{"paper_id":"3deb0abb-a88a-4e4b-871f-1c6c0f42b7dd","body_text":"Political Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination: Labor Market Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023) | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Political Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination: Labor Market Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023) Luis Garrido-Vergara, Garcé Adolfo This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract One of the key challenges of the contemporary research agenda on policy coordination and integration is the empirical analysis of cases that allow scholars to identify the causal mechanisms underpinning the interaction among actors in public policy processes (Trein et al., 2021 ). Drawing on the framework of Political Knowledge Regimes (Garcé, 2014 , 2017 ; Garcé & Cox, 2025 ), this article analyzes the cases of Chile and Uruguay with respect to the implementation of labor market reforms between 1990 and 2012. The comparison between these two cases shows that differences in policy coordination and actor integration produced technocratic reform processes in Chile while, in Uruguay, reforms were shaped by the influence of citizens and organized civil society. These differences are central to a comparative understanding of the relationship between democratization processes and the development of labor market policies in these countries. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of the relationship between knowledge, state coordination (Howlett, 2012 ), and labor market reforms, and help to illuminate how democratization processes become differently articulated with the production and use of knowledge in public policymaking. By explicitly incorporating the cognitive dimension, the article advances debates on policy coordination and integration, highlighting the role of political knowledge as a central element of contemporary governance. Political knowledge regimes policy coordination labor market reforms democratization Chile Uruguay I. Introduction In Latin America, labor market reforms have historically constituted a policy arena where distributive conflicts, ideological alignments, and specific modes of interaction between the state, social actors, and governing elites converge (Cook, 2007 ; Murillo et al., 2011 ). However, recent research suggests that observable differences in reform trajectories cannot be explained solely by formal institutional architecture or by the ideological orientations of incumbent governments. Rather, these differences are increasingly understood as the product of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) that structure the relationship between expert knowledge and public action in each country (Garcé, 2014 , 2017 ; Garcé & Cox, 2025 ). This perspective moves beyond approaches centered on bureaucratic capacity or partisan cleavages by showing that the production, legitimation, and use of specialized knowledge decisively condition patterns of state coordination and, ultimately, policymaking decisions (Garrido-Vergara & Cienfuegos, 2025 ; Garrido-Vergara & Sepúlveda-Rodríguez, 2025). This article examines the evolution of labor policy in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Although both countries are stable democracies and are often regarded as successful cases within the region, they offer particularly valuable leverage for exploring this article’s argument. Despite sharing comparable historical trajectories and relatively convergent development models, Chile and Uruguay have followed divergent paths in the configuration of their political knowledge regimes. Chile has consolidated a technocratic PKR, in which political authority tends to delegate decision-making to experts, with technical evidence playing a central role in policy formulation. Uruguay, by contrast, has developed a plebeian PKR, characterized by the primacy of political negotiation and social representation over technical expertise (Garcé, 2017 ). These regimes do not merely shape dominant ideas about what counts as legitimate knowledge; they also structure patterns of coordination, hierarchies of authority, and modes of governance. The comparative analysis of these two cases is particularly illuminating in the domain of labor market policy (Bonoli, 2010 ). This article analyzes the evolution of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023 as an expression of the dynamics of their respective political knowledge regimes. We argue that patterns of state coordination in the labor domain—technocratic in the Chilean case and deliberative-corporatist in that of Uruguay—do not derive mechanically from institutional capacities or prevailing partisan ideologies. Instead, they reflect deeper cognitive-political structures that determine which actors are legitimized to define public problems, propose solutions, design policy instruments, and evaluate outcomes (Béland & Cox, 2016 ; Peters, 2018 ; Schmidt, 2008 ). Furthermore, the article advances the argument that political knowledge regimes are not static structures. They evolve in response to paradigm crises, critical events (such as corruption scandals or episodes of institutional delegitimation), intellectual mobilization, and reconfigurations of the political field. These mechanisms may reinforce, strain, or transform the dominant cognitive authority, thereby altering the relationship between knowledge and power and, consequently, patterns of governmental coordination. From this perspective, labor market reforms constitute a privileged observational window for understanding how elites respond to contingent challenges and how those responses are structured by consolidated epistemic frameworks (Alasuutari & Qadir, 2014 ; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010 ). In sum, this article argues that understanding the differences between Chile and Uruguay in labor market reform requires shifting the analytical focus from institutional architecture to the cognitive dimension of governance, examining how political knowledge regimes selectively shape the participation of experts, social actors, parties, and citizens in decision-making processes (Howlett, 2023 ). The comparative examination of these cases thus contributes to a broader understanding of the role of knowledge in politics and of how national epistemic structures influence the design, implementation, and coordination of public policies. II. Political Knowledge Regimes The relationship between science and politics profoundly shapes the dynamics of public policymaking. In order to characterize the specific form that this relationship takes in different national contexts, Campbell and Pedersen developed the concept of Knowledge Regimes (2015; 2010). Building on this approach, Garcé introduced the concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (2014). Both concepts were formulated with the same objective: to explain why different nations generate and use expert knowledge in systematically different ways. Despite this shared purpose, the two concepts prioritize different analytical dimensions. The concept of Knowledge Regimes (KR) developed by Campbell and Pedersen focuses on the supply side of expert knowledge. It refers specifically to the institutional machinery through which information and policy solutions are produced in a given country. Knowledge regimes explain the main characteristics of the available expert knowledge and its use in public policy by examining the organization of knowledge production, which is in turn derived from the variety of capitalism and the structure of national policy regimes. By contrast, the concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) emphasizes the demand side of expert knowledge, focusing on policymakers themselves. This demand is derived from the characteristics of the political elite in general and, in particular, from its political culture. In turn, the nature of this demand shapes and conditions the supply of expert knowledge. From this perspective, the bridge between knowledge and public policy is not merely institutional, but fundamentally political and cultural. Drawing on the typology proposed by Campbell and Pedersen, Garcé (2014) developed the classification presented in Table 1, which distinguishes four ideal types of political knowledge regimes. Taken together, the typology of PKRs captures systematic variation in how political systems value, organize, and deploy expert knowledge in public policymaking. In technocratic regimes, political parties rely extensively on experts and delegate substantial authority to them in defining public policies, in the expectation that technical consensus will translate smoothly into political consensus. Plebeian majoritarian regimes, by contrast, subordinate knowledge to the political interests of the dominant party, limiting the autonomy of expertise and precluding the emergence of a competitive or demanding marketplace of ideas. Technocratic pluralism combines pluralism with rationalism, generating an open and contested arena in which alternative policy paradigms compete on the basis of specialized expertise and evidentiary standards. By contrast, plebeian pluralism couples pluralism with anti-intellectualism, resulting in a comparatively low and largely instrumental use of expert knowledge, under which expertise is mobilized selectively to support political negotiation rather than to structure policy design. Together, these ideal types highlight how variations in elite beliefs about knowledge shape the authority of expertise and, ultimately, modes of coordination and decision-making in public policy. ***Table 1 here*** Craig Parsons’ (2007) influential “map” of theoretical approaches in political science helps clarify the distinction between these two concepts. Parsons constructs his analytical framework by combining two axes. The first derives from the classic distinction between the material (objective) and the ideational (subjective), which he terms the “logic of position” versus the “logic of interpretation.” Arguments grounded in the logic of position explain politics through what are considered objective factors, whereas arguments grounded in the logic of interpretation emphasize perceptions, meanings, and subjective understandings. The second axis distinguishes between general and particular explanations, based on the role attributed to concrete historical situations. Combining these two dimensions, Parsons identifies four major approaches in contemporary political science: structuralist, institutionalist, psychological, and ideational. Within this framework, the Knowledge Regime concept developed by Campbell and Pedersen clearly has an institutionalist lineage. Economic and political institutions explain both the type of knowledge produced and how it is used. The variety of capitalism (liberal or coordinated) and the structure of policy regimes (open and decentralized or closed and centralized) are treated as objective and historically constructed factors. By contrast, the Political Knowledge Regime concept developed by Garcé has a distinctly ideational orientation. Shared understandings within a society—and more specifically, elite beliefs about expert knowledge—explain the demand for expertise and, consequently, the nature of the bridge between expert knowledge and public policy. Importantly, both concepts fall within the category of particularistic explanations in Parsons’ framework, as they trace outcomes to historically contingent configurations rather than universal laws. Political Knowledge Regimes therefore provide an ideational answer to the question of how expert knowledge is used in public policymaking across countries. As such, the concept should be situated within the broader ideational shift that has been prominent in political science since the early 1990s (Béland, 2019, 2019; Béland & Cox, 2016; Blyth, 2011; W. R. Campbell, 2004; Gofas & Hay, 2010; K. M. Parsons, 2003; Schmidt, 2008). Parsons defines ideational explanations as follows: “ Ideational claims explain actions by tracing them to some constellation of practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, and/or identities through which certain people interpret their world. Since these ideational elements are man-made, like institutions, they too can only ground a distinct and irreducible causal logic in a particularistic format, as the consequence of earlier contingent actions ” (Parsons, 2007, pp. 39–40). What specific ideas, then, explain the different modes of production and use of expert knowledge in public policymaking across countries? How do these ideas operate in practice? According to Garcé (2014), PKRs depend fundamentally on how political elites value science. Two analytically distinct dimensions can be identified. The delegative dimension concerns the extent to which elites consider it legitimate to delegate governing decisions and policy design to experts. The partisan dimension refers to whether political elites believe that expert knowledge can exist independently of political and electoral interests. In other words, do elites believe in the possibility of politically neutral expertise? The answers to these questions reflect deeply shared descriptive and causal beliefs with far-reaching political consequences. Keeping these two dimensions in view is essential for analyzing the differences between the political knowledge regimes of Chile and Uruguay. Before turning to the empirical cases, however, the next section examines the relationship between PKRs and policy coordination. III. Political Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination The concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) provides an analytical framework for understanding how states structure the relationship between expert knowledge and public action, and how this relationship conditions prevailing modes of governmental coordination. Comparative research on public policy has consistently shown that state decisions are not solely the outcome of bureaucratic capacities, formal institutional arrangements, or partisan ideology. Rather, they are also shaped by ideational constructs that operate as cognitive and normative frameworks through which policymakers interpret, categorize, and hierarchize the value of different forms of knowledge (Béland, 2019; Schmidt, 2008). Understood as the cultural and political structure that defines the legitimacy of expert knowledge within governing elites, PKRs lie at the core of this debate. III.i. PKRs as Cognitive Determinants of State Coordination In their original formulation, Campbell and Pedersen (2015; 2010) conceptualized Knowledge Regimes (KRs) as the institutional and organizational arrangements devoted to the production of evidence for governmental action. Garcé (2014) extended this approach by shifting the analytical focus from the institutionalized supply of knowledge to the political demand for expertise among policymakers. This analytical shift introduces a decisive ideational and cultural dimension: what matters is not only how much knowledge is produced in a society, but who uses it, for what purposes, and under what criteria of epistemic legitimacy. From this perspective, PKRs function as cognitive devices that determine whether technical evidence is internalized, contested, instrumentalized, or marginalized in decision-making processes. This distinction is particularly relevant for the analysis of policy coordination, a central concept in both public administration and policy studies. At its most basic level, policy coordination refers to the mechanisms and processes through which different agencies, levels of government, and state actors align their actions in pursuit of shared objectives (Peters, 2014; Peters & Pierre, 2016; Pierre & Peters, 2020). Contemporary states confront complex and multidimensional policy problems that far exceed the jurisdictional boundaries of any single agency or ministry. As a result, coordination constitutes a structural requirement for governance-oriented policy strategies (Katsamunska, 2016; Richards, 2002). The key analytical question, therefore, is not whether states attempt to coordinate, but how coordination is achieved and which principles guide it. The literature distinguishes three levels of state coordination (Bouckaert et al., 2022; Peters, 2014). Negative coordination focuses on avoiding interference, duplication, or conflict among agencies and is typically achieved through functional separation rather than intersectoral cooperation (Scharpf, 1994). Positive coordination, by contrast, involves deliberate strategies of collaboration, including joint planning, information sharing, and negotiated action to generate policy synergies (Peters, 2018). A third and more demanding level is policy integration, which entails the convergence of goals, instruments, procedures, and intersectoral timelines under a unified governmental orientation (Trein et al., 2021). Integration does not emerge spontaneously: it requires actors with decisional authority, stable institutional mechanisms, and—crucially—shared criteria regarding what constitutes a legitimate basis for decision-making. It is precisely this last dimension that falls within the domain of PKRs. By defining who is considered capable of producing “correct” decisions within the state, PKRs operate as causal mechanisms that orient governmental coordination in a strong sense. In technocratic political knowledge regimes, where expert knowledge enjoys high political and epistemic legitimacy, technical evidence becomes a central criterion for decision-making. Consequently, actors who produce such knowledge—experts, specialized agencies, and technical commissions—are positioned as key decision-makers within the policy process. Under these conditions, coordination is expected to rely on technical evaluations, expert committees, regulatory frameworks, and cumulative intersectoral policy designs. By contrast, in plebeian or politicized PKRs, where expert knowledge is viewed as secondary, suspect, or subordinate, coordination depends primarily on political bargaining, negotiation among organized actors, and corporatist mechanisms. In these contexts, technical consistency is less decisive than interest representation and social legitimacy. Accordingly, PKRs do not merely regulate the presence of expert knowledge in decision-making; they also define hierarchies of authority within the state. They determine who can legitimately speak in the name of what is considered “ correct ,” “efficient,” “just,” or “legitimate” in public action. For this reason, PKRs should not be understood as purely technical arrangements, but rather as symbolic structures of power. From a sociological perspective, PKRs operate as structures that shape governmental action by stabilizing expectations and delineating what is perceived as reasonable, feasible, and acceptable. In this sense, PKRs influence not only how knowledge is valued, but also how coordination unfolds in the operation of the state, by generating cognitive and normative alignments among actors across policy sectors. This helps explain why coordination patterns vary even among countries with similar bureaucratic capacities, and why reforms may fail when they contradict the dominant cognitive structure of a given PKR (Garcé, 2014). In practice, a political knowledge regime functions as both a filter and a selection mechanism in public policymaking (see Appendix 1). Unlike approaches that conceive the relationship between knowledge and public action as a stable and functionalist device (Hoppe, 1996; Scott, 2020), PKRs are dynamic and contingent structures. Their relative stability rests on their ability, at specific historical moments, to articulate a coherent order of actors, interpretive frames, norms, institutions, and legitimacy criteria that guide both the production and use of knowledge in public policy (Béland & Cox, 2016; Schmidt, 2008). Yet this stability is never absolute. PKRs evolve and mutate in response to broader social, political, and ideological changes associated with political cycles. Understanding the politics of knowledge therefore requires attention to the processes through which a regime is established, consolidated, and eventually enters into crisis or is displaced by an alternative configuration (Garcé, 2014). A first mechanism of transformation is paradigm crisis, understood as the inability of the dominant regime to adequately explain and address emerging public problems. When established analytical categories, indicators, and theories become insufficient to interpret new challenges—such as the Chilean social uprising of 2019 (Joignant & Garrido-Vergara, 2025)—a process of cognitive misalignment may emerge (Hall, 1993). This undermines the explanatory authority of the prevailing regime and opens space for alternative discourses that seek to reinterpret reality in more convincing ways. A second mechanism involves critical events that challenge the credibility of the institutional order, including corruption scandals, economic crises, or major governance failures. Such episodes operate as turning points because they disrupt routinized state practices and render visible what previously appeared natural or uncontested (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). In these contexts, crises erode not only institutional trust but also confidence in the knowledge frameworks that justified prior decisions, creating opportunities to redefine which forms of expertise are required, who should produce them, and under what evaluative criteria (Capoccia, 2016). A third mechanism of change is intellectual mobilization, driven by the entry of new experts, citizen movements, interest groups, universities, research centers, and civil society organizations. These actors compete for symbolic and material resources and introduce alternative cognitive frames in an effort to influence public decision-making (Haas, 1997; Stone, 2017). Struggles over cognitive authority unfold across multiple arenas—public debate, technical commissions, academic production, and the media—and may generate gradual shifts that eventually reconfigure the dominant regime. Finally, PKRs are shaped by reconfigurations of the political field such as regime change, ideological alternation, state modernization, or shifts in governing coalitions. In these scenarios, it is not only political priorities that change, but also the criteria for selecting experts, the institutionalization of technical devices, and the definition of what counts as valid evidence and relevant knowledge (Campbell & Pedersen, 2015; Peters, 2019). What is at stake, therefore, is not only who decides, but on the basis of which forms of knowledge and normative orientations. In sum, PKRs become susceptible to change when new actors successfully challenge the cognitive authority of the dominant regime. Such displacement does not depend solely on the technical or argumentative strength of ideas, but on their capacity to be politically articulated, embedded in networks, supported by institutional resources, and mobilized convincingly in moments of heightened uncertainty. From this perspective, the history of public policy can also be read as a history of struggles over cognitive power: struggles to define “what counts as a problem,” “what constitutes a solution,” and who holds the legitimacy to decide on matters that shape collective life (see Appendix 2). III.ii. PKRs as Independent Causal Mechanisms A crucial insight emerging from the study of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) is that, beyond reflecting governing ideologies or institutionally validated state capacities, they can also be understood as independent causal mechanisms in explaining patterns of state coordination and, particularly, in shaping specific decision-making practices, as illustrated in Appendix 2. Their effect does not lie solely in the normative definition of policy goals, but rather in the establishment of informal decision rules that condition both policy design and implementation. Observable differences in coordination among countries with robust institutional structures are explained less by formal architecture than by the epistemic culture of political elites (Alasuutari & Qadir, 2014; Schmidt, 2008). This argument implies three causal consequences. First, PKRs generate path dependence insofar as they stabilize coordination patterns by selectively legitimizing certain actors—such as experts, political parties, trade unions, or social movements—while excluding others. Second, PKRs may produce resistance to change, as reforms that contradict the regime’s dominant cognitive structure may follow trajectories with negative tendencies, ultimately leading to failure or abandonment, regardless of their technical merits. Finally, PKRs generate tensions between regulatory coherence and heterogeneity: technocratic regimes tend to produce cumulative and coherent regulatory frameworks, whereas plebeian regimes are more likely to generate heterogeneous policies as a result of negotiation-based processes. With respect to the relationship between coordination, agency, and crisis, the literature on agency-based institutional change emphasizes that actors do not operate in a structural vacuum, but rather through interpretive frameworks that define which actions are possible, legitimate, and desirable (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Accordingly, PKRs influence not only “routine” decision-making, but are especially consequential in critical moments, when elites must decide whether to delegate authority to experts or to privilege direct political representation. In contexts of economic, political, or social crisis, this distinction becomes particularly salient depending on the type of PKR. Under technocratic regimes, the typical response is to reinforce expert-based instruments such as economic commissions, technical committees, or impact evaluations. Under plebeian regimes, the prevailing response is to strengthen participatory or corporatist mechanisms, including tripartite dialogue, trade-union negotiation, and social pressure. For this reason, crises tend, in most cases, to reaffirm rather than destabilize PKRs. The effect of PKRs on policy coordination can be synthesized into four interrelated causal propositions. First, PKRs define who is recognized as a legitimate decision-maker in the policy process, privileging experts, political parties, trade unions, or citizens to varying degrees. Second, they establish the dominant cognitive criterion through which decisions are justified, whether grounded primarily in technical evidence or in political representation. Third, PKRs shape the expected pattern of intersectoral alignment, ranging from integrated coordination to negotiated arrangements or fragmented governance. Finally, these configurations generate distinct regulatory trajectories over time, producing either coherent and cumulative reforms or heterogeneous and episodic policy change. From this perspective, the differences between Chile and Uruguay—both stable democracies with professional bureaucracies and comparable levels of state development—are no longer puzzling. What varies is not state capacity, but the culturally accepted way of deciding on behalf of the state. Put differently, patterns of governmental coordination reflect the PKR’s underlying cognitive structure. IV. Political Knowledge Regimes in Chile and Uruguay It is often argued that Chile and Uruguay are similar democracies (Alcántara Sáez & Luna, 2004; Antía, 2019). From a comparative perspective, both rank among the most stable democracies in the region (Chouhy, 2022) and score highly on standard indicators of democratic quality (EIU, 2024; V-DEM, 2024). Yet, in one highly specific and analytically relevant respect, they differ markedly. The relationship between knowledge and power operates in fundamentally different ways in the two political systems. In Chile, the voice of the expert has historically been strong and clearly heard; knowledge and power are closely connected. In Uruguay, by contrast, from the earliest stages of state formation, an opposite pattern can be observed. Citizens possess powerful mechanisms to make their preferences count in public policy, but experts do not. Specialized knowledge is instead used as a weapon in political competition and struggles over power. In short, the relationship between knowledge and power in Uruguay is characterized more by conflict than by cooperation. As a result, the two countries exhibit different PKRs (Garcé, 2017). IV.i. Chile Chilean political history reveals a strong structural continuity in the close relationship between expert knowledge and political power. From state formation in the nineteenth century to recent democratic governments, Chilean elites have consistently placed their trust in experts—national and foreign alike—as guarantors of order, rationality, and good governance. This disposition constitutes the core of Chile’s PKR. During the nineteenth century, Chilean elites built a state inspired by Enlightenment rationality, in which knowledge was regarded as a principle of authority. Albert Hirschman (1964) identified two emblematic episodes illustrating this tendency: the hiring of the French economist Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil as advisor and professor (1855) and, secondly, the drafting of the Banking Law (1860) along with the advisory role of the Andean “money doctor,” Edwin Kemmerer, in the creation of the Central Bank (1925). To these episodes, one may add the Klein-Saks mission, commissioned to design an anti-inflation plan (1955). In all three cases, sovereignty over key aspects of economic policy was temporarily transferred to foreign experts in order to resolve national crises. Politics thus relied on the legitimacy of technical knowledge that promised neutrality and efficiency. Reliance on experts also shaped the education sector. Figures such as Andrés Bello, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, and Valentín Letelier consolidated the idea that national progress depended on science and instruction. Bello, founding rector of the University of Chile, conceived education as the foundation of republican order; Sarmiento established the Normal School for Teachers in 1842, introducing foreign pedagogical models; and Letelier founded the Pedagogical Institute (1889) under the influence of German positivism (Ávalos, 2003). These initiatives institutionalized a political culture that equated knowledge with civilization and science with progress. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Comtean positivism reinforced this conception. Intellectuals such as José Victorino Lastarria and Letelier himself promoted a synthesis of liberalism and science, arguing that scientific rationality should guide politics (Ardao, 2008; Brunner, 1984; Cancino, 2011; Jaksic, 1989). In this view, science guaranteed moral and social order, replacing political passions with the objectivity of knowledge. Positivism thus consolidated the idea that government should be grounded in knowledge, while adding the legitimacy of modern science. Democratization in the early twentieth century did not dismantle the Chilean PKR, but rather reconfigured it. In Dahl’s (1971) terms, the transition toward polyarchy was a largely “top-down” evolution, guided by enlightened elites who retained a monopoly over legitimate knowledge. The structural link between knowledge and power—forged in the nineteenth century and consolidated through positivism—persisted as a core cultural matrix of the Chilean state. This imprint continued throughout the twentieth century in new institutional forms. In the 1960s, the rise of economists within the state—driven by developmentalism and ECLAC’s structuralist ideas—transformed the economic field into a space of ideological competition among structuralists, Marxists, dependency theorists, and liberals (Markoff & Montecinos, 1994). Economic knowledge initially legitimized antagonistic political projects—from Frei’s “Revolution in Liberty” to Allende’s “Chilean road to socialism”—but, from the 1980s onward, became a principle of consensus. From being a source of conflict, knowledge became a foundation of order. The most emblematic expression of this logic was the prominence of the Chicago Boys during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. Trained at the University of Chicago through an agreement with the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (1956), these economists produced El Ladrillo , the programmatic document underpinning the regime’s neoliberal project (Garate Chateau, 2012; Montecinos, 1998; Silva, 2015). Pinochet delegated broad authority to them, making economic policy the axis of authoritarian power. Political authority was thus subordinated to technical expertise, consolidating the expert as a governing actor. The return to democracy did not break with this structure. From 1990 onward, economists continued to occupy key positions within the state under democratic governments. Patricio Silva (1991) identified the emergence of a new technocratic group—the “CIEPLAN monks”—who, from social-democratic positions, preserved the centrality of expert knowledge in policymaking. As Huneeus (2014) observed, technocracy became both a source of political legitimacy and a mediating device between partisan and social actors. Over the last two decades, however, Chile’s technocratic PKR has entered into crisis. From the “ penguin movement ” to the 2019 social uprising, segments of Chilean society have demanded limits on delegation to experts and a more democratic redefinition of the relationship between knowledge and politics. Yet, countervailing signals have also emerged: technocracy has been challenged but continues to exist. IV.ii. Uruguay In contrast to the Chilean case, Uruguay’s trajectory reveals the formation of a different type of PKR: one in which political authority retains primacy over technical expertise. Whereas in Chile specialized knowledge became a structural foundation of legitimacy, in Uruguay it has always occupied a subordinate position within a political system dominated by partisan and caudillista logics. Like Chile’s, Uruguay’s PKR has its origins in the nineteenth century. From the outset, Uruguayan politics was structured more by popular mobilization and negotiation between emerging political parties (Colorado and Blanco) than by enlightened leadership. Caudillos emerged as legitimate representatives of popular sectors excluded from suffrage. Opposing them, the “ doctors ”—the university-educated elite—attempted to impose a rational and civilized order, but ultimately failed. By the late nineteenth century, the enlightened elite was compelled to integrate into mass parties and subordinate itself to their clientelistic and personalistic logic (Perez Anton, 1988). Spencerian positivism (Ardao, 2008), influential in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, facilitated rapprochement between “caudillos” and “doctors” by providing ruling elites with a modernizing language and some sociological sensitivity. However, it failed to displace the primacy of politics over technical knowledge. Its brief and moderate influence allowed intellectual elites to enter party politics without altering the established hierarchy. Uruguayan political culture thus consolidated a durable equilibrium: politics as the arena of negotiation and representation, and knowledge as a subordinate instrument. Unlike Chile’s “top-down” democratic trajectory, Uruguay followed a “bottom-up” path. Although Batllismo, which was highly influential in the first half of the twentieth century, displayed a particular sensitivity to engineers and technical expertise, Uruguayan politics continued to prioritize citizen demands and organized groups over expert rationality. As electoral competition between the Colorados and Blancos intensified, the “bridge” to experts became narrower and more unstable. By the mid-1950s, when Uruguay entered economic crisis, the country lacked basic social data (the last population census dated from 1908) and mature economic sciences (there was no degree program in economics). The Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) launched by President John F. Kennedy represented a major opportunity to build information and develop reform alternatives. In this context, Uruguay established an ad hoc planning office, the Commission for Investment and Economic Development, to produce an Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES), as required under the Punta del Este Charter to access ALPRO funds. The plan was ambitious and sophisticated, but was never implemented as designed. Political parties subjected it to a double process of adaptation: substantively, as party ideology filtered proposals, and strategically, as electoral calculations determined the timing of reform adoption. By the late 1960s, following the brief developmentalist experience, a group of experts aligned with economic liberalism began to take shape. In the same office that had produced the PNDES, a small group of experts initially influenced by ECLAC shifted toward more market-friendly positions inspired by the “Brazilian miracle” and authors such as Roberto Campos. Alejandro Végh Villegas—Uruguay’s counterpart to Chile’s Hernán Büchi—was the central figure in this intellectual conversion. Some of these experts participated in economic policymaking during the dictatorship (1973–1985), but their influence was considerably weaker than in Chile. Uruguayan neoliberalism never achieved a “critical mass” and economists lacked autonomy vis-à-vis the military hierarchy, which retained protectionist convictions. As Rial (1986) emphasized, supreme political authority remained firmly in the hands of the armed forces, which never fully delegated power to experts. Following democratic restoration in 1985, political control over public decision-making remained decisive. Although economists gained greater presence in economic governance, their rise was “limited, moderate, and politically controlled” (Garcé, 2017, p. 29). Key ministries continued to reflect partisan balances, and cabinet selection prioritized political negotiation over technical meritocracy. Unlike Chile, Uruguay never developed a systematic policy of recruiting foreign experts. Neither in the 1920s—when it faced monetary crises comparable to those of its neighbors—did it resort to “money doctors” such as Edwin Kemmerer or Otto Niemeyer, nor in the 1950s, despite rising inflation, did it invite missions akin to Klein-Saks. This absence consolidated a political model in which technical knowledge never became a source of state legitimacy. In sum, while the Chilean case reflects the consolidation of a technocratic and elitist PKR, Uruguay is characterized by a structural resistance to delegating power to experts. Technical knowledge never acquired autonomous political legitimacy; its role was to advise, not to govern. This historical pattern of subordinating knowledge to power defines the specificity of Uruguay’s PKR, whose stability rests on the persistent hegemony of partisan logic over technical rationality. V. Theory-Guided Process-Tracing Analysis: Political Knowledge Regimes and Labor Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023) This section investigates how different PKRs operate as causal mechanisms shaping the coordination and sequencing of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Table 2 presents a comparative chronological overview of key labor policy milestones in Chile and Uruguay in this period. Rather than offering an exhaustive legal inventory, the figure is intended to illustrate how different PKRs structure the sequencing, scope, and coordination of labor reforms over time. The juxtaposition of legislative and regulatory interventions highlights contrasting patterns of policy change: in Chile, reforms tend to cluster around technically integrated adjustments to the Labor Code whereas, in Uruguay, they emerge through negotiated and institutionally plural processes anchored in social dialogue. Read in conjunction with the process-tracing analysis, the figure provides empirical grounds for the claim that PKRs shape not only policy content, but also the temporal and coordinative logic through which reforms are produced and stabilized. ***Table 2 here*** V.i. Analytical Purpose and Methodological Strategy This study adopts a theory-guided process-tracing strategy to reconstruct the causal mechanisms that connect PKRs to the divergent trajectories of coordination and design of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. The focus of the analysis is not a purely descriptive comparison of policy differences, but rather seeks to identify and reconstruct the underlying causal mechanism that explains why, under relatively similar structural conditions, the two countries developed distinct and persistent reform patterns over time (Beach, 2016; Waldner, 2015). Unlike approaches that conceive crises, critical junctures, or exogenous shocks as direct causes of institutional change (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007), the analysis proposed here understands windows of opportunity as conditional activators of pre-existing causal mechanisms, rather than as sufficient explanatory factors in themselves. From this perspective, windows of opportunity do not automatically determine policy outcomes; instead, they open decision spaces that are interpreted and processed differently depending on the dominant cognitive regime (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). From a mechanistic perspective, PKRs are conceptualized as relatively stable, historically constructed cognitive structures that define criteria of epistemic legitimacy, hierarchies of decisional authority, and acceptable technologies of state coordination (Garcé, 2014, 2017; Garcé & Cox, 2025). Within this framework, economic crises, structural reforms, or external shocks do not necessarily alter these regimes; rather, they tend to reaffirm them by activating causal sequences consistent with previously institutionalized patterns of knowledge and authority. The analysis analytically distinguishes two interrelated causal mechanisms. Mechanism X (epistemic) explains how the PKR filters what types of knowledge are considered legitimate for defining public problems, as well as who is authorized to formulate diagnoses and propose solutions. Mechanism Y (coordinative) explains how this epistemic selection is translated into a specific mode of alignment and coordination among state and social actors, whether through technocratic forms of integration or through negotiated political-corporatist arrangements. The sequential articulation of these two mechanisms allows for a systematic reconstruction of the causal link between ideas, modes of coordination, and public policy outcomes. Process tracing is particularly well suited to this study because the core argument rests on ideational and cognitive factors—such as shared beliefs, criteria of legitimacy, and hierarchies of authority—that cannot be adequately captured through correlational approaches or purely institutional comparisons (Beach, 2016). Accordingly, the analysis adopts a mechanistic conception of causality, in which PKRs do not operate as passive contextual variables but as independent causal mechanisms that structure state decision-making over time. Methodologically, this strategy makes it possible to assess different types of evidence—historical, institutional, sequential, and longitudinal—using tests commonly employed in process tracing, such as hoop tests (necessary conditions) and partial smoking-gun tests (direct evidence of the mechanism) (Mahoney, 2012). In particular, the analysis shows that windows of opportunity perform an analytically equivalent function in both countries, yet generate substantively different effects due to the differential activation of mechanisms X and Y mediated by the dominant PKR. This approach has two central analytical advantages. First, it avoids functionalist or episodic explanations of institutional change by demonstrating that crises tend to reinforce, rather than transform, existing cognitive regimes. Second, it permits a middle-range causal inference, in which PKRs explain not only the content of labor reforms, but also the culturally accepted way of deciding, coordinating, and governing in the name of the state. The outcome under analysis corresponds to the pattern of state coordination through which labor reforms were designed and implemented in each country. In the case of Chile, this pattern takes a technocratic and integrated form, characterized by the centrality of expert knowledge as a criterion of decisional legitimacy, the recurrent use of technical commissions and specialized devices, and by a dynamic of incremental and cumulative reforms. This mode of coordination fosters high levels of intersectoral coherence insofar as shared technical diagnoses facilitate alignment among ministries, agencies, and state actors, thereby reducing regulatory fragmentation over time. In Uruguay, by contrast, the coordination pattern of labor reforms is predominantly political-corporatist and negotiated. The definition of problems and solutions is articulated through negotiation among political parties, trade unions, and organized social actors, with a strong institutionalization of social dialogue through bodies such as the Wage Councils. This arrangement produces more heterogeneous policy instruments and greater regulatory fragmentation, reflecting sequential agreements and shifting distributive equilibria. The coexistence of these divergent patterns constitutes an interesting puzzle, given that both countries share relevant structural conditions—stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable levels of state development—that conventional approaches would not predict such contrasting coordination trajectories. The central explanatory variable (X) in this study is the PKR, understood as the historically constructed set of ideas, norms, and practices that regulate the valuation of expert knowledge, the acceptable degree of epistemic delegation, and the political legitimacy attributed to technical evidence in public decision-making. Rather than conceiving knowledge as a neutral or merely instrumental input, the PKR concept emphasizes its politically structured character, highlighting how different national contexts institutionalize different criteria on who may know, decide, and justify state action. From this perspective, Chile is characterized by a technocratic PKR, marked by high delegation to experts and a widespread belief in the neutrality and decisional superiority of technical knowledge, which legitimizes its centrality in policy design. In Uruguay, by contrast, a plebeian-pluralist PKR predominates, in which political representation and social negotiation constitute the primary sources of legitimacy, and expert knowledge plays a subordinate and instrumental role. The central hypothesis guiding the analysis holds that these divergent PKR configurations causally structure modes of state coordination, persistently shaping how actors align, deliberate, and make decisions in labor reform processes. The reconstruction of the causal mechanism shows how PKRs operate sequentially to structure divergent patterns of state coordination and labor reform. In a first stage, PKRs shape the epistemic beliefs of elites, defining the legitimacy of expert knowledge, its presumed neutrality, and its relationship to political deliberation. In Chile, these beliefs favor high epistemic delegation whereas, in Uruguay, they subordinate technical knowledge to political representation and negotiation. These initial orientations are translated, in a second stage, into a differentiated selection of legitimate actors, authorizing experts and technical commissions in the Chilean case and, in the Uruguayan case, parties, trade unions, and social actors. Building on this configuration, the PKR activates—in a third stage, the core of the mechanism—contrasting modes of coordination: technocratic and integrated coordination in Chile, and political-corporatist and negotiated coordination in Uruguay. In the face of crises and contingencies, rather than altering these regimes, the mechanism tends to reaffirm them, reinforcing technical devices in Chile and participatory channels in Uruguay. The repetition of this sequence over time consolidates divergent trajectories and a form of cognitive path dependence: coherent and incremental reforms in the former case, and heterogeneous and pact-based reforms in the latter. ***Table 3 here*** Table 3 synthesizes the results of the process-tracing analysis by reconstructing the sequential operation through which PKRs shape divergent patterns of labor reform coordination in Chile and Uruguay. The table shows that differences in policy outcomes do not emerge from isolated decisions or single reform episodes, but from a cumulative causal sequence in which epistemic beliefs, actor selection, coordination technologies, and crisis responses are consistently aligned with the dominant PKR in each country. In Chile, a technocratic PKR structures high epistemic delegation, privileges expert-centered decision arenas, and legitimizes integrated and cumulative policy designs, which are further reinforced during moments of crisis through technical devices and expert evaluation. In Uruguay, by contrast, a plebeian–pluralist PKR prioritizes political deliberation and social negotiation, authorizes parties and trade unions as central actors, and produces negotiated and heterogeneous reforms that are stabilized through corporatist arrangements and distributive pacts. Taken together, the evidence presented across stages satisfies the requirements of mechanism-based inference—combining necessary conditions and partial smoking-gun evidence—and supports the claim that PKRs operate as independent causal mechanisms structuring the coordination and long-term trajectories of labor reforms in both cases. ***Table 4 here*** Table 4 demonstrates that windows of opportunity—such as political cycle changes, economic crises, social conflict, or the COVID-19 pandemic—do not operate as autonomous drivers of labor reform outcomes in Chile and Uruguay. Instead, they function as conditional triggers that activate pre-existing causal mechanisms structured by the dominant PKR in each case. Across all critical events, Mechanism X (epistemic selection) consistently filters which forms of knowledge are considered legitimate for diagnosing problems, while Mechanism Y (mode of coordination) translates that selection into distinct patterns of state alignment and decision-making. In Chile, windows of opportunity systematically reinforce technocratic interpretation, expert-centered coordination, and incremental yet coherent policy adjustments. In Uruguay, the same events activate political–social interpretations, negotiated coordination through corporatist and participatory arenas, and more heterogeneous but socially embedded reform outcomes. The table thus provides comparative evidence that similar shocks generate divergent policy trajectories not because of the shocks themselves, but because they are processed through different PKRs that stabilize coordination patterns over time and consolidate path-dependent reform trajectories. The process-tracing analysis relies on a combination of evidentiary tests to assess the causal role of PKRs in shaping labor reform coordination. First, the analysis satisfies a series of hoop tests, showing that alternative explanations—such as differences in state capacity or partisan ideology—are insufficient to account for the persistent divergence observed between Chile and Uruguay. Both countries exhibit stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable levels of administrative capacity, yet follow distinct coordination trajectories. Second, the evidence provides strong mechanistic support for the sequential linkage between PKRs, modes of coordination, and policy outcomes, as this articulation remains consistent across multiple reform episodes and critical events. Finally, the analysis yields partial smoking-gun evidence insofar as the systematic delegation of decisional authority to experts in Chile—absent an equivalent form of autonomous technocratic authority in Uruguay—directly corroborates the operation of the proposed causal mechanism. The inference is further strengthened through counterfactual reasoning. Plausible alternative scenarios suggest that, had Uruguay developed a technocratic PKR, labor reforms would likely have exhibited higher levels of technical integration and intersectoral coherence. Conversely, if Chile had operated under a plebeian PKR, labor reforms would have been expected to take more corporatist and fragmented forms, shaped by sustained negotiation among social and political actors. The non-occurrence of these counterfactual trajectories—despite repeated windows of opportunity and shared structural conditions—reinforces the causal claim that PKRs, rather than contingent events or institutional capacities alone, structure coordination patterns in a systematic and enduring manner. Regarding scope conditions and limitations, the proposed mechanism is best understood as a middle-range explanation, applicable under specific contextual conditions. In particular, it is most relevant in settings characterized by democratic stability, professional bureaucracies, and policy domains that require sustained intersectoral coordination over time. The argument does not claim universal applicability across all political systems or policy areas. Instead, it offers a theoretically grounded and empirically supported explanation of how knowledge, authority, and coordination interact in comparable democratic contexts, while leaving open the question of how PKRs may operate differently under conditions of institutional fragility, authoritarian governance, or low administrative capacity. VI. Conclusions This article has argued that Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) constitute a central and independent causal mechanism for understanding persistent differences in patterns of state coordination and labor reform trajectories in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Through a theory-guided process-tracing strategy, the analysis demonstrates that, even under similar structural conditions—stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable state capacities—the two countries developed divergent ways of designing, coordinating, and implementing labor reforms as a result of deeply embedded cognitive structures that regulate the legitimacy of expert knowledge and decisional authority. The article’s main contribution is to shift the explanatory focus from institutional or ideological variables toward the cognitive dimension of governance. Whereas much of the literature explains policy coordination in terms of formal hierarchies, organizational arrangements, or political leadership, this study shows that culturally accepted criteria regarding who is entitled to know and decide on behalf of the state precede and structure such arrangements. In this sense, PKRs operate as epistemic filters that select legitimate actors, coordination technologies, and regulatory trajectories, thereby generating stable patterns of state action over time. The comparative analysis reveals that Chile’s technocratic PKR favors positive and integrated coordination, grounded in epistemic delegation, the recurrent use of technical commissions, and the coherent accumulation of reforms. By contrast, Uruguay’s plebeian-pluralist PKR produces a political-corporatist and negotiated mode of coordination, sustained by interest representation, institutionalized social dialogue, and the sequential adaptation of policy instruments. These differences do not reflect inherent strengths or weaknesses, but rather alternative—and politically structured—ways of addressing complex policy problems. From a methodological perspective, the article contributes to the literature on ideational causality by demonstrating the value of process tracing for reconstructing cognitive mechanisms that are not directly observable, yet generate systematic and verifiable effects over time. The distinction between epistemic mechanisms (the selection of legitimate knowledge) and coordinative mechanisms (the alignment of actors and instruments) advances a middle-range theory of how ideas structure state action beyond specific critical junctures. Importantly, the analysis shows that crises tend to reinforce, rather than destabilize, dominant PKRs, thereby contributing to cognitive path dependence. The implications of the study are twofold. Analytically, it calls for the explicit incorporation of the politics of knowledge into comparative analyses of policy reform, coordination, and integration. Normatively, it suggests that debates over “better coordination” or “better policies” cannot be abstracted from national epistemic cultures that define which decision-making modes are considered legitimate. Reforms that ignore these cognitive structures are more likely to encounter resistance, fragmentation, or failure. Finally, the scope of the argument is deliberately bounded. PKRs explain coordination patterns under conditions of democratic stability and bureaucratic professionalization, and they do not purport to offer a universal theory of institutional change. Nevertheless, the findings open a broader comparative agenda for examining how political knowledge regimes shape policymaking in other sectors—such as health, education, or environmental regulation—and across different regional contexts. In this sense, the article proposes a productive analytical pathway for understanding public policy not only as a problem of institutions or interests, but as a contest structured by cognitive power in the contemporary state. Declarations Funding: This research was partially supported by the FONDECYT project No. 11200235 and by the Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (ANID, Chile) through the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES, ANID/FONDAP/1523A0005). Author Contribution Luis Garrido-Vergara conceived the research design, developed the theoretical framework, and led the process-tracing analysis. Adolfo Garcé developed the theoretical framework, and contributed to the historical and comparative analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan cases and to the interpretation of empirical evidence. Both authors jointly discussed the results, contributed to the writing and revision of the manuscript, and approved the final version. 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Variations by Type of Political Knowledge Regime (PKR) URUGUAY (2000–2023) CHILE (2000–2023) Date Milestone Date Milestone 06/07/2000 Law No. 17,243. Emergency Law. Public and Private Services. Promotion of Employment and Investment. 05/10/2001 Law No. 19,759. Amends the Labor Code regarding new forms of employment contracts, the right to unionization, workers’ fundamental rights, and related matters. 07/03/2005 Decree No. 105/005. Convening of Wage Councils. 13/10/2006 Law No. 20,123. Subcontracting Law. 10/01/2006 Law No. 17,940. Trade Union Freedom Act. 21/02/2007 Law No. 20,170. Simplified regime for determining income tax for small taxpayers. 09/06/2006 Decree No. 165/006. Regulation of the right to strike. Trade union freedom. Collective bargaining. 06/12/2007 Law No. 20,233. Public sector wage adjustment; grants bonuses; adjusts family and maternity allowances and other benefits. 05/12/2006 Law No. 18,065. Domestic Work Act. 17/03/2008 Law No. 20,255. Pension reform. 07/02/2007 Law No. 18,099. Private activity. Social security. Workplace accident insurance and joint liability. 23/04/2008 Law No. 20,262. Special bonus for low-income sectors. 09/01/2008 Law No. 18,240. “Uruguay Trabaja” (Uruguay Works) Program. 15/12/2008 Presidential Instruction No. 013 (2008). National Employment Committee. 17/01/2008 Law No. 18,251. Labor outsourcing. Joint liability. 29/08/2016 Law No. 20,940. Introduces substantial changes to the labor relations system (Labor Code). 05/05/2008 Decree No. 232/008. Targeted Employment Program (POE). 15/06/2017 Law No. 21,015. Promotes the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the labor market. 15/10/2008 Law No. 18,362. Public Procurement for Development Program. 26/04/2023 Law No. 21,561. Amends the Labor Code to reduce working hours. 30/09/2009 Law No. 18,566. Collective Bargaining System. 30/03/2023 Law No. 21,578. Adjusts the monthly minimum wage, expands eligibility for family and maternity allowances, and extends the guaranteed minimum wage and temporary subsidies for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. 10/12/2010 Decree No. 354/010. Right to strike. Trade union freedom. Vacating of public offices. 31/01/2012 Resolution 006/012 of the Planning and Budget Office. “Uruguay Crece Contigo” (Uruguay Grows with You) Program. 20/09/2013 Law No. 19,133. Youth Employment Act. Labor insertion and training programs. 08/11/2018 Law No. 19,691. Employment promotion for persons with disabilities. 20/08/2021 Law No. 19,973. Employment Promotion Act and regulation of active labor market policies aimed at young people (15–29 years), workers over 45, and persons with disabilities (updated in 2023). 30/08/2021 Law No. 19,978. Approval of rules for the promotion and regulation of telework (amended by Decree No. 86/022 of 17/03/2022). Source: Own elaboration. Methodological note: The figure is based on a systematic documentary review of official legal texts, executive regulations, government reports, and press sources in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Table 3: Process-Tracing Analysis of the Effects of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) on Labor Reforms: Chile and Uruguay Stage of the Mechanism Key Causal Question Operation of the PKR (Mechanism) Observable Evidence in Chile Observable Evidence in Uruguay Type of Evidence Type of Test 1. Elite epistemic beliefs What type of knowledge is considered legitimate for governing? The PKR defines the political valuation of expert knowledge and the acceptable degree of epistemic delegation. High confidence in technical neutrality; belief in the decisional superiority of experts Skepticism toward expert knowledge; normative primacy of political deliberation Theoretical + historical Hoop test (necessary condition) 2. Selection of authorized actors Who is entitled to define labor problems and solutions? The PKR filters access to decisional authority and establishes hierarchies of legitimacy. Centrality of technical commissions, economic ministries, and academic experts Centrality of political parties, trade unions, and organized social actors Institutional Hoop test 3. Activation of the coordination mode How are state actors aligned and coordinated? The PKR legitimizes a specific technology of state coordination. Positive coordination, intersectoral technical integration, cumulative policy designs Negotiated, corporatist, and sequential coordination Policy design Partial smoking-gun test 4. Response to crises and contingencies How are shocks, conflicts, or uncertainty interpreted? The PKR operates as a stable interpretive framework in contexts of contingency. Reinforcement of technical devices, expert evaluation, and regulatory adjustments Reinforcement of social dialogue, political negotiation, and distributive pacts Sequential Mechanistic evidence 5. Trajectory stabilization What types of reforms gain consolidation over time? The PKR generates cognitive path dependence and institutional selectivity. Coherent, incremental, and normatively consistent reforms Heterogeneous, negotiated, and fragmented reforms Longitudinal Trajectory evidence Source: Own elaboration. Table 4: Causal Mechanisms, Windows of Opportunity, and the Coordination of Labor Reforms: Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023) Window of Opportunity (Critical Event) Causal Mechanism X: PKR → Epistemic Selection Causal Mechanism Y: PKR → Mode of Coordination Activation in Chile Activation in Uruguay Policy Outcome Political cycle change (2000–2005) The PKR defines which forms of knowledge are considered legitimate to diagnose labor problems. The PKR legitimizes the dominant coordination technology. Technical diagnosis of rigidities and productivity; expert commissions Political–social diagnosis of employment; partisan and trade-union deliberation Chile: incremental technical adjustments / Uruguay: negotiated reforms International economic crisis (2008–2009) The PKR guides expert interpretation of the shock. The PKR structures the state response to risk. Reinforcement of technical evaluation and targeted regulatory adjustments Reactivation of social dialogue and Wage Councils Chile: normative coherence / Uruguay: negotiated expansion Labor conflicts and union pressure (2010–2014) The PKR filters the authority of knowledge in the face of conflict. The PKR determines whether conflict is managed technically or politically. Subordination of conflict to technical and legal criteria Centrality of conflict as a legitimate decisional input Chile: gradual reforms / Uruguay: negotiated reconfiguration Second-generation structural reforms (2015–2017) The PKR defines the role of experts in normative redesign. The PKR conditions the degree of intersectoral integration. Technocratic design with interministerial coherence Sequential negotiation and distributive adjustments Chile: integrated reform / Uruguay: heterogeneous reform COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021) The PKR operates as a stable cognitive framework under extreme uncertainty. The PKR selects the legitimate channel for emergency coordination. Technical committees, expert evidence, standardized solutions Tripartite pacts, social negotiation, and adaptability Chile: coherent instruments / Uruguay: flexible solutions Post-crisis reopening and adjustment (2022–2023) The PKR consolidates selective learning. The PKR reinforces path dependence. Return to technocratic incrementalism Consolidation of negotiated arrangements Stabilized divergent trajectories Source: XX Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files Appendices.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {\"props\":{\"pageProps\":{\"initialData\":{\"identity\":\"rs-8503812\",\"acceptedTermsAndConditions\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":true,\"archivedVersions\":[],\"articleType\":\"Research Article\",\"associatedPublications\":[],\"authors\":[{\"id\":592396513,\"identity\":\"52ad4773-a6a8-454c-8a43-843b131d092d\",\"order_by\":0,\"name\":\"Luis Garrido-Vergara\",\"email\":\"\",\"orcid\":\"\",\"institution\":\"University of Chile\",\"correspondingAuthor\":true,\"prefix\":\"\",\"firstName\":\"Luis\",\"middleName\":\"\",\"lastName\":\"Garrido-Vergara\",\"suffix\":\"\"},{\"id\":592396514,\"identity\":\"5415340c-d55b-44fe-9e1f-4f6ba9dfbb01\",\"order_by\":1,\"name\":\"Garcé Adolfo\",\"email\":\"\",\"orcid\":\"\",\"institution\":\"University of the Republic\",\"correspondingAuthor\":false,\"prefix\":\"\",\"firstName\":\"Garcé\",\"middleName\":\"\",\"lastName\":\"Adolfo\",\"suffix\":\"\"}],\"badges\":[],\"createdAt\":\"2026-01-03 01:38:14\",\"currentVersionCode\":1,\"declarations\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1\",\"doiUrl\":\"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1\",\"draftVersion\":[],\"editorialEvents\":[],\"editorialNote\":\"\",\"failedWorkflow\":false,\"files\":[{\"id\":106622468,\"identity\":\"6321c63e-20d1-475f-91fc-94ba946806de\",\"added_by\":\"auto\",\"created_at\":\"2026-04-10 14:13:04\",\"extension\":\"pdf\",\"order_by\":0,\"title\":\"\",\"display\":\"\",\"copyAsset\":false,\"role\":\"manuscript-pdf\",\"size\":1242874,\"visible\":true,\"origin\":\"\",\"legend\":\"\",\"description\":\"\",\"filename\":\"manuscript.pdf\",\"url\":\"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8503812/v1/8e341d1a-3e41-4bcd-bb7a-7d25d8fc3735.pdf\"},{\"id\":102862378,\"identity\":\"c7ac30a5-2700-45ab-8594-58a24fb76271\",\"added_by\":\"auto\",\"created_at\":\"2026-02-17 16:17:04\",\"extension\":\"docx\",\"order_by\":1,\"title\":\"\",\"display\":\"\",\"copyAsset\":false,\"role\":\"supplement\",\"size\":15870,\"visible\":true,\"origin\":\"\",\"legend\":\"\",\"description\":\"\",\"filename\":\"Appendices.docx\",\"url\":\"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8503812/v1/54b41b503d743c2cbe6bf601.docx\"}],\"financialInterests\":\"No competing interests reported.\",\"formattedTitle\":\"\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003ePolitical Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination: Labor Market Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"fulltext\":[{\"header\":\"I. Introduction\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eIn Latin America, labor market reforms have historically constituted a policy arena where distributive conflicts, ideological alignments, and specific modes of interaction between the state, social actors, and governing elites converge (Cook, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR19\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2007\\u003c/span\\u003e; Murillo et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR43\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2011\\u003c/span\\u003e). However, recent research suggests that observable differences in reform trajectories cannot be explained solely by formal institutional architecture or by the ideological orientations of incumbent governments. Rather, these differences are increasingly understood as the product of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) that structure the relationship between expert knowledge and public action in each country (Garc\\u0026eacute;, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR23\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2014\\u003c/span\\u003e, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR24\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e; Garc\\u0026eacute; \\u0026amp; Cox, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR25\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2025\\u003c/span\\u003e). This perspective moves beyond approaches centered on bureaucratic capacity or partisan cleavages by showing that the production, legitimation, and use of specialized knowledge decisively condition patterns of state coordination and, ultimately, policymaking decisions (Garrido-Vergara \\u0026amp; Cienfuegos, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR26\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2025\\u003c/span\\u003e; Garrido-Vergara \\u0026amp; Sep\\u0026uacute;lveda-Rodr\\u0026iacute;guez, 2025).\\u003c/p\\u003e \\u003cp\\u003eThis article examines the evolution of labor policy in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Although both countries are stable democracies and are often regarded as successful cases within the region, they offer particularly valuable leverage for exploring this article\\u0026rsquo;s argument. Despite sharing comparable historical trajectories and relatively convergent development models, Chile and Uruguay have followed divergent paths in the configuration of their political knowledge regimes. Chile has consolidated a technocratic PKR, in which political authority tends to delegate decision-making to experts, with technical evidence playing a central role in policy formulation. Uruguay, by contrast, has developed a plebeian PKR, characterized by the primacy of political negotiation and social representation over technical expertise (Garc\\u0026eacute;, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR24\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e). These regimes do not merely shape dominant ideas about what counts as legitimate knowledge; they also structure patterns of coordination, hierarchies of authority, and modes of governance.\\u003c/p\\u003e \\u003cp\\u003eThe comparative analysis of these two cases is particularly illuminating in the domain of labor market policy (Bonoli, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR10\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2010\\u003c/span\\u003e). This article analyzes the evolution of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023 as an expression of the dynamics of their respective political knowledge regimes. We argue that patterns of state coordination in the labor domain\\u0026mdash;technocratic in the Chilean case and deliberative-corporatist in that of Uruguay\\u0026mdash;do not derive mechanically from institutional capacities or prevailing partisan ideologies. Instead, they reflect deeper cognitive-political structures that determine which actors are legitimized to define public problems, propose solutions, design policy instruments, and evaluate outcomes (B\\u0026eacute;land \\u0026amp; Cox, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR8\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2016\\u003c/span\\u003e; Peters, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR48\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e; Schmidt, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR55\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2008\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e \\u003cp\\u003eFurthermore, the article advances the argument that political knowledge regimes are not static structures. They evolve in response to paradigm crises, critical events (such as corruption scandals or episodes of institutional delegitimation), intellectual mobilization, and reconfigurations of the political field. These mechanisms may reinforce, strain, or transform the dominant cognitive authority, thereby altering the relationship between knowledge and power and, consequently, patterns of governmental coordination. From this perspective, labor market reforms constitute a privileged observational window for understanding how elites respond to contingent challenges and how those responses are structured by consolidated epistemic frameworks (Alasuutari \\u0026amp; Qadir, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR1\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2014\\u003c/span\\u003e; Mahoney \\u0026amp; Thelen, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR40\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2010\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e \\u003cp\\u003eIn sum, this article argues that understanding the differences between Chile and Uruguay in labor market reform requires shifting the analytical focus from institutional architecture to the cognitive dimension of governance, examining how political knowledge regimes selectively shape the participation of experts, social actors, parties, and citizens in decision-making processes (Howlett, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR34\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2023\\u003c/span\\u003e). The comparative examination of these cases thus contributes to a broader understanding of the role of knowledge in politics and of how national epistemic structures influence the design, implementation, and coordination of public policies.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"II. Political Knowledge Regimes\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eThe relationship between science and politics profoundly shapes the dynamics of public policymaking. In order to characterize the specific form that this relationship takes in different national contexts, Campbell and Pedersen developed the concept of Knowledge Regimes\\u0026nbsp;(2015; 2010). Building on this approach, Garc\\u0026eacute; introduced the concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (2014). Both concepts were formulated with the same objective: to explain why different nations generate and use expert knowledge in systematically different ways.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eDespite this shared purpose, the two concepts prioritize different analytical dimensions. The concept of Knowledge Regimes (KR) developed by Campbell and Pedersen focuses on the supply side of expert knowledge. It refers specifically to the institutional machinery through which information and policy solutions are produced in a given country. Knowledge regimes explain the main characteristics of the available expert knowledge and its use in public policy by examining the organization of knowledge production, which is in turn derived from the variety of capitalism and the structure of national policy regimes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eBy contrast, the concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) emphasizes the demand side of expert knowledge, focusing on policymakers themselves. This demand is derived from the characteristics of the political elite in general and, in particular, from its political culture. In turn, the nature of this demand shapes and conditions the supply of expert knowledge. From this perspective, the bridge between knowledge and public policy is not merely institutional, but fundamentally political and cultural.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eDrawing on the typology proposed by Campbell and Pedersen, Garc\\u0026eacute;\\u0026nbsp;(2014)\\u0026nbsp;developed the classification presented in Table 1, which distinguishes four ideal types of political knowledge regimes. Taken together, the typology of PKRs captures systematic variation in how political systems value, organize, and deploy expert knowledge in public policymaking. In technocratic regimes, political parties rely extensively on experts and delegate substantial authority to them in defining public policies, in the expectation that technical consensus will translate smoothly into political consensus. Plebeian majoritarian regimes, by contrast, subordinate knowledge to the political interests of the dominant party, limiting the autonomy of expertise and precluding the emergence of a competitive or demanding marketplace of ideas. Technocratic pluralism combines pluralism with rationalism, generating an open and contested arena in which alternative policy paradigms compete on the basis of specialized expertise and evidentiary standards. By contrast, plebeian pluralism couples pluralism with anti-intellectualism, resulting in a comparatively low and largely instrumental use of expert knowledge, under which expertise is mobilized selectively to support political negotiation rather than to structure policy design. Together, these ideal types highlight how variations in elite beliefs about knowledge shape the authority of expertise and, ultimately, modes of coordination and decision-making in public policy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e***Table 1 here***\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eCraig Parsons\\u0026rsquo; (2007) influential \\u0026ldquo;map\\u0026rdquo; of theoretical approaches in political science helps clarify the distinction between these two concepts. Parsons constructs his analytical framework by combining two axes. The first derives from the classic distinction between the material (objective) and the ideational (subjective), which he terms the \\u0026ldquo;logic of position\\u0026rdquo; versus the \\u0026ldquo;logic of interpretation.\\u0026rdquo; Arguments grounded in the logic of position explain politics through what are considered objective factors, whereas arguments grounded in the logic of interpretation emphasize perceptions, meanings, and subjective understandings. The second axis distinguishes between general and particular explanations, based on the role attributed to concrete historical situations. Combining these two dimensions, Parsons identifies four major approaches in contemporary political science: structuralist, institutionalist, psychological, and ideational.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eWithin this framework, the Knowledge Regime concept developed by Campbell and Pedersen clearly has an institutionalist lineage. Economic and political institutions explain both the type of knowledge produced and how it is used. The variety of capitalism (liberal or coordinated) and the structure of policy regimes (open and decentralized or closed and centralized) are treated as objective and historically constructed factors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eBy contrast, the Political Knowledge Regime concept developed by Garc\\u0026eacute; has a distinctly ideational orientation. Shared understandings within a society\\u0026mdash;and more specifically, elite beliefs about expert knowledge\\u0026mdash;explain the demand for expertise and, consequently, the nature of the bridge between expert knowledge and public policy. Importantly, both concepts fall within the category of particularistic explanations in Parsons\\u0026rsquo; framework, as they trace outcomes to historically contingent configurations rather than universal laws.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003ePolitical Knowledge Regimes therefore provide an ideational answer to the question of how expert knowledge is used in public policymaking across countries. As such, the concept should be situated within the broader ideational shift that has been prominent in political science since the early 1990s\\u0026nbsp;(B\\u0026eacute;land, 2019, 2019; B\\u0026eacute;land \\u0026amp; Cox, 2016; Blyth, 2011; W. R. Campbell, 2004; Gofas \\u0026amp; Hay, 2010; K. M. Parsons, 2003; Schmidt, 2008). Parsons defines ideational explanations as follows: \\u0026ldquo;\\u003cem\\u003eIdeational claims explain actions by tracing them to some constellation of practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, and/or identities through which certain people interpret their world. Since these ideational elements are man-made, like institutions, they too can only ground a distinct and irreducible causal logic in a particularistic format, as the consequence of earlier contingent actions\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u0026rdquo;\\u0026nbsp;(Parsons, 2007, pp. 39\\u0026ndash;40).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eWhat specific ideas, then, explain the different modes of production and use of expert knowledge in public policymaking across countries? How do these ideas operate in practice? According to Garc\\u0026eacute;\\u0026nbsp;(2014), PKRs depend fundamentally on how political elites value science. Two analytically distinct dimensions can be identified. The delegative dimension concerns the extent to which elites consider it legitimate to delegate governing decisions and policy design to experts. The partisan dimension refers to whether political elites believe that expert knowledge can exist independently of political and electoral interests. In other words, do elites believe in the possibility of politically neutral expertise?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe answers to these questions reflect deeply shared descriptive and causal beliefs with far-reaching political consequences. Keeping these two dimensions in view is essential for analyzing the differences between the political knowledge regimes of Chile and Uruguay. Before turning to the empirical cases, however, the next section examines the relationship between PKRs and policy coordination.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"III. Political Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eThe concept of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) provides an analytical framework for understanding how states structure the relationship between expert knowledge and public action, and how this relationship conditions prevailing modes of governmental coordination. Comparative research on public policy has consistently shown that state decisions are not solely the outcome of bureaucratic capacities, formal institutional arrangements, or partisan ideology. Rather, they are also shaped by ideational constructs that operate as cognitive and normative frameworks through which policymakers interpret, categorize, and hierarchize the value of different forms of knowledge (B\\u0026eacute;land, 2019; Schmidt, 2008). Understood as the cultural and political structure that defines the legitimacy of expert knowledge within governing elites, PKRs lie at the core of this debate.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eIII.i. PKRs as Cognitive Determinants of State Coordination\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn their original formulation, Campbell and Pedersen\\u0026nbsp;(2015; 2010)\\u0026nbsp;conceptualized Knowledge Regimes (KRs) as the institutional and organizational arrangements devoted to the production of evidence for governmental action. Garc\\u0026eacute;\\u0026nbsp;(2014)\\u0026nbsp;extended this approach by shifting the analytical focus from the institutionalized supply of knowledge to the political demand for expertise among policymakers. This analytical shift introduces a decisive ideational and cultural dimension: what matters is not only how much knowledge is produced in a society, but who uses it, for what purposes, and under what criteria of epistemic legitimacy. From this perspective, PKRs function as cognitive devices that determine whether technical evidence is internalized, contested, instrumentalized, or marginalized in decision-making processes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis distinction is particularly relevant for the analysis of policy coordination, a central concept in both public administration and policy studies. At its most basic level, policy coordination refers to the mechanisms and processes through which different agencies, levels of government, and state actors align their actions in pursuit of shared objectives\\u0026nbsp;(Peters, 2014; Peters \\u0026amp; Pierre, 2016; Pierre \\u0026amp; Peters, 2020). Contemporary states confront complex and multidimensional policy problems that far exceed the jurisdictional boundaries of any single agency or ministry. As a result, coordination constitutes a structural requirement for governance-oriented policy strategies\\u0026nbsp;(Katsamunska, 2016; Richards, 2002). The key analytical question, therefore, is not whether states attempt to coordinate, but how coordination is achieved and which principles guide it.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe literature distinguishes three levels of state coordination\\u0026nbsp;(Bouckaert et al., 2022; Peters, 2014). Negative coordination focuses on avoiding interference, duplication, or conflict among agencies and is typically achieved through functional separation rather than intersectoral cooperation\\u0026nbsp;(Scharpf, 1994). Positive coordination, by contrast, involves deliberate strategies of collaboration, including joint planning, information sharing, and negotiated action to generate policy synergies\\u0026nbsp;(Peters, 2018). A third and more demanding level is policy integration, which entails the convergence of goals, instruments, procedures, and intersectoral timelines under a unified governmental orientation\\u0026nbsp;(Trein et al., 2021). Integration does not emerge spontaneously: it requires actors with decisional authority, stable institutional mechanisms, and\\u0026mdash;crucially\\u0026mdash;shared criteria regarding what constitutes a legitimate basis for decision-making. It is precisely this last dimension that falls within the domain of PKRs. By defining who is considered capable of producing \\u0026ldquo;correct\\u0026rdquo; decisions within the state, PKRs operate as causal mechanisms that orient governmental coordination in a strong sense.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn technocratic political knowledge regimes, where expert knowledge enjoys high political and epistemic legitimacy, technical evidence becomes a central criterion for decision-making. Consequently, actors who produce such knowledge\\u0026mdash;experts, specialized agencies, and technical commissions\\u0026mdash;are positioned as key decision-makers within the policy process. Under these conditions, coordination is expected to rely on technical evaluations, expert committees, regulatory frameworks, and cumulative intersectoral policy designs. By contrast, in plebeian or politicized PKRs, where expert knowledge is viewed as secondary, suspect, or subordinate, coordination depends primarily on political bargaining, negotiation among organized actors, and corporatist mechanisms. In these contexts, technical consistency is less decisive than interest representation and social legitimacy. Accordingly, PKRs do not merely regulate the presence of expert knowledge in decision-making; they also define hierarchies of authority within the state. They determine who can legitimately speak in the name of what is considered \\u0026ldquo;\\u003cem\\u003ecorrect\\u003c/em\\u003e,\\u0026rdquo; \\u0026ldquo;efficient,\\u0026rdquo; \\u0026ldquo;just,\\u0026rdquo; or \\u0026ldquo;legitimate\\u0026rdquo; in public action. For this reason, PKRs should not be understood as purely technical arrangements, but rather as symbolic structures of power.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFrom a sociological perspective, PKRs operate as structures that shape governmental action by stabilizing expectations and delineating what is perceived as reasonable, feasible, and acceptable. In this sense, PKRs influence not only how knowledge is valued, but also how coordination unfolds in the operation of the state, by generating cognitive and normative alignments among actors across policy sectors. This helps explain why coordination patterns vary even among countries with similar bureaucratic capacities, and why reforms may fail when they contradict the dominant cognitive structure of a given PKR\\u0026nbsp;(Garc\\u0026eacute;, 2014). In practice, a political knowledge regime functions as both a filter and a selection mechanism in public policymaking (see Appendix 1).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eUnlike approaches that conceive the relationship between knowledge and public action as a stable and functionalist device\\u0026nbsp;(Hoppe, 1996; Scott, 2020), PKRs are dynamic and contingent structures. Their relative stability rests on their ability, at specific historical moments, to articulate a coherent order of actors, interpretive frames, norms, institutions, and legitimacy criteria that guide both the production and use of knowledge in public policy\\u0026nbsp;(B\\u0026eacute;land \\u0026amp; Cox, 2016; Schmidt, 2008). Yet this stability is never absolute. PKRs evolve and mutate in response to broader social, political, and ideological changes associated with political cycles. Understanding the politics of knowledge therefore requires attention to the processes through which a regime is established, consolidated, and eventually enters into crisis or is displaced by an alternative configuration\\u0026nbsp;(Garc\\u0026eacute;, 2014).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eA first mechanism of transformation is paradigm crisis, understood as the inability of the dominant regime to adequately explain and address emerging public problems. When established analytical categories, indicators, and theories become insufficient to interpret new challenges\\u0026mdash;such as the Chilean social uprising of 2019\\u0026nbsp;(Joignant \\u0026amp; Garrido-Vergara, 2025)\\u0026mdash;a process of cognitive misalignment may emerge\\u0026nbsp;(Hall, 1993). This undermines the explanatory authority of the prevailing regime and opens space for alternative discourses that seek to reinterpret reality in more convincing ways.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eA second mechanism involves critical events that challenge the credibility of the institutional order, including corruption scandals, economic crises, or major governance failures. Such episodes operate as turning points because they disrupt routinized state practices and render visible what previously appeared natural or uncontested\\u0026nbsp;(Mahoney \\u0026amp; Thelen, 2010). In these contexts, crises erode not only institutional trust but also confidence in the knowledge frameworks that justified prior decisions, creating opportunities to redefine which forms of expertise are required, who should produce them, and under what evaluative criteria\\u0026nbsp;(Capoccia, 2016).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eA third mechanism of change is intellectual mobilization, driven by the entry of new experts, citizen movements, interest groups, universities, research centers, and civil society organizations. These actors compete for symbolic and material resources and introduce alternative cognitive frames in an effort to influence public decision-making\\u0026nbsp;(Haas, 1997; Stone, 2017). Struggles over cognitive authority unfold across multiple arenas\\u0026mdash;public debate, technical commissions, academic production, and the media\\u0026mdash;and may generate gradual shifts that eventually reconfigure the dominant regime.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFinally, PKRs are shaped by reconfigurations of the political field such as regime change, ideological alternation, state modernization, or shifts in governing coalitions. In these scenarios, it is not only political priorities that change, but also the criteria for selecting experts, the institutionalization of technical devices, and the definition of what counts as valid evidence and relevant knowledge\\u0026nbsp;(Campbell \\u0026amp; Pedersen, 2015; Peters, 2019). What is at stake, therefore, is not only who decides, but on the basis of which forms of knowledge and normative orientations.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn sum, PKRs become susceptible to change when new actors successfully challenge the cognitive authority of the dominant regime. Such displacement does not depend solely on the technical or argumentative strength of ideas, but on their capacity to be politically articulated, embedded in networks, supported by institutional resources, and mobilized convincingly in moments of heightened uncertainty. From this perspective, the history of public policy can also be read as a history of struggles over cognitive power: struggles to define \\u0026ldquo;what counts as a problem,\\u0026rdquo; \\u0026ldquo;what constitutes a solution,\\u0026rdquo; and who holds the legitimacy to decide on matters that shape collective life (see Appendix 2).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eIII.ii. PKRs as Independent Causal Mechanisms\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eA crucial insight emerging from the study of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) is that, beyond reflecting governing ideologies or institutionally validated state capacities, they can also be understood as independent causal mechanisms in explaining patterns of state coordination and, particularly, in shaping specific decision-making practices, as illustrated in Appendix 2. Their effect does not lie solely in the normative definition of policy goals, but rather in the establishment of informal decision rules that condition both policy design and implementation. Observable differences in coordination among countries with robust institutional structures are explained less by formal architecture than by the epistemic culture of political elites\\u0026nbsp;(Alasuutari \\u0026amp; Qadir, 2014; Schmidt, 2008).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis argument implies three causal consequences. First, PKRs generate path dependence insofar as they stabilize coordination patterns by selectively legitimizing certain actors\\u0026mdash;such as experts, political parties, trade unions, or social movements\\u0026mdash;while excluding others. Second, PKRs may produce resistance to change, as reforms that contradict the regime\\u0026rsquo;s dominant cognitive structure may follow trajectories with negative tendencies, ultimately leading to failure or abandonment, regardless of their technical merits. Finally, PKRs generate tensions between regulatory coherence and heterogeneity: technocratic regimes tend to produce cumulative and coherent regulatory frameworks, whereas plebeian regimes are more likely to generate heterogeneous policies as a result of negotiation-based processes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eWith respect to the relationship between coordination, agency, and crisis, the literature on agency-based institutional change emphasizes that actors do not operate in a structural vacuum, but rather through interpretive frameworks that define which actions are possible, legitimate, and desirable\\u0026nbsp;(Mahoney \\u0026amp; Thelen, 2010). Accordingly, PKRs influence not only \\u0026ldquo;routine\\u0026rdquo; decision-making, but are especially consequential in critical moments, when elites must decide whether to delegate authority to experts or to privilege direct political representation. In contexts of economic, political, or social crisis, this distinction becomes particularly salient depending on the type of PKR. Under technocratic regimes, the typical response is to reinforce expert-based instruments such as economic commissions, technical committees, or impact evaluations. Under plebeian regimes, the prevailing response is to strengthen participatory or corporatist mechanisms, including tripartite dialogue, trade-union negotiation, and social pressure. For this reason, crises tend, in most cases, to reaffirm rather than destabilize PKRs.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe effect of PKRs on policy coordination can be synthesized into four interrelated causal propositions. First, PKRs define who is recognized as a legitimate decision-maker in the policy process, privileging experts, political parties, trade unions, or citizens to varying degrees. Second, they establish the dominant cognitive criterion through which decisions are justified, whether grounded primarily in technical evidence or in political representation. Third, PKRs shape the expected pattern of intersectoral alignment, ranging from integrated coordination to negotiated arrangements or fragmented governance. Finally, these configurations generate distinct regulatory trajectories over time, producing either coherent and cumulative reforms or heterogeneous and episodic policy change. From this perspective, the differences between Chile and Uruguay\\u0026mdash;both stable democracies with professional bureaucracies and comparable levels of state development\\u0026mdash;are no longer puzzling. What varies is not state capacity, but the culturally accepted way of deciding on behalf of the state. Put differently, patterns of governmental coordination reflect the PKR\\u0026rsquo;s underlying cognitive structure.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"IV. Political Knowledge Regimes in Chile and Uruguay\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eIt is often argued that Chile and Uruguay are similar democracies (Alc\\u0026aacute;ntara S\\u0026aacute;ez \\u0026amp; Luna, 2004; Ant\\u0026iacute;a, 2019). From a comparative perspective, both rank among the most stable democracies in the region (Chouhy, 2022) and score highly on standard indicators of democratic quality (EIU, 2024; V-DEM, 2024). Yet, in one highly specific and analytically relevant respect, they differ markedly. The relationship between knowledge and power operates in fundamentally different ways in the two political systems. In Chile, the voice of the expert has historically been strong and clearly heard; knowledge and power are closely connected. In Uruguay, by contrast, from the earliest stages of state formation, an opposite pattern can be observed. Citizens possess powerful mechanisms to make their preferences count in public policy, but experts do not. Specialized knowledge is instead used as a weapon in political competition and struggles over power. In short, the relationship between knowledge and power in Uruguay is characterized more by conflict than by cooperation. As a result, the two countries exhibit different PKRs (Garc\\u0026eacute;, 2017).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eIV.i. Chile\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eChilean political history reveals a strong structural continuity in the close relationship between expert knowledge and political power. From state formation in the nineteenth century to recent democratic governments, Chilean elites have consistently placed their trust in experts\\u0026mdash;national and foreign alike\\u0026mdash;as guarantors of order, rationality, and good governance. This disposition constitutes the core of Chile\\u0026rsquo;s PKR.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eDuring the nineteenth century, Chilean elites built a state inspired by Enlightenment rationality, in which knowledge was regarded as a principle of authority. Albert Hirschman\\u0026nbsp;(1964)\\u0026nbsp;identified two emblematic episodes illustrating this tendency: the hiring of the French economist Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil as advisor and professor (1855) and, secondly, the drafting of the Banking Law (1860) along with the advisory role of the Andean \\u0026ldquo;money doctor,\\u0026rdquo; Edwin Kemmerer, in the creation of the Central Bank (1925). To these episodes, one may add the Klein-Saks mission, commissioned to design an anti-inflation plan (1955). In all three cases, sovereignty over key aspects of economic policy was temporarily transferred to foreign experts in order to resolve national crises. Politics thus relied on the legitimacy of technical knowledge that promised neutrality and efficiency.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eReliance on experts also shaped the education sector. Figures such as Andr\\u0026eacute;s Bello, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, and Valent\\u0026iacute;n Letelier consolidated the idea that national progress depended on science and instruction. Bello, founding rector of the University of Chile, conceived education as the foundation of republican order; Sarmiento established the Normal School for Teachers in 1842, introducing foreign pedagogical models; and Letelier founded the Pedagogical Institute (1889) under the influence of German positivism\\u0026nbsp;(\\u0026Aacute;valos, 2003). These initiatives institutionalized a political culture that equated knowledge with civilization and science with progress.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eDuring the second half of the nineteenth century, Comtean positivism reinforced this conception. Intellectuals such as Jos\\u0026eacute; Victorino Lastarria and Letelier himself promoted a synthesis of liberalism and science, arguing that scientific rationality should guide politics\\u0026nbsp;(Ardao, 2008; Brunner, 1984; Cancino, 2011; Jaksic, 1989). In this view, science guaranteed moral and social order, replacing political passions with the objectivity of knowledge. Positivism thus consolidated the idea that government should be grounded in knowledge, while adding the legitimacy of modern science.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eDemocratization in the early twentieth century did not dismantle the Chilean PKR, but rather reconfigured it. In Dahl\\u0026rsquo;s\\u0026nbsp;(1971)\\u0026nbsp;terms, the transition toward polyarchy was a largely \\u0026ldquo;top-down\\u0026rdquo; evolution, guided by enlightened elites who retained a monopoly over legitimate knowledge. The structural link between knowledge and power\\u0026mdash;forged in the nineteenth century and consolidated through positivism\\u0026mdash;persisted as a core cultural matrix of the Chilean state.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis imprint continued throughout the twentieth century in new institutional forms. In the 1960s, the rise of economists within the state\\u0026mdash;driven by developmentalism and ECLAC\\u0026rsquo;s structuralist ideas\\u0026mdash;transformed the economic field into a space of ideological competition among structuralists, Marxists, dependency theorists, and liberals\\u0026nbsp;(Markoff \\u0026amp; Montecinos, 1994). Economic knowledge initially legitimized antagonistic political projects\\u0026mdash;from Frei\\u0026rsquo;s \\u0026ldquo;Revolution in Liberty\\u0026rdquo; to Allende\\u0026rsquo;s \\u0026ldquo;Chilean road to socialism\\u0026rdquo;\\u0026mdash;but, from the 1980s onward, became a principle of consensus. From being a source of conflict, knowledge became a foundation of order.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe most emblematic expression of this logic was the prominence of the Chicago Boys during Augusto Pinochet\\u0026rsquo;s dictatorship. Trained at the University of Chicago through an agreement with the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (1956), these economists produced \\u003cem\\u003eEl Ladrillo\\u003c/em\\u003e, the programmatic document underpinning the regime\\u0026rsquo;s neoliberal project\\u0026nbsp;(Garate Chateau, 2012; Montecinos, 1998; Silva, 2015). Pinochet delegated broad authority to them, making economic policy the axis of authoritarian power. Political authority was thus subordinated to technical expertise, consolidating the expert as a governing actor.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe return to democracy did not break with this structure. From 1990 onward, economists continued to occupy key positions within the state under democratic governments. Patricio Silva\\u0026nbsp;(1991)\\u0026nbsp;identified the emergence of a new technocratic group\\u0026mdash;the \\u0026ldquo;CIEPLAN monks\\u0026rdquo;\\u0026mdash;who, from social-democratic positions, preserved the centrality of expert knowledge in policymaking. As Huneeus\\u0026nbsp;(2014)\\u0026nbsp;observed, technocracy became both a source of political legitimacy and a mediating device between partisan and social actors. Over the last two decades, however, Chile\\u0026rsquo;s technocratic PKR has entered into crisis. From the \\u0026ldquo;\\u003cem\\u003epenguin movement\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u0026rdquo; to the 2019 social uprising, segments of Chilean society have demanded limits on delegation to experts and a more democratic redefinition of the relationship between knowledge and politics. Yet, countervailing signals have also emerged: technocracy has been challenged but continues to exist.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eIV.ii. Uruguay\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn contrast to the Chilean case, Uruguay\\u0026rsquo;s trajectory reveals the formation of a different type of PKR: one in which political authority retains primacy over technical expertise. Whereas in Chile specialized knowledge became a structural foundation of legitimacy, in Uruguay it has always occupied a subordinate position within a political system dominated by partisan and \\u003cem\\u003ecaudillista\\u003c/em\\u003e logics.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eLike Chile\\u0026rsquo;s, Uruguay\\u0026rsquo;s PKR has its origins in the nineteenth century. From the outset, Uruguayan politics was structured more by popular mobilization and negotiation between emerging political parties (Colorado and Blanco) than by enlightened leadership. \\u003cem\\u003eCaudillos\\u003c/em\\u003e emerged as legitimate representatives of popular sectors excluded from suffrage. Opposing them, the \\u0026ldquo;\\u003cem\\u003edoctors\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u0026rdquo;\\u0026mdash;the university-educated elite\\u0026mdash;attempted to impose a rational and civilized order, but ultimately failed. By the late nineteenth century, the enlightened elite was compelled to integrate into mass parties and subordinate itself to their clientelistic and personalistic logic\\u0026nbsp;(Perez Anton, 1988).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSpencerian positivism\\u0026nbsp;(Ardao, 2008), influential in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, facilitated rapprochement between \\u0026ldquo;caudillos\\u0026rdquo; and \\u0026ldquo;doctors\\u0026rdquo; by providing ruling elites with a modernizing language and some sociological sensitivity. However, it failed to displace the primacy of politics over technical knowledge. Its brief and moderate influence allowed intellectual elites to enter party politics without altering the established hierarchy. Uruguayan political culture thus consolidated a durable equilibrium: politics as the arena of negotiation and representation, and knowledge as a subordinate instrument.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eUnlike Chile\\u0026rsquo;s \\u0026ldquo;top-down\\u0026rdquo; democratic trajectory, Uruguay followed a \\u0026ldquo;bottom-up\\u0026rdquo; path. Although Batllismo, which was highly influential in the first half of the twentieth century, displayed a particular sensitivity to engineers and technical expertise, Uruguayan politics continued to prioritize citizen demands and organized groups over expert rationality. As electoral competition between the Colorados and Blancos intensified, the \\u0026ldquo;bridge\\u0026rdquo; to experts became narrower and more unstable. By the mid-1950s, when Uruguay entered economic crisis, the country lacked basic social data (the last population census dated from 1908) and mature economic sciences (there was no degree program in economics).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) launched by President John F. Kennedy represented a major opportunity to build information and develop reform alternatives. In this context, Uruguay established an ad hoc planning office, the Commission for Investment and Economic Development, to produce an Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES), as required under the Punta del Este Charter to access ALPRO funds. The plan was ambitious and sophisticated, but was never implemented as designed. Political parties subjected it to a double process of adaptation: substantively, as party ideology filtered proposals, and strategically, as electoral calculations determined the timing of reform adoption.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eBy the late 1960s, following the brief developmentalist experience, a group of experts aligned with economic liberalism began to take shape. In the same office that had produced the PNDES, a small group of experts initially influenced by ECLAC shifted toward more market-friendly positions inspired by the \\u0026ldquo;Brazilian miracle\\u0026rdquo; and authors such as Roberto Campos. Alejandro V\\u0026eacute;gh Villegas\\u0026mdash;Uruguay\\u0026rsquo;s counterpart to Chile\\u0026rsquo;s Hern\\u0026aacute;n B\\u0026uuml;chi\\u0026mdash;was the central figure in this intellectual conversion.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSome of these experts participated in economic policymaking during the dictatorship (1973\\u0026ndash;1985), but their influence was considerably weaker than in Chile. Uruguayan neoliberalism never achieved a \\u0026ldquo;critical mass\\u0026rdquo; and economists lacked autonomy vis-\\u0026agrave;-vis the military hierarchy, which retained protectionist convictions. As Rial\\u0026nbsp;(1986)\\u0026nbsp;emphasized, supreme political authority remained firmly in the hands of the armed forces, which never fully delegated power to experts.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFollowing democratic restoration in 1985, political control over public decision-making remained decisive. Although economists gained greater presence in economic governance, their rise was \\u0026ldquo;limited, moderate, and politically controlled\\u0026rdquo;\\u0026nbsp;(Garc\\u0026eacute;, 2017, p. 29). Key ministries continued to reflect partisan balances, and cabinet selection prioritized political negotiation over technical meritocracy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eUnlike Chile, Uruguay never developed a systematic policy of recruiting foreign experts. Neither in the 1920s\\u0026mdash;when it faced monetary crises comparable to those of its neighbors\\u0026mdash;did it resort to \\u0026ldquo;money doctors\\u0026rdquo; such as Edwin Kemmerer or Otto Niemeyer, nor in the 1950s, despite rising inflation, did it invite missions akin to Klein-Saks. This absence consolidated a political model in which technical knowledge never became a source of state legitimacy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn sum, while the Chilean case reflects the consolidation of a technocratic and elitist PKR, Uruguay is characterized by a structural resistance to delegating power to experts. Technical knowledge never acquired autonomous political legitimacy; its role was to advise, not to govern. This historical pattern of subordinating knowledge to power defines the specificity of Uruguay\\u0026rsquo;s PKR, whose stability rests on the persistent hegemony of partisan logic over technical rationality.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"V. Theory-Guided Process-Tracing Analysis: Political Knowledge Regimes and Labor Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023)\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eThis section investigates how different PKRs operate as causal mechanisms shaping the coordination and sequencing of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Table 2 presents a comparative chronological overview of key labor policy milestones in Chile and Uruguay in this period. Rather than offering an exhaustive legal inventory, the figure is intended to illustrate how different PKRs structure the sequencing, scope, and coordination of labor reforms over time. The juxtaposition of legislative and regulatory interventions highlights contrasting patterns of policy change: in Chile, reforms tend to cluster around technically integrated adjustments to the Labor Code whereas, in Uruguay, they emerge through negotiated and institutionally plural processes anchored in social dialogue. Read in conjunction with the process-tracing analysis, the figure provides empirical grounds for the claim that PKRs shape not only policy content, but also the temporal and coordinative logic through which reforms are produced and stabilized.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e***Table 2 here***\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eV.i. Analytical Purpose and Methodological Strategy\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis study adopts a theory-guided process-tracing strategy to reconstruct the causal mechanisms that connect PKRs to the divergent trajectories of coordination and design of labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. The focus of the analysis is not a purely descriptive comparison of policy differences, but rather seeks to identify and reconstruct the underlying causal mechanism that explains why, under relatively similar structural conditions, the two countries developed distinct and persistent reform patterns over time\\u0026nbsp;(Beach, 2016; Waldner, 2015).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eUnlike approaches that conceive crises, critical junctures, or exogenous shocks as direct causes of institutional change\\u0026nbsp;(Capoccia \\u0026amp; Kelemen, 2007), the analysis proposed here understands windows of opportunity as conditional activators of pre-existing causal mechanisms, rather than as sufficient explanatory factors in themselves. From this perspective, windows of opportunity do not automatically determine policy outcomes; instead, they open decision spaces that are interpreted and processed differently depending on the dominant cognitive regime\\u0026nbsp;(Mahoney \\u0026amp; Thelen, 2010).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFrom a mechanistic perspective, PKRs are conceptualized as relatively stable, historically constructed cognitive structures that define criteria of epistemic legitimacy, hierarchies of decisional authority, and acceptable technologies of state coordination\\u0026nbsp;(Garc\\u0026eacute;, 2014, 2017; Garc\\u0026eacute; \\u0026amp; Cox, 2025). Within this framework, economic crises, structural reforms, or external shocks do not necessarily alter these regimes; rather, they tend to reaffirm them by activating causal sequences consistent with previously institutionalized patterns of knowledge and authority.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe analysis analytically distinguishes two interrelated causal mechanisms. Mechanism X (epistemic) explains how the PKR filters what types of knowledge are considered legitimate for defining public problems, as well as who is authorized to formulate diagnoses and propose solutions. Mechanism Y (coordinative) explains how this epistemic selection is translated into a specific mode of alignment and coordination among state and social actors, whether through technocratic forms of integration or through negotiated political-corporatist arrangements. The sequential articulation of these two mechanisms allows for a systematic reconstruction of the causal link between ideas, modes of coordination, and public policy outcomes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eProcess tracing is particularly well suited to this study because the core argument rests on ideational and cognitive factors\\u0026mdash;such as shared beliefs, criteria of legitimacy, and hierarchies of authority\\u0026mdash;that cannot be adequately captured through correlational approaches or purely institutional comparisons\\u0026nbsp;(Beach, 2016). Accordingly, the analysis adopts a mechanistic conception of causality, in which PKRs do not operate as passive contextual variables but as independent causal mechanisms that structure state decision-making over time.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eMethodologically, this strategy makes it possible to assess different types of evidence\\u0026mdash;historical, institutional, sequential, and longitudinal\\u0026mdash;using tests commonly employed in process tracing, such as hoop tests (necessary conditions) and partial smoking-gun tests (direct evidence of the mechanism)\\u0026nbsp;(Mahoney, 2012). In particular, the analysis shows that windows of opportunity perform an analytically equivalent function in both countries, yet generate substantively different effects due to the differential activation of mechanisms X and Y mediated by the dominant PKR.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis approach has two central analytical advantages. First, it avoids functionalist or episodic explanations of institutional change by demonstrating that crises tend to reinforce, rather than transform, existing cognitive regimes. Second, it permits a middle-range causal inference, in which PKRs explain not only the content of labor reforms, but also the culturally accepted way of deciding, coordinating, and governing in the name of the state. The outcome under analysis corresponds to the pattern of state coordination through which labor reforms were designed and implemented in each country. In the case of Chile, this pattern takes a technocratic and integrated form, characterized by the centrality of expert knowledge as a criterion of decisional legitimacy, the recurrent use of technical commissions and specialized devices, and by a dynamic of incremental and cumulative reforms. This mode of coordination fosters high levels of intersectoral coherence insofar as shared technical diagnoses facilitate alignment among ministries, agencies, and state actors, thereby reducing regulatory fragmentation over time.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn Uruguay, by contrast, the coordination pattern of labor reforms is predominantly political-corporatist and negotiated. The definition of problems and solutions is articulated through negotiation among political parties, trade unions, and organized social actors, with a strong institutionalization of social dialogue through bodies such as the Wage Councils. This arrangement produces more heterogeneous policy instruments and greater regulatory fragmentation, reflecting sequential agreements and shifting distributive equilibria. The coexistence of these divergent patterns constitutes an interesting puzzle, given that both countries share relevant structural conditions\\u0026mdash;stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable levels of state development\\u0026mdash;that conventional approaches would not predict such contrasting coordination trajectories.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe central explanatory variable (X) in this study is the PKR, understood as the historically constructed set of ideas, norms, and practices that regulate the valuation of expert knowledge, the acceptable degree of epistemic delegation, and the political legitimacy attributed to technical evidence in public decision-making. Rather than conceiving knowledge as a neutral or merely instrumental input, the PKR concept emphasizes its politically structured character, highlighting how different national contexts institutionalize different criteria on who may know, decide, and justify state action.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFrom this perspective, Chile is characterized by a technocratic PKR, marked by high delegation to experts and a widespread belief in the neutrality and decisional superiority of technical knowledge, which legitimizes its centrality in policy design. In Uruguay, by contrast, a plebeian-pluralist PKR predominates, in which political representation and social negotiation constitute the primary sources of legitimacy, and expert knowledge plays a subordinate and instrumental role. The central hypothesis guiding the analysis holds that these divergent PKR configurations causally structure modes of state coordination, persistently shaping how actors align, deliberate, and make decisions in labor reform processes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe reconstruction of the causal mechanism shows how PKRs operate sequentially to structure divergent patterns of state coordination and labor reform. In a first stage, PKRs shape the epistemic beliefs of elites, defining the legitimacy of expert knowledge, its presumed neutrality, and its relationship to political deliberation. In Chile, these beliefs favor high epistemic delegation whereas, in Uruguay, they subordinate technical knowledge to political representation and negotiation. These initial orientations are translated, in a second stage, into a differentiated selection of legitimate actors, authorizing experts and technical commissions in the Chilean case and, in the Uruguayan case, parties, trade unions, and social actors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eBuilding on this configuration, the PKR activates\\u0026mdash;in a third stage, the core of the mechanism\\u0026mdash;contrasting modes of coordination: technocratic and integrated coordination in Chile, and political-corporatist and negotiated coordination in Uruguay. In the face of crises and contingencies, rather than altering these regimes, the mechanism tends to reaffirm them, reinforcing technical devices in Chile and participatory channels in Uruguay. The repetition of this sequence over time consolidates divergent trajectories and a form of cognitive path dependence: coherent and incremental reforms in the former case, and heterogeneous and pact-based reforms in the latter.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e***Table 3 here***\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eTable 3 synthesizes the results of the process-tracing analysis by reconstructing the sequential operation through which PKRs shape divergent patterns of labor reform coordination in Chile and Uruguay. The table shows that differences in policy outcomes do not emerge from isolated decisions or single reform episodes, but from a cumulative causal sequence in which epistemic beliefs, actor selection, coordination technologies, and crisis responses are consistently aligned with the dominant PKR in each country. In Chile, a technocratic PKR structures high epistemic delegation, privileges expert-centered decision arenas, and legitimizes integrated and cumulative policy designs, which are further reinforced during moments of crisis through technical devices and expert evaluation. In Uruguay, by contrast, a plebeian\\u0026ndash;pluralist PKR prioritizes political deliberation and social negotiation, authorizes parties and trade unions as central actors, and produces negotiated and heterogeneous reforms that are stabilized through corporatist arrangements and distributive pacts. Taken together, the evidence presented across stages satisfies the requirements of mechanism-based inference\\u0026mdash;combining necessary conditions and partial smoking-gun evidence\\u0026mdash;and supports the claim that PKRs operate as independent causal mechanisms structuring the coordination and long-term trajectories of labor reforms in both cases.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e***Table 4 here***\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eTable 4 demonstrates that windows of opportunity\\u0026mdash;such as political cycle changes, economic crises, social conflict, or the COVID-19 pandemic\\u0026mdash;do not operate as autonomous drivers of labor reform outcomes in Chile and Uruguay. Instead, they function as conditional triggers that activate pre-existing causal mechanisms structured by the dominant PKR in each case. Across all critical events, Mechanism X (epistemic selection) consistently filters which forms of knowledge are considered legitimate for diagnosing problems, while Mechanism Y (mode of coordination) translates that selection into distinct patterns of state alignment and decision-making. In Chile, windows of opportunity systematically reinforce technocratic interpretation, expert-centered coordination, and incremental yet coherent policy adjustments. In Uruguay, the same events activate political\\u0026ndash;social interpretations, negotiated coordination through corporatist and participatory arenas, and more heterogeneous but socially embedded reform outcomes. The table thus provides comparative evidence that similar shocks generate divergent policy trajectories not because of the shocks themselves, but because they are processed through different PKRs that stabilize coordination patterns over time and consolidate path-dependent reform trajectories.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe process-tracing analysis relies on a combination of evidentiary tests to assess the causal role of PKRs in shaping labor reform coordination. First, the analysis satisfies a series of hoop tests, showing that alternative explanations\\u0026mdash;such as differences in state capacity or partisan ideology\\u0026mdash;are insufficient to account for the persistent divergence observed between Chile and Uruguay. Both countries exhibit stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable levels of administrative capacity, yet follow distinct coordination trajectories. Second, the evidence provides strong mechanistic support for the sequential linkage between PKRs, modes of coordination, and policy outcomes, as this articulation remains consistent across multiple reform episodes and critical events. Finally, the analysis yields partial smoking-gun evidence insofar as the systematic delegation of decisional authority to experts in Chile\\u0026mdash;absent an equivalent form of autonomous technocratic authority in Uruguay\\u0026mdash;directly corroborates the operation of the proposed causal mechanism.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe inference is further strengthened through counterfactual reasoning. Plausible alternative scenarios suggest that, had Uruguay developed a technocratic PKR, labor reforms would likely have exhibited higher levels of technical integration and intersectoral coherence. Conversely, if Chile had operated under a plebeian PKR, labor reforms would have been expected to take more corporatist and fragmented forms, shaped by sustained negotiation among social and political actors. The non-occurrence of these counterfactual trajectories\\u0026mdash;despite repeated windows of opportunity and shared structural conditions\\u0026mdash;reinforces the causal claim that PKRs, rather than contingent events or institutional capacities alone, structure coordination patterns in a systematic and enduring manner.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eRegarding scope conditions and limitations, the proposed mechanism is best understood as a middle-range explanation, applicable under specific contextual conditions. In particular, it is most relevant in settings characterized by democratic stability, professional bureaucracies, and policy domains that require sustained intersectoral coordination over time. The argument does not claim universal applicability across all political systems or policy areas. Instead, it offers a theoretically grounded and empirically supported explanation of how knowledge, authority, and coordination interact in comparable democratic contexts, while leaving open the question of how PKRs may operate differently under conditions of institutional fragility, authoritarian governance, or low administrative capacity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"VI. Conclusions\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eThis article has argued that Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) constitute a central and independent causal mechanism for understanding persistent differences in patterns of state coordination and labor reform trajectories in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023. Through a theory-guided process-tracing strategy, the analysis demonstrates that, even under similar structural conditions\\u0026mdash;stable democracies, professional bureaucracies, and comparable state capacities\\u0026mdash;the two countries developed divergent ways of designing, coordinating, and implementing labor reforms as a result of deeply embedded cognitive structures that regulate the legitimacy of expert knowledge and decisional authority.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe article\\u0026rsquo;s main contribution is to shift the explanatory focus from institutional or ideological variables toward the cognitive dimension of governance. Whereas much of the literature explains policy coordination in terms of formal hierarchies, organizational arrangements, or political leadership, this study shows that culturally accepted criteria regarding who is entitled to know and decide on behalf of the state precede and structure such arrangements. In this sense, PKRs operate as epistemic filters that select legitimate actors, coordination technologies, and regulatory trajectories, thereby generating stable patterns of state action over time.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe comparative analysis reveals that Chile\\u0026rsquo;s technocratic PKR favors positive and integrated coordination, grounded in epistemic delegation, the recurrent use of technical commissions, and the coherent accumulation of reforms. By contrast, Uruguay\\u0026rsquo;s plebeian-pluralist PKR produces a political-corporatist and negotiated mode of coordination, sustained by interest representation, institutionalized social dialogue, and the sequential adaptation of policy instruments. These differences do not reflect inherent strengths or weaknesses, but rather alternative\\u0026mdash;and politically structured\\u0026mdash;ways of addressing complex policy problems.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFrom a methodological perspective, the article contributes to the literature on ideational causality by demonstrating the value of process tracing for reconstructing cognitive mechanisms that are not directly observable, yet generate systematic and verifiable effects over time. The distinction between epistemic mechanisms (the selection of legitimate knowledge) and coordinative mechanisms (the alignment of actors and instruments) advances a middle-range theory of how ideas structure state action beyond specific critical junctures. Importantly, the analysis shows that crises tend to reinforce, rather than destabilize, dominant PKRs, thereby contributing to cognitive path dependence.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe implications of the study are twofold. Analytically, it calls for the explicit incorporation of the politics of knowledge into comparative analyses of policy reform, coordination, and integration. Normatively, it suggests that debates over \\u0026ldquo;better coordination\\u0026rdquo; or \\u0026ldquo;better policies\\u0026rdquo; cannot be abstracted from national epistemic cultures that define which decision-making modes are considered legitimate. Reforms that ignore these cognitive structures are more likely to encounter resistance, fragmentation, or failure.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eFinally, the scope of the argument is deliberately bounded. PKRs explain coordination patterns under conditions of democratic stability and bureaucratic professionalization, and they do not purport to offer a universal theory of institutional change. Nevertheless, the findings open a broader comparative agenda for examining how political knowledge regimes shape policymaking in other sectors\\u0026mdash;such as health, education, or environmental regulation\\u0026mdash;and across different regional contexts. In this sense, the article proposes a productive analytical pathway for understanding public policy not only as a problem of institutions or interests, but as a contest structured by cognitive power in the contemporary state.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"Declarations\",\"content\":\"\\u003ch2\\u003eFunding:\\u003c/h2\\u003e \\u003cp\\u003eThis research was partially supported by the FONDECYT project No. 11200235 and by the Agencia Nacional de Investigaci\\u0026oacute;n y Desarrollo (ANID, Chile) through the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES, ANID/FONDAP/1523A0005).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003eAuthor Contribution\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eLuis Garrido-Vergara conceived the research design, developed the theoretical framework, and led the process-tracing analysis. Adolfo Garc\\u0026eacute; developed the theoretical framework, and contributed to the historical and comparative analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan cases and to the interpretation of empirical evidence. Both authors jointly discussed the results, contributed to the writing and revision of the manuscript, and approved the final version.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003eData Availability\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAll data supporting the findings of this study are available within the paper and its Supplementary Information.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"References\",\"content\":\"\\u003col\\u003e\\n \\u003cli\\u003eAlasuutari, P., \\u0026amp; Qadir, A. (2014). 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Policy Coordination and Integration: A Research Agenda. \\u003cem\\u003ePublic Administration Review\\u003c/em\\u003e, \\u003cem\\u003e81\\u003c/em\\u003e(5), 973\\u0026ndash;977. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13180\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n \\u003cli\\u003eV-DEM, V.-D. I. (2024). \\u003cem\\u003eDemocracy report 2024: Democracy wins? Autocratization and the challenge of global polarization\\u003c/em\\u003e. University of Gothenburg.\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n \\u003cli\\u003eWaldner, D. (2015). Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Inference. \\u003cem\\u003eSecurity Studies\\u003c/em\\u003e, \\u003cem\\u003e24\\u003c/em\\u003e(2), 239\\u0026ndash;250. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1036624\\u003c/li\\u003e\\n\\u003c/ol\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"Tables\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eTable 1. Typology of Political Knowledge Regimes (KPRs)\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003ctable border=\\\"1\\\" cellspacing=\\\"0\\\" cellpadding=\\\"0\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003ctbody\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eElite valuation of science\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eRationalism / Enlightenment\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eAnti-intellectualism / Pragmatism\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eClosed / centralized policymaking\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eI. Technocracy\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eII. Plebeian majoritarianism\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eOpen / decentralized policymaking\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eIII. Technocratic pluralism\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eIV. Plebeian pluralism\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tbody\\u003e\\n\\u003c/table\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSource: Garc\\u0026eacute; (2014, p. 456).\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eTable 2. Variations by Type of Political Knowledge Regime (PKR)\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003ctable border=\\\"1\\\" cellspacing=\\\"0\\\" cellpadding=\\\"0\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003ctbody\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd colspan=\\\"2\\\" valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eURUGUAY (2000\\u0026ndash;2023)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd colspan=\\\"2\\\" valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eCHILE (2000\\u0026ndash;2023)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eDate\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eMilestone\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eDate\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eMilestone\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e06/07/2000\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 17,243. Emergency Law. Public and Private Services. Promotion of Employment and Investment.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e05/10/2001\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 19,759. Amends the Labor Code regarding new forms of employment contracts, the right to unionization, workers\\u0026rsquo; fundamental rights, and related matters.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e07/03/2005\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eDecree No. 105/005. Convening of Wage Councils.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e13/10/2006\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,123. Subcontracting Law.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e10/01/2006\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 17,940. Trade Union Freedom Act.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e21/02/2007\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,170. Simplified regime for determining income tax for small taxpayers.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e09/06/2006\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eDecree No. 165/006. Regulation of the right to strike. Trade union freedom. Collective bargaining.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e06/12/2007\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,233. Public sector wage adjustment; grants bonuses; adjusts family and maternity allowances and other benefits.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e05/12/2006\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,065. Domestic Work Act.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e17/03/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,255. Pension reform.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e07/02/2007\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,099. Private activity. Social security. Workplace accident insurance and joint liability.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e23/04/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,262. Special bonus for low-income sectors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e09/01/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,240. \\u0026ldquo;Uruguay Trabaja\\u0026rdquo; (Uruguay Works) Program.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e15/12/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003ePresidential Instruction No. 013 (2008). National Employment Committee.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e17/01/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,251. Labor outsourcing. Joint liability.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e29/08/2016\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 20,940. Introduces substantial changes to the labor relations system (Labor Code).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e05/05/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eDecree No. 232/008. Targeted Employment Program (POE).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e15/06/2017\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 21,015. Promotes the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the labor market.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e15/10/2008\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,362. Public Procurement for Development Program.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e26/04/2023\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 21,561. Amends the Labor Code to reduce working hours.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e30/09/2009\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 18,566. Collective Bargaining System.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e30/03/2023\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 21,578. Adjusts the monthly minimum wage, expands eligibility for family and maternity allowances, and extends the guaranteed minimum wage and temporary subsidies for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e10/12/2010\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eDecree No. 354/010. Right to strike. Trade union freedom. Vacating of public offices.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e31/01/2012\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eResolution 006/012 of the Planning and Budget Office. \\u0026ldquo;Uruguay Crece Contigo\\u0026rdquo; (Uruguay Grows with You) Program.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e20/09/2013\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 19,133. Youth Employment Act. Labor insertion and training programs.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e08/11/2018\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 19,691. Employment promotion for persons with disabilities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e20/08/2021\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 19,973. Employment Promotion Act and regulation of active labor market policies aimed at young people (15\\u0026ndash;29 years), workers over 45, and persons with disabilities (updated in 2023).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e30/08/2021\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLaw No. 19,978. Approval of rules for the promotion and regulation of telework (amended by Decree No. 86/022 of 17/03/2022).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\u003cbr\\u003e\\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tbody\\u003e\\n\\u003c/table\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSource: Own elaboration.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eMethodological note: The figure is based on a systematic documentary review of official legal texts, executive regulations, government reports, and press sources in Chile and Uruguay between 2000 and 2023.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eTable 3: Process-Tracing Analysis of the Effects of Political Knowledge Regimes (PKRs) on Labor Reforms: Chile and Uruguay\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003ctable border=\\\"1\\\" cellspacing=\\\"0\\\" cellpadding=\\\"0\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003ctbody\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eStage of the Mechanism\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eKey Causal Question\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eOperation of the PKR (Mechanism)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eObservable Evidence in Chile\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eObservable Evidence in Uruguay\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eType of Evidence\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eType of Test\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e1. Elite epistemic beliefs\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eWhat type of knowledge is considered legitimate for governing?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR defines the political valuation of expert knowledge and the acceptable degree of epistemic delegation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHigh confidence in technical neutrality; belief in the decisional superiority of experts\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eSkepticism toward expert knowledge; normative primacy of political deliberation\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTheoretical + historical\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHoop test (necessary condition)\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e2. Selection of authorized actors\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eWho is entitled to define labor problems and solutions?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR filters access to decisional authority and establishes hierarchies of legitimacy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eCentrality of technical commissions, economic ministries, and academic experts\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eCentrality of political parties, trade unions, and organized social actors\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eInstitutional\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHoop test\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e3. Activation of the coordination mode\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHow are state actors aligned and coordinated?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR legitimizes a specific technology of state coordination.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003ePositive coordination, intersectoral technical integration, cumulative policy designs\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eNegotiated, corporatist, and sequential coordination\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003ePolicy design\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003ePartial smoking-gun test\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e4. Response to crises and contingencies\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHow are shocks, conflicts, or uncertainty interpreted?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR operates as a stable interpretive framework in contexts of contingency.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eReinforcement of technical devices, expert evaluation, and regulatory adjustments\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eReinforcement of social dialogue, political negotiation, and distributive pacts\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eSequential\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eMechanistic evidence\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003e5. Trajectory stabilization\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eWhat types of reforms gain consolidation over time?\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR generates cognitive path dependence and institutional selectivity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eCoherent, incremental, and normatively consistent reforms\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eHeterogeneous, negotiated, and fragmented reforms\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eLongitudinal\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTrajectory evidence\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tbody\\u003e\\n\\u003c/table\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSource: Own elaboration.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eTable 4: Causal Mechanisms, Windows of Opportunity, and the Coordination of Labor Reforms: Chile and Uruguay (2000\\u0026ndash;2023)\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003ctable border=\\\"1\\\" cellspacing=\\\"0\\\" cellpadding=\\\"0\\\" class=\\\"fr-table-selection-hover\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003ctbody\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eWindow of Opportunity (Critical Event)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eCausal Mechanism X: PKR \\u0026rarr; Epistemic Selection\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eCausal Mechanism Y: PKR \\u0026rarr; Mode of Coordination\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eActivation in Chile\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eActivation in Uruguay\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003ePolicy Outcome\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003ePolitical cycle change (2000\\u0026ndash;2005)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR defines which forms of knowledge are considered legitimate to diagnose labor problems.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR legitimizes the dominant coordination technology.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTechnical diagnosis of rigidities and productivity; expert commissions\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003ePolitical\\u0026ndash;social diagnosis of employment; partisan and trade-union deliberation\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eChile: incremental technical adjustments / Uruguay: negotiated reforms\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eInternational economic crisis (2008\\u0026ndash;2009)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR guides expert interpretation of the shock.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR structures the state response to risk.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eReinforcement of technical evaluation and targeted regulatory adjustments\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eReactivation of social dialogue and Wage Councils\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eChile: normative coherence / Uruguay: negotiated expansion\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eLabor conflicts and union pressure (2010\\u0026ndash;2014)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR filters the authority of knowledge in the face of conflict.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR determines whether conflict is managed technically or politically.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eSubordination of conflict to technical and legal criteria\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eCentrality of conflict as a legitimate decisional input\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eChile: gradual reforms / Uruguay: negotiated reconfiguration\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eSecond-generation structural reforms (2015\\u0026ndash;2017)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR defines the role of experts in normative redesign.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR conditions the degree of intersectoral integration.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTechnocratic design with interministerial coherence\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eSequential negotiation and distributive adjustments\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eChile: integrated reform / Uruguay: heterogeneous reform\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eCOVID-19 pandemic (2020\\u0026ndash;2021)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR operates as a stable cognitive framework under extreme uncertainty.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR selects the legitimate channel for emergency coordination.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTechnical committees, expert evidence, standardized solutions\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eTripartite pacts, social negotiation, and adaptability\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eChile: coherent instruments / Uruguay: flexible solutions\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctr\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003ePost-crisis reopening and adjustment (2022\\u0026ndash;2023)\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR consolidates selective learning.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eThe PKR reinforces path dependence.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eReturn to technocratic incrementalism\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eConsolidation of negotiated arrangements\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003ctd valign=\\\"top\\\"\\u003e\\n \\u003cp\\u003eStabilized divergent trajectories\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n \\u003c/td\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tr\\u003e\\n \\u003c/tbody\\u003e\\n\\u003c/table\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eSource: XX\\u003c/p\\u003e\"}],\"fulltextSource\":\"\",\"fullText\":\"\",\"funders\":[],\"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow\":false,\"hasManuscriptDocX\":true,\"hasOptedInToPreprint\":true,\"hasPassedJournalQc\":\"\",\"hasAnyPriority\":false,\"hideJournal\":true,\"highlight\":\"\",\"institution\":\"\",\"isAcceptedByJournal\":false,\"isAuthorSuppliedPdf\":false,\"isDeskRejected\":\"\",\"isHiddenFromSearch\":false,\"isInQc\":false,\"isInWorkflow\":false,\"isPdf\":false,\"isPdfUpToDate\":true,\"isWithdrawnOrRetracted\":false,\"journal\":{\"display\":true,\"email\":\"info@researchsquare.com\",\"identity\":\"researchsquare\",\"isNatureJournal\":false,\"hasQc\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":true,\"externalIdentity\":\"\",\"sideBox\":\"\",\"snPcode\":\"\",\"submissionUrl\":\"/submission\",\"title\":\"Research Square\",\"twitterHandle\":\"researchsquare\",\"acdcEnabled\":true,\"dfaEnabled\":false,\"editorialSystem\":\"\",\"reportingPortfolio\":\"\",\"inReviewEnabled\":false,\"inReviewRevisionsEnabled\":true},\"keywords\":\"Political knowledge regimes, policy coordination, labor market reforms, democratization, Chile, Uruguay\",\"lastPublishedDoi\":\"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1\",\"lastPublishedDoiUrl\":\"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1\",\"license\":{\"name\":\"CC BY 4.0\",\"url\":\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\"},\"manuscriptAbstract\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eOne of the key challenges of the contemporary research agenda on policy coordination and integration is the empirical analysis of cases that allow scholars to identify the causal mechanisms underpinning the interaction among actors in public policy processes (Trein et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR60\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2021\\u003c/span\\u003e). Drawing on the framework of Political Knowledge Regimes (Garc\\u0026eacute;, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR23\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2014\\u003c/span\\u003e, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR24\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e; Garc\\u0026eacute; \\u0026amp; Cox, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR25\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2025\\u003c/span\\u003e), this article analyzes the cases of Chile and Uruguay with respect to the implementation of labor market reforms between 1990 and 2012. The comparison between these two cases shows that differences in policy coordination and actor integration produced technocratic reform processes in Chile while, in Uruguay, reforms were shaped by the influence of citizens and organized civil society. These differences are central to a comparative understanding of the relationship between democratization processes and the development of labor market policies in these countries. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of the relationship between knowledge, state coordination (Howlett, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR33\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2012\\u003c/span\\u003e), and labor market reforms, and help to illuminate how democratization processes become differently articulated with the production and use of knowledge in public policymaking. By explicitly incorporating the cognitive dimension, the article advances debates on policy coordination and integration, highlighting the role of political knowledge as a central element of contemporary governance.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"manuscriptTitle\":\"Political Knowledge Regimes and Policy Coordination: Labor Market Reforms in Chile and Uruguay (2000–2023)\",\"msid\":\"\",\"msnumber\":\"\",\"nonDraftVersions\":[{\"code\":1,\"date\":\"2026-02-17 16:16:46\",\"doi\":\"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8503812/v1\",\"editorialEvents\":[{\"type\":\"communityComments\",\"content\":0}],\"status\":\"published\",\"journal\":{\"display\":true,\"email\":\"info@researchsquare.com\",\"identity\":\"researchsquare\",\"isNatureJournal\":false,\"hasQc\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":true,\"externalIdentity\":\"\",\"sideBox\":\"\",\"snPcode\":\"\",\"submissionUrl\":\"/submission\",\"title\":\"Research Square\",\"twitterHandle\":\"researchsquare\",\"acdcEnabled\":true,\"dfaEnabled\":false,\"editorialSystem\":\"\",\"reportingPortfolio\":\"\",\"inReviewEnabled\":false,\"inReviewRevisionsEnabled\":true}}],\"origin\":\"\",\"ownerIdentity\":\"72e75981-b8aa-48ef-a8a4-b7cdb9bf0ba1\",\"owner\":[],\"postedDate\":\"February 17th, 2026\",\"published\":true,\"recentEditorialEvents\":[],\"rejectedJournal\":[],\"revision\":\"\",\"amendment\":\"\",\"status\":\"posted\",\"subjectAreas\":[],\"tags\":[],\"updatedAt\":\"2026-04-10T14:11:33+00:00\",\"versionOfRecord\":[],\"versionCreatedAt\":\"2026-02-17 16:16:46\",\"video\":\"\",\"vorDoi\":\"\",\"vorDoiUrl\":\"\",\"workflowStages\":[]},\"version\":\"v1\",\"identity\":\"rs-8503812\",\"journalConfig\":\"researchsquare\"},\"__N_SSP\":true},\"page\":\"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]\",\"query\":{\"redirect\":\"/article/rs-8503812\",\"identity\":\"rs-8503812\",\"version\":[\"v1\"]},\"buildId\":\"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd\",\"isFallback\":false,\"isExperimentalCompile\":false,\"dynamicIds\":[84888],\"gssp\":true,\"scriptLoader\":[]}","source_license":"CC-BY-4.0","license_restricted":false}