, inclusivity, and resilience in contexts marked by political ambiguity and resource scarcity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe following sections present the empirical evidence underpinning these insights, detailing how governance arrangements, actor dynamics, and stakeholder experiences collectively shape Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s unique governance trajectory.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e4.2 \u0026nbsp;Governance Modes and Arrangements\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Centralised authority\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSomaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance is characterised by a highly centralised distribution of authority concentrated in key national officials (the executive and directors-general). While decentralisation is often linked to democratisation in developing contexts (Khumalo 2015), Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s power remains top-down, leading to erosion of authority in crucial ministries. Respondents widely observed a \u0026ldquo;centralised authority\u0026rdquo; system where the government exerts full, micro-level control over public services through presidentially appointed directors-general. As one public official (P2) explained:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The Somaliland government exercises full control, often a top-down, micro-level management of its public services and delivery of goods by nominating directors-general to operational positions within government agencies and ministries.\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis top-down approach is seen as inefficient, confirming arguments that horizontal power-sharing would better democratise decision-making (Peters 2016). Indeed, because authority is so concentrated, major decisions rest with a few individuals; one interviewee (P2) noted \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;the directors-general receive instructions by the president \u0026hellip; [and] often the president\u0026rsquo;s directives supersede the minister\u0026rsquo;s\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCentralisation has had mixed effects. On one hand, it enabled tight control of scarce national resources, helping Somaliland manage a small budget that grew from under $100 million to $400 million (P13). On the other hand, it weakened local governance by failing to devolve authority. Excessive hierarchy means communities outside major districts receive minimal public services. A respondent from rural Awdal (P3) illustrated this disparity, describing how his mother walked 15 miles twice a week to fetch water from a distant town because local provision was absent. Such evidence shows that a centralised authority, combined with limited resources, leaves many citizens underserved. Scholars argue that Somaliland must embrace decentralisation (Mal 2017) to empower local governments and elites to deliver critical services. In sum, decentralising power would distribute governance responsibilities more democratically and help maintain peace and stability across regions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Collaborative processes\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCollaboration is described as an intrinsic aspect of Somali culture, involving elders, clan leaders and religious figures working jointly with government officials in consensus-oriented forums. An academic (P9) noted that:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Somalis are naturally a collaborative society. We share resources, lands and wealth within our communities, either by direct descendants, relation or clan lineages. Our tribal and traditional leaders administer our social affairs and judge our disputes in cooperation with the local authorities to reach a desirable outcome\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, informal actors tend to wield the greatest influence in these collaborative governance processes. Power often lies with traditional authorities, confirming that the legitimacy of formal public actors in Somaliland is historically derived from clan elders and religious leaders (Renders 2012). Even with formal democratic structures, these informal actors can sway decisions by leveraging traditional authority over their constituents. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s government has also co-opted private agents and elders to help manage societal affairs, a practice that has yielded \u0026ldquo;more challenges than solutions\u0026rdquo; (Mule 2001). Civil society organizations (CSOs) attempt to broaden participation and accountability in such forums. As one CSO project officer (P6) explained:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Our responsibility \u0026hellip; includes giving the different civil society actors a voice in the process of governing, peacebuilding and the development of Somaliland \u0026hellip; [and] tirelessly to give voice to the women in Somaliland.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEmpowering women through collaboration is seen as vital for effective development outcomes (McEwan 2003), since traditional elders are men and may not grasp issues affecting women. CSO initiatives have lobbied for bills to protect women (e.g. against female genital mutilation and rape) and have pledged to \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003ebe a supporting arm [to] the government\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; rather than impose their will (P6). Despite these efforts, entrenched patriarchal structures limit progress. Women\u0026rsquo;s advocacy successes in the lower house were overturned by the male-dominated upper house (Guurti). A female parliamentarian (P18) lamented that because no women sit in the Guurti, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;no matter what policies or bills are passed in favour of women we will never get our rights\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/em\u003e When young, educated women challenge cultural and religious barriers,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026ldquo;we are immediately suppressed and our intentions are misrepresented \u0026hellip; [Men] say why are you trying to destroy the peace we have worked so hard to build\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (P19). Nevertheless, several respondents (including men) acknowledged that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s development will be more effective and equitable if women are genuinely included in collaborative governance processes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Perceptible shifts in power\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOver the past decades, power in Somaliland has visibly shifted from traditional informal authorities to formal state institutions. Studies note that modernisation of political systems often diminishes the centuries-old traditional power base (Phillips 2020; Richards 2009). In Somaliland, especially since its constitutional referendum, much authority that once rested with clan elders and cultural leaders has gradually transferred to state actors and elites. A public official (P7) observed this firsthand:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I have seen the \u0026lsquo;old guard\u0026rsquo; of traditional and cultural leaders gradually shifting their authority and power to the public actors of the state and convincing their followers to entrust the state with their economic and social affairs.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSimultaneously, power has dispersed even within the informal sphere. The ranks of local customary leaders (aaqils and sultans) have proliferated in the last two decades (Moe and Simojoki 2013), diluting the influence of any single traditional leader. An academic (P9) noted that the explosion in the number of aaqils and sultans has \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;significantly reduced their power base and influence,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e making it unclear who the legitimate customary authorities are. This diffusion, driven by population growth and increasingly complex clan structures, has weakened the authority of traditional leaders to act decisively. The waning dominance of the \u0026ldquo;old guard\u0026rdquo; that founded the post-1991 Somaliland state (Richards 2016) opened the door to a hybrid governance arrangement blending traditional and modern elements. This hybrid system has proven resilient against external pressures to fail (Renders and Terlinden 2010). One official (P15) emphasized Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s unique model:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;There is no system of governance like [this] anywhere else\u0026hellip; we have perfected a mode of arrangement between public and private actors to govern society.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, these longstanding actors (state elites and traditional elders) have also formed a monopoly on power by prioritising peace and stability (Wiuff Moe 2011; Musa and Horst 2019). Such \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003epeaceocracy\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Lynch et al. 2019) led by elites (Debiel et al. 2009) may face future resistance as calls grow for broader inclusion, women\u0026rsquo;s participation, justice and equality beyond just maintaining stability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Dynamic governance\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEffective governance in Somaliland requires a dynamic blend of traditional and modern practices rather than a rigid, static system. Scholars argue that governance arrangements must adapt to local customs and context (Renders and Terlinden 2010). Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s history reflects this: the government has adopted a mixed governance approach, integrating formal and customary elements to suit its deeply cultural society. One interviewee (P8) stressed the necessity of this flexibility:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Dynamism is crucial in Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance system\u0026hellip; Our society is deeply cultural\u0026hellip; We cannot be governed by a system that is not a byproduct of the historical and cultural foundations of our people.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Somali clan system remains a fundamental social structure (Moe and Simojoki 2013), so any governance mechanism must accommodate clan-based norms and values. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s political elites have largely succeeded in melding these traditions with modern state institutions, leveraging their clan ties and historical legitimacy to do so. A prime example of this dynamic governance is the judicial system. As a senior solicitor (P17) explained,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The formal courts of Somaliland have three systems of justice: the rule of law, customary law and Sharia law.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis coexistence illustrates how historical norms are combined with a modern legal framework. In practice, however, one system often dominates. According to the solicitor and another respondent (P1),\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The justice system of Somaliland is built upon\u0026hellip; customary law and Sharia law. The laws of the state nor the Constitution can supersede those two\u0026hellip; Sharia law is the ultimate law of the land.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndeed, the constitution itself mandates that all laws conform to Islamic Sharia. Still, certain customary rules. For instance, forbidding a wife to appear in court without her husband have no place in a progressive society. Moreover, serious crimes are often settled out of court by clan elders, allowing perpetrators to evade formal justice (Moe and Simojoki 2013). This tension demonstrates that even a well-integrated hybrid system has weaknesses when one facet consistently overrules the others. To strengthen dynamic governance, research suggests creating a mediating institution to harmonize traditional and formal systems. Such a body would help traditional, and reformist actors agree on simple, transparent and accountable rules enforceable by legal precedent (Chirayath et al. 2005). This reform could ensure that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s unique fusion of governance continues to evolve effectively, marrying tradition with the needs of a modern state.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e4.3 \u0026nbsp;Diverse Actors of Governance\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;State elites\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eState elites, comprising formal government figures (e.g. the executive, ministers, MPs, judiciary) and influential informal actors (traditional elders, clan and religious leaders), are key decision-makers in Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance (Bradbury et al. 2003; Debiel et al. 2009). During the Somaliland independence war, these groups formed a united front. A journalist (P14) recounted how statesmen \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;joined hands with their clan elders and leaders to co-govern the newly formed Republic of Somaliland,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e combining traditional legitimacy and political leadership to fight the civil war and build the state. Traditional leaders mobilised resources and legitimacy through clan networks, while state elites formed political coalitions. This collaboration brought peace and stability, along with economic development (Ahmed 2000; Musa and Horst 2019). However, this initial integrity has eroded. A traditional leader (P13) observed:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The old statesmen were truly state elites\u0026hellip; Today we have guerrilla fighters who call themselves statesmen\u0026hellip; they have no philosophy, no vision and do not know how to run a state.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHe further lamented:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The old traditional leaders\u0026hellip; achieved their objective. Today\u0026rsquo;s traditional leaders use their role to live off the state\u0026hellip; [to benefit] their lineage.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite such concerns, state elites retain great influence, dominating decision-making and often controlling institutions through patronage. A consultant (P1) explained that director-general posts in ministries are frequently filled by underqualified individuals appointed based on clan ties, undermining governance effectiveness (Mal 2017; Musa and Horst 2019).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Civil society organisations\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCSOs play an essential governance role in Somaliland, often substituting for the state in delivering public services, social welfare, and advocacy (Van Leeuwen 2009; Rossi 2014; Saggiomo 2014). A CSO leader (P11) explained that their organisations act as \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;the arm of the government,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e reaching places the state cannot and securing international aid (Phillips 2020). CSOs prioritise women\u0026rsquo;s rights and justice where state efforts have fallen short. A CSO activist (P11) observed that justice for women and children in rape cases was a critical gap. CSOs also mediate conflicts in areas beyond state reach, employing local clan members to negotiate peace. A field agent (P6) described their role:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Our people in the field are from the pastoral communities\u0026hellip; We recruit them to act as agents of peace.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCSOs complement government by extending services and amplifying voices on gender inclusion and human rights. A female parliamentarian (P18) stated:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The women of Somaliland need the CSOs\u0026rsquo; political, social, legal and financial aid to continue voicing our disapproval and discontent.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Business interest groups\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePowerful business groups, notably Dahabshiil and Telesom, dominate Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s economy and wield influence over governance, often stifling competition (World Bank 2015; Musa and Horst 2019). A respondent (P10) described how Dahabshiil\u0026rsquo;s expansion was driven by clan ties and inducements. A former employee turned official (P24) confirmed:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Small businesses\u0026hellip; cannot compete\u0026hellip; their influence effectively impacts people\u0026rsquo;s lives for the worse.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBusiness-political collusion fosters corruption, undermining governance (Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge 1995; Sabani et al. 2019). One businessman (P10) observed, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Because of the clan system, public officials are almost certain to receive gifts and bribes\u0026hellip; You won\u0026rsquo;t be offered an official post if you\u0026rsquo;re not compromised.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eMeanwhile, some officials condemn corruption, warning it threatens stability. An official (P25) asserted: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Corruption has no place in Somaliland, and it will lead to violence, instability and undo everything\u0026hellip;since independence.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Traditional leaders\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTraditional leaders hold dual roles: safeguarding cultural norms and participating in formal governance through the Guurti, which reviews legislation to ensure it aligns with Somali traditions and Islam (Richards 2016; Renders 2012). An elder (P22) explained: \u0026ldquo;[We] uphold Somali values\u0026hellip; Our purpose is to check and balance civilian policies to ensure they don\u0026rsquo;t conflict with Somali values, customs and beliefs.\u0026rdquo; However, some use this authority to block progressive reforms. A legal scholar (P5) noted a shift from past integrity to present-day self-interest: \u0026ldquo;The traditional leaders of the past lived humble lives\u0026hellip; Today\u0026rsquo;s leaders\u0026hellip; live lavishly\u0026hellip; Greed, popularity and power have corrupted traditional leaders.\u0026rdquo; Many elders now inherit their roles, contributing to stagnation. While they remain vital for social cohesion, their participation in governance must evolve to embrace inclusivity and accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurther understanding the roles of non-state actors, Cho (2024 highlights how NGOs leverage political influence within donor governments to shape aid allocations. Although Somaliland operates independently from substantial international aid frameworks, Cho\u0026rsquo;s findings offer valuable insights into how civil society and private sector actors can strategically influence governance processes. Somaliland exemplifies this dynamic, as evidenced by its vibrant civil society and influential business networks, which actively participate in governance dialogues and policy implementation, significantly shaping developmental trajectories and governance effectiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e4.4 \u0026nbsp;Multistakeholder Dialogue\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIDPs in Somaliland face marginalisation and exclusion from governance processes. Displacement is often seen as a temporary issue, addressed through humanitarian aid rather than long-term integration. Approximately 85,000 IDPs, mostly fleeing conflicts in Yemen, Ethiopia, and south-central Somalia, have settled in Somaliland. A humanitarian worker (P20) confirmed:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;In Somaliland we have more than 85,000 refugees\u0026hellip; we accept them because we have peace and stability. But they do not have the rights Somalilanders enjoy.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLegal frameworks restrict citizenship based on paternal lineage at independence, excluding IDPs and leaving them in a liminal state. These displaced populations often include minority clans and have limited access to education, housing, and healthcare. A CSO worker (P11) observed that the government tolerates IDPs\u0026rsquo; presence due to their contribution to the economy but fails to offer support:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The government\u0026hellip; does not want to support these groups, because the perception is that these people are not citizens and therefore do not deserve equal rights and support.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInternational organisations provide some aid, but long-term solutions are limited. Without greater empathy and inclusive policies, IDPs remain marginalised, perpetuating their vulnerability and undermining governance effectiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e- \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Women\u0026rsquo;s participation\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWomen\u0026rsquo;s participation in governance is shaped by deep cultural and religious norms. While some view gender roles as fixed and natural, others advocate for greater inclusion. A female academic (P20) stated:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The West\u0026rsquo;s ideals of women\u0026rsquo;s equality are very different from what our religion and culture teach\u0026hellip; We must be realistic \u0026ndash; some roles are just made for men.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis belief often confines women to domestic roles, excluding them from political leadership (Bourque and Grossholtz 1974). However, many women are active in civil society, leading NGOs and community initiatives. An older woman (P11) said:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;As a woman\u0026hellip; I must help\u0026hellip; as a volunteer or coordinator in a social organisation. As a political figure I would not be able to do this \u0026ndash; I would be constrained by\u0026hellip; bureaucracy, clan politics and public view.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSome women have broken these barriers, such as the Minister of Environment and Rural Development, but systemic challenges remain. A lawyer (P19) highlighted persistent inequality: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I have never been given the opportunity for advancement\u0026hellip; or [equal] status\u0026hellip; to the males.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e She emphasised that cultural change is necessary for true inclusivity. Younger women increasingly advocate for balanced participation that respects tradition while expanding opportunities. Achieving inclusive governance requires addressing structural barriers and shifting societal attitudes towards gender roles.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"5 Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe findings demonstrate that governance effectiveness in this unrecognised, resource-constrained, and politically complex context is not predicated on conventional, state-centric models of governance, but rather emerges from a locally constituted hybrid system that balances formal authority with informal, traditional institutions. By examining Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s unique governance structures, this study offers a nuanced understanding of how governance effectiveness is crafted and sustained in an atypical setting. The following sections unpack the key themes that emerged from the data, integrating these insights with the broader theoretical and empirical literature.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo guide the discussion, the Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e below maps the core empirical themes against the theoretical lenses outlined in the literature review. This provides a structured analytical framework for interpreting how governance effectiveness is negotiated and enacted in Somaliland.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTheory-to-Theme Mapping\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmpirical Theme\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTheoretical Lens Applied\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInterpretive Insight\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCentralised Authority\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLegitimacy, Hybridity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCentralised control is legitimated through clan-state authority negotiated via traditional norms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCollaborative Processes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHybridity, Multi-Level Governance (MLG)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance occurs through layered, consensus-based collaboration across formal and informal actors.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eShifting Power from Traditional to State Elites\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHybridity, Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTraditional authority is waning as formal institutions gain primacy, though legitimacy remains negotiated.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDynamic Governance Practices\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdaptive Governance, Hybridity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBlended systems evolve pragmatically in response to sociopolitical pressures and institutional constraints.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eState Elites and Political Capture\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLegitimacy, Adaptive Governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eElite control is maintained through informal legitimacy and flexible institutional arrangements.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCivil Society Organisations (CSOs)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMulti-Level Governance, Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCSOs reinforce governance by filling state capacity gaps and advocating for inclusion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBusiness Influence and Elite Capture\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdaptive Governance, Hybridity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEconomic actors shape governance through informal ties, often reinforcing elite dominance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTraditional Leaders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHybridity, Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCultural custodianship is formalised, but co-optation undermines their moral authority.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInternally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMulti-Level Governance, Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLegal exclusion despite economic contribution reveals limitations in inclusive legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWomen\u0026rsquo;s Participation in Governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLegitimacy, Multi-Level Governance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender inclusion is constrained by patriarchal norms, despite advocacy from civil society and formal gains.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe synthesis of the findings presented in the table above, reveals that governance effectiveness in Somaliland emerges from a contextually embedded, hybrid system where legitimacy is continuously negotiated across formal, informal, and religious domains. Centralised authority is sustained through clan-based legitimacy, while collaborative governance thrives via multi-level interactions among state, civil society, and traditional actors. Power has shifted from traditional to state elites, yet legitimacy remains contested and negotiated. Adaptive governance practices illustrate the system\u0026rsquo;s pragmatic evolution in response to institutional and social pressures. However, this hybrid stability also facilitates elite capture, with political and business actors reinforcing their dominance through informal ties. Civil society organisations act as critical intermediaries, compensating for state capacity gaps, though their role remains structurally under-integrated. Meanwhile, marginalised groups especially IDPs and women face systemic exclusion, revealing persistent legitimacy deficits despite broad-based contributions to society. Overall, the findings underscore that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance resilience is not rooted in institutional formality, but in its flexible, negotiated, and pluralistic political order.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.1 Challenging Governance Orthodoxy\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eA dominant assumption in governance and development studies is that effectiveness correlates with the establishment of strong, formal state institutions modelled on Weberian principles of bureaucracy, rule of law, and a monopoly over legitimate use of force (Grindle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Hyd\u0026eacute;n et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). However, Somaliland defies this orthodoxy. As one respondent (P2) noted, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The Somaliland government exercises full control, often a top-down, micro-level management of its public services and delivery of goods by nominating directors-general to operational positions within government agencies and ministries,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e yet this control is mediated by negotiations with clan elders and informal networks. This hybrid model illustrates that effectiveness can emerge even where formal state structures are incomplete or absent (Casson et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Herring et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe resilience of Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance highlights that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;peace and stability are achieved not because of international recognition or external aid, but because local actors negotiate authority and legitimacy through customary norms and pragmatic arrangements\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Phillips \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). The empirical evidence underscores that effectiveness is not tied solely to formal capacity; rather, it is generated through dynamic interactions between state elites, traditional leaders, civil society, and business interests. This supports Boege et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e concept of hybrid political orders, where governance effectiveness stems from a blend of formal institutions and informal, negotiated authority structures. In addition, the findings align with the principles of adaptive governance (Folke et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e), where governance effectiveness is achieved through pragmatic and iterative institutional responses to contextual constraints, rather than through strict adherence to a fixed governance blueprint. MLG further offers insight into the power imbalance between national and local authorities. The top-down centralisation observed in Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance system constrains horizontal accountability and undermines local autonomy which are key features of MLG that emphasise distributed authority and negotiated coordination across different levels of governance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.2 Hybridity as a Feature, not a Bug\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe findings affirm that hybridity in governance manifested through the coexistence of formal institutions, customary norms, and religious principles is a deliberate feature of Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s political system rather than a flaw to be rectified. The Guurti, or House of Elders, epitomizes this hybridity, serving as both a constitutional body and a traditional authority. As an elder (P22) stated, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;[We] uphold Somali values\u0026hellip; Our purpose is to check and balance civilian policies to ensure they don\u0026rsquo;t conflict with Somali values, customs and beliefs.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e This arrangement has contributed to relative political stability and local legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, hybridity also enables elite capture and exclusion. Many respondents, including a traditional leader (P13), lamented the shift from integrity to self-interest among both state elites and customary authorities: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The old statesmen were truly state elites\u0026hellip; Today we have guerrilla fighters who call themselves statesmen\u0026hellip; they have no philosophy, no vision and do not know how to run a state.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e Furthermore, the proliferation of traditional leaders (aaqils and sultans) over recent decades has diluted the authority of any single figure and contributed to a competitive and often exclusionary governance environment (Moe and Simojoki \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Business elites, such as Dahabshiil and Telesom, have leveraged clan connections to dominate markets and influence governance, as one respondent (P10) observed: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Small businesses\u0026hellip; cannot compete\u0026hellip; their influence effectively impacts people\u0026rsquo;s lives for the worse.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003eThis dual nature of hybridity, both stabilizing and exclusionary, reflects broader debates in governance literature. While hybridity can provide resilience in fragile contexts (Kraushaar \u0026amp; Lambach, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e), it can also reinforce entrenched power dynamics and inhibit genuine democratization, especially when elite actors prioritize stability over inclusivity (Musa and Horst \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Wiuff Moe \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, hybridity in Somaliland is not static; it functions within a dynamic governance framework that continuously negotiates between formal institutions and traditional practices to address evolving contextual challenges. This dynamism exemplifies adaptive governance, where institutional flexibility and negotiation among multiple actors are essential for maintaining political stability and responsiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3 Rethinking Inclusion and Legitimacy\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e A central finding of this study is that while local legitimacy, derived from negotiated authority and performance, underpins Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance, inclusion remains deeply uneven. Women, youth, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) face systemic barriers to participation. For instance, a female parliamentarian (P18) stated, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;The women of Somaliland need the CSOs\u0026rsquo; political, social, legal and financial aid to continue voicing our disapproval and discontent,\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e underscoring the reliance on civil society to advocate for gender rights where formal structures exclude them. Despite the presence of women in NGOs and some government roles, entrenched patriarchal norms, especially within the Guurti to limit their influence. As one respondent (P19) explained, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;We are immediately suppressed and our intentions are misrepresented\u0026hellip; [Men] say why are you trying to destroy the peace we have worked so hard to build.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, IDPs, despite contributing to local economies, remain marginalized. A humanitarian worker (P20) highlighted the exclusionary citizenship laws: \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;In Somaliland we have more than 85,000 refugees\u0026hellip; we accept them because we have peace and stability. But they do not have the rights Somalilanders enjoy.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e This exclusion challenges the sustainability of governance legitimacy. While local consensus has maintained order, exclusion risks alienating significant portions of the population and undermining long-term stability. This finding aligns with legitimacy theory, which posits that legitimacy is maintained through both output (service delivery) and procedural inclusivity. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance excels in the former but struggles with the latter.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe findings also reveal a gap in multi-level governance, where civil society organisations (CSOs), though active and impactful, lack a formalised mandate to participate in co-governance alongside state institutions. While CSOs contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding, advocacy, and essential service delivery (P6, P11), their roles are often peripheral and ad hoc. Strengthening multi-level governance would involve institutionalising the engagement of CSOs and marginalised groups, thereby fostering more inclusive, representative, and responsive governance structures. Moreover, the coexistence of religious, customary, and formal legal systems produces a form of legitimacy that is adaptive but unevenly applied. While this legal pluralism enables governance to resonate with diverse societal values, it also introduces inconsistencies and inequities. The state's focus on performance legitimacy delivering services and maintaining order must be complemented by procedural legitimacy rooted in broad-based inclusion, legal equity, and accountable institutional mechanisms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.4 Implications for Development Practice\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Somaliland case carries important implications for development interventions in fragile and unrecognised states. First, the findings caution against bypassing informal and hybrid governance structures. International actors and development agencies should recognize and work with local authorities whether formal or traditional to design interventions that resonate with local norms and practices. As one CSO leader (P11) noted, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Our responsibility\u0026hellip; includes giving the different civil society actors a voice in the process of governing, peacebuilding and the development of Somaliland.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, policies should emphasize adaptability over rigid adherence to formal governance benchmarks. Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s hybrid arrangements have proven resilient precisely because they evolve in response to contextual needs. This supports the adaptive governance literature (Folke et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e), which highlights the importance of institutional flexibility and learning. For instance, Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s judicial system integrates customary, Sharia, and formal law, demonstrating the capacity to negotiate competing legal norms in ways that preserve stability, albeit with notable trade-offs. Such flexible legal pluralism should be recognised not as a failure of formalisation but as a functional response to cultural, religious, and social realities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, development interventions must address systemic exclusion. Focusing on capacity building for women, youth, and marginalized groups including legal reforms to expand citizenship rights for IDPs can strengthen both inclusivity and legitimacy. Without such efforts, governance effectiveness may be undermined by growing inequalities and discontent. Moreover, as multiple respondents indicated, the co-optation of traditional leaders and business elites threatens to entrench elite dominance, suggesting that development strategies should incorporate mechanisms for accountability and equitable participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, the role of business interest groups deserves closer attention. While their influence has supported economic growth and diasporic remittance channels (Ahmed \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e), it has also enabled elite collusion and market capture. Future development practice must therefore strike a balance between leveraging economic actors and ensuring regulatory oversight to avoid undermining governance integrity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.5 Propositions for Future Research\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBuilding on the empirical findings and theoretical analysis of this study, a series of propositions are proposed to guide future research on governance effectiveness in unrecognised, fragile, and hybrid political contexts. These propositions are grounded in the interplay of legitimacy, hybridity, and adaptive governance observed in Somaliland, and they aim to inform comparative, longitudinal, and interdisciplinary investigations across similar settings. Together, they reflect an effort to distil conceptual insights from an empirically rich case and to stimulate further theory development and empirical validation in the field of governance for sustainable development.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 1\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGovernance effectiveness in unrecognised or fragile states can emerge from negotiated authority and legitimacy, rather than formal institutional strength or external recognition.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis proposition challenges the dominant assumption that state legitimacy and governance capacity are inherently dependent on formal recognition or Weberian institutional structures. As demonstrated in Somaliland, effectiveness can be constructed through locally embedded authority systems and contextually legitimacy, underscoring the importance of alternative governance paradigms in fragile or contested environments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 2\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eHybrid governance arrangements, while enabling resilience, also create conditions for elite capture and the marginalisation of women, youth, and displaced populations.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile hybridity facilitates adaptive governance by integrating traditional and formal systems, it can also reinforce structural inequalities and limit procedural inclusion. This duality highlights the need for governance research to interrogate who benefits from hybrid models and under what conditions inclusive participation can be institutionalised.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 3\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe adaptability of governance systems in politically complex contexts depends on their ability to blend traditional norms with modern bureaucratic mechanisms in ways that are flexible, negotiated, and context responsive.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGovernance in Somaliland illustrates the importance of institutional dynamism, where legitimacy and authority are not fixed but constantly reconstituted through interactions among diverse actors. Future research should explore how such dynamic arrangements evolve, and how traditional, religious, and bureaucratic institutions co-adapt in response to social and political change.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 4\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLegitimacy in hybrid systems is maintained more through performance legitimacy (i.e., service delivery and stability) than through procedural legitimacy (i.e., inclusive participation and formal rule compliance).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis proposition draws attention to the asymmetry between output-based and input-based forms of legitimacy in hybrid contexts. While the provision of public goods contributes to perceived governance effectiveness, sustained legitimacy requires greater attention to participatory governance, accountability, and equitable access to decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 5\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDominant business actors in fragile and unrecognised states often reinforce clan-based hierarchies and economic exclusion, influencing both governance arrangements and social equity outcomes.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe role of economic elites, particularly those tied to kinship and diaspora networks that raises important questions about the concentration of power, corruption, and market capture. This proposition calls for future research to investigate the intersections of economic dominance, political authority, and social marginalisation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProposition 6\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDevelopment interventions in hybrid political orders must engage with informal governance actors and local legitimacy systems, rather than relying solely on formal state institutions.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEffective and context-sensitive development practice requires an appreciation of the pluralistic governance landscape in settings like Somaliland. This proposition highlights the importance of working with customary, religious, and civic actors who hold substantive influence over local governance outcomes, service delivery, and conflict resolution.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTogether, these propositions offer a conceptual bridge between the findings of this study and broader debates in political science, development studies, and governance theory. They invite empirical testing, comparative analysis, and theoretical refinement, particularly in settings that are marginal to mainstream governance scholarship yet central to understanding the diversity of political order in the contemporary world.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6 Conclusion and Future Directions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study has explored how governance effectiveness for sustainable development is realised in Somaliland, an unrecognised polity characterised by limited formal capacity yet sustained internal stability. Drawing on thematic analysis of interviews with 26 governance actors, the findings reveal that effectiveness in such contexts does not derive solely from formal institutions, but rather emerges through hybrid arrangements that integrate traditional, religious, and bureaucratic structures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTheoretically, this research contributes to debates on governance in fragile and contested contexts by challenging state-centric models. It demonstrates that informal authority, legitimacy, and institutional adaptability can support governance outcomes where conventional benchmarks are absent or inapplicable. In doing so, it calls for a broader conceptualisation of governance effectiveness that is sensitive to local realities and plural forms of legitimacy. For policymakers and development practitioners, the findings underscore the importance of engaging with diverse governance actors beyond the formal state. In Somaliland, civil society organisations, traditional leaders, and business elites play significant roles in service provision, conflict resolution, and social cohesion. Development strategies should therefore be context-sensitive and inclusive, building on local governance logics rather than imposing external institutional models. Attention must also be paid to systemic exclusions, particularly of women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and younger generations whose participation is crucial for sustainable development and long-term legitimacy. In sum, by applying multiple theoretical lenses\u0026mdash;hybridity and electoral uncertainty (McKie, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e), state fragility and governance effectiveness (Ziaja et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), participatory democratic outcomes (Maboudi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e), internally-derived legitimacy in aid-independent contexts (Baldwin \u0026amp; Winters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e), and civil society's influence (Cho, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). This study advances a nuanced understanding of governance for sustainable development in unrecognised states like Somaliland.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFuture research could extend this inquiry through comparative studies of other unrecognised or de facto states such as Palestine, Northern Cyprus, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or Abkhazia to assess whether similar patterns of hybrid legitimacy and negotiated authority prevail. Employing mixed methods approaches, including large-scale surveys on legitimacy, trust, and inclusion, would further enrich understanding of governance perceptions in contested contexts. Additionally, focused studies on gendered governance, intergenerational leadership dynamics, and the political role of business actors would offer valuable insight into how power, participation, and exclusion are navigated in everyday governance. Ethnographic research on marginalised populations would also help illuminate the lived experiences of those often left out of dominant governance narratives. Together, these directions can contribute to a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of governance effectiveness in fragile, hybrid, and unrecognised settings. Ultimately, this study highlights the value of empirically engaging with underexplored governance contexts to challenge normative assumptions and enrich theoretical and policy understandings of sustainable development in fragile and hybrid systems.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ch2\u003eConflict of interest\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eInformed Consent\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this study, electronic informed consent was obtained from all participants between November 22, 2021 and January 8, 2022. Prior to participation, participants were informed of the study objectives, confidentiality of their responses, the absence of risks in the study, and their right to withdraw at any time without repercussions. All collected data were anonymized to protect participants\u0026rsquo; identities and ensure confidentiality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eEthics Declaration\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e This study received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), Research and Innovation Office, RMIT University (Approval No. 22779; NHMRC Code: EC00237) on 1 July 2020. All procedures involving human participants were conducted in accordance with the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research and the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research. Participants\u0026rsquo; confidentiality and anonymity were strictly maintained to protect their privacy throughout the research process.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFunding Statement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eI acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eM.F. prepared the research scope, conducted data collection and analysis, and developed the methodology and discussion. This research data forms part of M.F.'s doctoral thesis study. A.S. reviewed and edited the manuscript and contributed to the development of the tables, frameworks, introduction, and conclusion. All authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe qualitative data supporting the findings of this study is part of a doctoral thesis completed by M.F. in 2024. The full data analysis, including interview excerpts and methodological details, is available via the RMIT University Research Repository at the following URL:https://research-repository.rmit.edu.au/articles/thesis/Alternative_View_on_ Governance_in_Developing_Countries_An_Integrative_Analysis_ of_Governance_for_Sustainable_Development_in_Somaliland/25779630\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBank Group Policy on Good Governance (1999) \u003cem\u003eBank Group Policy on Good Governance\u003c/em\u003e, (July 1999). \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/21-EN-Bank_Group_Policy_on_Good_Governance.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/21-EN-Bank_Group_Policy_on_Good_Governance.pdf\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAhmed II (2000) Remittances and their economic impact in post-war Somaliland. Disasters 24(4):380\u0026ndash;389\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnsell CK, Torfing J (2016) Handbook on theories of governance. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Glos Northampton, Massachusetts\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAttride-Stirling J (2001) Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. Qualitative Res 1(3):385\u0026ndash;405\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBaldwin K, Winters MS (2020) How do different forms of foreign aid affect government legitimacy? Evidence from an informational experiment in Uganda. Stud Comp Int Dev 55(2):160\u0026ndash;183\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBalthasar D (2013) Somaliland's best kept secret: shrewd politics and war projects as means of state-making. J East Afr Stud 7(2):218\u0026ndash;238\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBenda\u0026ntilde;a A, Chopra T (2013) Women's rights, state-centric rule of law, and legal pluralism in Somaliland. Hague J Rule Law 5(1):44\u0026ndash;73\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBoege V (2006) Traditional approaches to conflict transformation. Potentials and limits'\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBoege V, Brown A, Clements K, Nolan A (2008) 'On hybrid political orders and emerging states: state formation in the context of \u0026lsquo;fragility\u0026rsquo;'\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eB\u0026ouml;rzel TA, Grimm S (2018) 'Building good (enough) governance in postconflict societies \u0026amp; areas of limited statehood: The European Union \u0026amp; the Western Balkans', \u003cem\u003eDaedalus\u003c/em\u003e, 147(1):116\u0026ndash;127\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBoyatzis RE (1998) Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development. sage\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBradbury M, Abokor AY, Yusuf HA (2003) Somaliland: Choosing politics over violence. Rev Afr Polit Econ 30(97):455\u0026ndash;478\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBr\u0026auml;utigam DA, Knack S (2004) Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Econ Dev Cult Change 52(2):255\u0026ndash;285\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBrinkerhoff DW, Johnson R (2008) \u003cem\u003eGood enough governance in fragile states: The role of center-periphery relations and local government\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBurkolter P, Perch L (2014) Greening growth in the south: Practice, policies and new frontiers. South Afr J Int affairs 21(2):235\u0026ndash;259\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCasson MC, Della Giusta M, Kambhampati US (2010) Formal and informal institutions and development. World Dev 38(2):137\u0026ndash;141\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChhotray V, Stoker G, Chhotray V, Stoker G (2009) Governance: From theory to practice. Springer\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCho E (2024) 'Development NGOs, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Aid Allocations'. Stud Comp Int Dev :1\u0026ndash;28\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eClements KP, Boege V, Brown A, Foley W, Nolan A (2007) State building reconsidered: The role of hybridity in the formation of political order. Political Sci 59(1):45\u0026ndash;56\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCoggins B (2014) Power politics and state formation in the twentieth century: The dynamics of recognition. Cambridge University Press\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDebiel T, Glassner R, Schetter C, Terlinden U (2009) Local state-building in Afghanistan and Somaliland. Peace Rev 21(1):38\u0026ndash;44\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEnglebert P (2009) Africa: Unity, sovereignty, sorrow. Lynne Rienner\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEriksen SS (2017) State effects and the effects of state building: institution building and the formation of state-centred societies. Third World Q 38(4):771\u0026ndash;786\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEubank N (2012) Taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: Lessons from Somaliland. J Dev Stud 48(4):465\u0026ndash;480\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEvans M (2012) Beyond the integrity paradox\u0026ndash;towards \u0026lsquo;good enough\u0026rsquo;governance? Policy Stud 33(1):97\u0026ndash;113\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFarah M (2024) \u003cem\u003eAlternative View on Governance in Developing Countries: An Integrative Analysis of Governance for Sustainable Development in Somaliland\u003c/em\u003e RMIT University. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://research-repository.rmit.edu.au/articles/thesis/Alternative_View_on_Governance_in_Developing_Countries_An_Integrative_ Analysis_of_Governance_for_Sustainable_Development_ in_Somaliland/25779630\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://research-repository.rmit.edu.au/articles/thesis/Alternative_View_on_Governance_in_Developing_Countries_An_Integrative _Analysis_of_Governance_for_ Sustainable_Development_in_Somaliland/25779630\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFarah MH, Sabani A (2019) Towards Sustainable Development Goals: A Literature Review and a Conceptual Framework of Governance Issues in Africa. ACM, p 1450366449\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFolke C, Hahn T, Olsson P, Norberg J (2005) Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. Annu Rev Environ Resour 30(1):441\u0026ndash;473\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGlass L-M, Newig J (2019) Governance for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: How important are participation, policy coherence, reflexivity, adaptation and democratic institutions? Earth Syst Gov 2:100031\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGoran H (2007) 'Governance and poverty reduction in Africa', \u003cem\u003eProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences\u003c/em\u003e, 104(43):16751. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.1073/pnas.0700696104\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1073/pnas.0700696104\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGrindle MS (2004) Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. Governance 17(4):525\u0026ndash;548\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGrindle MS (2007) Good enough governance revisited. Dev policy Rev 25(5):533\u0026ndash;574\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGrindle MS (2011) Good enough governance revisited. Dev policy Rev 29:s199\u0026ndash;s221\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eG\u0026uuml;ney T (2017) Governance and sustainable development: How effective is governance? J Int Trade Economic Dev 26(3):316\u0026ndash;335\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHerring E, Ismail L, McCullough A, Saed M (2020) Somalia, fragmented hybrid governance and inclusive development. Limited statehood and informal governance in the Middle East and Africa. Routledge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHersi MF (2018) 'State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building', \u003cem\u003eCommission on State Fragility, Growth and Development\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHyd\u0026eacute;n G, Olowu D, Okoth-Ogendo HWO (2000) African perspectives on governance. Africa World, Trenton, NJ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKaufmann D, Kraay A (2008) Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going? World Bank, Washington, DC\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKiely R (1998) Neoliberalism revised? A critical account of World Bank conceptions of good governance and market friendly intervention. Int J Health Serv 28(4):683\u0026ndash;702\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKooiman J (1999) Social-Political Governance: Overview, reflections and design. Public Management: Int J Res Theory 1(1):67\u0026ndash;92. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.1080/14719037800000005\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1080/14719037800000005\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKooiman J (2003) Governing as governance. SAGE, London\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKraushaar M, Lambach D (2009) Hybrid political orders: the added value of a new concept. Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Brisbane\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMaboudi T (2020) Participation, inclusion, and the democratic content of constitutions. Stud Comp Int Dev 55(1):48\u0026ndash;76\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMcKie K (2017) The politics of institutional choice across sub-Saharan Africa: Presidential term limits. Stud Comp Int Dev 52(4):436\u0026ndash;456\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMeadowcroft J (2007) Who is in charge here? Governance for sustainable development in a complex world. J Environ Planning Policy Manage 9(3\u0026ndash;4):299\u0026ndash;314\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMenkhaus K (2007) Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. Int Secur 31(3):74\u0026ndash;106\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMilton S (2021) Higher education and sustainable development goal 16 in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. High Educ 81(1):89\u0026ndash;108\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMoe LW, Simojoki MV (2013) Custom, contestation and co-operation: peace and justice promotion in Somaliland. Confl Secur Dev 13(4):393\u0026ndash;416\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMusa AM, Horst C (2019) State formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland: the impact of the private sector in an unrecognised state. Confl Secur Dev 19(1):35\u0026ndash;53\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNjeri S (2019) Somaliland; the viability of a liberal peacebuilding critique beyond state building, state formation and hybridity. Peacebuilding 7(1):37\u0026ndash;50\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOmri A, Mabrouk NB (2020) Good governance for sustainable development goals: Getting ahead of the pack or falling behind? Environ Impact Assess Rev 83:106388\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOstrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNew York\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOstrom E (2010) Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems. Am Econ Rev 100(3):641\u0026ndash;672\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePeters BG (2011a) Governing in the shadows. Asia Pac J public Adm 33(1):1\u0026ndash;16\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePhilip G (1999) The dilemmas of good governance: A Latin American perspective. Government Opposition 34(2):226\u0026ndash;242\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePhillips S (2013) 'Political settlements and state formation: the case of Somaliland'. Res Paper, 23\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRenders M, Terlinden U (2010) Negotiating statehood in a hybrid political order: The case of Somaliland. Dev Change 41(4):723\u0026ndash;746\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRhodes R (1996) The new governance: governing without government. Polit Stud 44(4):652\u0026ndash;667\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRichards R (2009) Challenging the Ideal? Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland. University of Bristol\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRichards R (2015) Bringing the outside in: Somaliland, statebuilding and dual hybridity. J Intervention Statebuilding 9(1):4\u0026ndash;25\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRichards R (2016) Understanding statebuilding: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland. Routledge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRidout TA (2012) Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success. J Middle East Afr 3(2):136\u0026ndash;156\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSchakel AH, Hooghe L, Marks G (2015) 'Multilevel governance and the state', \u003cem\u003eThe Oxford handbook of transformations of the state\u003c/em\u003e:269\u0026ndash;285\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eScheffran J (2025) Planetary Boundaries, Polycrisis and Politics in the Anthropocene: Climate Pathways, Tipping Cascades and Transition to Sustainable Peace in Integrative Geography. Towards Rethinking Politics, Policy and Polity in the Anthropocene: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Springer\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSharma GD, Yadav A, Chopra R (2020) Artificial intelligence and effective governance: A review, critique and research agenda. Sustainable Futures 2:100004\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSouth A (2018) Hybrid governance and the politics of legitimacy in the Myanmar peace process. J Contemp Asia 48(1):50\u0026ndash;66\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSpencer ME (1970) Weber on legitimate norms and authority. Br J Sociol 21(2):123\u0026ndash;134\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eStoker G (1998) Governance as theory: Five propositions. Int social Sci J 50(1):17\u0026ndash;28\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSuchman MC (1995) Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. Acad Manage Rev 20(3):571\u0026ndash;610. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.2307/258788\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.2307/258788\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/stable/258788\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/stable/258788\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTowah WD (2019) 'The Impact of Good Governance and Stability on Sustainable Development in Ghana'\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUnited Nations Development Programme (1997) Governance for sustainable human development: A UNDP policy document. United Nations Development Programme\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eVon Steinsdorff S, Fruhstorfer A (2012) Post-Soviet de facto states in search of internal and external legitimacy. Introduction. Communist Post-Communist Stud 45(1\u0026ndash;2):117\u0026ndash;121\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWalls M (2014) A Somali nation-state: history. culture and Somaliland's political transition'\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWeber M (1978) Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Univ of California\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWeiss TG (2000) Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges. Third World Q 21(5):795\u0026ndash;814. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.1080/713701075\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1080/713701075\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWiuff Moe L (2011) Hybrid and \u0026lsquo;everyday\u0026rsquo;political ordering: constructing and contesting legitimacy in Somaliland. J Legal Pluralism Unoff Law 43(63):143\u0026ndash;177\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWorld Bank (2019) \u003cem\u003eWorld Bank Open Data\u003c/em\u003e, https://data.worldbank.org/\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eZiaja S, Gr\u0026auml;vingholt J, Kreibaum M (2019) Constellations of fragility: An empirical typology of states. Stud Comp Int Dev 54:299\u0026ndash;321\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Governance, Sustainable Development, Somaliland, Unrecongised States, Hybridity, Comparative Governance","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eAs global challenges such as trade disruption, climate instability, and widening inequality expose the fragility of multilateral governance, the need to understand how sustainable development can be achieved in politically contested and resource-constrained contexts has grown increasingly urgent. While dominant development models emphasise state capacity, institutional formalism, and international recognition, this study examines how effective governance for sustainable development is operationalised in Somaliland, an unrecognised state in the Horn of Africa that has maintained relative peace and developmental progress despite lacking formal international status. Drawing on qualitative data from 26 in-depth interviews with state actors, civil society organisations, business leaders, and traditional authorities, the study identifies three critical dimensions of governance effectiveness: (1) governance modes and arrangements, (2) the diversity of governance actors, and (3) multistakeholder dialogue. The findings reveal that Somaliland\u0026rsquo;s governance success is rooted in its hybrid institutional arrangements, internal legitimacy, and adaptive decision-making processes that draw on customary, religious, and modern governance traditions. This research challenges conventional assumptions that equate effectiveness with institutional formality and state sovereignty, offering a context-sensitive perspective on governance in fragile or de facto states. It contributes to broader debates on hybridity, legitimacy, and inclusive development in international political economy and comparative development studies.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Rethinking Governance Effectiveness: Sustainable Development in an Unrecognised State","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-10-28 16:36:50","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7296005/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-11-21T06:22:00+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-11-05T14:48:27+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"252202762318816998450628776621018973218","date":"2025-11-03T21:43:36+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"193865433133088587880620150548435318488","date":"2025-11-03T13:27:03+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-10-29T14:13:31+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"286474906810591603962895089710141250379","date":"2025-10-26T13:33:00+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-10-14T11:01:08+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-10-01T17:14:10+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-10-01T16:58:35+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-09-12T11:49:04+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","date":"2025-09-12T10:09:30+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"98fe46fa-7836-458f-937a-3203bb0e9696","owner":[],"postedDate":"October 28th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":56915040,"name":"Humanities/Cultural and media studies"},{"id":56915041,"name":"Social science/Cultural and media studies"},{"id":56915042,"name":"Social science/Development studies"},{"id":56915043,"name":"Social science/Environmental studies"},{"id":56915044,"name":"Social science/Politics and international relations"},{"id":56915045,"name":"Social science/Social policy"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-27T02:08:23+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-10-28 16:36:50","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7296005","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7296005","identity":"rs-7296005","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}