{"paper_id":"07a5f150-79ed-4848-bf0f-64a030d9554c","body_text":"Muddled governance and politics in climate change adaptation in ‘Left Behind Places’: Evidence from Gwanda and Lupane Districts, Zimbabwe | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Muddled governance and politics in climate change adaptation in ‘Left Behind Places’: Evidence from Gwanda and Lupane Districts, Zimbabwe Vuyisile Precious Moyo, Wayne Malinga, Nqobile Sikhosana, Johannes Bhanye This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7037252/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 11 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Global and national adaptation discourses often celebrate policies, funding targets, and institutional frameworks. But what happens when these narratives collide with everyday life in rural ‘Left Behind Places’? Here, adaptation is not just about glossy project reports, it is about elders reviving seed-sharing networks, women organising water rotas, and communities demanding inclusion in decisions that affect their survival. This paper peels back the layers of policy rhetoric to reveal the governance failures, political exclusions, and grassroots innovations shaping climate adaptation in places too often ignored. The paper critically examines the governance and political dynamics shaping climate change adaptation in Gwanda and Lupane - two rural districts emblematic of ‘Left Behind Places’ in Zimbabwe’s political economy. Drawing on qualitative data from key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and policy analysis, the study reveals how adaptation efforts are constrained by politicised resource distribution, elite capture, and top-down decision-making processes. Despite the presence of formal climate policies and NGO interventions, local communities remain excluded from governance structures, with participation often reduced to symbolic performance. Yet, amid this institutional neglect, communities engage in grassroots adaptation through traditional knowledge, informal innovation, and social collaboration, what this paper conceptualises as climate citizenship from below. The findings call for a repoliticisation of adaptation governance in Zimbabwe, grounded in inclusion, transparency, and local agency. In advancing these arguments, the paper contributes to critical climate governance scholarship in Africa and offers pathways toward more just, participatory, and context-sensitive adaptation frameworks. Social science/Development studies Social science/Environmental studies Scientific community and society/Geography Social science/Geography Social science/Politics and international relations Social science/Social policy climate change rural governance politics left behind places Zimbabwe Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 1. Introduction In many rural corners of Zimbabwe, climate change is not simply an environmental crisis - it is a deeply political experience marked by exclusion, silence, and survival. Far from the promises of national adaptation plans and donor-led resilience programmes, the lived realities in these ‘Left Behind Places’ reveal structural abandonment, where adaptation is entangled in the entrenched logics of political patronage, elite control, and historical neglect. Climate shocks, whether droughts or floods, do not arrive on neutral ground; they strike along pre-existing fissures of inequality, further deepening socio-political fractures. In these marginalised districts, adaptation is less a shield and more a struggle, where access to resources, knowledge, and decision-making is governed by loyalty rather than vulnerability. This paper interrogates these dynamics, focusing on the governance failures, political exclusions, and, crucially, the everyday forms of agency through which communities are quietly and defiantly adapting from below. The impacts of climate change are increasingly evident in Zimbabwe, with extreme weather events such as El Niño-induced droughts becoming more frequent and severe (Moyo, 2024 ; Bhanye & Maisiri, 2023 ; Chidarikire & Magomana, 2024 ; Mugiyo et al., 2023). In rural areas, where communities are highly dependent on natural capital for their livelihoods, these climate-related challenges pose a significant threat to food security, water availability, and overall well-being (Nyambo et al., 2024 ). Chitongo ( 2021 ), Mugambiwa and Rukema ( 2019 ) opine that over the years, Zimbabwean rural areas have been exposed to several harsh climatic conditions that have negatively impacted livelihoods. Rural areas bear the most brunt of these impacts due to their overreliance on rain-fed agriculture and limited access to resources and technology. Zimbabwe and other parts of southern Africa typically experience below-average rainfall, leading to drought conditions. Malinga et al (2023) note that climate change-induced droughts have serious consequences for Zimbabwe, including crop failure affecting food production and food security in the country. Droughts also lead to water shortages, affecting both agriculture and daily life for people in rural Zimbabwe. Limited water and pasture availability can result in livestock deaths, impacting the livelihoods of many rural communities. In the shadow of the global climate crisis, rural districts of Gwanda and Lupane in Zimbabwe stand as stark examples of what emerging scholarship refers to as ‘Left Behind Places’ (Connor et al., 2024 ; MacKinnon et al., 2022 ). Characterized by geographic and socio-political marginalization, these areas experience the harsh realities of climate impacts more acutely than more developed regions (Fiorentino et al., 2024 ). With erratic rainfall patterns and frequent droughts, the vulnerability of these communities is not just a matter of environmental risk but also of socio-economic survival. The concept of ‘Left Behind Places’ primarily emerges from the discourse on regional inequality, where certain areas suffer from chronic underinvestment and a lack of socio-economic development (Connor et al., 2024 ; MacKinnon et al., 2022 ). These places are not only geographically isolated but are also often sidelined in political decision-making processes. This marginalization results in limited access to the resources necessary to cope with and adapt to environmental changes. In the context of climate change, this neglect translates into inadequate adaptation and resilience strategies, leaving these communities disproportionately affected by environmental disruptions. However, the intersection of climate change adaptation and governance in these contexts, especially in the African rural setting, remains underexplored in the literature. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by focusing on the political and governance frameworks that either enable or hinder effective climate change responses in Gwanda and Lupane. Despite extensive documentation on climate change across Zimbabwe, much of the existing research primarily focuses on general adaptation strategies, ecological impacts, and economic considerations (Brown et al., 2012 ; Chanza, 2017 ). Issues like the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity, water resource management, the utilization of local knowledge and traditional practices, and the socio-economic consequences on both rural and urban communities have been well-explored (Gukurume, 2013 ; Manyeruke et al., 2013 ; Tirivangasi & Nyahunda, 2019 ). Additionally, the implications of climate variability for public health have received significant attention (Ngwenya et al., 2018 ). However, there remains a critical gap in the literature: the exploration of governance structures and political dynamics that shape adaptation strategies in these marginalized regions, in particular, how governance and politics specifically affect climate change adaptation in ‘Left Behind Places’ like Gwanda and Lupane rural Districts in Zimbabwe. This oversight leaves a significant void in understanding why certain communities remain disproportionately vulnerable to climate impacts despite the national and international efforts to enhance resilience. This study aims to fill this gap by integrating an analysis of governance and political dynamics with climate change adaptation strategies in rural Zimbabwe. Focusing on neglected areas, this paper offers local perspective that highlights specific governance failures and political challenges in climate change adaptation. The research not only contributes to academic discourse but also aims to influence policymakers by demonstrating the need for inclusive and effective governance structures that are responsive to the unique challenges faced by marginalized rural communities. 2. Literature Review 2.1 Climate Change Impacts in Zimbabwe Climate change presents significant challenges across Zimbabwe, manifesting through varied agricultural, hydrological, and socio-economic impacts that disrupt the traditional rhythms of rural and urban life alike (Manyeruke et al., 2013 ; Tirivangasi & Nyahunda, 2019 ). In the agricultural sector, the predominant backbone of Zimbabwe’s economy, climate change has led to unpredictable rainfall patterns, prolonged droughts, and more frequent and intense heat waves. Studies have documented significant reductions in crop yields, particularly maize, which is the staple food, due to the shortened and erratic rainy seasons (Mulungu & Ng’ombe, 2019 ; Muzerengi & Tirivangasi, 2019 ). These changes not only threaten food security but also jeopardize the livelihoods of subsistence farmers who rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture. Hydrological effects are equally severe, as evidenced by fluctuations in river flows and reservoir levels, impacting both water quality and availability. Major water bodies that support agricultural and hydroelectric activities have experienced lower water levels, leading to water restrictions for cities and power cuts across major urban centers (Ndebele-Murisa et al., 2020 ). Such changes strain the already fragile water infrastructure and necessitate urgent adaptive strategies to secure water for domestic and industrial use. The socio-economic effects of climate change are profound and far-reaching. Rural communities, which are the least equipped to adapt, face increasing poverty due to crop failures and loss of livestock, compounded by a lack of alternative livelihood options (Ndebele-Murisa & Mubaya, 2015 ). The migration of distressed rural populations to urban areas in search of better opportunities has led to increased urban poverty and the expansion of informal settlements, which are vulnerable to other climate-induced hazards like flash floods (Ndlovu et al., 2024 ). Specific attention has been focused on rural areas, where the impacts of climate change are particularly pronounced. These communities experience the brunt of climate impacts due to their high dependence on natural resources and their marginal position in national economic planning (Phiri et al., 2019 ). This points to the urgent need for tailored climate adaptation strategies that address the specific vulnerabilities of these communities. For instance, the introduction of drought-resistant crop varieties and the development of community-based water harvesting and storage systems have been suggested as viable adaptation measures (Chineka, 2020 ). Moreover, the socio-economic fabric of rural Zimbabwe is linked to its ecological base, making these communities especially susceptible to climate perturbations. This dependency amplifies the need for comprehensive studies that not only address the physical impacts of climate change but also consider the socio-economic and political dynamics that exacerbate vulnerability. 2.2 Climate Change Governance Rosenau ( 2000 ) notes that governance relates to mechanisms directed toward the coordination of multiple forms of state and non-state action. In this vein, governance in climate change implies a recognition of the various actors who intervene in the purposive steering of society, toward low-carbon, resilient or sustainable objectives (Newell et al., 2012 ). This paper discusses governance by focusing on formal and informal structures and actors involved in decision-making and implementation, with the government of Zimbabwe being the main actor. The principles of good governance are key to understanding how the state is attempting to regulate and mitigate the effect of climate change on the livelihoods of rural farmers (Cooper & Wheeler, 2015 ). A question we seek to answer is whether the interplay of climate change governance strategies and politics are helping local communities to adapt to the effects of climate change. Local people should be involved in monitoring and evaluation of climate change impacts and mitigation interventions to adapt and transform to climate change (Ssekamatte, 2018 ). A comprehensive approach is needed when dealing with climate change governance because it is both an environmental and development issue focusing on the needs of societies, both now and in the future. Climate change impacts are being felt at global, regional, national, and local levels, rendering it a “glocal” problem that requires global solutions, (Evans & Thomas, 2023 ). Climate change governance is closely related to state and public administrative systems to deal with mitigation and adaptation to the effects of climate change (Fröhlich & Knieling, 2013 ). To respond to the threats of climate change in the 1980s, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was the first to be set up in 1988 and the first report produced in 1990 (Maslin, 2022 ). This was followed by the Rio Earth Summit which was a success in leading to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, which underlies the negotiations to limit global greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC acknowledges that different countries have emitted different amounts of greenhouse gases, with the developed world emitting more than the developing countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2022 ). In response, there have been several treaties for climate change governance, from the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to COP29 in 2024 to discuss and negotiate the best practices to deal with climate change. Zimbabwe has actively participated in international negotiations on climate change from as far back as 1992 (Moyo, 2024 ). It was among the first countries to sign and ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. Through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process and to attain the Sustainable Development Goals, the government of Zimbabwe is committed to protecting the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations (GoZ, 2021). With specific reference to Zimbabwe, there are several policies, programmes, projects, and other initiatives focusing on adaptation activities to the induced climate change challenges. The policies and documents governing climate change in Zimbabwe include the Zimbabwe Climate Policy and the Zimbabwe Climate Change Response Strategy. Governance plays a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of climate change adaptation strategies. Effective governance systems can enhance the capacity of communities to respond to climate impacts, while weak governance can exacerbate vulnerabilities and hinder adaptive responses. The literature on governance and climate change adaptation highlights a range of governance models, each with varying degrees of effectiveness in addressing the multifaceted challenges posed by climate change. In the context of Zimbabwe, the governance model has traditionally been centralized, with decision-making and resource allocation primarily conducted at the national level. Studies by Mapfumo and Chikodzi (2013) and Nhemachena et al. (2014) critique this model, noting that while it allows for coordinated policy implementation, it often fails to account for local specificities and the unique needs of rural communities. This centralization tends to overlook the local knowledge and strategies that are critical for effective adaptation, leading to a disconnect between national policies and local realities. Conversely, decentralized governance models, which involve the devolution of power and resources to local authorities, have been identified as more effective in some contexts. For example, research by Zhou and Mvena (2016) demonstrates how decentralized approaches in the districts of Gwanda and Lupane facilitated better stakeholder engagement and allowed for adaptation measures that were more closely aligned with local conditions. These measures included the development of local early warning systems and community-based water management initiatives, which were more responsive to the specific climate challenges faced by these communities. However, the success of decentralized governance models is not universal. Chanza and de Wit (2016) point out that the effectiveness of such models depends heavily on the capacity of local governments to manage resources and implement policies. In many cases, local authorities in Zimbabwe lack the necessary expertise, infrastructure, and financial resources to effectively manage adaptation initiatives. This has led to uneven implementation of adaptation strategies, with some areas showing progress while others continue to struggle. Jones and Maslin (2020) point out that climate change governance must be informed by the principles of inclusion, decentralization and autonomy, accountability and transparency, responsiveness and flexibility, and participation and inclusion. However, treaties and policies do not fit the preceding principles of governance (Ncube, 2025 ). Nations have hardly been on the same page in reducing emissions and financing climate change resilience in the countries most affected. IPCC ( 2022 ) claims that the lack of trust between developing and developed countries is one of the causes that makes climate change governance difficult at a global level. Additionally, in developing countries, it is the elite that attend climate change conferences, and the voices of the poor are hardly taken into consideration. Scholars like Maslin ( 2022 ), Dube and Phiri (2013) and Figueres ( 2008 ) claim that this is problematic because they are the most affected by climate shocks and extreme weather events, yet their voices are silenced. As such, effective climate change governance should involve local people in the monitoring and evaluation of climate change and any interventions to mitigate or adapt to climate change. 2.3 Zimbabwe Climate Policy Zimbabwe views climate change-induced drought as a direct threat to its socio-economic development, with the potential of reversing any developmental gains that may have been achieved over the past decades. However, Zimbabwe only developed the National Climate Policy in 2016, showing the national leadership’s late response to combat El Nino-induced challenges (Mugambiwa et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the government of Zimbabwe has sought to create a pathway towards a climate-resilient and low-carbon development economy in which the people can continue to develop and adapt in harmony with the environment (GoZ, 2016 ). As part of the global climate change governance, the Climate Policy is evidence that the government and people of Zimbabwe are willing to join the international community in addressing the causes and impacts of climate change as enshrined in UNFCCC. The Climate Policy emphasizes adaptation concerning rural communities and agriculture. The Zimbabwe Climate Policy draws lessons from three decades of UNFCCC implementation and the Kyoto Protocol. It also aims to support the fulfilment of some aspects of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 13, on the urgent need to combat climate change. In this regard, this policy reflects the Government’s thrust towards climate change adaptation and mitigation to some extent. To this end, the Zimbabwe Climate Policy provides a framework for addressing climate-related challenges that Zimbabwe faces now and, in the future, due to the changing climate. It forms the basis of developing action plans for national efforts on adaptation and mitigation, providing a platform to unpack and implement Zimbabwe’s Nationally Determined Contributions to contribute to the global goal of limiting temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius. However, there are ongoing debates on whether the crafting and implementation of the policy entail principles of participation and inclusion of locally affected rural farmers. There are principles underpinning Zimbabwe’s Climate Policy and the impact they have on rural livelihoods. The principles are; basing climate-related decisions or adaptation actions on sound data-based, modelling, robust scientific findings, including Indigenous Knowledge System (IKS) and rigorous analysis, but also on an integrated, participatory approach. The challenge with this principle as a form of governance is that it focuses on technical solutions to support adaptation and transformation that are limited in rural areas (Dodman and Mitlin ( 2015 ). Inclusivity and consensus orientation are missing in the above-stated principle. The second principle is ensuring Zimbabwe’s resilience to climate-related challenges by cross-sectional engagement, inclusive of public-private sector involvement in the implementation. Mugambiwa and Rukema ( 2019 ) counter this principle in that it excludes locals, notably in rural areas. The governance structures are entirely political and discriminatory and do not involve citizens in rural areas who work the land mostly affected by climate change (Chitongo, 2021 ). There is a lack of transparency, accountability, and rule of law, with the elite mostly interested in elite accumulation, instead of being responsive to the affected rural farmers. The Climate Policy emphasizes building resilience to climate challenges through adaptation programmes that are to be pursued concurrently with climate change mitigation programmes at local levels, and at the same time are sensitive to gender and people living with disabilities. However, Mugambiwa and Rukema ( 2019 ) and Dzvimbo et al., (2023) claim that these principles are only entrenched on paper, yet implementation paralysed. Programmes like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF) and NGOs like OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services, Climate Action Network, SNV, USAID, and World Vision, Hand in Hand inter alia, are controlled by the government through a highly centralized power structure. Hence, the participation of civil society and local communities is limited and not involved in the policy formulation and decision-making concerning hedging their livelihoods against livelihood shocks. 2.4 National Climate Change Response Strategy Phiri (2021) argues that the impacts of climate change in Zimbabwe are likely to stall the country’s development trajectory and pose a serious risk to food security and adaptive capacity. The National Climate Change Response Strategy is among the processes that seek to establish specific provisions for dealing with climate change issues, understanding the extent of the threat, and putting in place specific actions to manage potential impacts (GoZ, 2015 ). Firstly, the government’s commitment to developing a climate-resilient Zimbabwe has also been demonstrated by the elevation of the Climate Change Office into a fully-fledged Climate Change Department. The country envisages developing adaptation strategies that can mitigate the diverse and complex impacts of climate change and improve community livelihoods nationwide. The country’s vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change makes adaptation a national priority, demanding direction at the highest level. Therefore, the development of the National Climate Change Response Strategy, under Zimbabwe Climate Policy, seeks to address the climate change issues and contribute to a climate-resilient Zimbabwe (GoZ, 2015 ). The vision of Zimbabwe’s Climate Change Response Strategy is to create a climate change resilient nation, while its mission is to ensure sustainable development and a climate-proofed economy through engaging all stakeholders recognizing the vulnerable nature of Zimbabwe’s natural resources and society. The goal of the response strategy is to mainstream climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies in economic and social development at national and sectoral levels, through multi-stakeholder engagement, which is exclusionary as explained in the preceding paragraphs. It is therefore important to find out if this response strategy is inclusionary and helpful to people living in left behind places like Gwanda and Lupane and to unravel if it has transformed their capacities to deal with climate change ills. In terms of governance, it is also important to consider the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, section (73) affords every citizen environmental rights, which include the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being, have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that are to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting economic and social development (Goz, 2013 ). Section (72) of the same constitution affords rights to agricultural land for farming and keeping of livestock. Thus, anything that denies locals these rights such as the climate change induced drought, has to be addressed in one way or another (Goz, 2013 ). 2.5 Political Dynamics and Climate Change Adaptation The influence of political dynamics on climate change policies and adaptation strategies is profound, shaping how societies prepare for and respond to environmental challenges. Political will, or the lack thereof, plays a critical role in the efficacy of these strategies, impacting everything from policy formulation to resource allocation. Research consistently shows that political commitment is essential for the development and implementation of effective climate change policies. In Zimbabwe, the government has expressed a commitment to climate action through various national policies and international agreements. However, there are gaps between policy pronouncements and actual commitment, noting that political interest often wanes when it comes to the allocation of sufficient resources or the implementation of long-term strategies. This discrepancy can be attributed to multiple factors, including economic constraints and competing political priorities that overshadow environmental issues. Effective climate adaptation requires not just policies but also the appropriate allocation of resources. Resource allocation decisions are influenced by political agendas, often resulting in the uneven distribution of support. In Zimbabwe, resources for climate adaptation are frequently directed towards politically favorable regions or projects that promise immediate political gains, neglecting areas that might be more vulnerable but less politically influential (Saunders, 2020 ). This misallocation is detrimental to national resilience and exacerbates regional inequalities in climate vulnerability and adaptive capacity. The discrepancies between national climate policies and local realities are particularly evident in rural areas like Gwanda and Lupane. While national strategies may outline comprehensive plans for adaptation, local implementation is often hampered by inadequate local governance structures, lack of local knowledge integration, and insufficient funding (Mubaya & Mafongoya, 2017 ). Local communities frequently feel detached from the policymaking process, with little opportunity to influence decisions that directly affect their livelihoods and well-being (Mutukura, 2019 ). This disconnect underscores the need for more inclusive and participatory approaches in policy-making that consider the unique circumstances and needs of local communities. Case studies from other regions within and outside Zimbabwe offer insights into how political dynamics can better align with effective climate adaptation practices. For instance, adaptations in the agricultural sector, such as the promotion of drought-resistant crops and innovative farming techniques, have shown success where local leaders actively engage with and support their communities (Adhikari, 2018 ; Mpala & Simatele, 2024 ; Mubaya & Mafongoya, 2017 ). These successes highlight the potential benefits of aligning political will with practical, community-based approaches to climate adaptation. Politics, as elaborated by Leftwich ( 2008 ), is essential for decision-making related to climate change. There is a need for making binding collective decisions. Local and national politics matter greatly, both in terms of how climate change is incorporated into national policies and programmes and in terms of how climate change-related politics has an impact on broader political processes. Therefore, political dynamics in Zimbabwe play a crucial role in shaping the country’s response to climate change (Moyo, 2024 ). The government’s priorities, policies, and resource allocation decisions are influenced by political considerations, often at the expense of long-term sustainable development goals. In rural areas, where communities are most affected by climate change, the lack of political will and commitment to addressing environmental challenges has further compounded vulnerabilities. Dodman and Mitlin ( 2015 ) postulate that the national and local politics of climate change adaptation and transformation in low-income countries put much focus on technical solutions that mostly seclude rural locals. Programmes to reduce the effects of the El Nino-induced droughts are highly political and less sensitive to dwindling livelihoods (Phiri et al., 2019 ). Zimbabwe is in an ongoing state of political and social change. While the new constitution was adopted in March 2013, the national elections in August 2023 further consolidated the position of ZANU-PF in government, who are petty in assisting those who did not vote for them, especially in the Matabeleland regions. Moyo ( 2024 ) avers that Zanu PF has faced criticism for its governance practices, which some argue hinder effective climate change action mostly in rural areas. Issues such as corruption, lack of transparency, and inadequate implementation of policies have raised concerns about the party’s commitment to environmental governance, a political party that is expected to be the custodian of all Zimbabweans. 2.6 Theoretical Framework: Left Behind Places ‘Left Behind Places’ are regions that have been marginalized economically, socially, and politically, often experiencing slower development compared to more urbanized or favored areas (Connor et al., 2024 ; MacKinnon et al., 2022 ). In the context of climate change adaptation, these areas face distinct challenges due to their geographic isolation, lack of resources, and limited political influence, which collectively hinder their ability to respond to and manage climate impacts effectively (Fiorentino et al., 2024 ). The concept is particularly relevant in understanding how disparate socio-economic development and political neglect can exacerbate environmental vulnerabilities. In rural settings like Gwanda and Lupane, the designation of ‘Left Behind Places’ helps to frame the unique combination of geographic exposure to climate risks and socio-political marginalization that complicates adaptation efforts (Mikulewicz, 2018 ). A review of global case studies highlight the commonalities and differences in how ‘Left Behind Places’ manage climate adaptation. For instance, research on rural areas in Bangladesh has shown how limited access to technological and financial resources restricts the community’s ability to implement effective flood management strategies (Islam & Walkerden, 2015 ). Similarly, other left behind places, often overlooked in broader economic development strategies, struggle with outdated infrastructure that fails to protect against increasing climate variability and extreme weather events (Dawson, 2017 ). These cases highlight how geographical and political marginalization manifests in inadequate adaptation responses, often exacerbating the local communities’ vulnerability to climate change. While these studies provide valuable insights, there remains a significant gap in the literature concerning the specific interplay of governance and politics in climate change adaptation within ‘Left Behind Places’. Few studies have thoroughly examined how governance structures in these regions impact the implementation of adaptation strategies, particularly in African contexts like Zimbabwe. Even less attention has been paid to how political dynamics within these marginalized areas influence the allocation of adaptation resources and the effectiveness of response strategies. This lack of detailed investigation presents a critical gap, as understanding these dynamics is essential for developing more tailored and effective adaptation policies. 2.7 Conceptual Framework The conceptual framework (Fig. 1 ) illustrates the complex and interrelated dynamics that shape climate adaptation governance in ‘Left Behind Places,’ like marginalized rural districts in Zimbabwe. At its core, climate change impacts serve as the primary driver, generating environmental stresses that disproportionately burden vulnerable communities. These impacts occur within the broader context of ‘Left Behind Places,’ that are characterized by socio-political marginalization, historical neglect, and limited access to resources. Within this challenging context, two key institutional forces influence adaptation processes: governance structures, which include central government policies, local institutions, and civil society organisations, and political dynamics marked by elite capture, partisan control, and exclusionary practices. Adaptation actors, comprising government agencies, NGOs, traditional leaders, and local communities, navigate these intersecting governance and political spheres. Their roles and interactions are shaped by both constraints and opportunities embedded in the system. At the heart of the framework lies community resilience and climate citizenship, reflecting grassroots agency, indigenous knowledge, and collective coping strategies. These community-driven actions not only enable adaptation to environmental change but also contest and challenge existing power relations. Significantly, the framework emphasizes feedback loops where community agency actively influences governance and political processes by providing critical feedback and disrupting entrenched power asymmetries. Ultimately, these dynamic interactions determine the outcomes of adaptation efforts in terms of their effectiveness, equity, and sustainability. The framework positions climate adaptation as a deeply political and negotiated process, underscoring the essential role of marginalized communities in shaping just and meaningful responses to climate change. 3. Area of Study and Methodology 3.1 Area of Study This study was conducted in Gwanda District (Matabeleland South Province) and Lupane District (Matabeleland North Province) (Fig. 2 ), two rural regions in western Zimbabwe that typify what are increasingly referred to as ‘Left Behind Places’ - spatial zones characterised by chronic marginalisation, weak state presence, socio-political neglect, and heightened climate vulnerability (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018 ). Their selection was informed by their exposure to climate-induced droughts, persistent underdevelopment, and long-standing exclusion from national political and economic priorities. Gwanda District lies within Zimbabwe’s natural region V, one of the country’s driest agro-ecological zones, with average annual rainfall below 450 mm. The district is largely semi-arid, with sparse vegetation, frequent droughts, and fragile soils, making it particularly ill-suited to rain-fed agriculture - the primary livelihood strategy of most rural households. Lupane District, while situated slightly to the north, shares similar climatic characteristics, falling within natural region IV, which also experiences erratic rainfall patterns and periodic dry spells. Both areas have recorded significant livelihood losses during recent El Niño cycles, with farmers reporting reduced crop yields, livestock deaths, and deepening food insecurity (Chitongo, 2021 ). Beyond biophysical exposure, Gwanda and Lupane face multi-dimensional vulnerability rooted in historical political economy. These districts form part of the Matabeleland region, which has long been politically marginalised in post-independence Zimbabwe. Following the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s and the subsequent weakening of the opposition-aligned region, the state has invested minimally in infrastructure, public services, and economic development in Matabeleland - compared to regions such as Mashonaland (Ncube, 2025 ). This spatialised neglect has contributed to persistent poverty, out-migration, and growing mistrust in state institutions. Infrastructure and service provision in both districts remains grossly inadequate. Access to potable water is limited, agricultural extension services are thinly spread, roads are poorly maintained, and energy infrastructure is largely absent in rural wards. Formal employment is scarce, and most households rely on subsistence farming, informal trade, and remittances. These conditions severely constrain households’ adaptive capacity in the face of increasingly frequent climate shocks. Furthermore, both districts have experienced limited participation in national climate change policy processes. Despite the presence of several donor-funded adaptation projects like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF) and interventions by NGOs like World Vision and Amalima Loko - these initiatives are largely externally driven and unevenly distributed, often failing to reach the most vulnerable communities. Local governments in Gwanda and Lupane remain under-resourced and politically constrained, with weak institutional coordination, limited fiscal autonomy, and low integration of local knowledge in planning processes. The choice of Gwanda and Lupane was thus both purposive and conceptual. Purposively, they offer critical sites for examining how climate adaptation is experienced in rural Zimbabwe, where the intersection of climate risk, political exclusion, and institutional neglect is most pronounced. Conceptually, these districts provide fertile ground for advancing the idea of ‘Left Behind Places’ - not simply as zones of poverty, but as products of uneven development and political marginalisation. As such, studying these areas allows for a more grounded understanding of how adaptation is shaped by geography, history, and power, and why climate governance must be reimagined to reflect the lived realities of those most affected. 3.2 Methodology This study adopted a qualitative research design to explore the interplay between governance, politics, and climate change adaptation in two marginalised rural districts of Zimbabwe: Gwanda (Matabeleland South) and Lupane (Matabeleland North). These districts were purposefully selected due to their pronounced exposure to El Niño-induced droughts, historical socio-political marginalisation, and limited institutional presence in climate adaptation efforts. The research sought to understand not only the content of adaptation policies but also how they are experienced, mediated, and contested by rural communities and governance actors. Data were collected between June and September 2023 using a combination of key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and policy and document analysis. In total, sixteen (16) key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from government ministries (e.g., Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate; Ministry of Lands and Agriculture), local councillors, traditional leaders, and staff from civil society organisations involved in climate programming, such as World Vision, Amalima Loko, and Hand in Hand Zimbabwe. These interviews focused on policy implementation, institutional coordination, the role of political actors, and perceptions of community participation in climate adaptation. To capture grassroots experiences, twenty-four (24) in-depth interviews were conducted with smallholder farmers, local community members, and members of ward development committees across eight villages - four in Gwanda and four in Lupane. The interviews explored participants’ understanding of climate change, access to resources such as land and agricultural inputs, participation in adaptation initiatives, and perceptions of local leadership and governance responsiveness. Questions also probed the socio-political dynamics shaping adaptation practices, including corruption, clientelism, and political affiliation. In addition, four (4) focus group discussions were held (two in each district), each comprising 6–8 participants of mixed age and gender, to facilitate collective reflection and triangulate individual accounts. The FGDs provided insights into community norms, shared grievances, collective coping strategies, and local forms of resilience. They were particularly useful in exploring the intersection of adaptation, political loyalty, and exclusion from development benefits. The study also employed document and policy analysis to examine national adaptation frameworks, such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (2016), the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2015), and programme documentation from the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF). This helped contextualise empirical data within the official discourse and assess the gaps between policy rhetoric and lived experience. A purposive sampling strategy was used to identify participants with relevant knowledge or lived experience of climate change impacts and governance in the target districts. Selection of key informants and local participants was based on their roles in adaptation processes, their geographical vulnerability to climate shocks, and their involvement or exclusion from formal programmes. This sampling approach was critical for ensuring diversity of perspectives while maintaining focus on the research objectives. Data were analysed using thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke’s ( 2006 ) six-phase process. All interviews and discussions were audio-recorded (with consent), transcribed verbatim, and manually coded. Emerging themes were identified inductively and deductively, allowing the researchers to capture both anticipated and unexpected patterns related to governance structures, political dynamics, and community-based adaptation strategies. Codes were grouped into higher-order categories and synthesised into overarching analytical themes that form the core of the findings. The research adhered to strict ethical standards. Ethical clearance was obtained from Stellenbosch University Ethics Review Committee [SOC-2021-23651]. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to interviews and discussions. Participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity, with pseudonyms used in all quotations. Special care was taken to ensure that vulnerable participants, particularly the elderly, infirm, or politically marginalised individuals, were interviewed in a respectful, non-intrusive manner, with the right to withdraw at any point without consequence. 4. Findings Unearthing the Politics of Adaptation - Power, Exclusion, and Resilience in Zimbabwe’s Left Behind Places The findings are organised into six thematic subsections that examine: (1) land governance and political control; (2) disconnects between climate policies and rural realities; (3) the nature of government–civil society partnerships; (4) politicisation of adaptation interventions; (5) breakdowns in local accountability; and (6) community-driven coping strategies. Together, these insights reveal how climate change adaptation in marginalised rural contexts is deeply entangled with governance failures and the politics of exclusion. 4.1 Land Without Power: Political Capture of Communal Tenure Access to land is a fundamental pillar of rural livelihoods and a critical asset for climate change adaptation, particularly in contexts of prolonged drought such as those induced by El Niño (Bhanye, 2014). However, in Gwanda and Lupane, access to land remains entangled in a complex web of state custodianship, elite control, and politicised governance, severely undermining adaptive capacity. Under Zimbabwe’s communal tenure system, land is formally vested in the state and governed through customary authority structures, with usufruct rights granted to households for use but not ownership (Scoones, 1996). In principle, this system is designed to ensure equitable access, allowing households to expand cultivation as their needs grow (Bhanye et al., 2024 ). However, in practice, these principles are rarely upheld. The findings reveal that land allocation is neither transparent nor participatory. Rather, it is mediated through highly politicised channels dominated by traditional leaders and ZANU-PF-affiliated elites. A striking observation from a focus group discussion in Gwanda illustrates the disillusionment felt by local residents about land redistribution after independence: “We were misled during the war that after independence we would get more land to expand our subsistence agriculture. This has not been the case. Instead, we see the elite and those in Zanu PF grabbing former white people’s farms. In rural areas, we were not consulted on where we would like to be allocated land... This is sad and worrying for us, especially with this unpredictable climate change... If you voice up you risk being called rebellious and unpatriotic.” This narrative highlights how the promise of land equity has been subverted by postcolonial political dynamics, with land now functioning as a currency of political patronage. The reconfiguration of land governance from colonial authorities to post-independence elites has entrenched new hierarchies, where land allocation serves political loyalty rather than adaptive need. The fear of political reprisal silences community voices, further marginalising those already vulnerable to climate stress. The exclusionary nature of land allocation also has direct consequences for climate adaptation. In drought-prone districts like Gwanda and Lupane, access to fertile and well-situated land can significantly increase a household’s ability to engage in drought-resilient agriculture, such as small grains cultivation or rainwater harvesting. However, the elite capture of such land means that many communal farmers remain confined to marginal, degraded plots, where adaptive options are limited. This spatial injustice exacerbates climate vulnerability and deepens inequality in the distribution of environmental risks and opportunities. Moreover, the failure to institutionalise participatory land governance violates key principles of good governance such as transparency, equity, and responsiveness, which are essential for building climate-resilient rural systems. As the findings suggest, the politicisation of land not only breeds resentment and distrust but also deprives communities of a vital resource with which to respond to an increasingly volatile climate. Thus, land in these ‘Left Behind Places’ is not just a resource but a contested political terrain. Its capture by elites underscores how adaptation is not only about climate but also about power - who controls it, who is excluded from it, and how such exclusions shape the possibilities of survival in a warming world. 4.2 Policy in the Dark: Climate Governance Without Grassroots Climate change governance in Zimbabwe, while institutionally framed through national policies such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy and the National Climate Change Response Strategy, remains largely top-down, technocratic, and detached from the everyday realities of rural communities. In Gwanda and Lupane, archetypal ‘Left Behind Places’, the disjuncture between formal climate frameworks and on-the-ground implementation is both stark and consequential. Despite the government’s rhetorical commitment to inclusivity and participatory adaptation, evidence from this study reveals that rural farmers are neither aware of nor meaningfully involved in the design, implementation, or monitoring of climate change strategies. Projects such as the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF), purportedly a flagship programme for enhancing adaptive capacity in vulnerable areas, are implemented without adequate consultation with or participation from the very communities they intend to serve. A farmer from Lupane captured this frustration succinctly: “We only see NGOs and government stakeholders coming to implement programmes… they are not for everyone, and no one asks for our opinion.” This quote highlights the imposed and extractive nature of climate interventions in these districts. Instead of being co-produced or co-designed with local actors, programmes are parachuted into communities, often with externally set objectives and limited local ownership. The result is that such interventions, however well-intentioned, fail to resonate with local realities, values, or priorities. As a result, they are seen as transient projects that benefit a select few, rather than transformative strategies that build collective resilience. The absence of grassroots involvement fundamentally undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate governance. Without local voices, policies become disconnected from contextual knowledge systems like indigenous coping strategies or local climate memory, which are crucial for effective adaptation. Moreover, the repeated exclusion of community input fosters deep mistrust between rural citizens and state or non-governmental actors, making it difficult to build sustained partnerships for resilience. This top-down governance model also reflects broader patterns of political marginalisation. As the findings suggest, many rural residents interpret their exclusion from decision-making as symptomatic of a broader political economy in which their voices carry little weight. Consequently, climate adaptation policies that fail to integrate grassroots knowledge and agency risk reproducing the very inequalities they purport to address. Furthermore, implementation gaps exacerbate the perception that climate change governance is an elite-driven process, often used to secure donor funding or meet international obligations, rather than to genuinely transform the lives of the rural poor. This instrumentalisation of policy, decoupled from practice, represents a core governance failure in the climate response architecture of Zimbabwe. Figure 3 illustrates the disconnect between national climate policies and local realities in Gwanda and Lupane. It highlights how top-down policy flows through NGOs and local government institutions often lack meaningful community participation, feedback mechanisms, and institutional support, resulting in limited local engagement and effectiveness. Without substantive inclusion of rural communities, climate governance remains a project of policy without presence, well-documented on paper but invisible in practice. In places like Gwanda and Lupane, where vulnerability to climate shocks is high and institutional trust is low, a shift towards decentralised, participatory, and locally accountable governance is not only necessary but urgent. 4.3 Token Partnerships or Real Collaboration? Government–Civil Society Dynamics In recent years, Zimbabwe’s climate governance space has witnessed a noticeable evolution in the relationship between government and civil society organisations (CSOs). While traditionally adversarial, particularly around politically sensitive issues like human rights, land reform, and extractive industries, the climate change agenda appears to have created a more cooperative space for engagement. However, the depth, sincerity, and impact of this collaboration, particularly in rural ‘Left Behind Places’ such as Gwanda and Lupane, remain contested. There is growing institutional recognition of the role that civil society plays in climate adaptation, especially in community engagement, policy advocacy, and project implementation. One government stakeholder noted: “There is a very effective Civil Society Climate Change Working Group… actively part of the National Steering Committee.” This Working Group has served as a formal conduit for CSOs to participate in national climate decision-making processes, including drafting inputs into policy and offering feedback on government-led interventions. It is a positive step toward pluralising governance and decentralising knowledge flows, and signals a shift from closed-door policymaking to multi-stakeholder engagement in Zimbabwe’s climate response. However, this collaborative spirit at the national level is not uniformly experienced on the ground. Evidence from Gwanda and Lupane suggests that this apparent partnership often fails to translate into meaningful engagement with rural communities. Despite the visibility of NGOs and climate-focused CSOs in these regions, their operations are frequently constrained by centralised decision-making, donor-driven timelines, and limited capacity to embed themselves long-term within local institutions. A farmer in Gwanda remarked: “They come with their banners and workshops, but once they leave, nothing really changes for us. We are told what will happen, but never asked what we think should happen.” Such sentiments reflect the persistent perception of external imposition rather than co-production, even in projects facilitated by civil society. The CSOs, while more trusted than government by many rural residents, are still viewed as intermediaries rather than true partners in governance. This highlights a critical issue: collaboration at the national policy table can be symbolic if it is not backed by horizontal linkages at the local level that include rural actors as agents, not passive recipients. Moreover, the role of civil society is further complicated by its dual accountability - to both communities and external funders. This tension can compromise their autonomy and responsiveness, especially in regions where political sensitivities make it difficult to challenge state narratives or prioritise controversial issues like land rights and local power imbalances. While the government’s willingness to work with civil society on climate issues is laudable, the partnership often functions more as a performance of inclusion than as a transformative shift in governance. Rural communities continue to express concern that decisions are made elsewhere, with limited transparency or feedback loops. As one Lupane villager put it: “We hear they [NGOs and government] are working together in Harare, but we don’t know what they are deciding or who they speak for.” This raises a key question: Is participation in climate governance real, or just rhetorical? The symbolic presence of civil society in formal structures may check donor boxes, but without a deliberate effort to embed community voices and redistribute decision-making power, it risks becoming tokenistic. Thus, while climate change has opened a relatively safer and more collaborative policy space for civil society engagement, the gap between elite partnerships and grassroots empowerment remains wide. Bridging this divide requires not only institutional reform but also a fundamental shift in how adaptation is conceptualised - not as a technical intervention, but as a political process grounded in justice, inclusion, and local agency. 4.4 Seeds of Discontent: Corruption and Partisan Control of Adaptation Inputs Agricultural input schemes - ostensibly designed to enhance adaptive capacity and bolster food security in drought-prone areas - have become deeply politicised in Zimbabwe, particularly in rural districts like Gwanda and Lupane. Instead of serving as tools for inclusive adaptation, these programmes are often repurposed as vehicles for partisan control, elite accumulation, and electoral mobilisation. As such, they deepen existing vulnerabilities and undermine the transformative potential of climate adaptation. Government input support programmes, which include the distribution of maize seed, fertiliser, and other agricultural resources, are widely seen by rural communities not as developmental interventions, but as extensions of ZANU-PF’s political patronage network. Farmers across focus group discussions expressed disillusionment with the scheme’s discriminatory nature. As one participant from Gwanda stated: “The government of Zimbabwe is trying their best to provide rural farmers with agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizers. However, these seeds are mostly for maize and not for sorghum and millet which are commonly grown here. We know that this scheme has nothing to do with livelihood enhancement... it’s political campaigns laden with corruption.” This quote captures both the exclusionary nature of input distribution and the broader mismatch between state-driven interventions and local agroecological realities. While maize remains, the dominant crop promoted by government schemes, it is ill-suited to the semi-arid conditions of Matabeleland North and South, where rainfall is increasingly erratic due to climate change. Local crops such as sorghum and millet, traditionally grown in these regions due to their drought tolerance, receive far less institutional support. This reflects a fundamental flaw in climate adaptation governance: the prioritisation of politically symbolic crops over context-sensitive agronomy. Moreover, input distribution is tightly controlled through local leadership structures aligned with the ruling party, further entrenching political exclusion. Testimonies from both Gwanda and Lupane reveal how farmers perceived access to inputs as conditional upon political allegiance. One community member explained: “One of the village heads took all the agricultural inputs meant for all farmers in my village and only allocated them to those supporting the ruling party. This means that if you do not belong to ZANU PF, you will have your livelihood compromised.” This account points to a systemic erosion of equity, transparency, and trust - core tenets of good governance. It also reinforces how adaptation strategies are not implemented in a political vacuum but are deeply embedded in local power structures that use state resources for political gatekeeping. Furthermore, farmers report that the seeds distributed under the government’s schemes are often not climate-resilient, poorly suited to the short and unpredictable growing seasons exacerbated by the effects of El Niño. While there are government efforts to promote drought-tolerant varieties through agricultural extension services, uptake remains low. Reasons include lack of awareness, weak institutional support, and distrust in state-led initiatives, particularly when communities perceive them as politically motivated rather than driven by agronomic suitability or genuine livelihood enhancement. In this context, adaptation becomes not just a technical or environmental challenge but a profoundly political one. The corruption and partisan nature of input distribution distorts adaptation outcomes, reinforcing climate vulnerability along political lines and disempowering communities already struggling with environmental precarity. Figure 4 illustrates the political economy of adaptation inputs distribution illustrating how political elites, traditional leaders, and local councillors control access to agricultural inputs, which are preferentially allocated to party loyalists, while excluded community members face denial, marginalization, and exclusion from critical resources such as seeds, fertilisers, climate information, and agricultural support. The politicisation of adaptation inputs transforms a potentially empowering intervention into a tool of exclusion and control. It undermines the credibility of climate governance institutions and hampers the development of robust, community-centred adaptation systems. Any serious commitment to equitable and effective climate resilience in ‘Left Behind Places’ must first reckon with the toxic entanglement of adaptation, power, and partisanship. 4.5 Governance at Arm’s Length: Community Distrust and Broken Accountability Effective climate adaptation in rural settings depends not only on national policies and technical inputs but also on the quality of local governance, the everyday relationships between state actors and communities that determine trust, transparency, and responsiveness. In Gwanda and Lupane, however, this relationship is frayed. What emerges from the findings is a picture of disconnected leadership, deep-rooted community mistrust, and a breakdown in accountability mechanisms - a dangerous triad that compromises adaptation effectiveness. Local leaders often claim to be accessible, responsive, and aligned with the needs of their constituents. A councillor from Ward 22 in Gwanda, for instance, insisted: “I have an open-door policy… all villagers can come to me.” Such statements reflect the official narrative of proximity and public service, which portrays local governance as participatory and people-centred. However, interviews and focus group discussions across both districts tell a different story, one of resentment, political exclusion, and broken social contracts. In contrast to the councillor’s portrayal, a villager offered a more sobering account: “We no longer trust our leaders because they are corrupt and fuel poverty in this area. Instead of them pioneering development projects… they hijack projects meant to help poor farmers.” This contradiction reveals the symbolic nature of local governance, where leaders publicly perform responsiveness while privately consolidating control. Accountability is further eroded when local leaders serve dual roles: as community representatives and as gatekeepers of state resources, roles that often blur in practice. The example of input distribution being reserved for ruling party supporters reinforces how political partisanship supplants impartial service delivery. “One village head took all the agricultural inputs meant for all farmers in my village and only allocated them to those supporting the ruling party.” Such politicisation of basic services leads to what Ferguson ( 1994 ) described as the “anti-politics machine”, a system that claims neutrality but operates through deeply political logics, often disguised as technical governance. The net effect is that trust in institutions deteriorates, and governance becomes a performative exercise rather than a meaningful channel of representation and redress. This erosion of trust is not incidental; it is structurally embedded. The top-down orientation of Zimbabwe’s governance system, where policies are formulated at the centre and filtered down through aligned local elites, leaves little room for genuine grassroots participation. Local actors are thus seen not as co-creators of policy, but as passive recipients or, worse, as politically conditional beneficiaries. The findings suggest that accountability mechanisms are either absent or deeply compromised. While the Constitution guarantees rights to development and environmental protection, these rights are hollow without institutional pathways for grievance, remedy, or democratic oversight. Community members report that complaints go unheard, and that challenging local leaders is either futile or politically dangerous, particularly in areas historically marginalised for their perceived opposition to the ruling party. Ultimately, the breakdown of local accountability reflects a deeper crisis of governance legitimacy in ‘Left Behind Places.’ When communities lose trust in their representatives, climate adaptation efforts lose credibility, traction, and sustainability. Rebuilding that trust requires more than policy; it demands institutional reform, participatory governance, and mechanisms for holding leaders accountable to those they claim to serve. In contexts like Gwanda and Lupane, where climate risk is compounded by political neglect, such transformations are not optional - they are essential. 6. Rural Resilience in the Margins: Community Strategies Beyond the State In the face of persistent state failure, political exclusion, and unreliable institutional support, rural communities in Gwanda and Lupane are not passive victims of climate change. Rather, they exhibit notable forms of agency, adaptation, and innovation that demonstrate the power of grassroots resilience in navigating environmental uncertainty. These bottom-up efforts, rooted in everyday practice, indigenous knowledge, and social solidarity, constitute what can be understood as “climate citizenship from below”. Despite receiving limited or no meaningful support from formal governance structures, communities have developed a suite of coping strategies to mitigate the effects of El Niño-induced droughts. These include the establishment of community gardens, especially along riverbanks and wetlands; a partial shift to drought-resistant crops such as sorghum and millet; and the continued reliance on traditional knowledge systems such as timing agricultural activities based on local ecological indicators. Such strategies not only reflect adaptation but also embody a form of political critique, an insistence on survival despite abandonment. However, these efforts occur within a climate of profound scepticism toward the state. One local farmer commented: “People still want to grow maize… they don’t believe the government will meet their needs.” This remark encapsulates a double reality: a continued reliance on maize as a cultural and dietary staple, and a deep mistrust in state-led adaptation interventions that are often seen as ill-suited, corrupt, or politically biased. Although government programmes promote small grains, uptake remains limited due to perceptions that they are labour-intensive, lack market support, or carry a stigma of being “poverty crops.” Farmers also noted that institutions like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) show limited interest in buying these crops, reinforcing disincentives to shift away from maize. Yet, adaptation persists, not as a product of state planning, but through incremental adjustments driven by local knowledge and mutual aid. For instance, in both Gwanda and Lupane, women-led initiatives have emerged around shared water harvesting systems and cooperative seed saving, allowing small-scale farmers to experiment with alternative planting techniques. Informal information-sharing networks among older farmers continue to provide crucial guidance on soil preservation and rain forecasting, especially as formal extension services become increasingly politicised or inaccessible. This form of “resilience in the margins” must not be romanticised. It is often fragile, under-resourced, and overburdened by structural neglect. Nevertheless, it reveals a critical insight: adaptive capacity does not solely reside within formal institutions. It is embedded in local relationships, practices, and ecological intimacy - factors consistently overlooked by national climate strategies. Figure 5 illustrates community-driven adaptation processes grounded in traditional knowledge and social networks. It highlights how grassroots strategies like seed sharing, community gardens, water harvesting, and informal mutual aid contribute to resilience and climate citizenship from below, fostering local agency amid state failure and political exclusion. As they continue to adapt through their own means, rural communities in Gwanda and Lupane assert a form of climate-citizenship, a claim to climate and water justice that emerges not through institutional access, but through lived resistance. This grassroots adaptation is not merely reactive; it is generative. It proposes alternative models of sustainability that challenge the technocratic and centralised logic of mainstream climate governance. 5. Discussion Climate Change Adaptation as a Political Project - Power, Participation, and Grassroots Futures 5.1 Beyond Technocratic Adaptation – Climate Governance as Political Practice Mainstream climate change adaptation frameworks in Zimbabwe, much like elsewhere in the Global South, are often framed through a technocratic lens that prioritises policy instruments, climate modelling, and centrally managed intervention schemes. These approaches, while appearing rational and scientific, tend to obscure the deeply political nature of adaptation, particularly in marginalised rural areas like Gwanda and Lupane. The result is a depoliticised governance architecture that treats adaptation as a neutral, technical challenge rather than a terrain of power, exclusion, and struggle. Ferguson’s ( 1994 ) seminal work on The Anti-Politics Machine provides a powerful lens through which to understand how development and climate interventions function to “depoliticise” deeply political issues by presenting them as technical problems to be solved by experts. This tendency is evident in Zimbabwe’s climate governance landscape, where national strategies such as the Zimbabwe Climate Change Response Strategy (GoZ, 2015 ) and the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (GoZ, 2016 ) focus on sectoral planning, capacity building, and resilience metrics - while glossing over the entrenched governance failures, elite capture, and structural inequalities that mediate access to climate-related resources. This technocratic framing is reinforced by donor-driven programmes like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund, which, although ostensibly participatory, are often implemented through a top-down architecture that marginalises rural voices. As the findings in Gwanda and Lupane reveal, input schemes and climate projects are routinely manipulated by local political elites who distribute resources along partisan lines, favouring ZANU-PF loyalists while excluding dissenting or unaffiliated community members. As one participant put it: “If you do not belong to ZANU PF, you will have your livelihood compromised.” Such experiences illustrate how clientelism shapes adaptation outcomes, with access to seeds, fertilisers, and land mediated through informal networks of loyalty and control. This dynamic is emblematic of what Leftwich ( 2008 ) describes as the “primacy of politics” in development, where outcomes are determined not by policy design, but by the power relations, interests, and incentives that shape implementation on the ground. Land governance provides another example of how adaptation is structured by politics rather than technical logic. Despite constitutional provisions and the historical promises of the land reform programme, the reality in Gwanda and Lupane is that access to arable land remains politicised, controlled by traditional leaders and party-affiliated elites. Land is not allocated based on ecological need or adaptive potential, but through patronage networks that reward loyalty. This undermines the very foundation of adaptive capacity in these drought-prone regions. Moreover, the exclusion of local knowledge and community agency in planning processes reinforces the dominance of scientific expertise and state-centric authority, sidelining grassroots strategies that have long supported rural resilience. Adaptation must be understood as an “arena of contestation,” where knowledge, authority, and resources are unevenly distributed and negotiated. The failure to acknowledge these dynamics has led to an illusion of adaptation - one where policies exist, projects are implemented, and international obligations are met, but the lived realities of vulnerability persist or even deepen. This disjuncture highlights the urgent need to reposition adaptation as a political practice, one that prioritises accountability, transparency, and democratic inclusion over technocratic efficiency. Clearly, climate adaptation in ‘Left Behind Places’ like Gwanda and Lupane cannot be addressed through depoliticised technical fixes. It must confront the historical legacies of marginalisation, the contemporary logics of political control, and the real conditions under which rural communities strive to survive and adapt. Without doing so, adaptation efforts risk reinforcing the very inequalities they seek to overcome. 5.2 From Participation-as-Performance to Deep Inclusion – Interrogating Governance Claims Climate change adaptation discourse in Zimbabwe frequently emphasises participation, inclusion, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. National documents such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (GoZ, 2016 ) and the National Climate Change Response Strategy (GoZ, 2015 ) stress the need for “broad-based stakeholder engagement” and “community-driven approaches” in building climate resilience. However, evidence from Gwanda and Lupane reveals a troubling disjuncture between this participatory rhetoric and the lived experiences of rural communities, suggesting that participation often remains symbolic rather than substantive. Figure 6 illustrates the governance and participation spectrum in climate adaptation, ranging from tokenistic participation and symbolic inclusion to genuine grassroots engagement and deep co-production. It highlights the gradations of community involvement and the challenges posed by elite-controlled and proxy participation. A notable initiative is the Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change (CSCCC), which has been praised for fostering dialogue between civil society organisations (CSOs) and government actors, particularly through its engagement with the National Climate Change Steering Committee. Government officials often highlight this platform as evidence of inclusive governance. As one stakeholder explained: “There is a very effective Civil Society Climate Change Working Group… actively part of the National Steering Committee.” While this collaboration is an encouraging sign of evolving governance structures, it raises critical questions about who is being represented and whether such engagement genuinely filters down to the grassroots. As Cornwall ( 2008 ) argues, participatory spaces often become “invited spaces” controlled by elites and structured in ways that limit dissent and redefine community involvement around state-defined terms. In the case of the CSCCC, rural residents and marginalised constituencies are rarely direct participants in agenda-setting or decision-making. Instead, participation is mediated through NGO representatives, many of whom are disconnected from the local contexts they claim to represent. This top-down model of “participation-by-proxy” fosters widespread mistrust among rural communities. In Gwanda and Lupane, local leaders such as chiefs, councillors, and NGO officials are often seen not as community advocates but as gatekeepers of state power and donor resources. As one villager in Lupane lamented: “We no longer trust our leaders... one village head took all the agricultural inputs and gave them to ruling party supporters.” These experiences reflect what can be described as “governance at arm’s length”: a system where the appearance of engagement masks a deeper lack of accountability and responsiveness. Institutions may be physically present through NGO offices, local councillors, or development projects, but they often operate without meaningful consultation, deliberation, or feedback loops. This distance reinforces feelings of abandonment and contributes to what Gaventa ( 2006 ) calls the “vertical gap” in governance, the space between citizens and those who claim to govern on their behalf. Moreover, the instrumentalisation of participation used to legitimise externally designed projects or fulfil donor reporting requirements undermines its transformative potential. Many rural residents view participatory events as “box-ticking exercises”, where their presence is required but their voices are marginalised. As a farmer in Gwanda remarked: They [NGOs] come with their banners and workshops, but once they leave, nothing really changes for us. We are told what will happen, but never asked what we think should happen. This sentiment underscores a deeper crisis of governance legitimacy in Zimbabwe’s climate change response. Participation, when reduced to performance, not only disempowers communities but also delegitimises the very processes intended to build trust and resilience. It reinforces the perception that adaptation planning is something done to communities rather than with them. To move beyond participation as a performance, there is an urgent need to repoliticise participatory governance. This means recognising that adaptation decisions are embedded in power relations and must be co-produced through genuinely inclusive, locally grounded, and democratically accountable processes. It requires creating “claimed spaces” (Cornwall, 2002 ), where communities articulate their own priorities, define success on their own terms, and challenge the structures that reproduce their marginalisation. 5.3 Climate Citizenship from Below – Locating Resilience in Everyday Practice Dominant climate adaptation frameworks in Zimbabwe, as in much of the Global South, tend to view rural communities as passive recipients of aid, knowledge, and intervention. Yet, in ‘Left Behind Places’ like Gwanda and Lupane, where state support is inconsistent, politically mediated, or absent altogether, communities are enacting their own forms of bottom-up resilience. These grassroots strategies, grounded in traditional knowledge, mutual aid, and everyday innovation, represent a form of what can be termed climate-citizenship: a mode of political agency through which people claim the right to survive, adapt, and thrive in the face of systemic abandonment. The findings reveal how rural farmers are drawing on vernacular resilience (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013 ), locally situated and historically embedded knowledge systems that enable adaptation without dependence on formal institutions. In both Gwanda and Lupane, households have initiated and maintained community gardens, especially along wetland areas, to buffer against drought-related food insecurity. Seed-sharing practices, often coordinated informally through social networks, enable farmers to access traditional varieties of crops like sorghum and millet, which are more drought-tolerant than the maize typically promoted by government schemes. These practices are not just pragmatic responses to climate variability, they are political acts. They contest the authority and effectiveness of state-led adaptation, especially when such interventions are perceived as corrupt, exclusionary, or irrelevant. As one farmer explained: “People still want to grow maize… they don’t believe government will meet their needs.” This statement reflects a broader epistemic and political disillusionment: a sense that the state lacks both the will and the understanding to support contextually appropriate resilience. In response, communities have forged their own pathways, drawing on local knowledge, historical memory, and collective labour as tools for survival. These strategies challenge the technocratic framing of adaptation as a linear process delivered from above, and instead position it as an emergent, place-based struggle for dignity, recognition, and life. The concept of climate-citizenship captures how marginalised communities assert their rights to essential environmental goods through everyday practices of care, resistance, and survival. In Gwanda and Lupane, this includes the construction of small-scale water harvesting pits, rotational community watering systems, and the informal coordination of communal labour during planting and harvesting seasons. Likewise, vernacular resilience offers an important corrective to adaptation models that privilege scientific expertise while marginalising local and indigenous knowledge. As MacKinnon and Derickson ( 2013 ) argue, vernacular resilience emerges from “people’s embedded relationships with place, practice, and community” - a description that resonates powerfully with the lived realities of the farmers in this study. By recognising these efforts as legitimate and valuable, we move toward an adaptation paradigm that is not only more just but also more effective. Importantly, these grassroots practices also reframe the rural poor as active subjects rather than passive victims of climate change. They make visible the agency, ingenuity, and political critique embedded in local responses. Rather than waiting for distant policy interventions or donor-led projects, these communities are asserting their right to adapt on their own terms, reclaiming their ecological knowledge and reweaving their social relations in ways that challenge narratives of helplessness. Yet, despite their importance, these practices are often undervalued in official adaptation planning, which continues to focus on large-scale, measurable interventions aligned with national targets or donor priorities. By sidelining local ingenuity, policy frameworks miss opportunities to support scalable, culturally appropriate solutions that are already rooted in community practice. 6. Conclusion Repoliticising Adaptation in Left Behind Places – Towards Climate Justice from Below This paper critically examined the intersection of climate governance, politics, and local agency in Zimbabwe’s marginalised districts of Gwanda and Lupane, regions emblematic of what are increasingly being called ‘Left Behind Places.’ At the heart of the argument lies a fundamental challenge to the dominant, technocratic framings of climate adaptation. Rather than neutral, scientific, or purely environmental interventions, adaptation in these contexts is deeply shaped by historical injustices, political capture, institutional failures, and contested claims to voice, space, and survival. The findings reveal how climate adaptation in Zimbabwe is marked by a disjuncture between national policy and local experience. Government-led adaptation programmes, often designed around technical efficiency and donor imperatives, function as what Ferguson ( 1994 ) terms an anti-politics machine - they obscure structural inequalities by treating adaptation as a problem of inputs and implementation, while ignoring the real, lived politics of access, exclusion, and control. Input schemes are routinely politicised, land remains a tool of elite capture, and participation is performed more than practised. At best, civil society platforms such as the Civil Society Climate Change Working Group offer symbolic inclusion; at worst, they legitimise an exclusionary governance model cloaked in the language of participation. Yet, this is not only a story of state failure. It is also a story of grassroots resilience and political agency. In the absence of robust institutional support, rural communities are enacting forms of vernacular resilience and climate-citizenship, where adaptation becomes a lived, place-based struggle. Through informal seed sharing, traditional water harvesting, and the maintenance of community gardens, farmers are not just surviving, they are asserting their right to adapt on their own terms. These everyday acts of climate resilience are deeply political: they constitute a claim to inclusion, dignity, and justice, not as beneficiaries, but as co-authors of their own futures. The paper contributes to the growing body of literature arguing that climate adaptation is, at its core, a political and justice-oriented process. It demands a critical interrogation of who decides, who benefits, and who is left behind. The evidence from Gwanda and Lupane shows that adaptation without accountability, equity, or grassroots voice is not adaptation at all - it is abandonment in disguise. Policy frameworks must therefore shift from technocratic metrics of resilience to relational, redistributive, and participatory models of climate governance. This includes devolving authority to local institutions that are transparent and accountable; embedding indigenous and local knowledge into adaptation planning; and disrupting the entrenched systems of partisan control, exclusionary participation, and resource capture that undermine climate justice. What is ultimately needed is not just better adaptation policy, but a reparative adaptation agenda - one that redresses historical marginalisation, rebuilds the broken social contract between state and citizen, and recognises the right to adapt as a form of political belonging. Gwanda and Lupane are not blank slates awaiting intervention. They are sites of innovation, resistance, and climate citizenship from below. As we move deeper into an era of compounding climate crises, a final provocation must be raised: If climate governance continues to marginalise those already living at the edge of precarity, then what exactly are we adapting to, and for whom? The future of climate justice in Africa will not be built solely in national policy rooms or donor reports, it will be built in the fields, homesteads, and communities of those whose everyday practices defy erasure and demand recognition. Declarations Disclosure statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Disclaimer: Liability for commissions, omissions and/or views expressed in this paper remains entirely the responsibility of the authors. Funding: The study did not receive funding from any source Data availability (data transparency): The paper has no data to declare Ethics Declaration: This study received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Stellenbosch [SOC-2021-23651] on 20 February 2023. All research procedures adhered to the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki and followed established social science research ethics protocols involving human participants. Consent to Participate: Informed consent was obtained from all participants between 20 February 2023 and 15 May 2023, prior to the commencement of data collection activities in Gwanda and Lupane Districts. The consent process included both verbal and written explanations of the research objectives, the voluntary nature of participation, and the right to withdraw at any point without any negative consequences. Participants signed or verbally confirmed their consent before taking part in interviews or focus group discussions. All engagements were carried out with full respect for participants’ confidentiality, autonomy, and dignity. Clinical Trial Number: Not Applicable. Consent to Publish declaration: Not applicable. Author Contribution VPM - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.WM - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.NS - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.JB - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing. References Adhikari S (2018) Drought impact and adaptation strategies in the mid-hill farming system of western Nepal. 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Camb J Reg Econ Soc 11(1):189–209 Rosenau JN (2000) The governance of fragmegration: Neither a world republic nor a global interstate system. Studia Diplomatica, 15–39 Saunders R (2020) The politics of resource bargaining, social relations and institutional development in Zimbabwe since independence. Springer International Publishing, pp 371–403 Scoones I et al (1996) & E. A. Hazards and opportunities: farming livelihoods in dryland Africa. Lessons from Zimbabwe (p. 283-pp) Ssekamatte D (2018) The role of monitoring and evaluation in climate change mitigation and adaptation interventions in developing countries. Afr Evaluation J 6(1):1–9 Tirivangasi HM, Nyahunda L (2019) Challenges faced by rural people in mitigating the effects of climate change in the Mazungunye communal lands, Zimbabwe. Jàmbá: J Disaster Risk Stud 11(1):1–9 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 13 Nov, 2025 Reviews received at journal 12 Nov, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 03 Nov, 2025 Reviews received at journal 25 Aug, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 23 Aug, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 14 Aug, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 13 Aug, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 13 Aug, 2025 Editor invited by journal 13 Aug, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 31 Jul, 2025 First submitted to journal 31 Jul, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {\"props\":{\"pageProps\":{\"initialData\":{\"identity\":\"rs-7037252\",\"acceptedTermsAndConditions\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":false,\"archivedVersions\":[],\"articleType\":\"Article\",\"associatedPublications\":[],\"authors\":[{\"id\":501133657,\"identity\":\"1bf205d2-4b98-43ff-8fdf-7b06479ec792\",\"order_by\":0,\"name\":\"Vuyisile Precious 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Introduction\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eIn many rural corners of Zimbabwe, climate change is not simply an environmental crisis - it is a deeply political experience marked by exclusion, silence, and survival. Far from the promises of national adaptation plans and donor-led resilience programmes, the lived realities in these \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; reveal structural abandonment, where adaptation is entangled in the entrenched logics of political patronage, elite control, and historical neglect. Climate shocks, whether droughts or floods, do not arrive on neutral ground; they strike along pre-existing fissures of inequality, further deepening socio-political fractures. In these marginalised districts, adaptation is less a shield and more a struggle, where access to resources, knowledge, and decision-making is governed by loyalty rather than vulnerability. This paper interrogates these dynamics, focusing on the governance failures, political exclusions, and, crucially, the everyday forms of agency through which communities are quietly and defiantly adapting from below.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe impacts of climate change are increasingly evident in Zimbabwe, with extreme weather events such as El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o-induced droughts becoming more frequent and severe (Moyo, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR37\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; Bhanye \\u0026amp; Maisiri, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR4\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2023\\u003c/span\\u003e; Chidarikire \\u0026amp; Magomana, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR8\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; Mugiyo\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eet al., 2023). In rural areas, where communities are highly dependent on natural capital for their livelihoods, these climate-related challenges pose a significant threat to food security, water availability, and overall well-being (Nyambo et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR51\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). Chitongo (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR11\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2021\\u003c/span\\u003e), Mugambiwa and Rukema (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR40\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e) opine that over the years, Zimbabwean rural areas have been exposed to several harsh climatic conditions that have negatively impacted livelihoods. Rural areas bear the most brunt of these impacts due to their overreliance on rain-fed agriculture and limited access to resources and technology. Zimbabwe and other parts of southern Africa typically experience below-average rainfall, leading to drought conditions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMalinga et al (2023) note that climate change-induced droughts have serious consequences for Zimbabwe, including crop failure affecting food production and food security in the country. Droughts also lead to water shortages, affecting both agriculture and daily life for people in rural Zimbabwe. Limited water and pasture availability can result in livestock deaths, impacting the livelihoods of many rural communities. In the shadow of the global climate crisis, rural districts of Gwanda and Lupane in Zimbabwe stand as stark examples of what emerging scholarship refers to as \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; (Connor et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR12\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; MacKinnon et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR33\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e). Characterized by geographic and socio-political marginalization, these areas experience the harsh realities of climate impacts more acutely than more developed regions (Fiorentino et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR22\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). With erratic rainfall patterns and frequent droughts, the vulnerability of these communities is not just a matter of environmental risk but also of socio-economic survival.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe concept of \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; primarily emerges from the discourse on regional inequality, where certain areas suffer from chronic underinvestment and a lack of socio-economic development (Connor et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR12\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; MacKinnon et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR33\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e). These places are not only geographically isolated but are also often sidelined in political decision-making processes. This marginalization results in limited access to the resources necessary to cope with and adapt to environmental changes. In the context of climate change, this neglect translates into inadequate adaptation and resilience strategies, leaving these communities disproportionately affected by environmental disruptions. However, the intersection of climate change adaptation and governance in these contexts, especially in the African rural setting, remains underexplored in the literature. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by focusing on the political and governance frameworks that either enable or hinder effective climate change responses in Gwanda and Lupane.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eDespite extensive documentation on climate change across Zimbabwe, much of the existing research primarily focuses on general adaptation strategies, ecological impacts, and economic considerations (Brown et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR6\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2012\\u003c/span\\u003e; Chanza, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR7\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e). Issues like the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity, water resource management, the utilization of local knowledge and traditional practices, and the socio-economic consequences on both rural and urban communities have been well-explored (Gukurume, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR28\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e; Manyeruke et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR34\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e; Tirivangasi \\u0026amp; Nyahunda, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR58\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e). Additionally, the implications of climate variability for public health have received significant attention (Ngwenya et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR50\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e). However, there remains a critical gap in the literature: the exploration of governance structures and political dynamics that shape adaptation strategies in these marginalized regions, in particular, how governance and politics specifically affect climate change adaptation in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; like Gwanda and Lupane rural Districts in Zimbabwe. This oversight leaves a significant void in understanding why certain communities remain disproportionately vulnerable to climate impacts despite the national and international efforts to enhance resilience.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis study aims to fill this gap by integrating an analysis of governance and political dynamics with climate change adaptation strategies in rural Zimbabwe. Focusing on neglected areas, this paper offers local perspective that highlights specific governance failures and political challenges in climate change adaptation. The research not only contributes to academic discourse but also aims to influence policymakers by demonstrating the need for inclusive and effective governance structures that are responsive to the unique challenges faced by marginalized rural communities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"2. Literature Review\",\"content\":\"\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec3\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.1 Climate Change Impacts in Zimbabwe\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eClimate change presents significant challenges across Zimbabwe, manifesting through varied agricultural, hydrological, and socio-economic impacts that disrupt the traditional rhythms of rural and urban life alike (Manyeruke et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR34\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e; Tirivangasi \\u0026amp; Nyahunda, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR58\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e). In the agricultural sector, the predominant backbone of Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s economy, climate change has led to unpredictable rainfall patterns, prolonged droughts, and more frequent and intense heat waves. Studies have documented significant reductions in crop yields, particularly maize, which is the staple food, due to the shortened and erratic rainy seasons (Mulungu \\u0026amp; Ng\\u0026rsquo;ombe, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR42\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e; Muzerengi \\u0026amp; Tirivangasi, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR44\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e). These changes not only threaten food security but also jeopardize the livelihoods of subsistence farmers who rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eHydrological effects are equally severe, as evidenced by fluctuations in river flows and reservoir levels, impacting both water quality and availability. Major water bodies that support agricultural and hydroelectric activities have experienced lower water levels, leading to water restrictions for cities and power cuts across major urban centers (Ndebele-Murisa et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR46\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2020\\u003c/span\\u003e). Such changes strain the already fragile water infrastructure and necessitate urgent adaptive strategies to secure water for domestic and industrial use.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe socio-economic effects of climate change are profound and far-reaching. Rural communities, which are the least equipped to adapt, face increasing poverty due to crop failures and loss of livestock, compounded by a lack of alternative livelihood options (Ndebele-Murisa \\u0026amp; Mubaya, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR47\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e). The migration of distressed rural populations to urban areas in search of better opportunities has led to increased urban poverty and the expansion of informal settlements, which are vulnerable to other climate-induced hazards like flash floods (Ndlovu et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR48\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eSpecific attention has been focused on rural areas, where the impacts of climate change are particularly pronounced. These communities experience the brunt of climate impacts due to their high dependence on natural resources and their marginal position in national economic planning (Phiri et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR52\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e). This points to the urgent need for tailored climate adaptation strategies that address the specific vulnerabilities of these communities. For instance, the introduction of drought-resistant crop varieties and the development of community-based water harvesting and storage systems have been suggested as viable adaptation measures (Chineka, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR9\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2020\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, the socio-economic fabric of rural Zimbabwe is linked to its ecological base, making these communities especially susceptible to climate perturbations. This dependency amplifies the need for comprehensive studies that not only address the physical impacts of climate change but also consider the socio-economic and political dynamics that exacerbate vulnerability.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec4\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.2 Climate Change Governance\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eRosenau (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR54\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2000\\u003c/span\\u003e) notes that governance relates to mechanisms directed toward the coordination of multiple forms of state and non-state action. In this vein, governance in climate change implies a recognition of the various actors who intervene in the purposive steering of society, toward low-carbon, resilient or sustainable objectives (Newell et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR49\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2012\\u003c/span\\u003e). This paper discusses governance by focusing on formal and informal structures and actors involved in decision-making and implementation, with the government of Zimbabwe being the main actor. The principles of good governance are key to understanding how the state is attempting to regulate and mitigate the effect of climate change on the livelihoods of rural farmers (Cooper \\u0026amp; Wheeler, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR13\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e). A question we seek to answer is whether the interplay of climate change governance strategies and politics are helping local communities to adapt to the effects of climate change. Local people should be involved in monitoring and evaluation of climate change impacts and mitigation interventions to adapt and transform to climate change (Ssekamatte, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR57\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e). A comprehensive approach is needed when dealing with climate change governance because it is both an environmental and development issue focusing on the needs of societies, both now and in the future.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eClimate change impacts are being felt at global, regional, national, and local levels, rendering it a \\u0026ldquo;glocal\\u0026rdquo; problem that requires global solutions, (Evans \\u0026amp; Thomas, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR19\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2023\\u003c/span\\u003e). Climate change governance is closely related to state and public administrative systems to deal with mitigation and adaptation to the effects of climate change (Fr\\u0026ouml;hlich \\u0026amp; Knieling, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR23\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e). To respond to the threats of climate change in the 1980s, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was the first to be set up in 1988 and the first report produced in 1990 (Maslin, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR35\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e). This was followed by the Rio Earth Summit which was a success in leading to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, which underlies the negotiations to limit global greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC acknowledges that different countries have emitted different amounts of greenhouse gases, with the developed world emitting more than the developing countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR29\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e). In response, there have been several treaties for climate change governance, from the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to COP29 in 2024 to discuss and negotiate the best practices to deal with climate change.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eZimbabwe has actively participated in international negotiations on climate change from as far back as 1992 (Moyo, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR37\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). It was among the first countries to sign and ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. Through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process and to attain the Sustainable Development Goals, the government of Zimbabwe is committed to protecting the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations (GoZ, 2021). With specific reference to Zimbabwe, there are several policies, programmes, projects, and other initiatives focusing on adaptation activities to the induced climate change challenges. The policies and documents governing climate change in Zimbabwe include the Zimbabwe Climate Policy and the Zimbabwe Climate Change Response Strategy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eGovernance plays a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of climate change adaptation strategies. Effective governance systems can enhance the capacity of communities to respond to climate impacts, while weak governance can exacerbate vulnerabilities and hinder adaptive responses. The literature on governance and climate change adaptation highlights a range of governance models, each with varying degrees of effectiveness in addressing the multifaceted challenges posed by climate change.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eIn the context of Zimbabwe, the governance model has traditionally been centralized, with decision-making and resource allocation primarily conducted at the national level. Studies by Mapfumo and Chikodzi (2013) and Nhemachena et al. (2014) critique this model, noting that while it allows for coordinated policy implementation, it often fails to account for local specificities and the unique needs of rural communities. This centralization tends to overlook the local knowledge and strategies that are critical for effective adaptation, leading to a disconnect between national policies and local realities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eConversely, decentralized governance models, which involve the devolution of power and resources to local authorities, have been identified as more effective in some contexts. For example, research by Zhou and Mvena (2016) demonstrates how decentralized approaches in the districts of Gwanda and Lupane facilitated better stakeholder engagement and allowed for adaptation measures that were more closely aligned with local conditions. These measures included the development of local early warning systems and community-based water management initiatives, which were more responsive to the specific climate challenges faced by these communities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eHowever, the success of decentralized governance models is not universal. Chanza and de Wit (2016) point out that the effectiveness of such models depends heavily on the capacity of local governments to manage resources and implement policies. In many cases, local authorities in Zimbabwe lack the necessary expertise, infrastructure, and financial resources to effectively manage adaptation initiatives. This has led to uneven implementation of adaptation strategies, with some areas showing progress while others continue to struggle. Jones and Maslin (2020) point out that climate change governance must be informed by the principles of inclusion, decentralization and autonomy, accountability and transparency, responsiveness and flexibility, and participation and inclusion. However, treaties and policies do not fit the preceding principles of governance (Ncube, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR45\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2025\\u003c/span\\u003e). Nations have hardly been on the same page in reducing emissions and financing climate change resilience in the countries most affected. IPCC (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR29\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e) claims that the lack of trust between developing and developed countries is one of the causes that makes climate change governance difficult at a global level. Additionally, in developing countries, it is the elite that attend climate change conferences, and the voices of the poor are hardly taken into consideration. Scholars like Maslin (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR35\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e), Dube and Phiri (2013) and Figueres (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR21\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2008\\u003c/span\\u003e) claim that this is problematic because they are the most affected by climate shocks and extreme weather events, yet their voices are silenced. As such, effective climate change governance should involve local people in the monitoring and evaluation of climate change and any interventions to mitigate or adapt to climate change.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec5\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.3 Zimbabwe Climate Policy\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eZimbabwe views climate change-induced drought as a direct threat to its socio-economic development, with the potential of reversing any developmental gains that may have been achieved over the past decades. However, Zimbabwe only developed the National Climate Policy in 2016, showing the national leadership\\u0026rsquo;s late response to combat El Nino-induced challenges (Mugambiwa et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the government of Zimbabwe has sought to create a pathway towards a climate-resilient and low-carbon development economy in which the people can continue to develop and adapt in harmony with the environment (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR27\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2016\\u003c/span\\u003e). As part of the global climate change governance, the Climate Policy is evidence that the government and people of Zimbabwe are willing to join the international community in addressing the causes and impacts of climate change as enshrined in UNFCCC. The Climate Policy emphasizes adaptation concerning rural communities and agriculture.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe Zimbabwe Climate Policy draws lessons from three decades of UNFCCC implementation and the Kyoto Protocol. It also aims to support the fulfilment of some aspects of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 13, on the urgent need to combat climate change. In this regard, this policy reflects the Government\\u0026rsquo;s thrust towards climate change adaptation and mitigation to some extent. To this end, the Zimbabwe Climate Policy provides a framework for addressing climate-related challenges that Zimbabwe faces now and, in the future, due to the changing climate. It forms the basis of developing action plans for national efforts on adaptation and mitigation, providing a platform to unpack and implement Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s Nationally Determined Contributions to contribute to the global goal of limiting temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius. However, there are ongoing debates on whether the crafting and implementation of the policy entail principles of participation and inclusion of locally affected rural farmers.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThere are principles underpinning Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s Climate Policy and the impact they have on rural livelihoods. The principles are; basing climate-related decisions or adaptation actions on sound data-based, modelling, robust scientific findings, including Indigenous Knowledge System (IKS) and rigorous analysis, but also on an integrated, participatory approach. The challenge with this principle as a form of governance is that it focuses on technical solutions to support adaptation and transformation that are limited in rural areas (Dodman and Mitlin (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR17\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e). Inclusivity and consensus orientation are missing in the above-stated principle. The second principle is ensuring Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s resilience to climate-related challenges by cross-sectional engagement, inclusive of public-private sector involvement in the implementation. Mugambiwa and Rukema (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR40\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e) counter this principle in that it excludes locals, notably in rural areas. The governance structures are entirely political and discriminatory and do not involve citizens in rural areas who work the land mostly affected by climate change (Chitongo, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR11\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2021\\u003c/span\\u003e). There is a lack of transparency, accountability, and rule of law, with the elite mostly interested in elite accumulation, instead of being responsive to the affected rural farmers.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe Climate Policy emphasizes building resilience to climate challenges through adaptation programmes that are to be pursued concurrently with climate change mitigation programmes at local levels, and at the same time are sensitive to gender and people living with disabilities. However, Mugambiwa and Rukema (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR40\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e) and Dzvimbo et al., (2023) claim that these principles are only entrenched on paper, yet implementation paralysed. Programmes like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF) and NGOs like OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services, Climate Action Network, SNV, USAID, and World Vision, Hand in Hand inter alia, are controlled by the government through a highly centralized power structure. Hence, the participation of civil society and local communities is limited and not involved in the policy formulation and decision-making concerning hedging their livelihoods against livelihood shocks.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec6\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.4 National Climate Change Response Strategy\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003ePhiri (2021) argues that the impacts of climate change in Zimbabwe are likely to stall the country\\u0026rsquo;s development trajectory and pose a serious risk to food security and adaptive capacity. The National Climate Change Response Strategy is among the processes that seek to establish specific provisions for dealing with climate change issues, understanding the extent of the threat, and putting in place specific actions to manage potential impacts (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR26\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e). Firstly, the government\\u0026rsquo;s commitment to developing a climate-resilient Zimbabwe has also been demonstrated by the elevation of the Climate Change Office into a fully-fledged Climate Change Department. The country envisages developing adaptation strategies that can mitigate the diverse and complex impacts of climate change and improve community livelihoods nationwide. The country\\u0026rsquo;s vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change makes adaptation a national priority, demanding direction at the highest level. Therefore, the development of the National Climate Change Response Strategy, under Zimbabwe Climate Policy, seeks to address the climate change issues and contribute to a climate-resilient Zimbabwe (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR26\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe vision of Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s Climate Change Response Strategy is to create a climate change resilient nation, while its mission is to ensure sustainable development and a climate-proofed economy through engaging all stakeholders recognizing the vulnerable nature of Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s natural resources and society. The goal of the response strategy is to mainstream climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies in economic and social development at national and sectoral levels, through multi-stakeholder engagement, which is exclusionary as explained in the preceding paragraphs. It is therefore important to find out if this response strategy is inclusionary and helpful to people living in left behind places like Gwanda and Lupane and to unravel if it has transformed their capacities to deal with climate change ills.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eIn terms of governance, it is also important to consider the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, section (73) affords every citizen environmental rights, which include the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being, have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that are to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting economic and social development (Goz, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR25\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e). Section (72) of the same constitution affords rights to agricultural land for farming and keeping of livestock. Thus, anything that denies locals these rights such as the climate change induced drought, has to be addressed in one way or another (Goz, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR25\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec7\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.5 Political Dynamics and Climate Change Adaptation\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe influence of political dynamics on climate change policies and adaptation strategies is profound, shaping how societies prepare for and respond to environmental challenges. Political will, or the lack thereof, plays a critical role in the efficacy of these strategies, impacting everything from policy formulation to resource allocation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eResearch consistently shows that political commitment is essential for the development and implementation of effective climate change policies. In Zimbabwe, the government has expressed a commitment to climate action through various national policies and international agreements. However, there are gaps between policy pronouncements and actual commitment, noting that political interest often wanes when it comes to the allocation of sufficient resources or the implementation of long-term strategies. This discrepancy can be attributed to multiple factors, including economic constraints and competing political priorities that overshadow environmental issues.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eEffective climate adaptation requires not just policies but also the appropriate allocation of resources. Resource allocation decisions are influenced by political agendas, often resulting in the uneven distribution of support. In Zimbabwe, resources for climate adaptation are frequently directed towards politically favorable regions or projects that promise immediate political gains, neglecting areas that might be more vulnerable but less politically influential (Saunders, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR55\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2020\\u003c/span\\u003e). This misallocation is detrimental to national resilience and exacerbates regional inequalities in climate vulnerability and adaptive capacity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe discrepancies between national climate policies and local realities are particularly evident in rural areas like Gwanda and Lupane. While national strategies may outline comprehensive plans for adaptation, local implementation is often hampered by inadequate local governance structures, lack of local knowledge integration, and insufficient funding (Mubaya \\u0026amp; Mafongoya, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR39\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e). Local communities frequently feel detached from the policymaking process, with little opportunity to influence decisions that directly affect their livelihoods and well-being (Mutukura, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR43\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e). This disconnect underscores the need for more inclusive and participatory approaches in policy-making that consider the unique circumstances and needs of local communities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eCase studies from other regions within and outside Zimbabwe offer insights into how political dynamics can better align with effective climate adaptation practices. For instance, adaptations in the agricultural sector, such as the promotion of drought-resistant crops and innovative farming techniques, have shown success where local leaders actively engage with and support their communities (Adhikari, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR1\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e; Mpala \\u0026amp; Simatele, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR38\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; Mubaya \\u0026amp; Mafongoya, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR39\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e). These successes highlight the potential benefits of aligning political will with practical, community-based approaches to climate adaptation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003ePolitics, as elaborated by Leftwich (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR31\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2008\\u003c/span\\u003e), is essential for decision-making related to climate change. There is a need for making binding collective decisions. Local and national politics matter greatly, both in terms of how climate change is incorporated into national policies and programmes and in terms of how climate change-related politics has an impact on broader political processes. Therefore, political dynamics in Zimbabwe play a crucial role in shaping the country\\u0026rsquo;s response to climate change (Moyo, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR37\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). The government\\u0026rsquo;s priorities, policies, and resource allocation decisions are influenced by political considerations, often at the expense of long-term sustainable development goals. In rural areas, where communities are most affected by climate change, the lack of political will and commitment to addressing environmental challenges has further compounded vulnerabilities. Dodman and Mitlin (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR17\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e) postulate that the national and local politics of climate change adaptation and transformation in low-income countries put much focus on technical solutions that mostly seclude rural locals. Programmes to reduce the effects of the El Nino-induced droughts are highly political and less sensitive to dwindling livelihoods (Phiri et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR52\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2019\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eZimbabwe is in an ongoing state of political and social change. While the new constitution was adopted in March 2013, the national elections in August 2023 further consolidated the position of ZANU-PF in government, who are petty in assisting those who did not vote for them, especially in the Matabeleland regions. Moyo (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR37\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e) avers that Zanu PF has faced criticism for its governance practices, which some argue hinder effective climate change action mostly in rural areas. Issues such as corruption, lack of transparency, and inadequate implementation of policies have raised concerns about the party\\u0026rsquo;s commitment to environmental governance, a political party that is expected to be the custodian of all Zimbabweans.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec8\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.6 Theoretical Framework: Left Behind Places\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003e\\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; are regions that have been marginalized economically, socially, and politically, often experiencing slower development compared to more urbanized or favored areas (Connor et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR12\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e; MacKinnon et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR33\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2022\\u003c/span\\u003e). In the context of climate change adaptation, these areas face distinct challenges due to their geographic isolation, lack of resources, and limited political influence, which collectively hinder their ability to respond to and manage climate impacts effectively (Fiorentino et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR22\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). The concept is particularly relevant in understanding how disparate socio-economic development and political neglect can exacerbate environmental vulnerabilities. In rural settings like Gwanda and Lupane, the designation of \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; helps to frame the unique combination of geographic exposure to climate risks and socio-political marginalization that complicates adaptation efforts (Mikulewicz, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR36\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eA review of global case studies highlight the commonalities and differences in how \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; manage climate adaptation. For instance, research on rural areas in Bangladesh has shown how limited access to technological and financial resources restricts the community\\u0026rsquo;s ability to implement effective flood management strategies (Islam \\u0026amp; Walkerden, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR30\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e). Similarly, other left behind places, often overlooked in broader economic development strategies, struggle with outdated infrastructure that fails to protect against increasing climate variability and extreme weather events (Dawson, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR16\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2017\\u003c/span\\u003e). These cases highlight how geographical and political marginalization manifests in inadequate adaptation responses, often exacerbating the local communities\\u0026rsquo; vulnerability to climate change.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eWhile these studies provide valuable insights, there remains a significant gap in the literature concerning the specific interplay of governance and politics in climate change adaptation within \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo;. Few studies have thoroughly examined how governance structures in these regions impact the implementation of adaptation strategies, particularly in African contexts like Zimbabwe. Even less attention has been paid to how political dynamics within these marginalized areas influence the allocation of adaptation resources and the effectiveness of response strategies. This lack of detailed investigation presents a critical gap, as understanding these dynamics is essential for developing more tailored and effective adaptation policies.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec9\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e2.7 Conceptual Framework\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe conceptual framework (Fig.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig1\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e1\\u003c/span\\u003e) illustrates the complex and interrelated dynamics that shape climate adaptation governance in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places,\\u0026rsquo; like marginalized rural districts in Zimbabwe. At its core, climate change impacts serve as the primary driver, generating environmental stresses that disproportionately burden vulnerable communities. These impacts occur within the broader context of \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places,\\u0026rsquo; that are characterized by socio-political marginalization, historical neglect, and limited access to resources. Within this challenging context, two key institutional forces influence adaptation processes: governance structures, which include central government policies, local institutions, and civil society organisations, and political dynamics marked by elite capture, partisan control, and exclusionary practices.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAdaptation actors, comprising government agencies, NGOs, traditional leaders, and local communities, navigate these intersecting governance and political spheres. Their roles and interactions are shaped by both constraints and opportunities embedded in the system. At the heart of the framework lies community resilience and climate citizenship, reflecting grassroots agency, indigenous knowledge, and collective coping strategies. These community-driven actions not only enable adaptation to environmental change but also contest and challenge existing power relations.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eSignificantly, the framework emphasizes feedback loops where community agency actively influences governance and political processes by providing critical feedback and disrupting entrenched power asymmetries. Ultimately, these dynamic interactions determine the outcomes of adaptation efforts in terms of their effectiveness, equity, and sustainability. The framework positions climate adaptation as a deeply political and negotiated process, underscoring the essential role of marginalized communities in shaping just and meaningful responses to climate change.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"3. Area of Study and Methodology\",\"content\":\"\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec11\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e3.1 Area of Study\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis study was conducted in Gwanda District (Matabeleland South Province) and Lupane District (Matabeleland North Province) (Fig.\\u0026nbsp;\\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig2\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e2\\u003c/span\\u003e), two rural regions in western Zimbabwe that typify what are increasingly referred to as \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; - spatial zones characterised by chronic marginalisation, weak state presence, socio-political neglect, and heightened climate vulnerability (Rodr\\u0026iacute;guez-Pose, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR53\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2018\\u003c/span\\u003e). Their selection was informed by their exposure to climate-induced droughts, persistent underdevelopment, and long-standing exclusion from national political and economic priorities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eGwanda District lies within Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s natural region V, one of the country\\u0026rsquo;s driest agro-ecological zones, with average annual rainfall below 450 mm. The district is largely semi-arid, with sparse vegetation, frequent droughts, and fragile soils, making it particularly ill-suited to rain-fed agriculture - the primary livelihood strategy of most rural households. Lupane District, while situated slightly to the north, shares similar climatic characteristics, falling within natural region IV, which also experiences erratic rainfall patterns and periodic dry spells. Both areas have recorded significant livelihood losses during recent El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o cycles, with farmers reporting reduced crop yields, livestock deaths, and deepening food insecurity (Chitongo, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR11\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2021\\u003c/span\\u003e).\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eBeyond biophysical exposure, Gwanda and Lupane face multi-dimensional vulnerability rooted in historical political economy. These districts form part of the Matabeleland region, which has long been politically marginalised in post-independence Zimbabwe. Following the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s and the subsequent weakening of the opposition-aligned region, the state has invested minimally in infrastructure, public services, and economic development in Matabeleland - compared to regions such as Mashonaland (Ncube, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR45\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2025\\u003c/span\\u003e). This spatialised neglect has contributed to persistent poverty, out-migration, and growing mistrust in state institutions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eInfrastructure and service provision in both districts remains grossly inadequate. Access to potable water is limited, agricultural extension services are thinly spread, roads are poorly maintained, and energy infrastructure is largely absent in rural wards. Formal employment is scarce, and most households rely on subsistence farming, informal trade, and remittances. These conditions severely constrain households\\u0026rsquo; adaptive capacity in the face of increasingly frequent climate shocks.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFurthermore, both districts have experienced limited participation in national climate change policy processes. Despite the presence of several donor-funded adaptation projects like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF) and interventions by NGOs like World Vision and Amalima Loko - these initiatives are largely externally driven and unevenly distributed, often failing to reach the most vulnerable communities. Local governments in Gwanda and Lupane remain under-resourced and politically constrained, with weak institutional coordination, limited fiscal autonomy, and low integration of local knowledge in planning processes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe choice of Gwanda and Lupane was thus both purposive and conceptual. Purposively, they offer critical sites for examining how climate adaptation is experienced in rural Zimbabwe, where the intersection of climate risk, political exclusion, and institutional neglect is most pronounced. Conceptually, these districts provide fertile ground for advancing the idea of \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; - not simply as zones of poverty, but as products of uneven development and political marginalisation. As such, studying these areas allows for a more grounded understanding of how adaptation is shaped by geography, history, and power, and why climate governance must be reimagined to reflect the lived realities of those most affected.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec12\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e3.2 Methodology\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis study adopted a qualitative research design to explore the interplay between governance, politics, and climate change adaptation in two marginalised rural districts of Zimbabwe: Gwanda (Matabeleland South) and Lupane (Matabeleland North). These districts were purposefully selected due to their pronounced exposure to El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o-induced droughts, historical socio-political marginalisation, and limited institutional presence in climate adaptation efforts. The research sought to understand not only the content of adaptation policies but also how they are experienced, mediated, and contested by rural communities and governance actors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eData were collected between June and September 2023 using a combination of key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and policy and document analysis. In total, sixteen (16) key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from government ministries (e.g., Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate; Ministry of Lands and Agriculture), local councillors, traditional leaders, and staff from civil society organisations involved in climate programming, such as World Vision, Amalima Loko, and Hand in Hand Zimbabwe. These interviews focused on policy implementation, institutional coordination, the role of political actors, and perceptions of community participation in climate adaptation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eTo capture grassroots experiences, twenty-four (24) in-depth interviews were conducted with smallholder farmers, local community members, and members of ward development committees across eight villages - four in Gwanda and four in Lupane. The interviews explored participants\\u0026rsquo; understanding of climate change, access to resources such as land and agricultural inputs, participation in adaptation initiatives, and perceptions of local leadership and governance responsiveness. Questions also probed the socio-political dynamics shaping adaptation practices, including corruption, clientelism, and political affiliation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003e In addition, four (4) focus group discussions were held (two in each district), each comprising 6\\u0026ndash;8 participants of mixed age and gender, to facilitate collective reflection and triangulate individual accounts. The FGDs provided insights into community norms, shared grievances, collective coping strategies, and local forms of resilience. They were particularly useful in exploring the intersection of adaptation, political loyalty, and exclusion from development benefits.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe study also employed document and policy analysis to examine national adaptation frameworks, such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (2016), the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2015), and programme documentation from the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF). This helped contextualise empirical data within the official discourse and assess the gaps between policy rhetoric and lived experience.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eA purposive sampling strategy was used to identify participants with relevant knowledge or lived experience of climate change impacts and governance in the target districts. Selection of key informants and local participants was based on their roles in adaptation processes, their geographical vulnerability to climate shocks, and their involvement or exclusion from formal programmes. This sampling approach was critical for ensuring diversity of perspectives while maintaining focus on the research objectives.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eData were analysed using thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke\\u0026rsquo;s (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR5\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2006\\u003c/span\\u003e) six-phase process. All interviews and discussions were audio-recorded (with consent), transcribed verbatim, and manually coded. Emerging themes were identified inductively and deductively, allowing the researchers to capture both anticipated and unexpected patterns related to governance structures, political dynamics, and community-based adaptation strategies. Codes were grouped into higher-order categories and synthesised into overarching analytical themes that form the core of the findings.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003e The research adhered to strict ethical standards. Ethical clearance was obtained from Stellenbosch University Ethics Review Committee [SOC-2021-23651]. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to interviews and discussions. Participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity, with pseudonyms used in all quotations. Special care was taken to ensure that vulnerable participants, particularly the elderly, infirm, or politically marginalised individuals, were interviewed in a respectful, non-intrusive manner, with the right to withdraw at any point without consequence.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"4. Findings\",\"content\":\"\\u003ch2\\u003eUnearthing the Politics of Adaptation - Power, Exclusion, and Resilience in Zimbabwe’s Left Behind Places\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe findings are organised into six thematic subsections that examine: (1) land governance and political control; (2) disconnects between climate policies and rural realities; (3) the nature of government\\u0026ndash;civil society partnerships; (4) politicisation of adaptation interventions; (5) breakdowns in local accountability; and (6) community-driven coping strategies. Together, these insights reveal how climate change adaptation in marginalised rural contexts is deeply entangled with governance failures and the politics of exclusion.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec13\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e4.1 Land Without Power: Political Capture of Communal Tenure\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAccess to land is a fundamental pillar of rural livelihoods and a critical asset for climate change adaptation, particularly in contexts of prolonged drought such as those induced by El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o (Bhanye, 2014). However, in Gwanda and Lupane, access to land remains entangled in a complex web of state custodianship, elite control, and politicised governance, severely undermining adaptive capacity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eUnder Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s communal tenure system, land is formally vested in the state and governed through customary authority structures, with usufruct rights granted to households for use but not ownership (Scoones, 1996). In principle, this system is designed to ensure equitable access, allowing households to expand cultivation as their needs grow (Bhanye et al., \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR3\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2024\\u003c/span\\u003e). However, in practice, these principles are rarely upheld. The findings reveal that land allocation is neither transparent nor participatory. Rather, it is mediated through highly politicised channels dominated by traditional leaders and ZANU-PF-affiliated elites.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eA striking observation from a focus group discussion in Gwanda illustrates the disillusionment felt by local residents about land redistribution after independence: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;We were misled during the war that after independence we would get more land to expand our subsistence agriculture. This has not been the case. Instead, we see the elite and those in Zanu PF grabbing former white people\\u0026rsquo;s farms. In rural areas, we were not consulted on where we would like to be allocated land... This is sad and worrying for us, especially with this unpredictable climate change... If you voice up you risk being called rebellious and unpatriotic.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis narrative highlights how the promise of land equity has been subverted by postcolonial political dynamics, with land now functioning as a currency of political patronage. The reconfiguration of land governance from colonial authorities to post-independence elites has entrenched new hierarchies, where land allocation serves political loyalty rather than adaptive need. The fear of political reprisal silences community voices, further marginalising those already vulnerable to climate stress.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe exclusionary nature of land allocation also has direct consequences for climate adaptation. In drought-prone districts like Gwanda and Lupane, access to fertile and well-situated land can significantly increase a household\\u0026rsquo;s ability to engage in drought-resilient agriculture, such as small grains cultivation or rainwater harvesting. However, the elite capture of such land means that many communal farmers remain confined to marginal, degraded plots, where adaptive options are limited. This spatial injustice exacerbates climate vulnerability and deepens inequality in the distribution of environmental risks and opportunities.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, the failure to institutionalise participatory land governance violates key principles of good governance such as transparency, equity, and responsiveness, which are essential for building climate-resilient rural systems. As the findings suggest, the politicisation of land not only breeds resentment and distrust but also deprives communities of a vital resource with which to respond to an increasingly volatile climate. Thus, land in these \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; is not just a resource but a contested political terrain. Its capture by elites underscores how adaptation is not only about climate but also about power - who controls it, who is excluded from it, and how such exclusions shape the possibilities of survival in a warming world.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec14\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e4.2 Policy in the Dark: Climate Governance Without Grassroots\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eClimate change governance in Zimbabwe, while institutionally framed through national policies such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy and the National Climate Change Response Strategy, remains largely top-down, technocratic, and detached from the everyday realities of rural communities. In Gwanda and Lupane, archetypal \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo;, the disjuncture between formal climate frameworks and on-the-ground implementation is both stark and consequential.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eDespite the government\\u0026rsquo;s rhetorical commitment to inclusivity and participatory adaptation, evidence from this study reveals that rural farmers are neither aware of nor meaningfully involved in the design, implementation, or monitoring of climate change strategies. Projects such as the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF), purportedly a flagship programme for enhancing adaptive capacity in vulnerable areas, are implemented without adequate consultation with or participation from the very communities they intend to serve.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eA farmer from Lupane captured this frustration succinctly: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;We only see NGOs and government stakeholders coming to implement programmes\\u0026hellip; they are not for everyone, and no one asks for our opinion.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e This quote highlights the imposed and extractive nature of climate interventions in these districts. Instead of being co-produced or co-designed with local actors, programmes are parachuted into communities, often with externally set objectives and limited local ownership. The result is that such interventions, however well-intentioned, fail to resonate with local realities, values, or priorities. As a result, they are seen as transient projects that benefit a select few, rather than transformative strategies that build collective resilience.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe absence of grassroots involvement fundamentally undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate governance. Without local voices, policies become disconnected from contextual knowledge systems like indigenous coping strategies or local climate memory, which are crucial for effective adaptation. Moreover, the repeated exclusion of community input fosters deep mistrust between rural citizens and state or non-governmental actors, making it difficult to build sustained partnerships for resilience.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis top-down governance model also reflects broader patterns of political marginalisation. As the findings suggest, many rural residents interpret their exclusion from decision-making as symptomatic of a broader political economy in which their voices carry little weight. Consequently, climate adaptation policies that fail to integrate grassroots knowledge and agency risk reproducing the very inequalities they purport to address.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFurthermore, implementation gaps exacerbate the perception that climate change governance is an elite-driven process, often used to secure donor funding or meet international obligations, rather than to genuinely transform the lives of the rural poor. This instrumentalisation of policy, decoupled from practice, represents a core governance failure in the climate response architecture of Zimbabwe.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFigure \\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig3\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e3\\u003c/span\\u003e illustrates the disconnect between national climate policies and local realities in Gwanda and Lupane. It highlights how top-down policy flows through NGOs and local government institutions often lack meaningful community participation, feedback mechanisms, and institutional support, resulting in limited local engagement and effectiveness.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eWithout substantive inclusion of rural communities, climate governance remains a project of policy without presence, well-documented on paper but invisible in practice. In places like Gwanda and Lupane, where vulnerability to climate shocks is high and institutional trust is low, a shift towards decentralised, participatory, and locally accountable governance is not only necessary but urgent.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec15\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e4.3 Token Partnerships or Real Collaboration? Government\\u0026ndash;Civil Society Dynamics\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eIn recent years, Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s climate governance space has witnessed a noticeable evolution in the relationship between government and civil society organisations (CSOs). While traditionally adversarial, particularly around politically sensitive issues like human rights, land reform, and extractive industries, the climate change agenda appears to have created a more cooperative space for engagement. However, the depth, sincerity, and impact of this collaboration, particularly in rural \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; such as Gwanda and Lupane, remain contested.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThere is growing institutional recognition of the role that civil society plays in climate adaptation, especially in community engagement, policy advocacy, and project implementation. One government stakeholder noted: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;There is a very effective Civil Society Climate Change Working Group\\u0026hellip; actively part of the National Steering Committee.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e This Working Group has served as a formal conduit for CSOs to participate in national climate decision-making processes, including drafting inputs into policy and offering feedback on government-led interventions. It is a positive step toward pluralising governance and decentralising knowledge flows, and signals a shift from closed-door policymaking to multi-stakeholder engagement in Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s climate response.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eHowever, this collaborative spirit at the national level is not uniformly experienced on the ground. Evidence from Gwanda and Lupane suggests that this apparent partnership often fails to translate into meaningful engagement with rural communities. Despite the visibility of NGOs and climate-focused CSOs in these regions, their operations are frequently constrained by centralised decision-making, donor-driven timelines, and limited capacity to embed themselves long-term within local institutions. A farmer in Gwanda remarked: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;They come with their banners and workshops, but once they leave, nothing really changes for us. We are told what will happen, but never asked what we think should happen.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e Such sentiments reflect the persistent perception of external imposition rather than co-production, even in projects facilitated by civil society. The CSOs, while more trusted than government by many rural residents, are still viewed as intermediaries rather than true partners in governance. This highlights a critical issue: collaboration at the national policy table can be symbolic if it is not backed by horizontal linkages at the local level that include rural actors as agents, not passive recipients.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, the role of civil society is further complicated by its dual accountability - to both communities and external funders. This tension can compromise their autonomy and responsiveness, especially in regions where political sensitivities make it difficult to challenge state narratives or prioritise controversial issues like land rights and local power imbalances. While the government\\u0026rsquo;s willingness to work with civil society on climate issues is laudable, the partnership often functions more as a performance of inclusion than as a transformative shift in governance. Rural communities continue to express concern that decisions are made elsewhere, with limited transparency or feedback loops. As one Lupane villager put it: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;We hear they [NGOs and government] are working together in Harare, but we don\\u0026rsquo;t know what they are deciding or who they speak for.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis raises a key question: Is participation in climate governance real, or just rhetorical? The symbolic presence of civil society in formal structures may check donor boxes, but without a deliberate effort to embed community voices and redistribute decision-making power, it risks becoming tokenistic. Thus, while climate change has opened a relatively safer and more collaborative policy space for civil society engagement, the gap between elite partnerships and grassroots empowerment remains wide. Bridging this divide requires not only institutional reform but also a fundamental shift in how adaptation is conceptualised - not as a technical intervention, but as a political process grounded in justice, inclusion, and local agency.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec16\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e4.4 Seeds of Discontent: Corruption and Partisan Control of Adaptation Inputs\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAgricultural input schemes - ostensibly designed to enhance adaptive capacity and bolster food security in drought-prone areas - have become deeply politicised in Zimbabwe, particularly in rural districts like Gwanda and Lupane. Instead of serving as tools for inclusive adaptation, these programmes are often repurposed as vehicles for partisan control, elite accumulation, and electoral mobilisation. As such, they deepen existing vulnerabilities and undermine the transformative potential of climate adaptation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eGovernment input support programmes, which include the distribution of maize seed, fertiliser, and other agricultural resources, are widely seen by rural communities not as developmental interventions, but as extensions of ZANU-PF\\u0026rsquo;s political patronage network. Farmers across focus group discussions expressed disillusionment with the scheme\\u0026rsquo;s discriminatory nature. As one participant from Gwanda stated: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;The government of Zimbabwe is trying their best to provide rural farmers with agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizers. However, these seeds are mostly for maize and not for sorghum and millet which are commonly grown here. We know that this scheme has nothing to do with livelihood enhancement... it\\u0026rsquo;s political campaigns laden with corruption.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis quote captures both the exclusionary nature of input distribution and the broader mismatch between state-driven interventions and local agroecological realities. While maize remains, the dominant crop promoted by government schemes, it is ill-suited to the semi-arid conditions of Matabeleland North and South, where rainfall is increasingly erratic due to climate change. Local crops such as sorghum and millet, traditionally grown in these regions due to their drought tolerance, receive far less institutional support. This reflects a fundamental flaw in climate adaptation governance: the prioritisation of politically symbolic crops over context-sensitive agronomy.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, input distribution is tightly controlled through local leadership structures aligned with the ruling party, further entrenching political exclusion. Testimonies from both Gwanda and Lupane reveal how farmers perceived access to inputs as conditional upon political allegiance. One community member explained: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;One of the village heads took all the agricultural inputs meant for all farmers in my village and only allocated them to those supporting the ruling party. This means that if you do not belong to ZANU PF, you will have your livelihood compromised.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis account points to a systemic erosion of equity, transparency, and trust - core tenets of good governance. It also reinforces how adaptation strategies are not implemented in a political vacuum but are deeply embedded in local power structures that use state resources for political gatekeeping. Furthermore, farmers report that the seeds distributed under the government\\u0026rsquo;s schemes are often not climate-resilient, poorly suited to the short and unpredictable growing seasons exacerbated by the effects of El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o. While there are government efforts to promote drought-tolerant varieties through agricultural extension services, uptake remains low. Reasons include lack of awareness, weak institutional support, and distrust in state-led initiatives, particularly when communities perceive them as politically motivated rather than driven by agronomic suitability or genuine livelihood enhancement.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eIn this context, adaptation becomes not just a technical or environmental challenge but a profoundly political one. The corruption and partisan nature of input distribution distorts adaptation outcomes, reinforcing climate vulnerability along political lines and disempowering communities already struggling with environmental precarity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFigure \\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig4\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e4\\u003c/span\\u003e illustrates the political economy of adaptation inputs distribution illustrating how political elites, traditional leaders, and local councillors control access to agricultural inputs, which are preferentially allocated to party loyalists, while excluded community members face denial, marginalization, and exclusion from critical resources such as seeds, fertilisers, climate information, and agricultural support.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe politicisation of adaptation inputs transforms a potentially empowering intervention into a tool of exclusion and control. It undermines the credibility of climate governance institutions and hampers the development of robust, community-centred adaptation systems. Any serious commitment to equitable and effective climate resilience in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; must first reckon with the toxic entanglement of adaptation, power, and partisanship.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec17\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e4.5 Governance at Arm\\u0026rsquo;s Length: Community Distrust and Broken Accountability\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eEffective climate adaptation in rural settings depends not only on national policies and technical inputs but also on the quality of local governance, the everyday relationships between state actors and communities that determine trust, transparency, and responsiveness. In Gwanda and Lupane, however, this relationship is frayed. What emerges from the findings is a picture of disconnected leadership, deep-rooted community mistrust, and a breakdown in accountability mechanisms - a dangerous triad that compromises adaptation effectiveness.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eLocal leaders often claim to be accessible, responsive, and aligned with the needs of their constituents. A councillor from Ward 22 in Gwanda, for instance, insisted: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;I have an open-door policy\\u0026hellip; all villagers can come to me.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e Such statements reflect the official narrative of proximity and public service, which portrays local governance as participatory and people-centred. However, interviews and focus group discussions across both districts tell a different story, one of resentment, political exclusion, and broken social contracts. In contrast to the councillor\\u0026rsquo;s portrayal, a villager offered a more sobering account: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;We no longer trust our leaders because they are corrupt and fuel poverty in this area. Instead of them pioneering development projects\\u0026hellip; they hijack projects meant to help poor farmers.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis contradiction reveals the symbolic nature of local governance, where leaders publicly perform responsiveness while privately consolidating control. Accountability is further eroded when local leaders serve dual roles: as community representatives and as gatekeepers of state resources, roles that often blur in practice. The example of input distribution being reserved for ruling party supporters reinforces how political partisanship supplants impartial service delivery. \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;One village head took all the agricultural inputs meant for all farmers in my village and only allocated them to those supporting the ruling party.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e Such politicisation of basic services leads to what Ferguson (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR20\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e1994\\u003c/span\\u003e) described as the \\u0026ldquo;anti-politics machine\\u0026rdquo;, a system that claims neutrality but operates through deeply political logics, often disguised as technical governance. The net effect is that trust in institutions deteriorates, and governance becomes a performative exercise rather than a meaningful channel of representation and redress.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis erosion of trust is not incidental; it is structurally embedded. The top-down orientation of Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s governance system, where policies are formulated at the centre and filtered down through aligned local elites, leaves little room for genuine grassroots participation. Local actors are thus seen not as co-creators of policy, but as passive recipients or, worse, as politically conditional beneficiaries.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe findings suggest that accountability mechanisms are either absent or deeply compromised. While the Constitution guarantees rights to development and environmental protection, these rights are hollow without institutional pathways for grievance, remedy, or democratic oversight. Community members report that complaints go unheard, and that challenging local leaders is either futile or politically dangerous, particularly in areas historically marginalised for their perceived opposition to the ruling party.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eUltimately, the breakdown of local accountability reflects a deeper crisis of governance legitimacy in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places.\\u0026rsquo; When communities lose trust in their representatives, climate adaptation efforts lose credibility, traction, and sustainability. Rebuilding that trust requires more than policy; it demands institutional reform, participatory governance, and mechanisms for holding leaders accountable to those they claim to serve. In contexts like Gwanda and Lupane, where climate risk is compounded by political neglect, such transformations are not optional - they are essential.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\n\\u003ch3\\u003e6. Rural Resilience in the Margins: Community Strategies Beyond the State\\u003c/h3\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eIn the face of persistent state failure, political exclusion, and unreliable institutional support, rural communities in Gwanda and Lupane are not passive victims of climate change. Rather, they exhibit notable forms of agency, adaptation, and innovation that demonstrate the power of grassroots resilience in navigating environmental uncertainty. These bottom-up efforts, rooted in everyday practice, indigenous knowledge, and social solidarity, constitute what can be understood as \\u0026ldquo;climate citizenship from below\\u0026rdquo;.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eDespite receiving limited or no meaningful support from formal governance structures, communities have developed a suite of coping strategies to mitigate the effects of El Ni\\u0026ntilde;o-induced droughts. These include the establishment of community gardens, especially along riverbanks and wetlands; a partial shift to drought-resistant crops such as sorghum and millet; and the continued reliance on traditional knowledge systems such as timing agricultural activities based on local ecological indicators. Such strategies not only reflect adaptation but also embody a form of political critique, an insistence on survival despite abandonment.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eHowever, these efforts occur within a climate of profound scepticism toward the state. One local farmer commented: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;People still want to grow maize\\u0026hellip; they don\\u0026rsquo;t believe the government will meet their needs.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e This remark encapsulates a double reality: a continued reliance on maize as a cultural and dietary staple, and a deep mistrust in state-led adaptation interventions that are often seen as ill-suited, corrupt, or politically biased. Although government programmes promote small grains, uptake remains limited due to perceptions that they are labour-intensive, lack market support, or carry a stigma of being \\u0026ldquo;poverty crops.\\u0026rdquo; Farmers also noted that institutions like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) show limited interest in buying these crops, reinforcing disincentives to shift away from maize.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eYet, adaptation persists, not as a product of state planning, but through incremental adjustments driven by local knowledge and mutual aid. For instance, in both Gwanda and Lupane, women-led initiatives have emerged around shared water harvesting systems and cooperative seed saving, allowing small-scale farmers to experiment with alternative planting techniques. Informal information-sharing networks among older farmers continue to provide crucial guidance on soil preservation and rain forecasting, especially as formal extension services become increasingly politicised or inaccessible.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis form of \\u0026ldquo;resilience in the margins\\u0026rdquo; must not be romanticised. It is often fragile, under-resourced, and overburdened by structural neglect. Nevertheless, it reveals a critical insight: adaptive capacity does not solely reside within formal institutions. It is embedded in local relationships, practices, and ecological intimacy - factors consistently overlooked by national climate strategies.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFigure \\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig5\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e5\\u003c/span\\u003e illustrates community-driven adaptation processes grounded in traditional knowledge and social networks. It highlights how grassroots strategies like seed sharing, community gardens, water harvesting, and informal mutual aid contribute to resilience and climate citizenship from below, fostering local agency amid state failure and political exclusion.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAs they continue to adapt through their own means, rural communities in Gwanda and Lupane assert a form of climate-citizenship, a claim to climate and water justice that emerges not through institutional access, but through lived resistance. This grassroots adaptation is not merely reactive; it is generative. It proposes alternative models of sustainability that challenge the technocratic and centralised logic of mainstream climate governance.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"5. Discussion\",\"content\":\"\\u003ch2\\u003eClimate Change Adaptation as a Political Project - Power, Participation, and Grassroots Futures\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec20\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e5.1 Beyond Technocratic Adaptation \\u0026ndash; Climate Governance as Political Practice\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMainstream climate change adaptation frameworks in Zimbabwe, much like elsewhere in the Global South, are often framed through a technocratic lens that prioritises policy instruments, climate modelling, and centrally managed intervention schemes. These approaches, while appearing rational and scientific, tend to obscure the deeply political nature of adaptation, particularly in marginalised rural areas like Gwanda and Lupane. The result is a depoliticised governance architecture that treats adaptation as a neutral, technical challenge rather than a terrain of power, exclusion, and struggle.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eFerguson\\u0026rsquo;s (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR20\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e1994\\u003c/span\\u003e) seminal work on \\u003cem\\u003eThe Anti-Politics Machine\\u003c/em\\u003e provides a powerful lens through which to understand how development and climate interventions function to \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;depoliticise\\u0026rdquo; deeply political issues by presenting them as technical problems to be solved by experts.\\u003c/em\\u003e This tendency is evident in Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s climate governance landscape, where national strategies such as the Zimbabwe Climate Change Response Strategy (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR26\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e) and the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR27\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2016\\u003c/span\\u003e) focus on sectoral planning, capacity building, and resilience metrics - while glossing over the entrenched governance failures, elite capture, and structural inequalities that mediate access to climate-related resources.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis technocratic framing is reinforced by donor-driven programmes like the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund, which, although ostensibly participatory, are often implemented through a top-down architecture that marginalises rural voices. As the findings in Gwanda and Lupane reveal, input schemes and climate projects are routinely manipulated by local political elites who distribute resources along partisan lines, favouring ZANU-PF loyalists while excluding dissenting or unaffiliated community members. As one participant put it: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;If you do not belong to ZANU PF, you will have your livelihood compromised.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eSuch experiences illustrate how clientelism shapes adaptation outcomes, with access to seeds, fertilisers, and land mediated through informal networks of loyalty and control. This dynamic is emblematic of what Leftwich (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR31\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2008\\u003c/span\\u003e) describes as the \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;primacy of politics\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e in development, where outcomes are determined not by policy design, but by the power relations, interests, and incentives that shape implementation on the ground.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eLand governance provides another example of how adaptation is structured by politics rather than technical logic. Despite constitutional provisions and the historical promises of the land reform programme, the reality in Gwanda and Lupane is that access to arable land remains politicised, controlled by traditional leaders and party-affiliated elites. Land is not allocated based on ecological need or adaptive potential, but through patronage networks that reward loyalty. This undermines the very foundation of adaptive capacity in these drought-prone regions.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, the exclusion of local knowledge and community agency in planning processes reinforces the dominance of scientific expertise and state-centric authority, sidelining grassroots strategies that have long supported rural resilience. Adaptation must be understood as an \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;arena of contestation,\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e where knowledge, authority, and resources are unevenly distributed and negotiated.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe failure to acknowledge these dynamics has led to an illusion of adaptation - one where policies exist, projects are implemented, and international obligations are met, but the lived realities of vulnerability persist or even deepen. This disjuncture highlights the urgent need to reposition adaptation as a political practice, one that prioritises accountability, transparency, and democratic inclusion over technocratic efficiency.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eClearly, climate adaptation in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; like Gwanda and Lupane cannot be addressed through depoliticised technical fixes. It must confront the historical legacies of marginalisation, the contemporary logics of political control, and the real conditions under which rural communities strive to survive and adapt. Without doing so, adaptation efforts risk reinforcing the very inequalities they seek to overcome.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec21\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e5.2 From Participation-as-Performance to Deep Inclusion \\u0026ndash; Interrogating Governance Claims\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eClimate change adaptation discourse in Zimbabwe frequently emphasises participation, inclusion, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. National documents such as the Zimbabwe Climate Policy (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR27\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2016\\u003c/span\\u003e) and the National Climate Change Response Strategy (GoZ, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR26\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2015\\u003c/span\\u003e) stress the need for \\u0026ldquo;broad-based stakeholder engagement\\u0026rdquo; and \\u0026ldquo;community-driven approaches\\u0026rdquo; in building climate resilience. However, evidence from Gwanda and Lupane reveals a troubling disjuncture between this participatory rhetoric and the lived experiences of rural communities, suggesting that participation often remains symbolic rather than substantive. Figure\\u0026nbsp;\\u003cspan refid=\\\"Fig6\\\" class=\\\"InternalRef\\\"\\u003e6\\u003c/span\\u003e illustrates the governance and participation spectrum in climate adaptation, ranging from tokenistic participation and symbolic inclusion to genuine grassroots engagement and deep co-production. It highlights the gradations of community involvement and the challenges posed by elite-controlled and proxy participation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eA notable initiative is the Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change (CSCCC), which has been praised for fostering dialogue between civil society organisations (CSOs) and government actors, particularly through its engagement with the National Climate Change Steering Committee. Government officials often highlight this platform as evidence of inclusive governance. As one stakeholder explained: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;There is a very effective Civil Society Climate Change Working Group\\u0026hellip; actively part of the National Steering Committee.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eWhile this collaboration is an encouraging sign of evolving governance structures, it raises critical questions about who is being represented and whether such engagement genuinely filters down to the grassroots. As Cornwall (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR15\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2008\\u003c/span\\u003e) argues, participatory spaces often become \\u0026ldquo;invited spaces\\u0026rdquo; controlled by elites and structured in ways that limit dissent and redefine community involvement around state-defined terms. In the case of the CSCCC, rural residents and marginalised constituencies are rarely direct participants in agenda-setting or decision-making. Instead, participation is mediated through NGO representatives, many of whom are disconnected from the local contexts they claim to represent.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis top-down model of \\u0026ldquo;participation-by-proxy\\u0026rdquo; fosters widespread mistrust among rural communities. In Gwanda and Lupane, local leaders such as chiefs, councillors, and NGO officials are often seen not as community advocates but as gatekeepers of state power and donor resources. As one villager in Lupane lamented: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;We no longer trust our leaders... one village head took all the agricultural inputs and gave them to ruling party supporters.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThese experiences reflect what can be described as \\u0026ldquo;governance at arm\\u0026rsquo;s length\\u0026rdquo;: a system where the appearance of engagement masks a deeper lack of accountability and responsiveness. Institutions may be physically present through NGO offices, local councillors, or development projects, but they often operate without meaningful consultation, deliberation, or feedback loops. This distance reinforces feelings of abandonment and contributes to what Gaventa (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR24\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2006\\u003c/span\\u003e) calls the \\u0026ldquo;vertical gap\\u0026rdquo; in governance, the space between citizens and those who claim to govern on their behalf.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eMoreover, the instrumentalisation of participation used to legitimise externally designed projects or fulfil donor reporting requirements undermines its transformative potential. Many rural residents view participatory events as \\u0026ldquo;box-ticking exercises\\u0026rdquo;, where their presence is required but their voices are marginalised. As a farmer in Gwanda remarked:\\u003cdiv class=\\\"BlockQuote\\\"\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThey [NGOs] come with their banners and workshops, but once they leave, nothing really changes for us. We are told what will happen, but never asked what we think should happen.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThis sentiment underscores a deeper crisis of governance legitimacy in Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s climate change response. Participation, when reduced to performance, not only disempowers communities but also delegitimises the very processes intended to build trust and resilience. It reinforces the perception that adaptation planning is something done to communities rather than with them.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eTo move beyond participation as a performance, there is an urgent need to repoliticise participatory governance. This means recognising that adaptation decisions are embedded in power relations and must be co-produced through genuinely inclusive, locally grounded, and democratically accountable processes. It requires creating \\u0026ldquo;claimed spaces\\u0026rdquo; (Cornwall, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR14\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2002\\u003c/span\\u003e), where communities articulate their own priorities, define success on their own terms, and challenge the structures that reproduce their marginalisation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\\u003cdiv id=\\\"Sec22\\\" class=\\\"Section2\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch2\\u003e5.3 Climate Citizenship from Below \\u0026ndash; Locating Resilience in Everyday Practice\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eDominant climate adaptation frameworks in Zimbabwe, as in much of the Global South, tend to view rural communities as passive recipients of aid, knowledge, and intervention. Yet, in \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; like Gwanda and Lupane, where state support is inconsistent, politically mediated, or absent altogether, communities are enacting their own forms of bottom-up resilience. These grassroots strategies, grounded in traditional knowledge, mutual aid, and everyday innovation, represent a form of what can be termed climate-citizenship: a mode of political agency through which people claim the right to survive, adapt, and thrive in the face of systemic abandonment.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe findings reveal how rural farmers are drawing on vernacular resilience (MacKinnon \\u0026amp; Derickson, \\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR32\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e), locally situated and historically embedded knowledge systems that enable adaptation without dependence on formal institutions. In both Gwanda and Lupane, households have initiated and maintained community gardens, especially along wetland areas, to buffer against drought-related food insecurity. Seed-sharing practices, often coordinated informally through social networks, enable farmers to access traditional varieties of crops like sorghum and millet, which are more drought-tolerant than the maize typically promoted by government schemes.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThese practices are not just pragmatic responses to climate variability, they are political acts. They contest the authority and effectiveness of state-led adaptation, especially when such interventions are perceived as corrupt, exclusionary, or irrelevant. As one farmer explained: \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;People still want to grow maize\\u0026hellip; they don\\u0026rsquo;t believe government will meet their needs.\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e This statement reflects a broader epistemic and political disillusionment: a sense that the state lacks both the will and the understanding to support contextually appropriate resilience. In response, communities have forged their own pathways, drawing on local knowledge, historical memory, and collective labour as tools for survival. These strategies challenge the technocratic framing of adaptation as a linear process delivered from above, and instead position it as an emergent, place-based struggle for dignity, recognition, and life.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe concept of climate-citizenship captures how marginalised communities assert their rights to essential environmental goods through everyday practices of care, resistance, and survival. In Gwanda and Lupane, this includes the construction of small-scale water harvesting pits, rotational community watering systems, and the informal coordination of communal labour during planting and harvesting seasons.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eLikewise, vernacular resilience offers an important corrective to adaptation models that privilege scientific expertise while marginalising local and indigenous knowledge. As MacKinnon and Derickson (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR32\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e2013\\u003c/span\\u003e) argue, vernacular resilience emerges from \\u003cem\\u003e\\u0026ldquo;people\\u0026rsquo;s embedded relationships with place, practice, and community\\u0026rdquo;\\u003c/em\\u003e - a description that resonates powerfully with the lived realities of the farmers in this study. By recognising these efforts as legitimate and valuable, we move toward an adaptation paradigm that is not only more just but also more effective.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eImportantly, these grassroots practices also reframe the rural poor as active subjects rather than passive victims of climate change. They make visible the agency, ingenuity, and political critique embedded in local responses. Rather than waiting for distant policy interventions or donor-led projects, these communities are asserting their right to adapt on their own terms, reclaiming their ecological knowledge and reweaving their social relations in ways that challenge narratives of helplessness.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eYet, despite their importance, these practices are often undervalued in official adaptation planning, which continues to focus on large-scale, measurable interventions aligned with national targets or donor priorities. By sidelining local ingenuity, policy frameworks miss opportunities to support scalable, culturally appropriate solutions that are already rooted in community practice.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003c/div\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"6. Conclusion\",\"content\":\"\\u003ch2\\u003eRepoliticising Adaptation in Left Behind Places – Towards Climate Justice from Below\\u003c/h2\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis paper critically examined the intersection of climate governance, politics, and local agency in Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s marginalised districts of Gwanda and Lupane, regions emblematic of what are increasingly being called \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places.\\u0026rsquo; At the heart of the argument lies a fundamental challenge to the dominant, technocratic framings of climate adaptation. Rather than neutral, scientific, or purely environmental interventions, adaptation in these contexts is deeply shaped by historical injustices, political capture, institutional failures, and contested claims to voice, space, and survival.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe findings reveal how climate adaptation in Zimbabwe is marked by a disjuncture between national policy and local experience. Government-led adaptation programmes, often designed around technical efficiency and donor imperatives, function as what Ferguson (\\u003cspan citationid=\\\"CR20\\\" class=\\\"CitationRef\\\"\\u003e1994\\u003c/span\\u003e) terms an \\u003cem\\u003eanti-politics machine\\u003c/em\\u003e - they obscure structural inequalities by treating adaptation as a problem of inputs and implementation, while ignoring the real, lived politics of access, exclusion, and control. Input schemes are routinely politicised, land remains a tool of elite capture, and participation is performed more than practised. At best, civil society platforms such as the Civil Society Climate Change Working Group offer symbolic inclusion; at worst, they legitimise an exclusionary governance model cloaked in the language of participation.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eYet, this is not only a story of state failure. It is also a story of grassroots resilience and political agency. In the absence of robust institutional support, rural communities are enacting forms of vernacular resilience and climate-citizenship, where adaptation becomes a lived, place-based struggle. Through informal seed sharing, traditional water harvesting, and the maintenance of community gardens, farmers are not just surviving, they are asserting their right to adapt on their own terms. These everyday acts of climate resilience are deeply political: they constitute a claim to inclusion, dignity, and justice, not as beneficiaries, but as co-authors of their own futures.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe paper contributes to the growing body of literature arguing that climate adaptation is, at its core, a political and justice-oriented process. It demands a critical interrogation of who decides, who benefits, and who is left behind. The evidence from Gwanda and Lupane shows that adaptation without accountability, equity, or grassroots voice is not adaptation at all - it is abandonment in disguise.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003ePolicy frameworks must therefore shift from technocratic metrics of resilience to relational, redistributive, and participatory models of climate governance. This includes devolving authority to local institutions that are transparent and accountable; embedding indigenous and local knowledge into adaptation planning; and disrupting the entrenched systems of partisan control, exclusionary participation, and resource capture that undermine climate justice.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eWhat is ultimately needed is not just better adaptation policy, but a reparative adaptation agenda - one that redresses historical marginalisation, rebuilds the broken social contract between state and citizen, and recognises the right to adapt as a form of political belonging. Gwanda and Lupane are not blank slates awaiting intervention. They are sites of innovation, resistance, and climate citizenship from below.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eAs we move deeper into an era of compounding climate crises, a final provocation must be raised: \\u003cem\\u003eIf climate governance continues to marginalise those already living at the edge of precarity, then what exactly are we adapting to, and for whom?\\u003c/em\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\u003cp\\u003eThe future of climate justice in Africa will not be built solely in national policy rooms or donor reports, it will be built in the fields, homesteads, and communities of those whose everyday practices defy erasure and demand recognition.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"Declarations\",\"content\":\"\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eDisclosure statement:\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eDisclaimer:\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u0026nbsp;\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eLiability for commissions, omissions and/or views expressed in this paper remains entirely the responsibility of the authors.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eFunding:\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe study did not receive funding from any source\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eData availability\\u0026nbsp;(data transparency):\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThe paper has no data to declare\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eEthics Declaration:\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eThis study received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Stellenbosch [SOC-2021-23651] on 20 February 2023. All research procedures adhered to the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki and followed established social science research ethics protocols involving human participants.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eConsent to Participate:\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eInformed consent was obtained from all participants between 20 February 2023 and 15 May 2023, prior to the commencement of data collection activities in Gwanda and Lupane Districts. The consent process included both verbal and written explanations of the research objectives, the voluntary nature of participation, and the right to withdraw at any point without any negative consequences. Participants signed or verbally confirmed their consent before taking part in interviews or focus group discussions. All engagements were carried out with full respect for participants\\u0026rsquo; confidentiality, autonomy, and dignity.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eClinical Trial Number:\\u003c/strong\\u003e Not Applicable.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eConsent to Publish declaration:\\u003c/strong\\u003e Not applicable.\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003e\\u003cstrong\\u003eAuthor Contribution\\u003c/strong\\u003e\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\\u003cp\\u003eVPM - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.WM - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.NS - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.JB - conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and writing - original draft, review and editing.\\u003c/p\\u003e\"},{\"header\":\"References\",\"content\":\"\\u003col\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eAdhikari S (2018) Drought impact and adaptation strategies in the mid-hill farming system of western Nepal. Environments 5(9):101\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eBhanye J (2024) Beyond informality:\\u0026lsquo;Nimble peri-urban land transactions\\u0026rsquo;-how migrants on the margins trade, access and hold land for settlement. Discover Global Soc 2(1):6\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eBhanye JI, Dzingirai V, Campbell MM (2024) Transactional and Supplementary Strategies for Accessing Land Among Migrants on the Margins: An Ethnographic Study Among Malawian Migrants at Lydiate Informal Settlement, Zimbabwe. Secondary Cities and Local Governance in Southern Africa. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 87\\u0026ndash;114\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eBhanye J, Maisiri M (2023) Environmental Communication (EC) and the new media: An African context perspective. The Palgrave Handbook of Global Social Change. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 1\\u0026ndash;23\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eBraun V, Clarke V (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Res Psychol 3(2):77\\u0026ndash;101\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eBrown D, Chanakira RR, Chatiza K, Dhliwayo M, Dodman D, Masiiwa M, Zvigadza S (2012) Climate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation in Zimbabwe. International Institute for Environment and Development.\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eChanza N (2017) Limits to climate change adaptation in Zimbabwe: Insights, experiences and lessons. Limits to climate change adaptation. 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Prog Hum Geogr 37(2):253\\u0026ndash;270\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMacKinnon D, Kempton L, O\\u0026rsquo;Brien P, Ormerod E, Pike A, Tomaney J (2022) Reframing urban and regional \\u0026lsquo;development\\u0026rsquo;for \\u0026lsquo;left behind\\u0026rsquo;places. Camb J Reg Econ Soc 15(1):39\\u0026ndash;56\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eManyeruke C, Hamauswa S, Mhandara L (2013) The effects of climate change and variability on food security in Zimbabwe: A socio-economic and political analysis. Int J Humanit Social Sci 3(6):270\\u0026ndash;286\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMaslin S (2022) Driving higher enterprise value through good governance. Research Handbook on Corporate Board Decision-Making. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp 135\\u0026ndash;161\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMikulewicz M (2018) The post-politics of adaptation to climate change. The University of Manchester (United Kingdom)\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMoyo VP (2024) Rural Farmers\\u0026rsquo; Adaptive And Transformative Capacity In Response To Climate Change And Artisanal Small-Scale Mining In Rural Gwanda, Zimbabwe, 1980 TO 2021 (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch University)\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMpala TA, Simatele MD (2024) Climate-smart agricultural practices among rural farmers in Masvingo district of Zimbabwe: Perspectives on the mitigation strategies to drought and water scarcity for improved crop production. Front Sustainable Food Syst 7:1298908\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMubaya CP, Mafongoya P (2017) The role of institutions in managing local level climate change adaptation in semi-arid Zimbabwe. Clim Risk Manage 16:93\\u0026ndash;105\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMugambiwa SS, Rukema JR (2019) Rethinking indigenous climate governance through climate change and variability discourse by a Zimbabwean rural community. Int J Clim Change Strateg Manag 11(5):730\\u0026ndash;743\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eMugiyo H, Magadzire T, Choruma DJ, Chimonyo VGP, Manzou R, Jiri O, Mabhaudhi T (2023) El ni\\u0026ntilde;o\\u0026rsquo;s effects on southern african agriculture in 2023/24 and anticipatory action strategies to reduce the impacts in zimbabwe. 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J\\u0026agrave;mb\\u0026aacute;: J Disaster Risk Stud 11(1):1\\u0026ndash;9\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNcube AM (2025) After Battles then comes War: Juxtaposing the Role of the Anglican Diocese of Matabeleland in Gukurahundi Healing and Reconciliation. E-J Religious Theological Stud 11(4):117\\u0026ndash;127\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNdebele-Murisa MR, Mubaya CP, Pretorius L, Mamombe R, Iipinge K, Nchito W, Mwalukanga B (2020) City to city learning and knowledge exchange for climate resilience in southern Africa. PLoS ONE, 15(1), e0227915\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNdebele-Murisa M, Mubaya C (2015) Climate change: Impact on agriculture, livelihood options and adaptation strategies for smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe. Beyond crises: Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s prospects transformation 155:198\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNdlovu S, Maviza G, Tarusarira J, Caroli G, Mandlenkosi M, Makanda J (2024) The nexus between climate change, migration and social tensions in Zimbabwe\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNewell P, Pattberg P, Schroeder H (2012) Multiactor governance and the environment. Annu Rev Environ Resour 37(1):365\\u0026ndash;387\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNgwenya B, Oosthuizen J, Cross M, Frimpong K (2018) Emerging heat-related climate change influences; a public health challenge to health care practitioners and policy makers: insight from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Int J disaster risk Reduct 27:596\\u0026ndash;601\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eNyambo P, Zhou L, Mapuka FN, Slayi M, Muchaku S, Dzvene AR (2024) Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change for Enhanced Nutrition, Food, and Income Security of Rural Communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. \\u003cem\\u003eHandbook of Nature-Based Solutions to Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change\\u003c/em\\u003e, 1\\u0026ndash;24\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003ePhiri K, Dube T, Moyo P, Ncube C, Ndlovu S (2019) Small grains resistance? Making sense of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers\\u0026rsquo; cropping choices and patterns within a climate change context. Cogent Social Sci\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eRodr\\u0026iacute;guez-Pose A (2018) The revenge of the places that don\\u0026rsquo;t matter (and what to do about it). Camb J Reg Econ Soc 11(1):189\\u0026ndash;209\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eRosenau JN (2000) The governance of fragmegration: Neither a world republic nor a global interstate system. Studia Diplomatica, 15\\u0026ndash;39\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eSaunders R (2020) The politics of resource bargaining, social relations and institutional development in Zimbabwe since independence. Springer International Publishing, pp 371\\u0026ndash;403\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eScoones I et al (1996) \\u0026amp; E. A. \\u003cem\\u003eHazards and opportunities: farming livelihoods in dryland Africa. Lessons from Zimbabwe\\u003c/em\\u003e (p. 283-pp)\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eSsekamatte D (2018) The role of monitoring and evaluation in climate change mitigation and adaptation interventions in developing countries. Afr Evaluation J 6(1):1\\u0026ndash;9\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003cli\\u003e\\u003cspan\\u003eTirivangasi HM, Nyahunda L (2019) Challenges faced by rural people in mitigating the effects of climate change in the Mazungunye communal lands, Zimbabwe. J\\u0026agrave;mb\\u0026aacute;: J Disaster Risk Stud 11(1):1\\u0026ndash;9\\u003c/span\\u003e\\u003c/li\\u003e\\u003c/ol\\u003e\"}],\"fulltextSource\":\"\",\"fullText\":\"\",\"funders\":[],\"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow\":false,\"hasManuscriptDocX\":true,\"hasOptedInToPreprint\":true,\"hasPassedJournalQc\":\"\",\"hasAnyPriority\":false,\"hideJournal\":false,\"highlight\":\"\",\"institution\":\"\",\"isAcceptedByJournal\":false,\"isAuthorSuppliedPdf\":false,\"isDeskRejected\":\"\",\"isHiddenFromSearch\":false,\"isInQc\":false,\"isInWorkflow\":false,\"isPdf\":false,\"isPdfUpToDate\":true,\"isWithdrawnOrRetracted\":false,\"journal\":{\"display\":true,\"email\":\"info@researchsquare.com\",\"identity\":\"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications\",\"isNatureJournal\":false,\"hasQc\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":false,\"externalIdentity\":\"palcomms\",\"sideBox\":\"Learn more about [Humanities \\u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)\",\"snPcode\":\"41599\",\"submissionUrl\":\"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3\",\"title\":\"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications\",\"twitterHandle\":\"\",\"acdcEnabled\":true,\"dfaEnabled\":true,\"editorialSystem\":\"stoa\",\"reportingPortfolio\":\"Nature AJ\",\"inReviewEnabled\":true,\"inReviewRevisionsEnabled\":false},\"keywords\":\"climate change, rural, governance, politics, left behind places, Zimbabwe\",\"lastPublishedDoi\":\"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7037252/v1\",\"lastPublishedDoiUrl\":\"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7037252/v1\",\"license\":{\"name\":\"CC BY 4.0\",\"url\":\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\"},\"manuscriptAbstract\":\"\\u003cp\\u003eGlobal and national adaptation discourses often celebrate policies, funding targets, and institutional frameworks. But what happens when these narratives collide with everyday life in rural \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo;? Here, adaptation is not just about glossy project reports, it is about elders reviving seed-sharing networks, women organising water rotas, and communities demanding inclusion in decisions that affect their survival. This paper peels back the layers of policy rhetoric to reveal the governance failures, political exclusions, and grassroots innovations shaping climate adaptation in places too often ignored. The paper critically examines the governance and political dynamics shaping climate change adaptation in Gwanda and Lupane - two rural districts emblematic of \\u0026lsquo;Left Behind Places\\u0026rsquo; in Zimbabwe\\u0026rsquo;s political economy. Drawing on qualitative data from key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and policy analysis, the study reveals how adaptation efforts are constrained by politicised resource distribution, elite capture, and top-down decision-making processes. Despite the presence of formal climate policies and NGO interventions, local communities remain excluded from governance structures, with participation often reduced to symbolic performance. Yet, amid this institutional neglect, communities engage in grassroots adaptation through traditional knowledge, informal innovation, and social collaboration, what this paper conceptualises as climate citizenship from below. The findings call for a repoliticisation of adaptation governance in Zimbabwe, grounded in inclusion, transparency, and local agency. In advancing these arguments, the paper contributes to critical climate governance scholarship in Africa and offers pathways toward more just, participatory, and context-sensitive adaptation frameworks.\\u003c/p\\u003e\",\"manuscriptTitle\":\"Muddled governance and politics in climate change adaptation in ‘Left Behind Places’: Evidence from Gwanda and Lupane Districts, Zimbabwe\",\"msid\":\"\",\"msnumber\":\"\",\"nonDraftVersions\":[{\"code\":1,\"date\":\"2025-08-21 16:09:04\",\"doi\":\"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7037252/v1\",\"editorialEvents\":[{\"type\":\"communityComments\",\"content\":0},{\"type\":\"decision\",\"content\":\"Revision requested\",\"date\":\"2025-11-13T11:09:45+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"editorInvitedReview\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-11-12T11:10:39+00:00\",\"index\":\"hide\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"reviewerAgreed\",\"content\":\"33303705652529640755718995793300471771\",\"date\":\"2025-11-03T05:23:51+00:00\",\"index\":\"hide\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"editorInvitedReview\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-08-25T18:34:29+00:00\",\"index\":\"hide\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"reviewerAgreed\",\"content\":\"23606940307618275094105868831907614802\",\"date\":\"2025-08-23T08:51:01+00:00\",\"index\":\"hide\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"reviewerAgreed\",\"content\":\"54087640973041416833352281435236433499\",\"date\":\"2025-08-14T10:17:58+00:00\",\"index\":\"hide\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"reviewersInvited\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-08-13T21:28:44+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"editorAssigned\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-08-13T20:53:08+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"editorInvited\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-08-13T20:02:07+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"checksComplete\",\"content\":\"\",\"date\":\"2025-07-31T10:09:07+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"submitted\",\"content\":\"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications\",\"date\":\"2025-07-31T09:32:28+00:00\",\"index\":\"\",\"fulltext\":\"\"}],\"status\":\"published\",\"journal\":{\"display\":true,\"email\":\"info@researchsquare.com\",\"identity\":\"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications\",\"isNatureJournal\":false,\"hasQc\":true,\"allowDirectSubmit\":false,\"externalIdentity\":\"palcomms\",\"sideBox\":\"Learn more about [Humanities \\u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)\",\"snPcode\":\"41599\",\"submissionUrl\":\"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3\",\"title\":\"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications\",\"twitterHandle\":\"\",\"acdcEnabled\":true,\"dfaEnabled\":true,\"editorialSystem\":\"stoa\",\"reportingPortfolio\":\"Nature AJ\",\"inReviewEnabled\":true,\"inReviewRevisionsEnabled\":false}}],\"origin\":\"\",\"ownerIdentity\":\"49454e71-b8ab-414e-aa21-1062054f9216\",\"owner\":[],\"postedDate\":\"August 21st, 2025\",\"published\":true,\"recentEditorialEvents\":[],\"rejectedJournal\":[],\"revision\":\"\",\"amendment\":\"\",\"status\":\"under-review\",\"subjectAreas\":[{\"id\":53236006,\"name\":\"Social science/Development studies\"},{\"id\":53236007,\"name\":\"Social science/Environmental studies\"},{\"id\":53236008,\"name\":\"Scientific community and society/Geography\"},{\"id\":53236009,\"name\":\"Social science/Geography\"},{\"id\":53236010,\"name\":\"Social science/Politics and international relations\"},{\"id\":53236011,\"name\":\"Social science/Social policy\"}],\"tags\":[],\"updatedAt\":\"2026-03-06T03:39:06+00:00\",\"versionOfRecord\":[],\"versionCreatedAt\":\"2025-08-21 16:09:04\",\"video\":\"\",\"vorDoi\":\"\",\"vorDoiUrl\":\"\",\"workflowStages\":[]},\"version\":\"v1\",\"identity\":\"rs-7037252\",\"journalConfig\":\"researchsquare\"},\"__N_SSP\":true},\"page\":\"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]\",\"query\":{\"redirect\":\"/article/rs-7037252\",\"identity\":\"rs-7037252\",\"version\":[\"v1\"]},\"buildId\":\"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7\",\"isFallback\":false,\"isExperimentalCompile\":false,\"dynamicIds\":[84888],\"gssp\":true,\"scriptLoader\":[]}","source_license":"CC-BY-4.0","license_restricted":false}