{"paper_id":"7ce59049-bb3e-44c5-921e-698178bf5b9c","body_text":"UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 1\n1Unrealistic optimism in the eye of the storm: Positive bias towards the consequences of \n2COVID-19 during the second and third waves of the pandemic.\n3\n4Ada Maksim 1¶ , Sławomir Śpiewak 1¶ , Natalia Lipp 1¶, Natalia Dużmańska-Misiarczyk 1¶, \n5Grzegorz Gustaw1¶ Krzysztof Rębilas 1¶ , Paweł Strojny 1¶\n6 \n71 Institute of Applied Psychology, Faculty of Management and Social Communication, \n8Jagiellonian University in Kraków, ul. Prof. St. Łojasiewicza 4, 30-348 Kraków, Poland\n9\n10\n11*Corresponding author: e-mail: adatracz@gmail.com (AM)\n12\n13¶ These authors contributed equally to this work.\n14\n15\n16\n17 \n18\n19Ada Maksim, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8762-0784\n20Sławomir Śpiewak, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9107-1389\n21Natalia Lipp, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5738-6771\n22Natalia Dużmańska-Misiarczyk, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7769-968X\n23Grzegorz Gustaw, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9153-3387\n24Krzysztof Rębilas https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4637-2358\n25Paweł Strojny, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6016-044X\n26\n27\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \nNOTE: This preprint reports new research that has not been certified by peer review and should not be used to guide clinical practice.\n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 2\n28\n29Abstract\n30Research conducted at the outset of the pandemic shows that people are vulnerable to \n31unrealistic optimism (UO). However, the Weinstein model suggests that this tendency may \n32not persist as the pandemic progresses. Our research aimed at verifying whether UO persists \n33during the second (Study 1) and the third wave (Study 2) of the pandemic in Poland, whether \n34it concerns the assessment of the chances of COVID-19 infection (Study 1 and Study 2), the \n35chances of severe course of the disease and adverse vaccine reactions (Study 2). We show that \n36UO towards contracting COVID-19 persists throughout the pandemic. However, in situations \n37where we have little influence on the occurrence of the event, the participants do not show \n38UO. The exceptions are those who have known personally someone who has died from a \n39coronavirus infection. These results are discussed in terms of self-esteem protection and the \n40psychological threat reduction mechanism.\n41Keywords: unrealistic optimism, positive bias, positive illusions, contracting COVID-19, \n42severe consequences of COVID-19\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 3\n43Unrealistic optimism in the eye of the storm: Positive bias towards the consequences of \n44COVID-19 during the second and third waves of the pandemic.\n45It is common for people to make predictions about their future. While pessimists tend to \n46contemplate the worst-case scenario, optimists believe that good things will happen to them \n47(1). According to recent meta-analyses, optimism is believed to be associated with benefits of \n48various types, including health and well-being (2,3). For example, optimism is associated with \n49a lower risk of cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality (3). Some authors (3,4) suggest \n50that future studies should be focused on evaluating the benefits of interventions that are aimed \n51at reducing pessimism and promoting optimism. However, not all aspects of optimism are \n52desirable or beneficial.\n53Dispositional optimism “is defined as the generalized positive expectancy that one \n54will experience good outcomes” (5) and is mostly responsible for the above-mentioned \n55benefits. Its dark side variant is so-called unrealistic optimism, a cognitive bias that makes \n56people think that negative events are more likely to happen to others, and positive events are \n57more likely to happen to them (6,7). Although some researchers (4) posit that unrealistic \n58optimism functions as a positive illusion that helps people to cope with potentially threatening \n59experiences by reducing anxiety, others (6,8–10) point to the maladaptive aspects of the \n60optimistic bias. For example, unrealistic optimism may be related to developing some dire \n61conditions such as coronary disease (5), alcoholism (9), breast cancer in women, and prostate \n62cancer in men (6) as people have tendency to underestimate own risk of developing serious \n63health problems. Unrealistic optimism is also correlated with risky and hazardous behaviours. \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 4\n64People who perceive themselves as better drivers than others admit to violating speed limits \n65(10), and young women who presume they are less likely than others to get pregnant are also \n66less likely to use effective contraception methods—such behaviour could result in an \n67unwanted pregnancy (8).\n68Unrealistic optimism during the COVID-19 pandemic\n69Being unrealistically optimistic about one’s chances of being infected by coronavirus \n70(and the ability to infect others) may lead to the illusion that obeying the strict policies \n71imposed by the government is simply unnecessary in one’s case (11). As a result, unrealistic \n72optimism could lead to reckless behaviours during the pandemic, such as ignoring the \n73protective measures recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO; keeping a social \n74distance, covering mouth and nose with a mask, avoiding crowded or indoor settings, etc.) \n75which could lead to spreading the disease (1). The issue of unrealistic optimism has grown in \n76importance in light of recent research on the perceived risk of infection during the COVID-19 \n77pandemic. Dolinski and his colleagues (1) decided to verify if the imminent COVID-19 \n78pandemic would stimulate the expression of unrealistic optimism. The researchers tested \n79whether subjects would perceive that they are exposed to the disease to the same extent as the \n80average person like themselves or if they would be affected by the unrealistic optimism (or \n81the opposite – unrealistic pessimism) bias. The research of Dolinski and colleagues (1) was \n82conducted in March 2020 when the media reported about the first people diagnosed with \n83coronavirus in Poland. In their study, the pattern of unrealistic optimism in the face of the \n84beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic emerged. Similar results were obtained in other \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 5\n85European countries (France, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Italy) in February 2020 before \n86the collapse of the healthcare system in Italy (12). People who were asked about their chances \n87of getting infected were generally optimistic and assessed the personal risk of contracting \n88coronavirus as lower than others.\n89Further research results also point to the implications of the positive bias for \n90health-related behaviours (13,14). According to Oljača and colleagues (15), the optimistic \n91bias may indeed influence attitudes towards compliance with restrictions. In a study \n92conducted in Serbia, the participants who scored higher on the UOS–NLE subscale \n93(measuring unrealistic optimism towards negative life events) assessed the risk connected \n94with COVID-19 infection as lower and declared lower compliance with the pandemic \n95restrictions. Similarly, Gordeeva and colleagues (16) found a positive link between defensive \n96optimism (the tendency to diminish the risk of the emergence of negative events) and failure \n97to comply with the stay-at-home rule in their study conducted in Russia in March and April \n982020.\n99Predictors of unrealistic optimism in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic\n100So far, the most elaborated theoretical model of unrealistic optimism has been \n101formulated by Neil Weinstein (7). Below we refer to the five factors that, according to the \n102Weinstein model (7), may have the most significant impact on unrealistic optimism during the \n103pandemic. At least two factors should inhibit the tendency to the positive bias among people \n104at pandemic risk: (a) the perceived probability of the event and (b) the ease of recalling a \n105stereotypical victim of a given situation. The first one is inherently connected with the \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 6\n106pandemic’s growth and increasing numbers of people contracting coronavirus. Higher \n107perceived frequency (i.e., probability) in the general population should affect personal \n108judgement of the risk but not necessarily others’ judgement. Thus, when the event is more \n109frequent, the unrealistic bias may be weakened by a higher own risk rating. The second \n110predictor that works in a similar direction means that the assumption regarding stereotype \n111salience is based on the representativeness heuristic (17). Weinstein (7) assumes that the \n112harder it is to imagine a typical victim of a specific event, the weaker the optimistic bias will \n113be. As the pandemic spreads, individuals should be more aware that the severe consequences \n114of COVID-19 affect not only the elderly with significant health problems but also younger, \n115healthy people. With the increase in diversity and the number of victims of the pandemic, it \n116will be more difficult to create a stereotypical image of the person most exposed to \n117coronavirus, which should reduce the tendency to create cognitive illusions.\n118However, there are two other predictors that in our opinion would work in opposite \n119directions to enhance positive illusions: (c) controllability of the situation, (d) the degree of \n120desirability, and (e) the personal experience which the last one can work both ways. \n121Controllability of the situation refers to a human’s sense that a situation’s outcome is \n122dependent on their own actions. Therefore, people tend to overestimate their chances in \n123positive events and underestimate their risks in negative events. In our opinion, people at risk \n124during a pandemic may be vulnerable to the illusion of control through the availability of \n125preventive measures: wearing a mask, keeping their distance, disinfecting hands. Thus, they \n126can create the illusion of greater control of the situation and less chance of contracting the \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 7\n127virus. In our opinion, a sense of control can foster a positive bias when asking individuals \n128about the chances of contracting coronavirus. In this aspect, people seem more susceptible to \n129the illusion of their own preventive actions but not necessarily for other aspects such as \n130vulnerability to a severe course of COVID-19 or adverse vaccine reactions. The degree of \n131desirability refers to the severity of the consequences. It is assumed that the more desirable a \n132situation’s outcome, the greater the optimistic bias. However, negative events induce a more \n133negative effect which leads to defensive strategies for protecting oneself and also results in \n134higher optimistic bias. People desire positive outcomes, and when they are faced with the risk \n135of losing their health or even their life they may be prone to reducing anxiety and protecting \n136their self-esteem. One such strategy may be by creating positive illusions, which allows \n137individuals to change their perception of a situation from threatening to less threatening. The \n138last moderator mentioned by Weinstein (7) is the assumption about personal experience which \n139is based on the availability heuristic (18). Previous experience with an event increases the \n140belief in its reoccurrence. Personal experience may, in a similar vein, change the personal \n141perception of the risk faced by an individual. However, two alternatives of these changes in \n142the perception of the risk may be taken into account according to the existing literature (10). \n143The first one is the shift in the perception of the situation to be more threatening and even \n144leads to the opposite unrealistic pessimism phenomenon (19) or to a lower level of unrealistic \n145optimism (10). Alternatively, personal experience may, in some cases, result in enhanced \n146self-protective motivation and may lead to an underestimation of the personal risk in relation \n147to others (9).\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 8\n148Aim of the studies\n149Considering the above, it seems important to examine the tendency to positive bias as \n150the COVID-19 pandemic develops, so we decided to explore the susceptibility to unrealistic \n151optimism during the second (Study 1) and the third wave of the pandemic in Poland (Study 2), \n152when the number of infections increased dramatically. If the tendency to unrealistic optimism \n153persists in the further stages of the pandemic, we expect to replicate the tendency to \n154underestimate one’s own chance of contracting coronavirus despite the growth in the number \n155of infections in the population both during the second (Study 1) and third (Study 2) waves of \n156the pandemic in Poland. In addition, in Study 2, we decided to broaden the spectrum of \n157assessing the tendency to unrealistic optimism with two issues that seem to be of particular \n158importance as the pandemic develops: the severity of a potential COVID-19 infection and \n159adverse vaccine reactions. As far as we know, there is scarce evidence whether the optimistic \n160bias is limited only to the prediction of the chance of contracting COVID-19 or is related to \n161other important health-related topics. The positive bias toward coronavirus risk assessments \n162does not imply that people assume they are at risk of serious complications and at risk of \n163losing their health and even their lives. On the contrary, it can be assumed that such cognitive \n164bias may protect individuals from thinking about the serious consequences of contracting \n165COVID-19. Thus, the presence of the cognitive bias towards contracting COVID-19 does not \n166necessarily mean that people are positively biased towards assessment of the chances of a \n167severe course of the disease or adverse vaccine reactions. Those two seem to be beyond \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 9\n168individuals’ ability to take their own actions that could create the illusion of control and lead \n169to the positive bias. \n170Based on the research by Dolinski et al. (1), to determine the sample size, we expected \n171Cohen's d effect sizes to be from d = 0.238 to d = 0.491. For the calculations, we adopted the \n172average value of d = 0.365; expected power of .90 and alpha = .05. The analysis of the power \n173in G*Power (version 3.1.9.7; 20) for the difference between the two dependent means and the \n174two-tailed t-test, showed that the required power is achieved by a sample of 81 individuals. In \n175order to meet these assumptions, we determined a sample size of at least 81 people in each of \n176the studies.\n177We report all manipulations, measures, and exclusions in these studies (supplementary \n178materials for more details). No studies in this manuscript were preregistered. All statistical \n179procedures were performed in IBM SPSS v.26.0 (21)\n180Study 1\n181We decided to conduct our first study in November 2020, during the spike of the very \n182severe second wave of the pandemic in Poland. In 2020, 70,000 more people died in Poland \n183than in previous years, which is nearly 20% more than in 2019 (and at the same time is the \n184highest rate of death since World War II) (22). In November 2020 alone, 605,885 coronavirus \n185cases were confirmed in Poland, and 11,494 people died as a result of the infection (23). Thus, \n186the possible ramifications of excessive optimism became visible to every naive person. We \n187expect to replicate the effect obtained by Dolinski and colleagues (1) who conducted their \n188study at the beginning of the pandemic in Poland when people had not yet faced the \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 10\n189widespread traumatic experiences of the deaths of their relatives and friends due to \n190coronavirus.\n191Method\n192This study was part of a larger research plan concerning decision-making about resource \n193allocation during the coronavirus pandemic. In this report, we focus on the elements of the \n194procedure related to the measurement of unrealistic optimism (a full description of the \n195procedure and other measures used in the study can be found in the supplementary materials). \n196Detailed information on the materials and instructions for Study 1 can be found in the \n197repository: https://zenodo.org/record/5984642.\n198The study was approved by Research Ethics Committee at the Institute of Applied \n199Psychology, Faculty of Management and Social Communication Jagiellonian University in \n200Krakow. The participants were informed about the confidentiality of their data, the voluntary \n201nature of the study and the possibility of ceasing to complete the survey at any time. Their \n202answers were anonymized in the database. As the research was conducted online the consent to \n203participate in the study was obtained online by entering personal data and clicking on the \n204“continue” button.\n205Participants\n206The first study involved 111 participants (90 female and 21 male) aged 18 to 42 years (M \n207= 22.23, SD = 3.53). All of the participants were students of the Jagiellonian University in \n208Kraków. Of all the participants, two were quarantined during the study, and four had been, at \n209some point, diagnosed with COVID-19. The participants were assigned to the study conditions \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 11\n210on the basis of quasi-randomization. At the very beginning of the study, they were asked about \n211their day of birth. The numbers between 1 and 31 were divided into four intervals which were \n212used to redirect the participants to two different conditions (control and experimental) based on \n213their answers.\n214Materials\n215Pandemic and neutral context\n216The participants were assigned to one of two conditions related to one of two \n217contexts—pandemic vs non-pandemic—as a part of the larger research project mentioned \n218earlier. Four separate photos were used (i.e., two for the pandemic context and two for \n219non-pandemic). More information about the chosen photos can be found in the supplementary \n220materials. We had no theoretical predictions about the impact of manipulating the context (i.e., \n221pandemic vs. neutral), however, due to the fact that context can significantly change the \n222perception of the social situation, especially in people who are more or less exposed to the \n223effects of a pandemic, we decided to take it into account in our preliminary analyses.\n224Unrealistic optimism measurement\n225Our main dependent variable was the measure of how the participants were unrealistically \n226optimistic about the possibility of contracting coronavirus. To this end, we asked them two \n227questions:\n2281. How would you rate your chances of contracting coronavirus?\n2292. How would you rate the chances that someone else like you will contract coronavirus?\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 12\n230The participants answered both questions by estimating the chance of becoming infected as a \n231percentage (from 0 to 100). It is suggested by Harris et al. (24) that such an indirect method of \n232assessing the optimistic bias (by asking two separate questions) is more beneficial and \n233informative than the classical, direct way introduced by Weinstein (7) which consists of only \n234one item where participants are asked to compare themselves to an average other.\n235Procedure\n236The first study was conducted in November 2020 at the peak of the second wave of the \n237coronavirus in Poland. Due to pandemic restrictions, the study was conducted online. \n238Participants received an email invitation to take part in the study. If they clicked the link \n239received in the email, they were redirected to an online survey. Firstly, they were informed \n240about data privacy and gave active, informed consent. Then, after assignment to research \n241conditions, they were asked two questions regarding the perceived chance of contracting \n242coronavirus—by themselves and someone similar to them. Finally, the participants filled in \n243demographic data and were thanked for participating in the study. Detailed information about \n244all the additional materials and scales used in the study can be found in the supplementary \n245materials.\n246Results\n247Due to the fact that being infected with COVID-19 at some point could influence the \n248assessment of the risk of contracting coronavirus, participants who had been diagnosed with \n249COVID-19 (n = 4) and participants who were in quarantine (n = 2) were excluded from the \n250analysis. Preliminary analysis (general linear model with the assessment of the chance of \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 13\n251infection as a within-subject factor and sex, age, and condition as between-subject factors) \n252showed that the assessment of the chance of infection was not influenced by the experimental \n253condition (see pandemic vs neutral photos; F(1, 79) = 0.07, p = 0.791. There were also no \n254differences related to the age (F(12, 107) = 1.53, p = 0.130) and sex (F(1, 79) = 0.03, p = \n2550.869) of the participants. Therefore, in further analysis, all results were considered jointly, \n256regardless of the manipulation of the pandemic vs the non-pandemic context, age, and gender \n257of the participants. The estimate of contracting coronavirus oneself was significantly different \n258from the estimate of it being contracted by someone else. The participants assessed their \n259chance of becoming infected (M = 52.97, SD = 24.24) as lower than the chance of someone \n260else becoming infected (M = 61.18, SD = 23.26). This difference is statistically significant and \n261effect size is of moderate strength (t (103) = -4.69; p <0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.34).\n262\nTable 1\nSummary of self and others’ chances assessments from the two studies\nSelf Others Paired-samples t-testHow do you assess the chances \nof… related to Covid-19 M SD M SD t df p 95% CI\nLower Upper\nStudy 1 Contracting 52.97 24.24 61.18 23.26 4.69 103 <0.001 -11.68 -4.74\nContracting 42.55 24.67 51.03 22.98 5.69 70 <0.001 -11.45 -5.51\nSerious \ncomplications 31.13 24.48 31.94 21.53 0.297 69 0.768 -6.28 4.65\nStudy 2\nDeveloping adverse \nvaccine reactions 27.06 24.43 28.33 22.14 0.912 69 0.365 -4.05 1.51\n263Discussion\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 14\n264The results of our first study correspond with other reports confirming a tendency to \n265unrealistic optimism in the context of the assessment of life- or health-threatening events \n266(5,6,9). It can be argued that a similar relationship may occur in people’s behaviour in response \n267to the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our study is in line with the few reports to date (1,12–\n26815), that show that unrealistic optimism may bias those who are at risk of the coronavirus \n269pandemic. For example, in the study by Dolinski and colleagues (1), which was carried out at \n270the beginning of the pandemic in Poland, the same group of students was asked three times \n271about their assessment of the chances of contracting coronavirus, and it was shown that the \n272tendency to unrealistic optimism remained stable among men but actually intensified among \n273women during the week after the first COVID-19 infection was announced. However, it is not \n274clear—according to the Weinstein model (7) — whether the tendency to underestimate the \n275chances of contracting coronavirus will continue over the long term. Our study initially \n276confirmed that there was a continuing tendency to underestimate the chances of catching \n277COVID-19 during an exacerbating pandemic in Poland.\n278Study 2\n279In our second study, we decided to extend the scope of the optimistic bias exploration to \n280more specific aspects of pandemic risk. During the development of a pandemic, two aspects \n281seem to be particularly important, and little known from the point of view of unrealistic \n282optimism: (a) estimating the chances of serious complications as a consequence of a possible \n283COVID-19 infection, and (b) the perceived risk of developing adverse vaccine reactions. \n284There is strong evidence in the literature on unrealistic optimism suggesting that this effect \n285occurs rather in the case of events that we assume we can control to some extent (1,7). \n286According to Weinstein (7), in the case of events that people feel they can control it is easier \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 15\n287for them to visualise their own behaviour aimed at reducing the risk. Thus, they overestimate \n288their influence on the situation and are more susceptible to the optimistic bias. People may, to \n289some extent, try to minimise the risk of contracting COVID-19 through their behaviour, thus, \n290the possibility of becoming infected seems to be dependent on a person’s actions and under \n291their control. However, people believe that they have no control over whether, as a result of \n292the infection, they will experience serious complications that may result in death or a serious \n293threat to life. Thus, we hypothesise that although people will underestimate the chances of \n294getting ill, at the same time they will not underestimate the chances of developing a serious \n295course of the disease as a consequence of a possible COVID-19 infection.\n296The chances of getting infected can be effectively reduced by following the \n297recommendations of the WHO: limiting social contacts, wearing a face mask, or disinfecting \n298hands. In the event of a severe course of COVID-19 infection, people do not have personal \n299control over how the disease develops. In a study by Asimakopoulou and colleagues (11), \n300participants showed lower unrealistic optimism when asked about the risk of hospitalisation, \n301being taken into the intensive care unit, and being ventilated due to COVID-19 (less \n302manageable situations) than when asked about the risk of contracting coronavirus or infecting \n303someone else (more manageable situations). Therefore, we assume that in the case of the risk \n304of a severe course of COVID-19, the effect of unrealistic optimism will be weaker.\n305We decided to include one more variable which was not included in previous studies as \n306they were conducted during a different stage of the pandemic. Our second study was \n307conducted in February 2021, after the second coronavirus wave in Poland, which turned out to \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 16\n308be much more severe than the first one. Between September and December 2020, 1,205,878 \n309new cases of coronavirus infections were confirmed and 25,656 people died due to a \n310COVID-19 infection. At the peak of the second wave, COVID-19 patients occupied 20,000 \n311hospital beds (23).\n312We assumed that, at this point, most of the participants will already have had their own \n313experiences related to coronavirus, and in particular, they might personally know someone for \n314whom contracting coronavirus had serious consequences. We decided to verify if the personal \n315experience of knowing someone who had developed a severe illness due to COVID-19 or \n316died from it would affect the unrealistic optimism of the participants.\n317In the literature on unrealistic optimism, we found mixed results related to the influence \n318of personal experience (9,10). In a study by McKenna and Albery (10), participants who were \n319involved in a car accident showed lower unrealistic optimism concerning their driving skills \n320than other participants, but only if they were hospitalised as a result of the accident. In \n321contrast, in a longitudinal study related to alcohol abuse (9), people who experienced negative \n322consequences related to alcohol consumption at subsequent stages of the study still rated their \n323own risk of developing serious problems related to alcohol abuse as lower than others.\n324Finally, since the date of the study coincided with the commencement of the vaccination \n325programme in Poland, we were also interested in the assessment of the chances of adverse \n326vaccination reactions – self versus others. We assumed that as the chances of adverse \n327vaccination reactions are beyond one’s control, we will not observe optimistic bias in this \n328case.\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 17\n329Method\n330Participants\n331The second study involved 84 participants (57 female, 26 male, and 1 nonbinary), aged from 19 \n332to 65 (M = 35.42, SD = 9.07). Eleven of the participants were at some point diagnosed with \n333COVID-19, two were quarantined while participating in the study. Out of 84 participants, 78 \n334knew someone diagnosed with COVID-19, 47 knew someone who manifested severe \n335symptoms of COVID-19, and 30 participants knew someone who died due to COVID-19.\n336Materials\n337Pandemic and neutral context\n338Similarly, as in Study 1, we used the manipulation of the context of the unrealistic \n339optimism assessment. Before the assessment, half of the participants were presented with \n340pandemic-associated, death-related pictures whereas the other half were presented with - the \n341same as in Study 1 - neutral images. The materials were chosen based on the separate pilot \n342study. The stimuli used in the second study can be found in the supplementary materials. \n343Detailed information on the materials and instructions for study 2 can be found in the repository: \n344https://zenodo.org/record/5984642.\n345Unrealistic optimism measurement\n346As we wanted to verify whether unrealistic optimism would also apply to other aspects \n347related to the coronavirus pandemic (apart from the assessment of the chances of being \n348infected), we additionally asked the participants the following questions:\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 18\n3491. How would you rate your chances of a severe course of the disease if you contract \n350coronavirus?\n3512. How would you rate the chances of someone else becoming severely ill if they contract \n352coronavirus?\n353These questions related to the possible unrealistic optimism about a severe course of \n354coronavirus disease. As the coronavirus vaccination programme was already underway during \n355the second study, we also wanted to check if there were some differences in the assessment of \n356the possible side effects of a vaccination:\n3571. How would you rate your chances of developing severe side effects after a coronavirus \n358vaccination?\n3592. How would you rate the chances of someone else developing severe side effects after a \n360coronavirus vaccination?\n361Personal experience of COVID-19\n362The second study was conducted on the verge of the third wave of the coronavirus \n363pandemic in Poland. Thus, we assumed that the participants may have had some personal \n364experience of COVID-19 at this point, which might have influenced the way they assessed their \n365chances of getting infected and developing severe symptoms of COVID-19. At the end of the \n366study, participants reported if they personally knew someone diagnosed with COVID-19, if \n367they personally knew someone who developed severe symptoms of COVID-19, and if they \n368personally knew someone who died due to a COVID-19 infection.\n369Procedure\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 19\n370Again, due to the pandemic restrictions, the study was conducted online. Participants \n371received an email invitation to take part in the study. If they clicked on the link received in the \n372email, they were redirected to the online survey. Firstly, they were informed about data privacy \n373and gave active, informed consent. Similar to the first study, participants were assigned to the \n374research condition quasi-randomly, based on their day of birth. Depending on the condition, \n375participants saw either neutral photos (control conditions) or photos related to the coronavirus \n376pandemic (experimental conditions).\n377In the next step, they were asked to estimate their perceived chances of being infected with \n378COVID-19, developing severe symptoms of COVID-19, and suffering severe side effects of \n379vaccination against COVID-19. To assess the tendency to the optimistic bias, they also \n380answered the same questions regarding their co-workers/other students. Finally, the \n381participants filled in demographic data and information about their personal experience of \n382COVID-19. More detailed information about the other measures used in the study can be found \n383in the supplementary materials.\n384Results\n385As in the first study, we excluded participants who declared that they had tested positive \n386for the presence of coronavirus (n = 11) and participants who were in quarantine (n = 2) as \n387their answers may have biased the results. Since during the second study, vaccination against \n388coronavirus was already underway in Poland, we also excluded participants who had been \n389vaccinated with at least one dose (n = 2). First, in the preliminary analysis, we checked if \n390there were any differences in unrealistic optimism measures due to different experimental \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 20\n391conditions (pandemic vs neutral photos). As we found none (F(1,15) = 0.13, p = .726), we \n392decided to analyse all the data together. There were also no differences concerning unrealistic \n393optimism due to the gender (F(1,15) = 0.13, p = .865) and age (F(32,15) = 0.71, p = .795) of \n394the participants. The effect of unrealistic optimism related to the chances of contracting \n395coronavirus has been successfully replicated (t(70) = -5.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -0.37). The \n396respondents assessed their chances of becoming infected lower (M = 42.55, SD = 24.67) than \n397the chances of other people (M = 51.03, SD = 22.98).\n398There was no effect of unrealistic optimism related to a severe course of COVID-19 \n399infection (see Table 1). However, when assessing the chances of a severe course of the \n400disease, personal experience related to coronavirus turned out to be an important factor. There \n401was an interaction effect between unrealistic optimism and personal acquaintance with \n402someone who died from a COVID-19 infection (F(1,68) = 6.50, p = .013, Cohen’s d = 0.58). \n403Participants who knew someone who died as a result of COVID-19 infection estimated their \n404chances of a severe course of coronavirus infection significantly lower (M = 26.29, SD = \n40519.74) than the chances of substantial side effects of COVID-19 infection for other people (M \n406= 36.41, SD = 19.27; p = .028). This effect did not appear in the case of participants who did \n407not personally know any victims of COVID-19 infection (Mself = 33.65 SDself = 26.47 \n408comparing to Mother = 29.61 SDother = 22.47; p = .218).\n409Other experiences with the coronavirus pandemic (i.e., knowing people who have \n410become infected or who have been severely ill) did not contribute to the effect of unrealistic \n411optimism concerning a severe course of COVID-19 disease. There was no interactional effect \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 21\n412in the case of a personal acquaintance with someone who has been severely ill (F(1,68) = 2.03, \n413p = .158, Cohen’s d = 0.31). Additionally, we decided not to perform analysis on a personal \n414acquaintance with someone who has been infected as a between-subject factor since 78 of 84 \n415participants knew someone who has been ill.\n416There was also no effect of unrealistic optimism concerning potential adverse reactions of \n417the COVID-19 vaccination (see Table 1). Overall, respondents rated the chances of \n418experiencing vaccination side effects as low for themselves (M = 27.06; SD = 24.43) as for \n419others (M = 28.33, SD = 22.14). Any type of personal experiences with the coronavirus \n420pandemic were of no importance in this case (knowing someone who has been severely ill: \n421F(1,68) = 0.32, p = .573; Cohen’s d = 0.14; knowing someone who died from COVID-19 \n422infection: F(1,68) = 1.97, p = .166; Cohen’s d = 0.33).\n423Discussion\n424The evidence presented in our research supports the assumption that the optimistic bias \n425is maintained as the COVID-19 pandemic progresses and is not limited to the initial stages of \n426a pandemic outbreak. Bottemanne and colleagues (25) suggest that the optimism bias may \n427diminish as coronavirus spreads around the world. They argue that in face of an inevitable \n428threat people tend to use unfavourable information more likely to update their beliefs. At first, \n429the coronavirus pandemic was rather distant and novel but with more and more cases the risk \n430of infection was getting higher and, as a result, this might have updated people’s beliefs about \n431their personal chances of getting ill and weakened the optimistic bias. In contrast to the \n432assumptions of Bottemanne and colleagues (25), our data, collected in two studies conducted \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 22\n433during the second and third waves of the pandemic in Poland, confirm the existence of \n434unrealistic optimism regarding the assessment of the chances of contracting coronavirus. \n435Moreover, as the pandemic progressed, not only did the optimism not diminish, but the \n436strength of the effect appears to be stable (i.e., Cohen’s d in Study 1 vs. Study 2 is 0.34 and \n4370.37, respectively). In both studies, the pandemic and non-pandemic contexts did not affect \n438the assessment of any aspects of pandemic risk. This may be an argument for the high \n439availability of information about the pandemic and relative insensitivity to additional \n440information that would change the perception of reality during the second and third waves of \n441the pandemic in Poland.\n442Interestingly, in the second study, people assessed both their own likelihood of \n443becoming infected and of others as lower than in the first study (i.e., 52.97 vs 42.10 for one’s \n444own assessment and 61.18 vs 51.00 for others). However, it is difficult to draw conclusions \n445about the differences in the estimates of absolute values on that basis, because the results \n446come from different groups of respondents at different stages of the pandemic’s development. \n447We do not know whether this result indicates the opposite trend to that observed in the studies \n448by Dolinski et al. (1) or whether it represents differences in the perceived probability of \n449infection of various groups of people.\n450Nevertheless, maintaining the illusion of the lower vulnerability to infection that \n451accompanies the sharp increase in the number of infected people — as we are dealing with in \n452the second and third waves of the pandemic — indicates a strong cognitive bias that does not \n453seem to have been reduced by the incoming information. According to Weinstein’s \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 23\n454assumption of the perceived probability of the event (7), in March 2020, in Poland, there were \n455a dozen new COVID-19 cases a day, while in the second half of the year, the numbers were \n456oscillating around several thousand cases a day and more. As the incidence of the disease \n457increases with the duration of the pandemic, individuals are supposed to make more realistic \n458estimations of the chances of their own illness and should make those assessments similar to \n459others, thus one would expect that the tendency to unrealistic optimism should decrease. \n460However, the above argumentation assumes that people rationally evaluate the chances of \n461positive and negative events in their lives, which, as we know from the many studies in the \n462field about decision making and judgement, is no longer true (18,26). Likewise, the \n463assumption that a growing number of infections should change the stereotypical image of a \n464typical victim (7), which in turn should inhibit the tendency to the positive bias also turned \n465out not to be valid in our studies. While people in our research showed positive illusions \n466about coronavirus infection, the attempt to explain this phenomenon should focus on the role \n467of factors that, from the theoretical point of view, could contribute to their maintenance.\n468One reason why individuals may be motivated to maintain a positive illusion is when \n469they are trying to control an unpredictable situation (27). The outbreak of a pandemic is \n470undoubtedly a factor that increases the unpredictability and uncertainty of actions and raises \n471many risks related to the consequences of the decisions that individuals are making. There is a \n472growing body of literature suggesting that the experience of uncontrollability increases \n473uncertainty (28) and leads to the experience of lack of control which is challenging for \n474various aspects of human functioning (29). In the context of our research, the most interesting \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 24\n475seems the self-protection motivation (30,31) and regaining control when people are facing \n476unpredictable situations (32). The positive illusion may be a form of self-protection and \n477cognitive bias can serve as promoting positivity in one’s self-views. Following this argument, \n478it can be expected that the growing number of infections will not only reduce the positive bias \n479but will foster uncertainty about the future and enhance motivation to regain control of the \n480situation, especially in terms of those aspects that may be perceived as controllable. We \n481expected, according to Weinstein’s model (7), that the positive illusion will be especially \n482strong in the case of the relatively controllable aspect of the pandemic situation (the chances \n483of contracting of COVID-19) but not for those aspects that are beyond control (a severe \n484course of COVID-19, adverse vaccine reactions). The results of Study 2 are consistent with \n485the above assumptions and other studies suggesting the existence of the positive illusion for \n486manageable rather than unmanageable situations (11). We predicted that in the case of the \n487chances of infection, such an illusion of control is more likely to occur than for other aspects \n488of assessment. Hand disinfection, self-isolation, and wearing a mask are actions that an \n489individual can take at any time because they depend solely on their will. There is, however, an \n490interesting contradiction in this aspect. Paradoxically, research shows that unrealistically \n491optimistic people less often follow the rules and respect limitations. In fact, they tend to \n492ignore protective measures and thus contribute to the spread of the virus. A positive illusion \n493can therefore be a knife that cuts both sides: from an individual’s perspective, the belief that \n494preventive measures are readily available strengthens the illusion of control, but it actually \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 25\n495leads to the ignoring of limitations, which not only does not reduce the risk but also seriously \n496increases it.\n497We did not expect to report the unrealistic optimism in regard to a severe course of \n498COVID-19. The degree of desirability which refers to the severity of the consequences \n499according to the Weinstein model (7) increases the pressure for a more realistic risk \n500assessment. As the risk of a wrong and inadequate assessment of the situation increases, \n501individuals pay higher costs for their wrong decisions. The results obtained are consistent \n502with our assumptions that an individual will not be prone to unrealistic optimism when \n503assessing a serious course of the disease. However, there is an interesting exception regarding \n504people who knew someone who died from a COVID-19 infection. The results obtained in \n505Study 2 show that people who experienced the death of a person they knew are unrealistically \n506optimistic in regards to the assessment their own chances of a severe course of COVID-19. \n507Knowing a person who died of COVID-19 may indicate the role of personal experience in the \n508development of the positive illusion. The existing literature does not allow for conclusive \n509assumptions about the influence of personal experience in the development of the positive \n510bias. Rather, our results may suggest that personal experience enhances the positive illusion, \n511however, there is another important factor that one cannot ignore. There is a considerable \n512number of empirical findings suggesting the consequences of mortality salience evoke a \n513psychological defence mechanism to protect self-esteem and reduce the psychological threat \n514and anxiety (33,34). The personal experience in our study took a specific form beyond \n515knowing someone infected with COVID-19. During the third wave of the pandemic, almost \n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 26\n516all respondents knew someone who had already been infected with coronavirus and our \n517results suggest that those kinds of experiences are not sufficient to enhance the positive bias \n518towards a severe course of the disease. The experience of COVID-19 does not necessarily \n519imply its seriousness. In the case of death, we are dealing not only with the experience of \n520severe complications but, above all, with mortality salience which bears far more \n521psychological consequences (35) than only the experience of a severe course of coronavirus \n522infection. Unfortunately, our study does not allow us to make a conclusion about the role of \n523the specificity of these kinds of personal experiences. More research is needed to verify the \n524role of assessing the consequences of infecting others in creating a positive illusion about the \n525seriousness of the disease. It cannot be ruled out that unrealistic optimism may be a specific \n526consequence of the awareness of one’s own mortality, which has not been verified in the \n527empirical research so far.\n528In our research, we refer to the predictions based on the Weinstein model (7), which we \n529consider to be the most elaborated theoretical framework in the literature explaining the \n530predictors of unrealistic optimism. We are aware that the inference about the relationship to \n531risk assessment in our research was indirect rather than direct. Further efforts should be made \n532to better demonstrate the direct relationship of factors in the Weinstein model (7) with the \n533development of the positive illusions regarding the assessment of various aspects of pandemic \n534risk (contagion risk, risk of a severe course, risk of unexpected vaccine reactions) and the role \n535of mortality salience in upholding positive illusions.\n536References\n . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a \n is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)\nThe copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 10, 2022. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.10.22274918doi: medRxiv preprint \n\nUNREALISTIC OPTIMISM IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 27\n537\n5381. Dolinski D, Dolinska B, Zmaczynska-Witek B, Banach M, Kulesza W. 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